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Abstract 
This dissertation is about the Loyalist Regiments of the American Revolution, 
1775-1783. These were the formal regiments formed by the British, consisting of 
Americans who stayed Loyal to the British crown during the American Revolutionary 
War. They fought in most of the main campaigns of this war and in 1783 left with the 
British Army for Canada, where many of them settled. 
The Loyalist regiments have been neglected by academic historians with only 
one major work on them as a group. The intention of this dissertation is to give them 
their proper place in the historiography of the American Revolutionary War and of 
eighteenth century military history. 
The dissertation is laid out in the following way. Chapter one, will be an 
overview of the history of Regiments, from their origins in Colonial days until 1783. 
It will assess how they were dealt with by the British and examine both organisation 
and combat. Chapter two is a thematic chapter looking principally at the organisation 
of the regiments as well as their motivation and composition. The next four chapters 
are case studies of three Loyalist regiments. Chapters three and four are a case study 
of the Queens Rangers. A database of all the soldiers who served in this regiment was 
created and is included with this dissertation. Chapter five is about the controversial 
regiment, the British Legion. Chapter 6 is a case study of the frontier regiment 
Butler‘s Rangers. 
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 1 
The Loyalist Regiments of the American Revolution 
Introduction 
 
On 25 November 1783, the last British soldiers remaining in America at the end 
of the Revolutionary War left New York City for Canada. With them went several 
regiments of troops that the British Army officially designated as Provincial Regiments 
and historians remember as Loyalist Regiments. Their counterparts in the British line 
regiments were returning home, but for the Provincials going home was little more than a 
dream; after American independence home was now a foreign country to the Loyalists of 
the Provincial units and few were ever able to return to America.1  The term ―Loyalist‖ 
refers to anyone who in some way supported the British during the American Revolution. 
This support could manifest itself in several ways, from pre-Revolutionary political 
activity to leaving the colony or serving in a Loyalist regiment. Service in a Loyalist 
regiment is one of the best ways to determine if a resident of the American colonies was a 
Loyalist, although there has been some controversy over this mode of definition. Some of 
the soldiers were not exactly volunteers, and many were recent immigrants. Alternatively 
a claim for compensation for loss of property to the British Government is another way of 
working out if a person was a Loyalist. In Canada, the Loyalists are known as the ―United 
Empire Loyalists,‖ and in the United States are commonly referred to as ―Tories.‖ This 
term derived from a contemporary derogation unrelated to the British political party of 
that name. A ―Patriot‖ is anyone who rebelled against the British Government. The 
British and the Loyalists referred to them as ―Rebels‖. 
The Loyalist Regiments of the American Revolutionary War consisted largely of 
Americans and British-born immigrants who fought for the British Crown in America in 
                                                 
1
 The term home means where the Loyalist soldiers had grown up and lived. Many of their families still 
remained in the new United States. 
 2 
the American Revolutionary war of 1775-1783.2 This dissertation provides the first in-
depth study of the Loyalist Regiments within the dual historiographical context of the 
American Revolution and British military history in the eighteenth century. While the 
Loyalists as a political group have been dealt with by historians extensively in the last 
hundred years, the militant Loyalists have been largely neglected, partly because they are 
less well-documented and partly because of a decline in the serious study of military 
history.  
Until the twentieth century, the Loyalists were popularly reviled and generally 
ignored by scholars in the United States and no serious attempt was made to understand 
why they opposed the Revolution. In the past hundred years historians have attempted to 
do this but there is still work to be done, as this thesis, hopes to show. Most histories of 
the American Loyalists cover the political, social, intellectual and economic facets of 
Loyalism or concentrate on Loyalism within a single colony and state.3 William H. 
Nelson's, The American Tory was not the first major American work on the Loyalists, 
but its sympathetic portrayal of the Loyalists‘ predicaments as ―conscious minorities‖ 
significantly changed the historical interpretations of the opponents of the Revolution 
in a way that no previous work had done before. Nelson‘s superb study roused 
significant historical interest in the Loyalists and in essence paved the way for 
historians to write more widely on the Loyalists. Wallace Brown‗s 1964 study of the 
                                                 
2
  This thesis will define Loyalist regiment as a multi company formal regiment administered by the 
British army‘s Provincial department. There were numerous other Loyalist units who did not fit this 
exact definition, these include, Militia, Associators or Refugees. Many of these units did become 
Provincial regiments. These units will be discussed in the sections on the origins of the Regiments as 
they were the first gatherings of armed Loyalists. 
3
 William H. Nelson, The American Tory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961);Bernard Bailyn, The 
Ideological Origins of The American Revolution (Cambridge MA: Belknapp Press, 1967, 1992 
edition): Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, (Cambridge MA: Belknapp Press, 1974). 
 3 
Loyalist claimants similarly evaluated the nature of what it meant to be a Loyalist.
4
 
Bernard Bailyn once stated that he could not understand why anyone would have 
wanted to be a Loyalist, although he would later write more sympathetically about the 
Loyalists in his biography of Thomas Hutchinson. The decision to oppose friends and 
colleagues was not an easy one and did not always come down to political ideology. 
Philip Ranlet in his 1986 work on the New York Loyalists posited that other factors 
such as the presence of the British army was often a factor.
5
 More recently Gary 
Nash‘s work ―The Unknown American Revolution,‖ while not wholly about Loyalists 
brought a sympathetic view towards the Loyalists and suggested that their local 
situation was often a key factor in their choices.
6
 Land rivalries and landlord tenant 
relations were also vital. There were cases of Loyalists settling scores with old rivals 
over these issues and of tenants settling scores with their patriot landlords. Recent 
historians such as Alan Taylor, Leslie Hall and Thomas Humphrey have focused on 
these issues and argued that the circumstances that created Loyalists were often less 
about ideology and more about material issues.
 7
 
The body of work covering militant Loyalism is far less extensive and for many 
years was the preserve of amateur historians and genealogists, many of whom produced 
some excellent work. The first historian to call for an urgent reassessment of the Loyalists 
                                                 
4
 Wallace Brown, The King’s Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist 
Claimants (Providence: Brown Univ. Press, 1965). 
5
 Phillip Ranlet,  The New York Loyalists, ( Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1986). 
6
 Gary Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, (London 2005). 
7
 Leslie Hall, Land and Allegiance in Revolutionary Georgia, (Athens, GA, 2001,); Alan Taylor, The 
Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution, (New 
York NY, 2006); Terry Bouton, Independence on the Land: Small Farmers and the American 
Revolution, in American Revolution, People and Perspectives, Andrew Frank, ed. (Santa Barbara, CA, 
2008) ; Thomas J Humphrey,  Land and Liberty: Hudson Valley Riots in the Age of Revolution, 
(DeKalb, IL, 2004). 
 4 
military operations, Albert T. Klyberg, was quickly answered.8 Paul Smith‘s Loyalists 
and Redcoats (1964) was a groundbreaking study of the Loyalists‘ role in British military 
strategy that changed the way in which historians viewed the militant Loyalists by finally 
establishing the centrality of the Loyalist Regiments in British military operations.9  
Smith‘s findings may be summarised as follows. The central thesis of Loyalists 
and Redcoats is that Loyalists were important to the British military planners at various 
stages of the war but that the British never had a coherent plan about how to use them. 
The Loyalists generally were not well-regarded or well-used by senior British officers in 
the field, and the British made crucial errors in their handling of the Loyalists. Early in 
the war, especially in 1775 and 1776, the British commanders assumed that most 
Americans had Loyalist sympathies and needed only a little encouragement to rally to 
British flag. This overly optimistic view grew out of the opinion that the rebellion was a 
troublesome insurrection and not anything like the continental conflict it would become. 
Organizational ineptitude can also explain the British failure to deploy the Loyalists 
properly. ―The early failure to utilize Loyalists, however, resulted not from a want of 
Loyalist enthusiasm but primarily from unpreparedness and the inability of the 
administration to co-ordinate them with other plans emanating with Whitehall.‖10 His 
conclusion is that the British did not do enough about the Loyalists until it was too late, 
because although after 1777 they did take them seriously, the French had allied with the 
                                                 
8
 ―By failing to regard or record the military role played by the Loyalists, the intellectual school has 
failed to grasp or portray one of the most important characteristics of the Revolution, its civil war 
quality. The role of the armed Loyalist is perhaps one of the most important and least discussed aspects 
of the Revolution.‖ Although Klyberg gives justification for writing about the armed Loyalists, he was 
harsh on Nelson. See, Albert T. Klyberg, “The Armed Loyalists as seen by American Historians,‖ the 
Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society 82 (1964): 101-108 at pp. 105-106. 
9
 Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: Study in British Revolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill: Univ. of 
North Carolina press, 1964). 
10
 Ibid. pp.10-11. 
 5 
Patriots by this time and the whole character of the war was altered.11 Thus, Smith 
proposed that had the British been more effective in utilising the Loyalists the outcome of 
the war might have been different. Such a view runs counter to the dominant military 
narratives which supposed that after the British defeat at Saratoga in October 1777, and 
on the eve of the French intervention, British victory was extremely unlikely.12 
Despite Smith‘s study, the military aspects of Loyalism have still not been as well 
covered as other aspects. Several issues and problems remain unresolved, as this 
introductory chapter will now demonstrate.  
First, the military history of the Loyalists has suffered largely because military 
history is not a popular an area of study amongst professional academic historians. 
Despite the rise of the New Military History since the 1970s, exemplified by the work of 
James McPherson, John Keegan and Stephen Ambrose, little progress had been made in 
Loyalist military studies. By contrast, Sylvia Frey produced valuable work on British 
soldiers, and Don Higginbotham and Charles Neimeyer on the Patriots: their conclusions 
regarding composition and social attitudes are particularly relevant when asking similar 
questions of the Loyalists.13 Questions and answers provided by New Military historians 
of the wars concerning motivation, socialisation and militancy shed light on the 
experiences of the Loyalists. The Loyalists, while having much in common with their 
                                                 
11
 Although the Southern expedition of 1776 was partially mounted to recruit Loyalists, its failure 
changed the opinion of many British officers towards Loyalists. Smith states that when the British did 
decide to treat the Loyalists more seriously, in 1777, it was in many cases, too late. He contends that 
the British treatment of civilians during the New York and southern campaigns deterred potential 
recruits. Ibid., p.58. 
12
 For a discussion of this view see, Piers Mackesy, War for America pp. 512-13. 
13
 Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America (Univ. of Texas Press, Austin 1981); Don Higginbotham 
The War of American Independence: military attitudes, policies and practice, 1763-1789 (Northeastern 
Univ. Press: Boston, 1983); Charles Patrick Neimeyer, America Goes to War: A Social History of the 
Continental Army, (New York, NY, 1997). 
 6 
British and Patriot contemporaries, had characteristics which set them apart and which 
demonstrates that they are as worthy of study as the British and Patriots.14   
Second, the demography of the Loyalist Regiments is a problematic area of 
investigation. The most reliable estimate suggests that there were 19,000 Loyalist soldiers 
who served in the Loyalist Regiments.15 There are brief reliable regimental histories also 
useful for genealogy and biographical history.16 There is no comprehensive statistical 
analysis of the Loyalists as whole (who Smith estimates at 513,000 or sixteen percent of 
the colonial population) against which a social profile of the Loyalist regiments may be 
                                                 
14
 These characteristics will e discussed in depth in the subsequent chapters. See James McPherson, 
For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (Oxford, 1997; John Keegan, Faces of 
Battle, (London, 1976); Stephen A. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, (London 1997). 
15
 His figure of 19,000 Loyalist soldiers is based on regimental returns, muster books, and other records 
and thus carries some authority. His figure is really as accurate as it is possible to get although it is 
possible to criticise Smith on the issue of categorisation. He mentions that he could not take the Black 
Pioneers into consideration as Loyalists as they were not strictly Loyalists, presumably because many 
of them were escaped slaves and their reason for enlisting was to secure a promised freedom. This is a 
flawed judgment as there were many free blacks that served. All Loyalists had widely different reasons 
for fighting but those who volunteered did so because they believed that in some way it was best for 
America to remain under the British Crown. This makes them all Loyalists. It is also interesting that 
while Smith disqualifies the Loyal Highland Emigrants because of their recent immigration he does not 
disqualify other recent immigrants within other regiments. This is an issue that has been prevalent in 
recent Loyalist literature, should a European born immigrant be considered a Loyalist? Historians like 
Philip Ranlet would say that they should not, while Paul Smith counts many of them in his calculations 
of serving Loyalists soldiers. The Black soldiers, that Smith does not count, were all American born. 
The issue of origin is a definite issue in any survey of the Loyalist regiments and it will be an n area 
that the thesis will look at. There were just too many European born recruits to ignore the issue. Paul H. 
Smith ―The American Loyalists: Notes on their Organization and Numerical Strength,‖ William and 
Mary Quarterly 15 (1968): 259-277, esp. 268-274. 
16
 William O. Raymond,  ―Loyalists in Arms,‖  The New Brunswick Historical Society Proceedings 5, 
(1904): 189-222; Hazel Mathews, The Mark of Honor  (Toronto 1967)  Raymond worked on the 
muster rolls in Canada and wrote an article detailing the experiences of nine regiments. It is interesting 
to note that Raymond, a Canadian writing in the 1900s, was also critical of the British generals for their 
under use of the Loyalists. Smith‘s article comments that Raymond‘s figures are incomplete but 
Raymond is one of Smith‘s major sources. Loyalists and Redcoats, 268; Smith ―Notes on the 
Loyalists,‖ p.271. 
 7 
compared; what exists, pre-eminently Wallace Brown‘s influential King’s Friends (1965), 
is based on the claims for losses submitted to the British government by Loyalist exiles, 
but these claimants constitute a small sample and provide questionable data on property 
values.17 Bearing in mind that it would take years of exhaustive research to undertake a 
fully comprehensive study of all the Loyalists recruited into the regiments, this 
dissertation aims to address the issue by looking at three important regiments from which 
wider conclusions may be drawn. In short, historians still do not know enough about the 
social composition of the Loyalists, and this dissertation will go some way to addressing 
this issue. 
Third, understanding of the Loyalists‘ motivation could be enhanced were 
scholars to take a much closer look at the ―voluntarism‖ of the Loyalist soldiers. Wartime 
armies are different from peacetime armies in the respect that the people who serve are 
more likely to be varied in background and experience than the peacetime regulars. This 
is as true of the largely volunteer eighteenth century armies as it is of later conscripted 
armies. The central task, then, is to understand the voluntary militarism behind 
paramilitary activity. Ideology provides some direction: the notion of defending life 
liberty and property is one of the main facets of the Loyalists conservative Whig 
ideology.18 Not all Loyalists were property owners; particularly the ordinary soldiers and 
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 Brown‘s study of the Loyalist claims on the British Government was an excellent study of the 
composition of the Loyalists. However if it has a flaw it is that the main source upon which it was 
based, by its very nature only concerns a limited number of Loyalists. By studying the claims Brown 
limited himself to studying those rich enough to put in a claim to the Royal commission on the Loyalist 
losses. Henry Young criticized the scope of the work, claiming that it merely provided a ―buttress‖ 
―rather than sufficient foundations for a future study of Loyalism‖. See, Wallace Brown, The King’s 
Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants (Providence: Brown Univ. 
Press, 1965); Henry Young, Review of The Kings Friends, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 23 
No. 3, July 1966, pp. 503-505 at p. 505. 
18
 The Liberty We Seek: Loyalist Ideology in Colonial New York and Massachusetts (Cambridge, 
MA.1983) 
 8 
they had many other reasons for fighting. They were, mostly, volunteers and by 
volunteering they were often going against the prevailing view of their local area. Smith 
questioned the voluntarism of many Loyalist recruits after 1777, and Philip Ranlet‘s 1986 
study of the New York Loyalists delivered a convincing argument that the British often 
pressed New Yorkers into service in the Loyalist Regiments, and widely recruited from 
among recent immigrants and American prisoners of war.19 In short, Ranlet‘s findings 
contradict the assumption that New York province was a bastion of Loyalist voluntarism. 
It is extremely difficult to assess why individual Loyalists volunteered but there are some 
pieces of evidence that shed some light on this and the thesis will consider these. 
Fourth, the Loyalist experience was not uniform across America. All the existing 
colonies had Loyalists, but for varying reasons some states had more than others, as 
Wallace Brown and others have clearly shown.20 The colony that had the largest number 
of organised Loyalists was undoubtedly New York, which consequently is responsibly for 
a rich historiography, including Ranlet‘s recent study, which seeks to downplay the local 
prevalence of Loyalism.21 Studies of Loyalists in the Southern colonies, which witnessed 
an upsurge in support for the British between 1779-1781, among other things criticise the 
                                                 
19
 Philip Ranlet, The New York Loyalists, ( Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1986), pp. 106-108, 
268. 
20
 Brown, The King’s Friends, p. 249. 
21
 Alexander Flick was the state historian of New York in the 1900s and he restored credibility to the 
Loyalists that had long been missing, as Klyberg points out. Alexander Flick,  Loyalism in New York 
during the American Revolution (New York: Columbia Univ. Press 1901); Klyberg, ―The Armed 
Loyalists‖ 102; Ranlet, New York Loyalists. Other Works on New York Loyalists include Rick Ashton, 
―The Loyalist Experience: New York, 1765-1785,‖ Unpublished PhD Diss. Northwestern University, 
1973; E. A. Cruickshank, ―The King‘s Royal Regiment of New York,‖ Ontario Historical Society 
Papers and Records 27 (1931) pp. 193-323; John, W. Poucher, ―Dutchess County Tories of the 
Revolutionary Period,‖  Dutchess County Historical Society  29 (1944) pp.68-75:, Joseph H. Vielbig, 
―Loyalism in Nassau County,‖ Nassau County Historical Journal 13 (1951) pp. 10-19; Oscar Zeichner, 
―The Loyalist problem in New York after the Revolution‖ New York State Historical Association 
21(1940): 284-302: Rick Ashton, ―The Loyalist Experience: New York, 1765-1785,‖ Unpublished PhD 
Diss. Northwestern University, 1973. 
 9 
British strategists of their utilisation of the local Loyalists.22 In many respects, the study 
of the Loyalist Regiments will address commonalities of military experience albeit with 
acknowledgement to local variations governing composition and voluntarism. 
Perhaps the most important commonality was the unfortunate circumstance of 
civil war. Robert Calhoon‘s comprehensive survey, Loyalists in Revolutionary America 
1760-1781 (1973), ranged across all the colonies from 1760-1783, and ―at every point the 
Loyalists became enmeshed in the tragedy of an ill-conceived exertion of national 
power.‖ 23  The Revolutionary War, Calhoon observes, is a ―Special Kind of Civil War‖ 
for the Loyalists never really enjoyed the substantial support of the civilian population 
and that they ―thrust up no charismatic leaders,[or] carried into battle no fully developed 
and widely shared vision of what America might become under continued British rule.‖24 
If the Loyalists invite comparison with the ―pre-emptive‖ revolution that was behind this 
Secession Movement in 1860-61, then, compared to the Confederacy, the Loyalists failed 
in energising the local population in sustaining a civil war. 25 
Fifth, how similar were the Loyalist Regiments to their fellow country men in the 
Continental Army? While the dissertation will not attempt any large scale comparisons to 
the Continental Army regiments there are undoubtedly areas throughout the dissertation 
where comparison is necessary. Like the Loyalists the Continental Army was raised 
                                                 
22
Robert W. Barnwell,  ―Loyalists in South Carolina 1765-1785‖, Unpublished PhD Diss Duke 
University, 1941; Cathy Coker, ―The Punishment of Revolutionary War Loyalists in South Carolina,‖ 
Unpublished PhD Diss., Univ. of South Carolina, 1987; Robert Dumond, The North Carolina Loyalists 
(Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press 1940); Robert G. Mitchell, ―Loyalist Georgia,‖ Unpublished PhD 
Diss. Tulane University, 1964; Chris New, Maryland Loyalists in the American Revolution (1996); 
Richard O. Curry, ―Loyalism in Western Virginia during the American Revolution‖ West Virginia 
History, 14 (1953) pp. 265-274. 
23
 Robert M. Calhoon, Loyalists in Revolutionary America 1760-1781 (New York: Harcourt Inc., 1973) 
p. 500 
24
 Ibid., pp. 500-502. 
25
 James McPherson has demonstrated how the Confederacy motivated the local population to 
encourage volunteers. See James McPherson, For Cause and Comrades. 
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rapidly but was organised in a way that aped the professional European armies in terms of 
form and structure. Many of the problems faced by the Loyalists: such as inexperience, 
financial issues, and whether to embrace American or European style strategy and tactics 
were shared by the Continental Army. The intervention of European professionals in the 
Continental Army is similar to the intervention of British officers in the Loyalist forces if 
less overt.26 The work of historians such as Robert Wright, Wayne Carp  and Charles 
Neimeyer investigated the vast problems in creating and maintaining the Continental 
Army. This thesis will demonstrate that the Loyalist faced equally complex problems, if 
not the same ones, and with radically different solutions. 
Sixth, the Loyalist Regiments have rarely been considered from the perspective of 
British military history. Over the course of the eighteenth century the British fought 
several wars on the American continent and had to adapt to this style of warfare. In 
December 1773, Allan MacLean, a former Jacobite and a half-pay major in the British 
Army, met the Secretary of War Lord Barrington and discussed plans for a Regiment of 
Scottish emigrants from the Highlands of Scotland lest military force be needed in 
America. This proves that the British establishment was conscious that not only was 
American support crucial should affairs in America take a military nature but that they 
had plans in place to cultivate it. While the British responded to MacLean‘s initiatives, 
and those of other Loyalist commanders, and in consequence adapted military techniques 
to the American theatre, historians generally echo Smith‘s findings that the British were 
                                                 
26
For a comprehensive study of the organisation of the Continental Army see Robert K. Wright, The 
Continental Army, (Washington, 1983); see also E Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure: 
Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783, (Chapel Hill, NC, 
1990); Charles Patrick Neimeyer, America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army, 
(New York, NY, 1997); Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence, Military Attitudes 
Policies and Practice 1763-1789 (Boston, 1983 edition). 
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disrespectful of the Loyalists and unmindful of their military potential.27 Moreover, 
British arrogance possibly discouraged many potential Loyalist recruits.28 However, this 
remains a fallow area of inquiry in major histories of the Revolutionary War.29 More 
important to this study are the classic histories dealing with military organisation by 
Charles M. Clode and J.A. Houlding; among other things, Houlding has proven that two 
innovative commanders of the Loyalist regiment the Queens Rangers, Robert Rogers and 
John Simcoe—who will be studied at length in this dissertation—were widely read by 
subsequent generations of young British officers.30 John Fortescue‘s multi-volume history 
of the British Army, barely mentions the Loyalists, but when does he reserves his 
strongest praise for two of the regiments studied closely in this dissertation: the Queens 
Rangers and the British Legion.31 These regiments were commanded by British officers, 
which was rare for the Loyalist Regiments, and this dissertation will examine how such 
leadership issues shaped the regiments‘ battle-field effectiveness and organization.32 
                                                 
27
 Cuneo states that the Loyalists were ―shocked‖ by the attitude the regular officers had towards them., 
John Cuneo, ―The Early Days of the Queens Rangers,‖ in Military Affairs, vol. 22, no. 3, 1958, pp. 65-
75, at p.74; Calhoon,  Loyalists in Revolutionary America, pp.327-328. 
28
 Calhoon,  Loyalists in Revolutionary America, pp. 327-328. 
29
 Mackesy mentions the Loyalists role in British strategy but not at length, as does Conway. Piers 
Mackesy, The War for America (London, Bison 1963); Stephen Conway, Britain and the American 
Revolution (London, 2000);Stephen Conway, The War of American Independence 1775-1783 (London, 
, 1995;David Chandler, ed.,  The Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford Univ. Press 1995);  
30
 Clode‘s work on the administration of the British army written in 1869 is a list of regulations with 
some commentary provided and is invaluable to scholars of the period.
 
Charles Matthew Clode, The 
Military Forces of the Crown; their Administration and Government (London, 1869); Houlding‘s work 
on the training on the British army is invaluable as it details not only how the British soldiers were 
trained-and this included the Loyalists- but the published works that the junior officers used to aid them 
with their training of their troops.. J.A. Houlding, Fit For Service (London 1980). 
31
 John W. Fortescue, History of the British Army Vols. II (London, 1910), Vol. III (London 1911). See 
comments on Fortescue by Albert T. Klyberg, “The Armed Loyalists as seen by American Historians,‖ 
the Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society 82 (1964): 101-108 at 103. 
32
 They are American historians who argue that the British misused the Loyalist regiments. They think 
that because the Loyalists risked and eventually lost so much they deserved to be treated better than 
they were. They also argue that by staffing the Loyalist regiments with British officers and British-born 
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Furthermore, as Smith demonstrated, Loyalists were a major part of the British army in 
the Revolutionary War after 1777, but the military organization and military operations of 
the Loyalist Regiments have not been subject to close scrutiny, an issue which this 
dissertation intends to address.  
Historians have traditionally viewed the Loyalists as an additional body of 
Americans or provincials attached to the British Army, with little distinctive features 
regarding their military operations. This dissertation, however, demonstrates that while in 
some ways the Loyalists were typical of eighteenth century provincial troops, in other far 
more important ways they constituted a significant development in the organization and 
deployment of light infantry units, in the refinement of light infantry tactics, as J. F. C. 
Fuller once hinted and in the creation of new kinds of self-contained and self-reliant 
units.33 While the Loyalist regiments are part of the American military tradition, equally 
the formation of these new kinds of units had a considerable influence in British military 
organization and tactics: the Loyalists emerge as a model of light infantry should be 
deployed, especially when conducting raids and fighting skirmishes. In a superficial and 
limited way, this transfiguration influenced European armies in the Napoleonic wars. This 
dissertation does not seek to emulate the New Military History, but to focus upon the 
military organization and military effectiveness of the Loyalist Regiments. To that the 
evidence has been accumulated selectively from a wide range of military records, muster 
rolls, military reports, private papers and correspondence, principally. By their very 
nature, wars are messy and unpredictable affairs but the records that are left behind are 
often anything but. Much of what happens in an army is recorded, often for economic 
                                                                                                                                            
recruits the ―American‖ identity of the regiments was eroded. John Cuneo, ―The Early Days of the 
Queens Rangers, p. 74.; Harry M. Ward, The War of Independence (London, 1999), p. 41. 
33
 The only monograph relevant to the period of study is J. F.C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the 
Eighteenth Century (Hutchinson, London 1925). Fuller gives high praise to the Queens Rangers and 
the British Legion but makes no mention of their  Loyalist status, suggesting that he viewed them as 
being little different from the British light infantry regiments. 
 13 
reasons. The British military establishment became much more centralised and efficient 
in the eighteenth century and as a result of this their standard of recording information 
also improved.34 In the late eighteenth century the British Army meticulously recorded all 
sorts of things relating to its soldiers, such as their names, age, and status in the army and 
in some cases their fates. The Revolutionary War was no exception and all those who 
served on the side of the British Government in whatever capacity were in some way 
documented, including the Loyalists. British military records are held mainly at the 
National Archives in London, and other repositories in the UK and Ireland, as well as in 
Canada and the US, mentioned below.35 In addition, while there is no comprehensive 
army list or biographical directory for the Loyalist Regiments, there are several useful 
published reference works.36  
                                                 
34
 The best work on the expansion of the British state is John Brewer, The Sinews of Power, (London 
1989). 
35
 The National Archives was until recently known as the Public Record Office. It is now known the 
National Archives at the Public Record Office. The citations in this thesis will use the shortened 
version PRO to refer to the above repository. The papers in the National Archives are organized by 
government department: the Colonial Office, the War Office, the Audit Office and the Treasury. The 
Colonial Office was responsible for everything that happened in the Colonies and during the 
Revolutionary War its Secretary of state was Lord Germain. Most of the material in the War Office 
relates to the army, although there is some duplication with the Colonial Office and the Treasury. In the 
Admiralty Papers, there are records relating to ships which transported the Loyalist regiments which 
often contain lists of personnel of those on board. The muster rolls mention what ship the men are on 
board. The Treasury papers are useful for payments made to Loyalist units, and identify officers and 
men by name. In WO 65 and T 64 there are the British American half-pay lists, which record every 
officer who served in the Loyalist Regiments. Also, T 50, relating to North Carolina Militia, gives 
details of the soldiers‘ origins. The military records kept in the National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, 
relate to the Loyalist Regiments that were demobilised in Canada. 
 
36
 Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches of the Loyalists of the American Revolution (New York: 
1864, 1966); Gregory Palmer, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution  (London 
, Meckler, 1984); Gregory Palmer, A Bibliography of Loyalist source material in the United States, 
Canada and Great Britain ( London: Meckler, published in association with the American Antiquarian 
Society, 1982); Philip Katcher, An Encyclopaedia of British, Provincial and German Army Units, 
1775-1783 (Harrisburg, 1973) Professor Henry Young of the University of Michigan attempted to 
 14 
To get an idea of how the records can be interpreted it is necessary to describe the 
records themselves. One of the most useful sources in the study of the Loyalist Regiments 
is the muster rolls. The muster rolls are spread throughout various archives.37 Each 
regiment produced one muster roll per company. There was no set number of companies 
in a regiment in this period, although it was often more than ten. The vital information 
contained on the muster rolls provides the names of everyone serving in the regiment at 
the time, but reveals nothing about the age or the background of the troops and guesswork 
is a dangerous past-time in trying to fill the gaps.38 The muster rolls then, like most 
sources, are best used not in isolation but in combination with other sources. What these 
sources are depends on what is needed to be known about the regiments. The muster rolls 
will be analysed in this dissertation principally to amplify analysis of military 
organization, rather than the social composition of the regiments.  
With regard to military operations, several sources should be mentioned at the 
outset. In both the Colonial Office and War Office papers there are several reports on the 
state of the Loyalist regiments as a body at various times during the Revolutionary War. 
While these reports do not contain anything like the same detail about individual 
regiments as the muster rolls, they are extremely useful in measuring attrition rates (via 
figures for wounded, sick, deserted and killed) and battlefield preparedness and 
                                                                                                                                            
produce a directory of officers but died before he could complete his work, although the I have read 
and used his notes. Young Papers, William L. Clements Library University of Michigan. The Online 
Institute for Advanced Loyalist studies has a vast array of primary documents relating to individual 
regiments, at http://www.royalprovincial.com accessed 22/2/2009. 
37
 British Army Muster rolls are held in WO 1. Most Loyalist muster rolls are in C Series Muster Rolls 
RG 8, 1867, but there are also some in the Treasury Solicitor‘s Office at TS 11/221 and in British 
Library Manuscript Collections, Haldimand Collection 1756-91 Add Mss 21661-21892.. 
38
 Some things can be worked out by guesswork, for example if an officer is listed as being on home 
leave in Britain it is more than likely that he is British. There were some officers in the regiments who 
were seconded from the regular British army and are therefore not any more of a Loyalist than an 
officer serving in a regular British Regiment. However if they were on leave in America this does not 
necessarily make them American. 
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effectiveness.39  It is easy to see the limitations of these tables as military sources yet 
these sources help historians appreciated just how rapidly regiments were prone to change 
during wartime. For example, both sides regularly lost men to desertion, many of who 
would later return or would serve in another regiment, as the muster rolls reveal.  
The papers of senior Loyalist officers and British generals are useful in varying 
degrees for researching the experiences of the regiments. Although Paul Smith worked on 
the regiments from the perspective of the British High Command, there is still useful 
material to be exploited in the papers of the British commanders. Seven years after 
Smith‘s book, the British State Papers for the Revolutionary War were published in 
series.40 The papers of the British generals are held in various sources in the UK, notably 
the Carleton Papers, the Cornwallis Papers and the Amherst Papers in the PRO, and in the 
US, notably the Clinton Papers and Gage Papers at the William L. Clements Library, 
which are relate largely to administrative matters.41 The papers of many Loyalist 
                                                 
39
 The reports in CO5/181 and 184 were sent from America in 1780 and 1781 at the request of the 
America Secretary Lord Germain. They are signed by General Henry Clinton, the commander of the 
British Army in America, and the Inspector General of the army in America, Alexander Innes. They are 
essentially tables, listing all the Provincial regiments that were serving in the Americas (modern day 
Canada, the USA and the West Indies) at that time. They give numbers serving in the regiments and 
those sick, or otherwise absent. They also give the locations of the regiments and, crucially, in some 
cases they have lists of those taken prisoner, killed, discharged or deserted. While these reports are of 
little use for finding out who served in the regiments they are useful comparative sources. For example, 
by comparing the sick lists it is again possible to deduce that the northern regiments serving in the 
south were more prone to sickness than those recruited in the south. Also provided are total numbers of 
enlistment, something not contained in the muster rolls.  
40
 K. G. Davies., Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783, 21 vols. (Shannon, 1972-1981). 
41
 The William L. Clements Library contains some of the best material on the Loyalists outside Britain. 
The Clinton Papers contain many documents relating to the Loyalists, covering combat operations and 
casualty rates. The McKenzie Papers contain documents relating to the supply situation of the British 
Army in America. The Loyalist Regiments are covered in these records which will be used in Chapter 
2. 
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commanders, including those of Robert Rogers, are held in the US.42 The Haldimand 
Collection at the British Library, which is also a major source for muster rolls, contains 
letters written to General Frederick Haldimand, by noted Loyalist officers like Lord 
Rawdon, Robert Rogers and John Simcoe.43  Simcoe‘s papers are in the William L. 
Clements Library.  
Chapter one provides an overview of the Loyalists Regiments from the initial 
formations in 1775 until the end of the war in 1783, outlining issues concerning militant 
Loyalism that pertinent to the investigation that follows. Chapter Two assesses the 
organization of the Loyalist regiments in thematic fashion and also discusses composition 
and motivation. Chapters three and four provide an in-depth examination of the Queens 
Rangers, probably the most important of the Loyalist Regiments in terms of battlefield 
effectiveness and organization. These chapters will serve to establish a control group 
from which conclusions may be drawn and tested against the case studies that follow. A 
database on the Queens Rangers has been constructed using principally the muster rolls of 
that regiment. This enables a prosopographical analysis on the service of the soldiers of a 
type which has not previously been attempted on a Loyalist regiments. Chapter five 
examines the British Legion. The British Legion was one of the most notorious units on 
any side in the Revolutionary War. They were very successful in combat but were 
accused of brutal vengefulness toward the Patriots. This chapter will examine both their 
battlefield effectiveness and assess their reputation. Chapter five will examine Butler‘s 
Rangers. Butler‘s Rangers operated with the Native Americans on the frontiers and they 
were accused of killing civilians. The chapter will discuss the organization of the 
regiment as well as evaluating their reputation. The appendices will include tables 
                                                 
42
These papers relate to Rogers command in the French and Indian War. Robert Rogers Papers, Detroit 
Public Library; Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library. 
43
 British Library Manuscript Collections Haldimand Collection, Add Mss 21661-21892. 
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relating to the organization and numbers of the regiment. It will include tables of 
calculations from the database. 
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Map1: The Colonies on the Eve of Independence. 
 
 
 
Source: Hugh Bicheno, Rebels and Redcoats, (London, 2003) p. 10 
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Chapter 1 
The Loyalist Regiments of the American Revolution 1775-1783 
Introduction  
In the spring of 1775 across the American Colonies individuals began to organise 
units in support of the British Crown. While most of these units remained relatively 
informal until 1776 it demonstrated that the Patriots were not the only American raised 
military force in the Colonies. By the end of the war in 1783 some 19,000 soldiers had 
served in 38 Loyalist regiments and had taken part in many of the major campaigns and 
engagements. This chapter provides a historical synopsis of the Loyalist Regiments 
during the American Revolutionary War, contextualising the principal themes and issues 
relative to their formation, composition, organisation, discipline and military 
effectiveness that will be explored in further depth in case studies given in subsequent 
chapters.1 It is apparent that in all of these respects the Loyalist regiments changed 
considerably over the course of the war. By evaluating these issues this thesis hopes to 
improve the existing historiographical record on the Loyalist regiments.2 The Loyalist 
regiments have never been investigated as an entity in their own right, rather than as an 
adjunct of the British Army, or how their presence impacted on British strategy.3 By 
                                                 
1This thesis will define Loyalist Regiment as a formal regiment administered by the British Army‘s 
Provincial Department. They were also known as Provincial Regiments. There were numerous other 
Loyalist units who did not fit this exact definition, these include, Militia, Associators or Refugees. 
Many of these units did become Provincial regiments and many others continued to exist out with the 
control of the Provincial Department, while still being supported in some way by the British 
administrative system. The earliest of these informal formations will be discussed in the sections on the 
origins of the Regiments as they were the first gatherings of armed Loyalists. The later informal units 
will be referred to in the relevant sections of this and other chapters, where their existence impacted on 
the Loyalist Regiments. 
2
 The historiography of the militant Loyalists has been discussed in the introduction. 
3
 Smith‘s work placed the Loyalist regiments in the context of they fitted into British strategical 
thinking and how the decisions the British made affected the Loyalists. The chapter will deal with 
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doing this the thesis will change the view of Loyalist regiments within eighteenth century 
military history and provide new criteria for the study of Revolutionary War units that 
goes beyond regimental histories to place them with similar studies of the British and 
Continental Armies such as those by Wright and Frey and Mayer.4 
Section 1 The Origins of the Loyalist Regiments 
Loyalist Militancy. 
Loyalist militarism can be defined as armed resistance to the Patriot authorities in 
support of the British crown. By defining the American War of Independence as a 
revolution, Loyalist activity can be defined as counter-revolutionary activity. The main 
question that this first section of the chapter will ask is why is Loyalist militant activity 
attractive to historians? To truly understand a revolution you need to understand all 
aspects of that revolution, including opposition to it. Armed counter revolutionary activity 
can be seen as the apogee of counter revolution because of the risk it involves. Armed 
Loyalists risked their lives, homes and families to support British authority and therefore 
their reasons for doing this are worthy of examination. However, Loyalist military 
activity is also worthy of historical study because of the light it sheds on the military 
effectiveness of irregular volunteers in the eighteenth century. Were these men as 
effective as the long serving regulars, and could the Loyalists participation in the war 
have been decisive? This will be discussed with relevance to their antecedents in Colonial 
and British military history in the section below. 
                                                                                                                                            
Smiths arguments in the relevant sections. See, Paul Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats (Chapel Hill, 
1964). 
4
 These three studies added important contributions to the study of military units in the American 
Revolutionary War. Wright evaluated the Continental Army in an administrative, military and political 
context. Frey conducted a social study of British soldiers in America and Mayer studied the camp 
followers and non combatants who served on all sides of the conflict. See Robert K. Wright, The 
Continental Army, (Washington, 1983); Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History 
of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Houston, TX, 1981); Holly Mayer, Belonging to the 
Army, (Charleston SC, 1997).  
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Loyalist militancy in the American Revolutionary War took several forms. These 
are uprisings, guerrilla units, brigands, refugees, militia units and formal regiments. The 
earliest form of militancy was the uprising.5  These were informal gatherings of Loyalists, 
often those who because of political or demographic circumstances had been oppressed 
by the Patriot majority and gathered together in support of the crown. They were usually 
ineffective and crushed rapidly.6 Many of the survivors fled their homes and joined more 
formal Loyalist units. At various time throughout the war there were also loose gatherings 
of guerrilla units and brigands. Brigands existed without formal aid from the British 
government but can sometimes be classified as Loyalists if they attacked Patriot property 
or gave some statements of Loyalty. Guerrilla units are more obviously loyal than 
brigands as they did not operate for pecuniary advantage but waged war on the Patriots. 
They operated exclusively behind enemy lines. It is almost impossible to identify who 
these people were as their activities were rarely recorded.7 Their existence was sometimes 
                                                 
5
 Uprisings will be discussed in greater detail below. 
6
 The biggest Loyalist uprising occurred largely amongst Highland Scottish Emigrants in North 
Carolina in the spring of 1776. It was crushed at the Battle of Moore‘s Creek in March 1776. It will be 
discussed later in this chapter. Many of the survivors became soldiers in Allan MacLean‘s Royal 
Highland Emigrants, although some of the officers would later serve in the British Legion in the South 
in 1780 and 1781. See, Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, pp.30-31. 
7
 The exception is the legendary James Moody, 1744-1809, who left an account of his activities as a 
guerrilla leader and Loyalist spy. Moody was a neutral farmer from Sussex County New Jersey who 
forced into militant action because he refused to sign a pledge of Loyalty to the Patriots in New Jersey. 
He held a commission in the New Jersey volunteers, but most of his war was spent behind Patriot lines 
in New Jersey, spying on and harassing the forces there. In July 1780 he was captured and sentenced to 
death. He managed to wriggle out of his manacles and escaped continuing his career in espionage until 
November 1781. In 1782 whilst in London he published his account of his experiences which made 
him a popular hero in Britain and Canada where he later settled. His account is an exciting, almost 
novelistic account of stirring deeds which would seem almost unbelievable had Moody not been 
careful to include in his book statements of authentication from his superiors, including Sir Henry 
Clinton, testifying to his activities and usefulness as a spy. See Motivation section, Chapter 2 of this 
thesis; James Moody, Lieut. James Moody’s Narrative of his Exertions and Sufferings in the Cause of 
Government, Since the Year 1776, (London, 1782); Dictionary of Canadian Biography, online at 
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more hoped for by the British than actually present in any great numbers but they 
certainly did exist.8 The next step up from Independent guerrilla units was Refugees. 
These were loose gatherings of Refugees who served behind British lines. They were 
armed but they were usually short lived as the best of them were usually recruited into the 
formal Loyalist regiments. Militia units existed throughout the Revolutionary War in 
various forms.9 They were formal in the sense that they were organised into separate units 
with a structure and appointed ranks but they did not always have separate companies and 
they varied greatly in size. They often served behind Patriot lines and were not always 
paid or clothed in uniforms. They differed from Guerrilla units in that they were 
financially supported by the British. The later Southern militia units served under an 
appointed British commander, Major Patrick Fergusson. Their soldiers were not expected 
to serve out-with their local areas. The militia were prominent until 1776 when many of 
their units became more formal Loyalist regiments. They came to prominence again in the 
Southern campaign of 1780. The Loyalist regiment was the most formal designation of 
Loyalist soldiers. They served in a formal multi company structure administered by the 
Provincial Department or else directly by the Local British Army commander, in the case 
of the Northern Department (Canada and the Canadian Frontiers). They wore similar 
uniforms to British regular soldiers (sometimes identical), carried the same weapons and 
used similar equipment.10 They were known as Provincial Regiments and they fought 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-
e.php?&id_nbr=2564&&PHPSESSID=v3aghm1gg5sj7o31ai903rorn1 accessed 4/6/09. 
8
 Sabine includes a number of reputed guerrillas and brigands in his biographical directory, but the 
information on them is understandably extremely sketchy. See Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches 
of Loyalists of the American Revolution, 2 vols. (Boston, 1864). 
9
 Eighteenth century militia will be discussed in depth in the next section, as they have considerable 
bearing on the subject of Armed Loyalism. 
10
 The weapons were the Land Pattern Musket (Brown Bess) or else a variety of Rifled muskets, some 
of which were provided by the regimental commander or the troops themselves. See table in Chapter 
Two for a list of the standard clothing and equipment for Loyalist Soldiers. 
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alongside the British Army in most of the major engagements of the war after 1776. This 
chapter (and the dissertation as a whole) will concentrate on the formal Loyalist 
Regiments but it will refer to the other units, as their existence often impacted on the 
Regiments, either as pre-cursors to the regiments or as an alternative source of 
combatants for the British. 
 The Loyalists in Colonial and British Military History 
It is important to consider the military antecedents of the Loyalists, placing them 
in a wider historiographical context that relates to Colonial militarism and British military 
history. By looking at the antecedents of the Loyalists it is possible to show their 
connections to previous military groups as well as being a separate entity. As mentioned 
above, the military effectiveness of volunteers is paramount to the study of the armed 
Loyalists. The Loyalists were a force of volunteers, temporary soldiers who joined the 
army for the duration of a war.11 This makes them different from regular British soldiers 
who signed on a long period of time (usually upwards of twenty years) for career 
purposes and who could expect to serve in numerous wars and location throughout their 
period of service.12 The British did raise temporary war-time troops and militia whose 
terms of service were different to the long term regulars and who have more in common 
with the Loyalist soldiers.13 While the British Army preferred to rely on its regulars, 
                                                 
11
 Philip Ranlet has disputed the extent to which all Loyalists were volunteers. While referring 
exclusively to Loyalists in New York he made the case that the British and the Loyalist commanders 
often forcibly recruited troops into regiments to meet quotas. His arguments will be discussed in 
chapter 2 but it is enough to state here that drafted Loyalists did not stay long and that the vast majority 
of Loyalist soldiers were volunteers. See Philip Ranlet, The New York Loyalists, (Knoxville KY, 1986), 
p. 105. 
12
 The best account of the regular eighteenth century soldiers is Houlding‘s work, which assesses all 
aspects of the lives of ordinary British soldiers, from training until they reached the battlefield. Sylvia 
Frey‘s work is also informative on the day to day lives of Revolutionary War British soldiers. See J.A. 
Houlding, Fit for Service, (London 1980); Frey The British Soldier in America. 
13
 Temporary wartime troops were raised in Britain for the duration of a war. They were usually 
demobilised at the end of this war. They were sometimes grouped into new regiments but often existing 
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during the course of a long war, temporary troops became essential and their effectiveness 
was crucial to the outcome of any war. The Patriots relied exclusively on temporary 
troops and were ultimately successful, which demonstrates that if given time to 
acclimatise to combat these troops could just be as efficient as the much vaunted British 
regulars. Thus, the use that the British made of their temporary wartime troops and 
particularly the American raised Loyalists-who became vital to them in the latter stages of 
the war- is crucial to understanding the reasons why the British eventually lost the war. 
Colonial Militia 
The first Loyalist regiments were formed in response to the early battles of the 
Revolutionary War in the spring of 1775 but their origins go back much further than this. 
The traditional form of defence in America was hastily organised units raised in time of 
war and longer standing part-time militia regiments. There were both Loyalist regiments 
and Loyalist militia. Although this thesis will concentrate on the organised Loyalist 
regiments, or Provincial Regiments, it is important to briefly discuss the Colonial militia 
as well as temporary regiments as they had a crucial role in defining the Colonial military 
mentality. The recent historiography of American colonial society is strongly focused on 
the violent nature of Early American society.14 This is a matter of debate but it is without 
                                                                                                                                            
regiments were simply augmented by new troops. Militia were local troops consisting of draftees 
whose served for a limited amount of time on a part-time basis. They will be examined more fully 
below. See John Brewer, The Sinews of Power, (London, 1990), pp.30-31; Hugh Strachan European 
Armies and the Conduct of War (London, 1983), p.28. 
14
The main recent works on Colonial militarism are the following: Fred Anderson and Andrew 
Clayton, The Dominion of War: Empire and Conflict in America, 1500-2000 (London, 2005); John 
Ferling, The Struggle for a Continent, The Wars of Early America, (Arlington Heights 1993); James A. 
Henretta, Michael Kammen and Stanley N. Katz, The Transformation of Early American History 
: Society, Authority and Ideology  (New York, 1991); Don Higginbotham ‗The Early American Way of 
War‘ in William and Mary Quarterly Vol. 44, No. 2 (1987); Douglas Leach, Roots of Conflict: British 
Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763, Chapel Hill, 1986); Bruce Lenman, Britain‘s 
Colonial Wars 1688-1783 (Harlow, 2001);Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars 1689-1762 
(Chicago, 1962); John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed, (Ann Arbor, 1990);John Shy, Towards 
 25 
doubt that frontier wars and regular acts of violence necessitated some form of organised 
military grouping. 
There had been organised military units in America as far back as the 
seventeenth-century and American troops had fought for the British throughout the 
eighteenth century. The earliest form of American defence was the Colonial Militia. The 
Loyalist regiments owe part of their origins to this group. The militia, were part-time 
soldiers who were called upon to defend their local areas when there was a threat. They 
were raised by ballot in every town and village where they were organised into formal 
groupings under appointed officers. Their service ranged from a few nights a month to 
full-time service in times of war. There had been militia in the colonies in America from 
the seventeenth-century onwards with the result that many Americans had some form of 
military training.15 John Shy is the principal authority on Colonial militia. He argues that 
the independence of the Colonial militia was gradually undermined by the increasing 
presence of regular British troops in America as the eighteenth century progressed. In the 
Seventeenth and early Eighteenth centuries they had considerable independence in 
operations but that the Seven Years War saw them gradually pushed into a secondary 
role.16 The militia still existed at the time of the Revolutionary War and indeed many 
militia regiments were transferred directly into the Continental Army. The Loyalists also 
had considerable connections to the militia. Although there are no documented figures on 
pre-war militia service many Loyalists had received this form of military training. 17 
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Loyalist militia regiments were amongst the first Loyalist military formations in the 
Revolutionary War before they were formed into Loyalist Regiments. For reasons of 
economy the British would resurrect the concept of militia in the Southern Colonies in 
1780 and would rely greatly upon them until their defeat at Kings Mountain in that year. 
 British Miltia. 
Although not directly related to the Loyalists the existence of an organised British 
Militia from 1756 had a bearing on how the British perceived their early Loyalist soldiers. 
The British had had several incarnations of militia stretching back hundreds of years but 
there was no proper legislation to make it compulsory until the militia act of 1756.18   The 
militia was to be raised in England and Wales, not in Scotland or Ireland and it was to be 
compulsory, men being drafted by a ballot. From 1762 the Militia was required to train at 
least 28 days a year.19  However, as Conway points out, the Revolutionary War was the 
first time many areas had used their militia.20  Militias and temporary troops were 
undoubtedly part of the British and American military tradition, although they were often 
held in disrepute by regular officers. Modern historians have challenged contemporary 
views as to the effectiveness of local militia. Hew Strachan has argued that the local 
knowledge of militia was beneficial to commanding officers when they deigned to use it. 
He also argues that many of the men who served as militia and as irregular troops were 
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often of higher intelligence than those who served in regular armies.21 While this is of 
course a potentially improvable statement, it is possible to qualify it by saying those men 
in local militias and volunteer troops were often men who had held down regular 
occupations in civilian society. All of this is relative to the Loyalists as they would fit 
many of the criteria that Strachan uses. However, Stephen Conway argues that as the 
local British militia at the time of the Revolutionary War were not strictly volunteers and 
people could pay someone to take their place it meant that often the lowest strata of 
society would be taken into the militia, Shy argues that the situation was similar in the 
American militia before the Revolution.22 However, in both cases their officers and NCOs 
were men of property or standing in their community.23 Militia commissions were often 
almost hereditary both in Britain and in the Colonies. If the father was a senior militia 
officer then his sons would often expect to get commissions.24 However, it is possible to 
state that a man‘s background in civilian life is not a deciding factor in what makes him a 
good soldier. The British Army, which included men from the lowest walks of life, 
generally performed well and rarely broke under the severest pressure. Strachan‘s 
statement makes sense in terms of the fact that intelligent men are ─ and again this is a 
dangerous assumption ─ more likely to use initiative in combat. In the kind of battle the 
British high command would have preferred to have fought, on a flat field, with brigades 
and divisions manoeuvring in neat lines, initiative was not a necessary or indeed always a 
desirable quality. However, in the kind of skirmishing in wooded or broken terrain that 
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that so often occurred in the French and Indian War and the Revolutionary War it became 
a desired quality, as successful commanders would find out quickly. 25 
Temporary War Time Regiments 
 In terms of being temporary full-time soldiers, the Loyalist regiments clearest 
antecedents are the temporary regiments raised in America during wartime. These ranged 
from loosely organised formations similar to the militia units, to uniformed highly 
disciplined regiments based upon regular regiments. They evolved during the course of 
the wars fought in America in the eighteenth century until by the French and Indian War 
there were several American regiments raised that were essentially regular in form.26 One 
of them, the Royal American Regiment, commanded by Colonel Henry Bouquet became 
a regular British regiment, the 60th Royal Americans in 1757. The regiment would serve 
in the Revolutionary War as a line regiment and eventually became the Kings Royal Rifle 
corps and later, the Royal Green Jackets.27 Another, Rogers Rangers, would inspire 
several Loyalist Ranger units; including one commanded by Rogers himself, the Queens 
Rangers.28 Rangers were a uniquely American designation of troops that had developed in 
the early part of the eighteenth century. They were light troops designed to ―range‖ over 
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vast distances and to fight irregular guerrilla style warfare. They were highly paid 
specialists who were often equipped with more accurate hunting rifles rather than 
muskets, and they were attired in clothing that would help them blend in to their 
surroundings.29 They often were equipped with companies of Native Americans or men 
who spoke Native American languages. The Loyalist ranger units were slightly different 
in form from the ranger units of the French and Indian War, not always sharing all the 
above characteristics. The original incarnation of the Queens Rangers and Butler‘s 
Rangers were the closest approximation to the French and Indian War units.30 As well as 
inspiring Loyalist ranger regiments the French and Indian War regiments had 
considerable influence on British light infantry regiments and companies.31 Robert 
Rogers instructed Lord George Howe in ranger tactics and he created his own light 
infantry companies –the first in the Regular British Army-drawing strongly from Rogers‘ 
ideas.32 George Howe‘s younger brother, William Howe, would continue his brother‘s 
innovations and would set up the first Light Infantry training camp in Sussex in 1774. 
Volunteers and MacLean‘s Proposals 
The French and Indian War had a great influence on the British Army. Their 
success on one level built over-confidence but it also convinced many young officers of 
the need for changes in the military tactics adopted in the British Army.33 It is often 
hypothesised that the major mistake that the British made in the Revolutionary War was 
                                                 
29
 Fred Anderson, The Crucible of War, (New York, 2001) p.181 
30
 See chapters 3 and 5. 
31
 The origins of the British light infantry will be discussed in full in chapter 2. See J.F.C Fuller, British 
Light Infantry in the Eighteenth century, (London 1925), p. 87. 
32
 Lord George Howe, 1725-1758, Commander of the 3
rd
 Foot in the French and Indian War, was an 
acting Brigadier General at the time of his death at the siege of Fort Ticonderoga in 1758, see ibid., p. 
86: Fred Anderson The Crucible of War, (London, 2000), pp 233-234. 
33
 Fred Anderson The Crucible of War, pp 729-734; Tony Hayter The Army and the First British 
Empire in David Chandler (ed.) The Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford, 1993) p.125; J.A. 
Houlding Fit for Service, pp. 230-235. 
 30 
failing to learn the most important lesson of the French and Indian War, that the 
American landscape could be used against the enemy. However, although the British in 
practice did not make many material changes to their army in the years between the 
French and Indian War and 1775 there were changes in the way people thought about the 
army, which shows the influence of the tactics used in the French and Indian War and that 
they were thinking about the best way to go combat American tactics. The problem is that 
in the rush to go to war many of the plans formed in the early 1770‘s were forgotten. In 
the early 1770‘s when American resistance to British measures increased several 
proposals were sent to the British War office offering to raise men in the event of a war.34 
One of these was from Major Allan MacLean a former Jacobite and serving British 
officer had served in America with distinction with the 60th Americans and successfully 
recruited troops for them. He was to become of the first Loyalist commanders and 
ultimately as a Brigadier General was second in command of Northern Command in the 
latter stages of the Revolutionary War.35 MacLean submitted plans to Lord Barrington in 
1771 for recruiting Highland troops in the event of war.36 Although these were not to be 
Loyalist troops, his plans reveal that MacLean was thinking of ways to combine 
traditional Highland/Jacobite tactics of light warfare with American style light tactics. 
Many of the proposals he came up with four years before the war would eventually be 
applied to Loyalist troops in the years ahead. His proposal was for ―Ten Companies of 
men‖ consisting of ―skilled boatmen‖ to be used ―at sea and otherwise.‖ 37  This idea of 
combined service ─ troops who would be adept at various skills ─ would inspire two of 
the most successful Loyalist units, the British Legion and the Queens Rangers both of 
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whom combined infantry, cavalry and artillerymen in the one regiment. MacLean wrote 
that he ―had served all the last war in North America and the West Indies‖ and ―hath 
acquired some knowledge of sea or expedition service and all the Country people where 
his connections lie are boatmen. On the strength of this whereof he undertook to raise ―a 
Battalion of Highlanders who in three months would be ready to serve by sea or land as 
his Majesty‘s service may require.‖ MacLean also says that the regiment should consist of 
men ―between the ages of fifteen years of age to and thirty and not older.‖ 
This document is remarkably similar in form to the later beating order that would 
be drawn up for MacLean‘s own Loyalist regiment the Royal Highland Emigrants, as 
well as to other later beating orders for other Loyalist Regiments.38 Because of 
MacLean‘s role in the establishment of one of the first Loyalist regiments it is possible to 
argue that the proposals serve as a model for the Loyalist regiments. However, the 
proposals did not get beyond the planning stage. Had MacLean‘s proposals and others 
like them been acted upon before the war then it is possible that the British could have 
engaged the Patriots with their own tactics in 1775 rather than later on. Yet Barrington 
did not ignore MacLean‘s proposals completely. In 1773 he asked him back to the War 
Office and made him an offer. He still wished him to raise a regiment of Scottish 
Highlanders but this time it was to be recruited from men who had immigrated to 
America. This was to be the first proposal for a regiment of Loyalists. 
In the autumn of 1774 at the same time as the first Continental Congress was 
meeting in Boston, plans were already afoot to arm volunteers to fight for the British if 
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events took a martial turn. Smith argues that the first formal proposal for an 
―Association‖ of Loyal Volunteers was by Timothy Ruggles in October 1774, but 
MacLean‘s proposals pre-date them.39 Lord Barrington, felt that MacLean, with his 
Jacobite connections was the ideal man to recruit Highlanders who Barrington hoped 
would choose Britain over their new country.40 This demonstrates that at senior levels of 
the British government there were those that were thinking that a force of Loyal 
Americans would be necessary. However, at this point the plans were for recent 
Emigrants, who were presumed to be loyal and trustworthy rather than American born 
men. The regiment that MacLean would form in June and July of 1775 would be granted 
special status that set it aside from other Loyalist regiments from its earliest days.41 It was 
made plain that although the regiment would be composed of men serving in America 
they would be officered by British veterans or sons of veterans and be given status similar 
to that of a British regular regiment. In later years several Loyalist Regiments, including 
the Queens Rangers, the British Legion and the Volunteers of Ireland would follow a 
model very similar to that followed by MacLean in 1775. It is no coincidence that these 
regiments were the most successful Loyalist regiments and arguably among the most 
successful fighting units on any side in the Revolutionary War. Therefore the role of 
Allan MacLean in the genesis of Loyalist regiments cannot be underestimated. He 
defined many of the rules by which they would be administered under and the type of 
men who they would ideally recruit. Also despite the fact that Barrington was no longer 
present in cabinet at the height of Loyalist recruitment, the similarity of his plans to later 
regiments shows that the two men had an undoubted influence on the Loyalists. 
The Effectiveness of Irregulars and Volunteers 
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As the Loyalists fit into the category of temporary volunteer troops it is necessary 
to assess opinions on volunteers and to raise the question of how professional soldiers felt 
about amateurs. The oft quoted Wolfe comment that the Provincial soldiers who served 
with him in the French and Indian War ―were the worst in the universe‖ is arguably not a 
comment about American soldiers but on amateur volunteer soldiers.42 The difference 
between career soldiers and temporary volunteer soldiers is one that has produced some 
interesting historical work. Fred Anderson‘s study of Massachusetts troops in the French 
and Indian War is an excellent study of men who fit into the latter category. Anderson 
goes into depth on the minutiae of military life as well as speculating on what motivated 
the soldiers to fight. Anderson‘s methodology in constructing his study is a useful 
guideline to how to study a large group of soldiers. In his appendices he gives detailed 
calculations on the numbers of Massachusetts soldiers as well as their previous 
backgrounds and social composition. Anderson contrasts the Massachusetts volunteers of 
the French and Indian War, men with trades and occupations, with the ―marginal 
members of British society‖ that served in the regular British units.43 He argues that 
regular soldiers were men who could be ―spared‖ from civilian life, whereas short-term 
soldiers were men who were ―temporarily available.‖44  He argues that their class 
background varied immensely and that their reasons for fighting differed from the 
regulars who were simply ordered to fight as part of their terms of service. Loyalist 
soldiers in general terms, meet many of Anderson‘s criteria. In many cases they were men 
with trades, occupations and social standing in their community who had more to lose 
than gain by serving. Other historians surveying volunteerism in the Revolutionary War 
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and later wars have come to varying conclusions about it.45 While ideals are often vital in 
getting the men to join it is often other reasons that keep the men their, such as group 
loyalty and comradeship. Does a temporary soldier have the same motivating factors as a 
professional soldier? A professional presumably joins the army for career reasons, 
particularly those who join in peacetime. Although a temporary soldier may do this, he 
may also be motivated by a cause. In the case of the Loyalist soldiers, they were risking 
their livelihoods and reputations as well as their lives. 
 Looking at British military history, making use of hastily raised irregulars was 
nothing new. The British Army had always massively increased in size at the outset of 
any major war. For example in the Seven Years War, parliament voted to maintain 92,000 
men in the British Army yet the Army had been reduced to 45,000 by 1765.46 This meant 
that at the beginning of any war Britain had to engage in large scale recruiting and at the 
end of a war, in large scale demobilisation. The military historian and strategist J.F.C. 
Fuller argues that this practice put Britain at a disadvantage in the first few years of a war, 
as they had to raise irregular troops so quickly. He talks about these troops being ―hastily 
improvised‖ and just as ―hastily disbanded‖ on peace.47 However, it is difficult to see how 
they could have done it differently. It was extremely expensive to raise and maintain a 
large army and while it could be justified in wartime it was harder to do so in peacetime, 
especially as taxes would remain high to pay for it. This hasty recruitment did have an 
undoubted effect on the effectiveness of any army Britain put into the field. Houlding 
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argues that with the exception of the American Revolutionary War, the performance of 
the British Army was generally poor for the first two years of every war it fought in the 
eighteenth century. He further suggests that the British were only successful against the 
Patriots because they were ―innocent of training, buoyed merely by enthusiasm.‖48 This 
judgement is harsh on the Patriots as in their ―innocence‖ they still managed to avoid 
being decisively defeated, not only during these two years but after 1777 when to go by 
Houlding‘s reasoning the British Army was supposed to have been at its most efficient. 
British Strategies Towards the Loyalists 1775-1776 
When the British clashed with Massachusetts Militia at Lexington and Concord in 
April 1775, they could little have envisaged a war that would last eight years and 
eventually see the might of France and Spain arrayed against them. The British military 
reaction to the coming war has often been categorised as slow and unheedful of the threat 
that the Rebellion posed to their Empire. While this is a matter of debate it is important to 
note that the British did not establish an administrative structure to manage militant 
Loyalists until the winter 1776. Thus there is an argument that the British were indeed 
slow in organising the Loyalists into a cohesive military force and only did so when 
thousands of refugees flooded into their territories which gave them an opportunity to 
exploit this source of manpower. Also, the Loyalists themselves had asked for an 
opportunity to fight. Many of the early military organisations were raised by individuals 
in uprisings against the Patriots who had assumed the power of government. Thus the 
strategic problems that the British faced between 1774 and 1776 were whether or not to 
utilise the militant Loyalists and then how to organize the Loyalists as effective military 
units. 
These problems are shown by the fact that there was not one view of how the 
Loyalists should be used and that not all Loyalists were viewed as being of similar status. 
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The initial British view of the Loyalists was that there were to be two models of recruits. 
Those recruits deemed to make the best soldiers were to be entered into the three Nova 
Scotia Regiments raised in 1775; Col. MacLean‘s Royal Highland Emigrants, Col. 
Francis Legge‘s Nova Scotia Volunteers and Lt Col. Goreham‘s Royal Fencible 
Volunteers.49  Smith states that these units received fifteen hundred recruits between 1775 
and 1776 and that the vast majority of their recruits were Highland Scots who had settled 
in Canada after 1763.50 They were raised in the British settlements in Canada and 
principally based there.51 Those recruits not enlisted into these Regiments were to be 
formed into regiments who were to act mainly as auxiliaries for the main British Army.52 
They were initially to be used as scouts and pioneers and occasionally for light infantry 
duties, initially Howe did not envisage them in battle standing shoulder to shoulder with 
his line troops.  
It is possible however, to argue that the British recognised the importance of the 
Loyalists early on- as recognised by Lord Barrington‘s proposal to Allan MacLean in 
1773- and that it was the circumstances of the first year of the war that dictated their slow 
reaction.53 The circumstances were: that from April 1775 until the landing at New York 
in the summer of 1776, the British Army was based in the city of Boston ─ they left 
Boston in spring 1776 ─ and in Canada. They had no other representation in the thirteen 
colonies except for a brief abortive expedition to Charleston in South Carolina in the 
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spring of 1776. This restricted their ability to form regiments, except the three units they 
would form in Canada in 1775. So it was not unwillingness to form regiments but an 
inability to attract large numbers of recruits, while they only occupied a small part of the 
American colonies. Therefore it can be argued that the British always intended to use the 
Loyalists as soon as they had the opportunity. There is considerable evidence ─ detailed 
in this chapter ─ to suggest that this was indeed the case. In early 1776 the British 
planned an expedition to the Southern Colonies to link up with planned Loyalist 
insurrections there.54 It was a complete failure but it is proof that the British were 
mounting military expeditions based on the recruitment of Loyalists early in the war. 
Indeed the invasion of New York, in August 1776, was at least partially motivated by 
expectations of large scale Loyalist support.55 In this they were proved right. Once the 
British were safely established in New York they were able to start forming Loyalist 
Regiments in earnest and began attracting large numbers of recruits. It was in response to 
this that an administration was set up to deal with the Loyalist regiments. 
There is however, a strong counter argument to the importance of the Loyalists to 
the British, in the early part of the war. This is based on the belief prevalent among many 
politicians, and senior officers that held that the existing forces could handle the war 
perfectly adequately. Large scale recruitment of new troops was thought to be very 
expensive. The King was largely opposed to this because of the financial outlay it would 
cause and preferred to augment existing regiments. He held that new units needed at least 
a year to be trained whereas existing units only took three months to augment with 
replacements and that raising too many new units would ―totally annihilate all chance of 
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compleating the regular forces which alone in time of need can be depended upon.‖ 56 
Thus, if George III believed this, most of his Ministers were bound to follow, meaning 
that large scale recruitment of any kind was not a priority in the first two years of the war. 
This does not mean that recruits were discouraged but that beating the Americans with 
regular regiments became the main strategic aim.  
Another issue which hampered large scale recruiting of Loyalists early on was the 
issue of the extent to which the war was to be prosecuted. The British were dealing with a 
rebellious subjects rather than a foreign power. Ultimately they wanted to get those 
subjects back to being loyal again. It was thought that too vigorous an approach to the 
war, especially any kind of attack on the civilian population would make reconciliation 
far more difficult. There was a fear that if Loyalists were let loose on their fellow 
Americans on a large scale then a bloody civil war could develop which could be hard for 
the British to control.57  
The financial implications of large scale recruitment were also of vital importance 
to the British. As mentioned above, even augmenting the existing army in times of war 
was an expensive affair and raising new regiments would raise costs to alarming levels. 
With House of Commons debates raging on the costs of the war, expenditure by the 
government on the war was closely scrutinised and anything which raised costs would 
have to have been considered entirely necessary by those in power before it was fully 
committed to.58 A letter from Germain to General Howe, in March 1776 underlines this 
financial caution towards Loyalist recruitment. Germain wrote that the Loyalist officers 
were ―not to be entitled to half-pay or to have any other rank than what was allowed to 
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the like corps in the last war.‖ 59 Germain goes on to say in the same above mentioned 
letter that Howe was not to given any additional funds to pay the Loyalist regiments and 
must find the money to pay them in his existing budget.60 This meant inevitably the 
Loyalists would not be Howe‘s first priority. If he could win the war without over-relying 
on the Loyalists then it would be economic for him to do so. It also put the responsibility 
for raising and maintaining Loyalists in the hands of the British officers commanding in 
America. This was problematic as it meant there was no unified policy for dealing with 
Loyalists; it was purely at the behest of the generals. This was to be the case until the 
formation of the Provincial Department in November 1776.  
The budgetary issue is important because a general‘s natural inclination would be 
to use the bulk of his budget on the tried and trusted British troops rather than go to the 
time and expense of training new ones who might not be initially successful in combat. It 
is to General Howe‘s credit that he did raise Loyalist battalions and did somehow find the 
money to raise and equip them. This could have been far sighted on his part in that he saw 
that there would come a time when he would need reinforcements and it was better to 
have them close to hand rather than wait months for them to come from Britain. John 
Brewer‘s work on the fiscal and military state shows that expenditure on the war from 
1775 to 1777 was far less than what it was after Saratoga and the French intervention.61 
So as well as having to manage his own budget Howe had considerably less money to 
spend than Clinton would after 1778. Despite this several attempts were made before the 
invasion of New York to raise Loyalists and to encourage them to rise up in Patriot 
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occupied areas. As well as the Nova Scotia battalions, some other units were raised in 
1775 and early 1776 notably, the New York volunteers who served for the length of the 
war, but in general the next big formation of units did not occur until after the invasion of 
New York in the late summer of 1776 which coincided with the establishment of the 
Provincial Service.62 
All of these issues meant that the recruitment of Loyalists, while important, was 
not the prime strategic consideration of the British in between 1774 and 1776. However, 
as the above section has shown this does not mean that it was not a consideration and that 
the issue was ignored. Arguably the British always thought that they would have to raise 
local help, it was just the extent to which they needed that help that was in doubt. 
Section 2: Loyalist Militancy 1774-1776. 
 
The Boston Association 
Massachusetts has long been regarded as the birthplace of the Revolution. 
However, it is ironic that it is also the birthplace of militant Loyalism. There were two 
early attempts to form regiments in 1774 and 1775. The first was in October 1774, by 
Colonel Thomas Gilbert at Freetown, Massachusetts.63 The second and longer lasting 
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formation was the Boston Association, or the Loyal American Association, which was 
formed by Timothy Ruggles in the summer of 1775. In December 1774 Ruggles 
submitted a proclamation calling for volunteers, which appeared in several Massachusetts 
newspapers.64 Ruggles was an experienced soldier and one of the most influential men in 
pre-war Massachusetts politics, having initially been a critic of the Stamp Tax, being 
elected President of the Stamp Act Congress in New York in 1765. He refused to go 
along with the proposals that were voted on there and from then on increasingly became 
identified as a defender of the Crown. As a Brigadier General of Provincial forces in the 
French and Indian War, he was eminently qualified to command the Boston 
Association.65 He had commanded a Massachusetts Provincial Regiment which fought at 
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the battle of Lake George in 1755, and in 1758 he commanded a division of Provincial 
Troops during the fighting at Ticonderoga. He was a Brigadier in Amherst‘s Canadian 
campaigns of 1759-60. All of this gave him a knowledge and familiarity with American 
warfare which would have made him a desirable figure for the British to have in their 
forces. 
The proclamation itself was a declaration of principles which set out the reasons 
for forming the association and affirming their Loyalty to the crown.66 Declarations like 
this from Loyalist soldiers are rare and this one provides a good example of what 
motivated men to take up arms in defence of the Crown. There is sometimes a tendency 
to separate the political Loyalists from the militant Loyalists; with the latter being a less 
articulate grouping that have left few declarations of their Loyalty to posterity, but this 
document in some ways bridges the gap.67 The Boston Association were admittedly a less 
soldier-like group than later units being older, consciously part-time soldiers but they 
were still a militant grouping. Later soldiers would provide similar sentiments in letters 
and journals but rarely provided such proficient collective sentiments of Loyalty like 
this.68 
There was a six month delay between the proclamation and the actual assembling 
of the unit in June 1775. There is no documented reason for this, except to speculate that 
there was more of a need for them in June with hostilities having broken out in earnest in 
April. There are several major works on the Loyalists in Massachusetts, but there is no 
single study on the Boston Association as a military unit, possibly because they were 
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never used in combat.69  However, as one of the first Loyalist units it is surely deserving 
of study.  
The Boston Association consisted of Massachusetts men who patrolled the streets 
of Boston. It was an entirely voluntary unit and was essentially a militia. It consisted of 
gentlemen soldiers, often very elderly gentlemen indeed, including several in their sixties 
and several of Boston‘s richest citizens served as private soldiers.70 This was of course 
different to the British line regiments and indeed to most of the later Loyalist regiments 
where recruitment consciously targeted relatively young men.71 The fact that they 
contained recruits of that age may explain why they were not used as a fighting unit by 
the British.  
Although they were radically different to the later Loyalist regiments, they bore 
similarities to some of the last Loyalist units that were formed, the militias in the South. 
The Boston Association was an organisation of undoubted political commitment; it was in 
a unique situation in that it consisted, not of young men who had had little to do with pre-
war politics like the later regiments, but some of Massachusetts‘ most prominent and 
wealthy citizens whose pre-war careers are reasonably well documented. Many of its 
recruits were members of the ―Friends of Government‖, before the war, which meant that 
the men of the Boston Association fit into the category of politically motivated Loyalist 
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soldiers. A good example of a politically motivated Loyalist would be Adino Paddock. 
He was 48, a French and Indian War veteran, Boston‘s only chase maker and a prominent 
and wealthy citizen with a sound knowledge of artillery.72 He was offered a senior post 
with the Patriots but turned it down to serve as a Captain in the Boston Association. After 
the evacuation he took no further military part in the war and went to live in England. 
Paddock could have joined the Patriots and preserved his estate and his livelihood yet 
chose to become a Loyalist.  
Many of the men in the Boston Association suffered similar fates to Paddock in 
terms of losing their property.73 Yet, at the time they served their property had not yet 
been confiscated, they were actually fighting to protect it. This makes them different from 
later Loyalist soldiers, many of whom who had already left their homes and lost their 
property when they joined their Regiments.  
In Ruggles, the regiment had a prominent local personality in command, which is 
something that was echoed with other regiments. Eminent American men formed their 
own regiments and often financed them. However, because of this, the commanders 
expected a certain degree of autonomy denied to the commanders of British line 
regiments. The British found this disagreeable and would attempt to limit this ―cult of 
personality‖ later on in the war. British generals often took on the role of Colonel in Chief 
of Loyalist units and the commanders were often youthful British officers who were 
willing to command Americans because they were too inexperienced to be given British 
commands.  
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The Boston Association was short lived. On 17 March, 1776, Boston was 
evacuated and the regiment left for Halifax, with many civilians and the main British 
Army. Most of the soldiers eventually went to London or remained in Canada but some of 
the younger men would join the newly formed New York Volunteers. The British 
involvement in the Boston Association was minimal. They provided some financial 
support, although Ruggles made the initial outlay. They provided little in the way of 
formal training and the Boston Association would see no combat. Yet to have used them 
in combat, the British would have to have radically overhauled them. This would have 
involved training which necessitated a lot of time and money. With Boston under siege, 
Howe did not have the men or resources to do this. However, less than a year later he 
would attempt a radical change of the Queens Rangers which would demonstrate exactly 
how he felt a Loyalist unit should be run. So the Boston Association lived out their short 
life-span with the kind of autonomy that no Loyalist unit would have again until the 
Southern campaigns of 1780-81. 
The Nova Scotia Regiments. 
In June 1775 at Halifax, Nova Scotia, Colonel Allan MacLean, acting on an order 
from Lord Barrington ─ as discussed previously ─ formed the Royal Highland Emigrants. 
In the autumn of 1775 Nova Scotia Volunteers and the Royal Fencible Volunteers were 
also formed in Nova Scotia. 74 The significance of the formation of these three regiments 
                                                 
74
 Paul Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, pp. 14, 67; Francis Legge 1719-1783 Governor of Nova Scotia 
see DCB online at  http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-
e.php?&id_nbr=2010&interval=25&&PHPSESSID=4pthrplhvie6a1pflgscjdtak7  accessed 11/11/2008. 
The Nova Scotia Volunteers were ordered to be raised in October 1775. They remained in Nova Scotia 
for the duration of the War. See Legge‘s Warrant to raise the regiment, Earl of Suffolk to Francis 
Legge 16 October 1775, WO 1/681 ff.59-60. Joseph Goreham, 1725-1790, Goreham had served with 
distinction as a Ranger in the French and Indian War. He raised the Royal Fencible Americans in June 
1775 in Nova Scotia sending out recruiting parties to Boston. They served as the Garrison of Fort 
Cumberland in New Brunswick until 1780 when they returned to Halifax, see DCB 
http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-
 46 
is that from the very start they were raised and administered by the British Army. They 
were the first regiments to be formed under the strict control of the British and they had a 
very different status to that of other Loyalist regiments, which meant from their earliest 
days they were treated similarly to British Line Regiments.75 
    The Royal Highland Emigrants, as the first such regiment, will be 
discussed here. The regiment was to be composed of Scottish Highlanders living in 
America and they were to be officered by British veterans or sons of veterans and be 
given status similar to that of a British regular regiment. The Beating Order (a document 
issued to the regiment‘s commander ordering him to raise a regiment) entitling Allan 
MacLean to raise two battalions of ten companies, states ―the whole Corps to be 
Cloathed, Armed, and Accoutred in Like manner with His Majesty‘s Royal Highland 
Regiments.‖76 Other Loyalist units raised in 1775 were not ―armed and accoutred‖ by the 
British Army in this way, for example, the Boston Association was distinguished from 
Civilians only by a ―white armband‖ and they provided their own weapons and 
equipment.77 The Royal Highland Emigrants were also to be ―paid as his Majesty‘s Other 
Regiments of Foot,‖ unlike the Boston Association of whom no evidence exists to suggest 
they were paid at all, other than by their commander Timothy Ruggles.78 The British 
spent a considerable sum on the Royal Highland Emigrants. From the unit‘s inception in 
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June of 1775 until June of 1776 the cost of raising the unit and its subsistence costs were 
£7247, 10s, 0d.79 From 14 June 1775 until April 1777 the Royal Highland Emigrants cost 
£16,230 9s, 111/4d.80 This considerable expenditure so early in the war demonstrates that 
the British felt that they would get return from at least some of their Loyalists.81 The other 
two regiments were raised along similar lines to the Royal Highland Emigrants, although 
their recruits were not exclusively Scots Highlanders. 
The case of the Nova Scotia regiments brings up a major theme of the thesis. This 
is that a small number of Provincial regiments had a higher status than others. These 
privileged regiments were given benefits denied to many other Loyalist regiments. They 
were paid in line with British regulars, supplied with the best arms and accoutrements and 
used in combat alongside British line regiments. As the war progressed their officers 
achieved half-pay status. The Royal Highland Emigrants, Lt. Col. Goreham‘s Royal 
Fencible Volunteers, and Col. Legge‘s Nova Scotia Volunteers were all to be considered 
almost as regular regiments and were composed as much as possible of ex-regulars and 
British born troops. 
Of the three Nova Scotia regiments the Royal Highland Emigrants achieved the 
most and were awarded accordingly. In 1779, the Royal Highland Emigrants became a 
line regiment, the 84th Highlanders, the first Loyalist regiment to achieve this honour.82 
The influence of MacLean‘s ideas on other Loyalist regiments is massive. A letter of July 
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1776 from John Robinson of the Treasury to General Howe states that Legge‘s Regiment 
were to be ―regulated in the same manner as Col MacLean and Colonel Goreham‘s 
Corps.‖83  This suggests that MacLean‘s unit was already serving as a model for other 
regiments. It would take until 1779 when even the next group of elite Loyalist regiments 
the Queens Rangers, the British Legion and the Volunteers of Ireland (all commanded by 
British regulars) would achieve the status that the Nova Scotia regiments would be given 
in 1775 and many Provincial regiments would never achieve it. However, of the Nova 
Scotia regiments, only the Royal Highland Emigrants had a successful combat record. 
The reasons for this are complex and hard to fathom. Both Legge‘s and Goreham‘s 
regiments had the same advantages as MacLean‘s but apart from some combat in 1775 
and 1776 their service was largely confined to garrison duty in Canada. Legge had fallen 
out of favour with the British Government in Canada by 1779, but his regiment could still 
have been utilised. As for Goreham‘s unit, there is no explanation given in any source. It 
is only possible to speculate, that garrisons were needed in Canada and his regiment 
fulfilled this function well. What is certain is that the three Nova Scotia regiments created 
an administrative structure for regiments which would be followed by the newly set up 
Provincial Department from August 1776. 
 
 
 
Section 3: The Provincial Service 1776-1783 
 The Provincial Service 1776-1778 
This section will discuss the innovations and changes made in respect of the 
Provincial regiments after the British Occupation of New York in 1776. After the 
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formation of the three regiments raised in Canada, there was a hiatus in regiments formed 
by the British of nearly a year. The reasons for this have been discussed above. 
In the summer of 1776 the British landed in New York and this led to the biggest 
recruitment of Loyalists thus far. According to early Loyalist historiography, the area 
where the Loyalists were strongest was New York. In the mythology of the Revolution, if 
Massachusetts was the birthplace of the Revolution then New York was the bastion of 
Toryism. One of the major reasons for invading New York was the reasoning that the 
support there was so strong, not just in terms of recruits but financial and material 
assistance.84 Certainly it was to be in New York where Loyalist regiments were organised 
under the banner of the Provincial Service. 
Once the invasion of New York City in August 1776 had been accomplished, 
General Howe set about forming a number of new units, as well as creating a formal 
department for administering these new Loyalist units.85 Two initial administrative 
appointments were made in August 1776, to create a centralised system for administering 
and financing the Loyalist regiments. These were the Muster Master General Lt. Col. 
Edward Winslow and Paymaster General Captain Robert MacKenzie. Winslow was 
deputed to collect and organise muster rolls of extant and future Provincial regiments.86  
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Winslow had held a number of administrative posts under Governor Thomas Hutchinson 
in pre-war Massachusetts and notably changed the record keeping system for Provincial 
records.87 Winslow then, was more than just a political appointment, to appease high 
ranking New England Loyalists, but a vital contributor to Loyalist administration with a 
vast experience of record keeping and maintenance. Winslow held his appointment until 
1783. Muster rolls keep records of every soldier serving for pay and supply purposes. It 
was a very demanding task; each regiment had to appoint staff to deal with paperwork 
and to take musters approximately every two months from wherever they were serving in 
America. Although there are extant muster rolls for 1776, the vast majority of them exist 
from the summer of 1777, which would suggest that the system took nearly a year to 
become fully established. Whilst record keeping may have been a distraction from 
soldiering at times, it put the Provincial units on an equal administrative footing with 
regular units and ensured that they were recorded accurately which in turn assured they 
were paid properly. It brought them into the community of the British Army. Provincials 
may have been denied half pay for officers and equal footing with regular regiments, but 
they were at least beginning to be administered the same way as the rest of the British 
Army.88  
The next major administrative appointment was in January 1777 when Alexander 
Innes, a regular British officer, was appointed Inspector General of the Provincial 
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Corps.89 While Winslow was an important figure in the organisation of the Provincial 
Corps his role was essentially that of record keeper, Innes, whose role as Inspector 
General was to recommend changes to the Commander in Chief, was a far more 
influential figure. Although individual commanders had the greatest role in influencing 
their regiments, Innes had a wider role in that he was able to advise the commanding 
generals on the best ways to use the Loyalist regiments and which ones were the most 
efficient.90 This makes his role more than that of just an administrator. Innes was also a 
fighting soldier and in that capacity he was trusted to make military recommendations. 
His main task was to make the Loyalist Regiments ―fit for service.‖ This is a common 
phrase but Innes would use it as his justification for the major changes he made to the 
Queens Rangers in March 1777. The fact that he kept his appointment until 1783 shows 
that in the eyes of Howe and Clinton, he succeeded. Innes‘ first major task was the re-
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organisation of the Queens Rangers.91 This intervention involved Innes recommending 
the dismissal of the commander of the regiment, two thirds of the officer corps and some 
two hundred of the rank and file. This contradicts Smith‘s view that the British did not 
really commence active interventions to make the Loyalists more efficient until the winter 
of 1777-1778.92 Smith does mention the affair but does not discuss the significance of 
Innes‘ actions in the context of making the Loyalists more capable of fighting alongside 
the British, portraying it as an incident which increased misunderstanding between the 
British and the Loyalists.93 While to an extent this may be true, it surely demonstrates that 
the British took the Loyalists seriously far earlier than they were often supposed to have 
done. This was the largest scale intervention that Innes would make in a Loyalist 
regiment and after this his conduct seems to have been to act as an advocate for the 
Loyalists. He was certainly influential in seeing that they were used in combat and that 
they were well supplied.  
The next major appointment to the Provincial Service was Governor William 
Tryon to be Major General of Provincials in March 1778.94 Tryon would command all the 
New York Provincial Troops in 1777 and would lead a campaign of his own in New 
Jersey in 1779 but his forces were predominantly British regulars and in most cases the 
Provincial regiments would serve alongside British regular regiments under a British 
commander.  
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The New Units of 1776-7 
In the aftermath of the occupation of New York and New Jersey in the late 
summer and autumn of 1776, and with the creation of the Provincial Service, the British 
set about creating new units. In all, nine new Provincial regiments were formed in New 
York in the autumn and winter of 1776.95 With the liberation of a large amount of 
territory in New York, and with numerous volunteers expected, the British had to form 
regiments quickly, but given the financial restrictions on recruiting they also had to do 
this cheaply. The quickest way of doing this was to follow the model of the appointment 
of Timothy Ruggles in Boston. Rich, prominent local men were appointed to the 
command of the new regiments. The reason for this was that they could partially finance 
their regiments and it was felt that would have the local celebrity to be able to bring in 
recruits. These were men like Oliver Delancey of New York and Cordlandt Skinner of 
New Jersey.96 They were prominent wealthy individuals in their colonies with a lot of 
experience in their respective colonial governments. The fact that had little in the way 
military experience was overlooked. Skinner and Delancey were both appointed 
Provincial Brigadier Generals and ordered to raise several battalions each. Other 
prominent men were given commands. Of these commanders, only Robert Rogers of the 
Queens Rangers was in any way renowned as a soldier.97 Ability to recruit seems to have 
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been given priority over military experience. For example of Skinner‘s six original 
battalion commanders, only one had any military experience but all six were prominent 
men in the New Jersey counties that they recruited their men from.98 While this proved 
useful for recruiting, it was gradually realised that these men were not always the most 
efficient or able soldiers. As the war progressed the British tended to give commands to 
more experienced soldiers and if this was not possible, to appoint ex regulars as 
subalterns. This practice caused Muster Master General Winslow to complain about the 
―coxcombs, fools and blackguards‖ who had been foisted on the Provincial Service from 
the regular ranks.99 Generals appointing regular officers to the Loyalist ranks would 
continue to be a topic of contention right up until the end of the war, although it was 
certainly not done extensively and in general, regimental commanders usually had the 
final say on appointments as too much outside interference caused discontent.100 
The number of volunteers raised in 1776 is hard to gauge as there are virtually no 
muster rolls extant for that year, so it is a topic of controversy.101 In 1903, Alexander 
Flick contended that Loyalism in New York was particularly strong,  claiming that 
―15,000 New Yorkers fought on land or sea‖ during the course of the war.102 Bernard 
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Mason argued that it would have been impossible for New York to supply this amount of 
men and Phillip Ranlet concluded that Loyalist support in New York was vastly 
exaggerated.103  What is certain is that the nine new regiments were successfully 
established in 1776 and had recruited enough men to be viable.104 Of all the units, the 
biggest by far was the New Jersey Volunteers. They consisted of six battalions and 
numbered nearly 2000 men by the end of the war.105 
An additional nine new regiments were formed in 1777, although three of them 
were subsumed into other Loyalist units at a later stage in the war.106 The formation of 
regiments tended to follow the progress of the British Army. For example as the British 
Army advanced into Pennsylvania in late 1777, they formed new regiments there. 1777 
also saw the beginning of Loyalists being used in roles other than infantrymen.107 This 
demonstrated the increasing of importance of Loyalists to the British. In late 1777 the 
first Loyalist cavalry was created, with Emmerich‘s Chasseurs and the Philadelphia Light 
Dragoons.108 Cavalry was expensive to raise and maintain and the formation of Loyalist 
cavalry was started in a very small way but by 1780 Loyalists provided the main cavalry 
force for the British Army in the Southern campaigns. In April 1777 the second battalion 
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of the New Jersey Volunteers were drafted in the Royal Artillery, the only Loyalist 
regiment to be used as artillery.109 
1776 and 1777 had seen the formation of sixteen new Provincial Regiments. By 
the end of this period many of them had seen combat, which demonstrated the increasing 
confidence that the British had in them. This is tempered by the fact that most Loyalist 
regiments were not yet considered anywhere near the equal of British regulars and tended 
to be used in secondary operations or raids. The events of 1778 would see Loyalists 
having to be trusted with far greater responsibility and become crucial to the British 
Army‘s hopes of success in America. 
 
The Innovations of 1778-1779 
With the war becoming global, major changes were needed in the size and 
structure of the British Army. With the exception of the Loyalist Regiments, only two 
new regiments had been raised before 1778 and very few capital ships built.110 However, 
after the French declaration of war in 1778, things would change dramatically. The 
British would have to reorganise to an exceptional degree. They began recruiting 
regiments on a grand scale and started preparing for a war that would involve them 
fighting on at least three continents. The Loyalists became a small cog in this new global 
war. If the British were to succeed in this kind of war, then their troops would have to be 
spread thinly. While there was never any suggestion of the Loyalists being used outwith 
                                                 
109
 Howe had originally considered creating a Loyalist Artillery Regiment but decided it would be 
cheaper and easier to use an existing regiment. They served as artillery men alongside the Royal 
Artillery Regiment until 1779. See Todd Braisted, A History of the second Battalion of New Jersey 
Volunteers online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/njv/2njvhist.htm accessed 
12/5/2009. 
110
 Piers Mackesy, The War for America, p. 250. 
 57 
America, they became vital to the campaign within America.111 As this chapter has 
demonstrated, the British had begun to redefine their approach to the Loyalists in 1777 in 
terms of making them more efficient. Some of these methods were actually quite tough 
on the Loyalists, for example the dismissal of commanders and soldiers in the name of 
efficiency. There was a realisation at the top level that whilst these measures had to 
continue there had to be inducements to encourage recruitment of potential Loyalists as 
well as to maintain the services of existing ones. They were faced with a quandary. Did 
they keep the Loyalists happy by letting them do things their own way and appointing 
Loyalists to high command or did they keep them under British authority and command? 
The solution was a not a simple one and required as much political skill as it did military 
sense. They largely opted for the latter option. The success of this was variable but it is 
possible to suggest that it was not a complete failure. 
Germain outlined his views on how the war should be conducted, in letters to 
Clinton.112 He had in mind a series of co-ordinated attacks in both the North and the 
South, supported by the navy.113 These were to be brief, highly mobile campaigns, 
designed to divide the Continental Army. The Loyalists were to be vital to this. As few 
regular reinforcements would be available to Clinton he would have to rely on the 
existing units that he had with him and recruit in America wherever he could.114 This 
involved not only creating new Loyalist regiments but augmenting the established 
Loyalist regiments and Regular regiments with Americans. As the war went, on these two 
measures came into conflict with each other, as it was regarded as both more 
                                                 
111
 Provincial Troops had been used in the West Indies in the French and Indian War but they were 
only used on the American Continent in the Revolutionary War. This is possibly because the distances 
involved would have discouraged recruits and also because the West Indies were notoriously fever 
ridden.  
112
 See Davies Documents of American Revolution, 1778 Vol. 
113
 For a detailed explanation of Germain's new strategy see Piers Mackesy, The War for America, Ch. 
14. 
114
Clinton was allowed only 3000 reinforcements from Britain in 1778, see ibid., p. 251. 
 58 
economically sound to augment the existing troops with recruits, as well as it as being a 
good military move, as the new troops would be intermingling with experienced ones.115 
The King himself was in favour of augmenting rather than raising new regiments. 
However, the British were not blind to the fact that putting Loyalists in with the British 
was not an ideal solution. Both Clinton and Germain acknowledged that ideally the 
Loyalists should be grouped together in case tensions should arise between British and 
Americans.116 They thought that Americans were more likely to enlist in regiments raised 
by Americans and containing Americans.117 It was not regarded as so much of a problem 
to augment regiments like the Queens Rangers and the Volunteers of Ireland, which 
although commanded by British officers and given equal status and trust in combat with 
the regular units, were still staffed largely with Loyalists. 
As a result of the change in strategy towards the Loyalists, Lord Germain 
instituted a number of reforms to attract recruits, particularly officers, to the Provincial 
regiments and to improve the morale of existing soldiers. In January 1779 new 
regulations were brought in which would add selected Loyalist regiments to a Provincial 
List. They were eligible for increased bounties for recruits, their officers were allowed a 
years full pay if they were incapacitated and all officers from these regiments were to be 
placed on the half-pay list on reduction of their regiments.118  It was a major change in 
policy, but it would not include every Loyalist Regiment. The Provincial List was a small 
group of regiments, comprising: The Queens Rangers, the British Legion, the Royal 
Highland Emigrants, the Kings American Regiment and the Volunteers of Ireland. These 
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were the units considered elite by the British. All had seen considerable service and were 
trusted to serve in the vanguard of any campaign alongside British units. Other provincial 
regiments did have the chance to attain half-pay status, but only if they met certain 
stringent criteria.119  
As new British troops would be needed in the West Indies and to defend the 
British Isles, the British needed to recruit as many Loyalists as possible. The difficulty 
that the British had was how to go about this. Financial considerations were important. 
From 1778 the British spent a lot of money on the Loyalists.120 New regiments and 
augmentations to existing ones were extremely expensive as was the administration 
required in the setting up of a new regiment. The Inspector General Alexander Innes who 
was responsible for all the administration, was given over £100, 000 in 1778 to spend on 
raising new regiments and augmenting existing Provincial corps.121 The changes do show 
that the British took the Loyalists seriously enough to spend money on them. Smith 
questions the effect that the regulations had on recruitment, arguing that the numbers did 
not increase dramatically.122 This is borne out by analysis of the muster rolls of the 
Queens Rangers which demonstrate that while there was a rise in numbers recruited in 
1779 it was not dramatic.123 Smith argues that the British had made too many mistakes 
early on and that the reforms had come too late. Yet, there were other reasons for slow 
recruitment. The war was dragging on and the prospect of a British victory was not 
certain. A Patriot victory would mean that Loyalists would almost certainly be victimised 
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in the new society and might have to leave altogether. This was not an ideal scenario in 
which to convince waverers to risk their lives and livelihoods.  
British victories brought hopes and fresh recruits, for example, there was a rise in 
recruits in 1780 when the British successfully invaded South Carolina, but within six 
months the situation had changed again. However, the fact that the reforms were made at 
all is significant and indicative of the fact that many Loyalists had proved themselves 
useful allies to the British. As well as the reforms the Loyalists themselves came to be 
trusted to run certain aspects of the war itself. After the death of Major John Andre ─ 
Clinton‘s a.d.c and chief of intelligence ─ in 1780, Loyalists like Col. Beverly Robinson 
took over much of the intelligence gathering operations for the British Army, again 
proving the reliance the British had on Loyalists.124 
The New Regiments 1777-81. 
Formation of Loyalist Regiments became a priority in 1777 and increasingly so 
after 1778. Smith suggested that after 1778 when the French came into the war and the 
West Indies were threatened the recruitment of Americans became paramount to the 
British.125  Of the twenty-five Provincial regiments from 1777, fourteen lasted until the 
mass demobilization of 1783, and only six lasted less than two years. Of those six, five 
were subsumed into other regiments.126 The fact that most of these regiments lasted until 
the end of the war demonstrates that the vast majority of them recruited enough men to 
make them viable, as under strength regiments were either disbanded or subsumed into 
other units. Of those units subsumed, three were formed into the British Legion, shortly 
after formation before they had time to recruit sufficiently.127 However, not all these 
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regiments attained full strength and not all of them saw combat.128 On closer examination 
the situation was not as optimistic as first appears. Taking the later regiments in 
comparison with those formed in 1776 there is a much higher proportion of regiments 
who did not see significant amounts of action and who were only really used for garrison 
duties. The earlier regiments made up the core of the Provincial elites. Of the new 
regiments only the British Legion, the Volunteers of Ireland and the Loyal American 
Regiment would be added to the Provincial List. Of these only the Loyal Americans were 
commanded by an American. The formation of the British Legion and the Volunteers of 
Ireland is important is it demonstrates how the British set about instantly creating elite 
regiments, both of which saw combat relatively soon after formation. These two units, 
although formed relatively late in the war, were amongst the most successful Provincial 
regiments of the war. Their formation came at a time when the British were re-evaluating 
their approach to the Loyalists. In spring 1778 Clinton decided to form two elite Loyalist 
regiments, the British Legion and the Volunteers of Ireland, designed to attract principally 
British and Irish born recruits. They were both to be commanded by young British 
aristocrats and many of their officers were regulars or ex regulars.129 The British Legion 
was commanded by Lord Cathcart and the Volunteers of Ireland was commanded by 
Lord Francis Rawdon.130 The two units were used in combat very shortly after formation 
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and saw extensive action in the Southern Campaign of 1779-81. The original qualification 
of recruiting only British born men was largely ignored and both regiments recruited local 
men. 
A disadvantage of the creation of these elite units was that the best men were 
being targeted by the elite regiments and the other regiments had to depend on what was 
left. This could have prejudiced British commanders against using the non elite units. 
However, the fact that so many units were created and maintained until the end of the war 
shows that the British were trying to get as much out of the Loyalists as they could. This 
would lead to several experiments with regiments which failed for reasons other than lack 
of support. The following short case study illustrates such an example. 
The Kings Rangers 
In 1779 the Loyalists regained the only true ―celebrity‖ that they had allied to 
their cause, when Lt Col. Robert Rogers, the legendary frontiersman, soldier, explorer, 
author and playwright returned to America to take command of a new regiment, the 
Kings Rangers.131 His brief spell of commanding the Queens Rangers had ended 
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ignominiously when he was dismissed from command amid allegations of drunkenness, 
financial irregularities and general unfitness for command. He left for Britain in early 
1777 and seemed destined to be the ―forgotten man‖ of the Revolutionary period. 
However, in early 1779 he arrived in Halifax, Nova Scotia and once more offered his 
services. The impact of Rogers‘ name had waned a little ─ Washington wrote no more 
letters anxiously searching for ways to negate his influence ─ but the British once more 
took a chance on him and Henry Clinton gave him the command of a new regiment, the 
Kings Rangers, authorised on 1 May 1779.132 
The original warrant for raising the regiment exemplifies the hopes that the 
British had for both Rogers and his new Regiment. It was to be recruited on the New 
England frontiers and was to consist of 530 enlisted men who were ―to receive the same 
pay and be under the same discipline as his majesty‘s regular troops.‖133 This proves that 
by 1779 the British were making a conscious effort to make clear to recruits that they 
would be treated on equal terms as regulars. Rogers was put under the command of 
General Haldimand, the Governor of Quebec.134 Clinton envisaged that the regiment was 
to be similar to Butler‘s Rangers, who in 1778 had fought several successful ─ if 
controversial ─ actions which had kept thousands of Patriot troops occupied on the New 
York frontier, troops who would otherwise have been fighting Clinton around New York 
                                                                                                                                            
June, 1776, The Papers of George Washington at the Library of Congress, S. 2, Letterbooks. Online at  
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mgw:3:./temp/~ammem_Hhsr  
 
132
 See Chapter 3. 
133
 H Clinton to Lt Col Robert Rogers 1 May 1779, New York, Haldimand Papers, Add Mss 21820, f. 
1, BL. 
134
 Haldimand was told that Rogers would raise two battalions on the frontiers and that he would not 
recruit at the British base of Niagara- the first port of call for Loyalist refugees heading to Canada and 
the base and recruiting station of Butler‘s Rangers and the Kings Royal Regiment of New York see 
Rawdon to Haldimand, 24 May 1779 New York, Add Mss 21820, f.7, BL 
 64 
City.135 Butler‘s unit had shown that a relatively small number of highly skilled 
frontiersmen could frustrate large numbers of Patriots and divert them from larger 
operations. The idea was that the most famous frontiersman in America could do the 
same thing on the New England frontiers. 
 Things did not work out as envisioned, however. By the autumn of 1779 
Haldimand was writing frustrated letters to Rogers demanding that he move from Niagara 
as he was competing for recruits with established regiments. He wrote that ―the Loyalists 
who are disposed to come in from the Mohawk River and that Neighbourhood naturally 
prefer enlisting with Sir John Johnson and Major Butler whose corps yet want many to 
compleat.‖136 Yet Rogers showed no signs of taking his men anywhere near enemy lines. 
Haldimand added that ―Major Rogers and his officers seem at a loss what to do.‖137   By 
the early spring of 1780 it became clear that Rogers had done little to recruit troops ─ he 
had recruited around sixty men ─ and there were again allegations that Rogers was 
drinking excessively and embezzling bounty monies.138 Rogers was accused by 
Haldimand of having ―disgraced the service.‖139  In April 1780, Rogers left the regiment 
without permission and went to Quebec. The regiment was then left in the hands of his 
brother, Major James Rogers. Whilst in Quebec Rogers was confined in prison for non 
payment of debts, yet astonishingly Clinton did not give up on him. He dispatched Brig. 
Gen. Allan MacLean to ―extricate‖ Rogers from prison if he could.140 The fact that 
Clinton could divert himself from the task of commanding the British Army in America, 
to attend to the affairs of a misbehaving Lieutenant Colonel and indeed could order a 
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senior officer to put aside all other duties to rescue him shows not only the importance of 
Rogers but of the importance of the Loyalists to the British especially after the strategic 
reorganisation of 1778. Rogers was regarded as a recruiting beacon for Loyalists and was 
therefore worth saving. It has to be said that for all his faults he exhibited considerable 
personal magnetism which may have motivated Clinton also. 
 MacLean failed to save Rogers and he left America never to return. James 
Rogers was left in command of the regiment for the last four years of its existence. They 
performed garrison duty at Niagara, Quebec and St Johns in Newfoundland, their 
numbers never exceeded sixty.141 The reason for investigating this failed regiment is to 
show that in some cases Loyalist regiments failed in spite of the best efforts of the British. 
Rogers could have been a major thorn in the Patriots‘ side on the New England frontiers, 
his previous record showed him to be every bit as able a frontier fighter as John Butler, 
but due to personal circumstances out-with the control of the British, he failed. Rogers‘ 
failure represented the last major attempt by the British to create an American Loyalist 
hero.  
The Southern Campaigns 1780-81 
 Another area where the best intentions of the British to recruit large 
numbers of Loyalists failed was in the Southern Colonies 1780 and 1781. As mentioned 
earlier, the British had changed their strategy significantly in 1778. In 1778 and 1779 the 
British had successfully invaded Georgia using a combination of British and Loyalist 
forces. Several new units had been formed in Georgia and many of these had included 
refugees from both North and South Carolina.142 The success in Georgia would have the 
effect of encouraging Germain into thinking that the British could have considerable 
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success elsewhere in the South. Leslie Hall has chronicled the situation in Georgia and 
demonstrated that land, whether seized from Loyalists or the hope of gaining land from 
the Patriots contributed to Loyalist strength there.143 
The plan was to send a seaborne force to South Carolina to take Charleston and to 
link up with the forces from Georgia that would move into South Carolina. It was 
intended that by taking Charleston the British could establish a base for the army and 
somewhere for Loyalists refugees and potential recruits to congregate. The plan was to 
establish as many new units as possible at Charleston and then to establish other units as 
the army moved into the interior. The campaign was initially very successful but by early 
1781 had reached a sort of stalemate and Cornwallis left to link up with Arnold and Maj. 
Gen Phillips in Virginia.144 
 Loyalists took a major part in all of these campaigns and battles, but 
although recruits did come in, the supply dried up as it became clear that the campaign 
was not going to succeed. The plan to form new regiments was not successful either. The 
units raised in Georgia in 1779 were successful, but few of those raised in 1780 were.145 It 
was initially thought that the best way to handle the expected flood of recruits would be to 
raise a combination of Provincial and militia units. Provincial units were generally 
regarded to be better soldiers but they took time to train and form, whereas militia could 
be raised quickly and with a minimum of administrative input from the British Army. The 
Provincials would be officered by British officers and suitable Americans. An example of 
one of these units was the South Carolina Royalists. They were a cavalry regiment raised 
in the summer of 1779 by Colonel Alexander Innes, the aforementioned Inspector 
General of Provincial forces. Innes, although a Scot with a previous commission in the 
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British Army, had lived in South Carolina before the war and had strong contacts in the 
area where he was recruiting.146 The Royalists were composed of men recruited in the 
Carolina area, and were frequently successful in action until the close of hostilities 
alongside Rawdon in South Carolina in 1781. However, regiments of this type were 
undoubtedly expensive and took a good deal of time to organise and bring up to combat 
effectiveness.  
By the summer of 1780, time was something that the British did not have in the 
Southern campaign. Cornwallis felt that he had to get troops ready quickly, because the 
Patriots were becoming more proficient and more numerous. In a letter to Clinton in July 
1780, Cornwallis wrote that he had decided to give up raising "expensive" provincial 
corps.147 He thought that the idea of recruiting and training new provincial regiments 
would ―cost a great deal of money‖ and instead he authorised the formation of militia 
regiments.148 He was being bombarded with requests for new corps, particularly cavalry, 
but had turned them all down preferring to augment the British Legion's cavalry.149 This 
effectively sounded the death knell for new Loyalist regiments. The existing regiments 
continued to recruit but no new regiments were formed after 1780. The new regiments 
could not compete with the reputations of the existing regiments and as a result went 
undermanned. If they were used at all it was for garrison duty and other menial tasks. The 
existing units desperately needed augmenting for the reason that they saw frequent 
combat the Southern campaign.150 Also, Northerners who went to the South were more 
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prone to sickness than their Southern counterparts and there were high instances of fever, 
malaria and sunstroke.151  Both John Simcoe and Lord Rawdon were sent home with 
broken health in 1781 as a result of the harsh conditions in the South. All of which meant 
local recruitment was essential. This made augmentation of established Loyalist units 
unavoidable and ended the creation of new units. 
Another major issue of Southern campaigns is the localised conflict between 
Loyalists and Patriots which had less to do with wider causes and more to do with local 
rivalries over land and social issues. Leslie Hall has chronicled this in respect to Georgia 
where the war at times descended into an orgy of violence between Loyalists and Patriots. 
These tensions were carried on into the South Carolina campaigns of 1780 and 1781. It is 
interesting to speculate whether the Southern Loyalists were more martial in their 
attitudes than their Northern counterparts and to what extent they were motivated by local 
jealousies and long held grudges.152 
Section 4. The Loyalists in Combat 1776-1783 
This section will look at the how the Loyalist Regiments were used in combat 
throughout the entire war. It will highlight some of the issues which will be investigated 
in greater depth in the case study chapters. The questions it will raise are: were the 
Loyalists good soldiers; were they used to their full potential and conversely were there 
problems with over reliance on the Loyalists? Loyalists actually saw a great deal of 
combat in the Revolutionary War and by the end of which there had been several battles 
in which most or all of the participants were Americans. Indeed in 1782 and 1783 after 
the British Army had stopped fighting several Loyalist units continued the war on the 
frontiers until being ordered to stop by the British. 
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The first Loyalists to see combat were those that had risen up against the Patriots 
in New England and in the South. There were sporadic uprisings throughout the South in 
1775. In December 1775 the Royal Highland Emigrants played a significant role in the 
defence of Quebec.153 In North Carolina in early 1776 hundreds of Highland Scottish 
emigrants rose up against the Patriot authority and were heavily defeated at the battle of 
Moore‘s Creek on 27 February 1776.154  
After the setback of Moore‘s Creek few large-scale risings took place and most 
Loyalist activity was organised by the British until the Southern campaigns of 1780 and 
1781. The risings had signalled to the British the willingness of Loyalists to fight for them 
but the results demonstrated that the Loyalists needed to be organised and backed by 
finance, discipline and equipment to maximise their effectiveness.155 
The initial combats of the Provincial Regiments were not spectacularly 
successful. It was expedient to raise the regiments quickly and efficiently with local men, 
but the senior British Officers in America had to consider whether these commanders 
were up to the job of commanding their men in combat. The first test of a Provincial 
Regiment in combat was not a success. At Mamaroneck on October 19 1776, Robert 
Rogers‘ Queens Rangers were ambushed and forced to retreat by a Patriot force 
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commanded by Lord Stirling.156 The action was a deliberate attempt by the Patriots to 
humiliate Robert Rogers and discourage Loyalist recruits. As Rogers was by far the most 
experienced of the new commanders, it did not bode well for the other regiments. In 
January 1777 the newly raised second battalion of the New Jersey Volunteers, was 
ambushed at Monmouth Courthouse in Monmouth County, New Jersey and lost thirty-
four men.157 These unsuccessful actions were all partially caused by rushing troops into 
combat and enforced the point that the Loyalist Regiments needed training before being 
committed to combat. After this the new Regiments were used sparingly until they were 
fully trained and trusted in combat which in many cases was not until late 1777 or 
1778.158 All the regiments formed in 1776 saw combat at some stage of the war.  
The main campaigns of the Revolutionary War from 1776 until 1779 largely 
occurred in the Northern theatre. The British invaded the New York colony in 1776 and 
pushed from New York into Pennsylvania in 1777. Several Loyalist Regiments took part 
in this campaign. The Queens Rangers in particular would take a major role in the 
important Battle of Brandywine Creek on 12 September 1777.159 It was at this battle that 
the light infantry potential was first demonstrated. The Queens Rangers defeated the 
Patriot Light Infantry which showed that Loyalists could match Patriot tactics like for 
like. It was also the first battle where a Loyalist regiment gained special praise for their 
role in a battle from the commanding general, Howe. All this demonstrated that if 
properly organised Loyalists could be as effective as British regulars and could be a 
genuinely effective arm of the British Army. 
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In the late summer of 1777, General Burgoyne launched an attack on the Patriots 
on the New York frontier which ended in defeat at Saratoga. Part of the reason for 
launching the campaign was to recruit Loyalists. This was not generally achieved.160  
Saratoga gave the Patriots a huge boost, both in terms of morale and strategically, because 
it eliminated a British Army at a stroke. It also enabled the Patriots to persuade the French 
to enter the war, thus utterly changing the war from a colonial uprising to a global 
conflict. On 28 June 1778, the British fought Washington‘s Army at Monmouth 
Courthouse. The result was a draw but it forced their withdrawal from Pennsylvania. 
There were sixteen Loyalist units who participated in some way at the battle of 
Monmouth Courthouse.161  However, as Morrissey and Hook point out in their work on 
Monmouth Courthouse, the Loyalists were not given important roles in the battle, being 
left in reserve positions and to guard the baggage train. The major exceptions were the 
Queens Rangers and the 2nd Battalion of the New Jersey Volunteers who took major 
combat roles. This demonstrated that there was an imbalance in the way that some 
Loyalist units were used. The Queens Rangers were commanded by a British Officer and 
the New Jersey Volunteers were serving with the Royal Artillery.  
Away from the main army, Loyalists were beginning to prove themselves on the 
frontiers in 1778. Butler‘s Rangers and the King‘s Royal Regiment of New York operated 
successfully alongside the Native Americans, almost independently of British command 
on the New York frontier.162 They also forced the Patriots to mount a full scale campaign 
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on the frontiers in 1779.163 Butler‘s and the King‘s Royal Regiment of New York were 
American commanded regiments, both of whom had been formed and trained with 
minimum interference from the British. However, their commanders-John Butler and Sir 
John Johnson- were vastly experienced soldiers with a great deal of experience in frontier 
warfare. This would suggest that it was not just regular British officers who the British 
trusted in command of the Loyalist regiments, but experienced soldiers. In many respects 
the original policy of using prominent local figures to raise Regiments proved to be 
flawed. It took a long time for these regiments to be used in combat and many of them 
were frequently relegated to reserve duties.164 The degree to which regiments were used 
depended on several factors: the experience and reputation of the unit; the local situation 
of where regiments were posted; and the urgency of the situation.  
The main army remained in New York until December of 1779 when General 
Clinton launched a major new campaign in the South by invading South Carolina. This 
theatre of war would be where the Loyalist Regiments would see more sustained combat 
than ever before. Up until 1780, the Loyalists had seen a considerable amount of combat 
but rarely in conjunction with other Loyalists in the main combat theatres. The Southern 
Campaigns would see Loyalists units fighting together in several battles and in some 
cases defeating Patriot armies.165 The Southern Campaigns have attracted a significant 
amount of historiographical attention and the Loyalists‘ role in these campaigns is 
emphasised quite prominently although there are no works devoted completely to them.166 
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If there is a consensus amongst recent historians it is that the existing Loyalist units were 
extremely efficient and successful in the Southern campaigns but that with one or two 
exceptions the newly formed regiments were undermanned and not particularly successful 
and the militia were next to useless particularly after their major defeat at Kings Mountain 
in October 1780. 
 The campaign was initially a spectacular success for the British and 
several Loyalist regiments contributed greatly to its success.167 Clinton landed near 
Charleston in April 1780. It fell a month later, after which Clinton returned to New York 
taking some of his army with him, including the Queens Rangers.168 He left Cornwallis in 
command. Cornwallis then proceeded to advance into the interior and by the autumn of 
1780 most resistance in South Carolina had been quelled after the victory at Camden on 
16 August 1780, at which the British Legion and the Volunteers of Ireland played a 
decisive part.169 After this victory Major Patrick Fergusson the commander of the Loyalist 
militia was despatched into the Appalachians on the border between North and South 
Carolina.170  As mentioned above the British had put a great deal of trust in the 
inexpensive militia. This trust proved to be misplaced as Fergusson managed to collect 
over 1000 recruits to the militia but they were isolated and defeated at Kings Mountain on 
7 October.171 Only a very small detachment of Provincial troops fought at the battle and it 
proved that hastily raised militia were no substitute for well trained Provincial Regiments. 
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  Although the British would have further success in the Carolinas they 
were never to fully regain the upper hand. After a force led by Tarleton and the British 
Legion lost badly at Cowpens in January 1781, Cornwallis decide to head to Virginia 
where a brigade commanded by the Patriot turncoat Benedict Arnold and consisting of 
Loyalists and British regulars-including the Queens Rangers- had established itself.172 
Cornwallis joined up with Arnold in May 1781 and after a summer of skirmishing with 
the Patriots he was besieged at Yorktown where he was forced to surrender in October 
1781. After Cornwallis had left for Virginia, a rearguard commanded by Lord Rawdon- 
spearheaded by the Volunteers of Ireland and including the Kings American Regiment 
and the Prince of Wales Volunteers- successfully held the Patriots in check for most of 
the early summer of 1781 before being forced by weakness of numbers to retreat to 
Charleston. 173 
So how successful were the Loyalist Regiments in combat? In general they 
performed relatively well. Apart from a few early setbacks, the organised regiments 
acquitted themselves well in most of the actions and campaigns they took part in. The 
major defeats where Loyalists participated in - with the exception of Cowpens- were 
where it was hastily raised Loyalist militia rather than Provincial Regiments. So were the 
Loyalists not used enough by the British? Could they have been committed in greater 
numbers and were they too often held in reserve or placed on garrison duty? There is 
some reason to suggest that many Loyalist regiments were held back too long, but it 
tended to be the less experienced regiments that were held back until they were needed. 
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Those with experience were used frequently. It is difficult to blame the British for 
prioritising the regiments with combat experience and neglecting those behind the lines. 
By 1780 the Loyalists were being used in far greater numbers and in general the British 
were pleased with the results and used them again. However, there is the Smith argument 
that by the end of the war the British were relying too greatly on the Loyalists. Again with 
the war becoming global the British had little option but to rely on the Loyalists. They 
certainly made mistakes, the reliance on militia in 1780 being a significant one, but time 
was undoubtedly against the British in 1780 and they had little time to train Provincial 
regiments. The Provincial regiments that fought so well in 1780 had had three years to get 
to that standard. Possibly more units could have been raised in 1777 and 1778 but those 
that were raised did a good job. The case studies will examine individual regiments in 
combat in greater detail and will demonstrate that Loyalists Regiments did their best to 
win the war. 
 
 Conclusion 
The War ended badly for the Loyalist regiments. Many of them were captured at 
Yorktown and the rest remained in New York, Charleston and various outposts on the 
frontiers. In 1783, they were demobilised in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Many of those that had 
not already left chose to remain there, where many of them helped to construct the 
Canadian state. Yet, this chapter has demonstrated that the Loyalist regiments can by no 
means be considered complete failures. They have a place in the American military 
tradition, one which is often neglected. By examining how the regiments were formed, 
administered and used in combat, this chapter and indeed the thesis has tried to reassess 
these issues.  The chronological approach allows the detailed examination of the massive 
changes made in the Loyalist regiments over the course of the war. It also allows the 
chapter to assess the changing nature of the British response to their Loyalist regiments. 
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While the failure of enough men to join the British cause was a factor in the British 
defeat, those that did enlist in a Loyalist Regiment did not let the British down. Equally it 
is debatable that the British let their Loyalist soldiers down. There were serious mistakes 
made, especially early on in the war, but many of these were corrected after 1778. Smith 
argues by that stage it was too late but those Loyalists that had joined the British were 
undoubtedly treated well. Their families were cared for at the expense of the British and 
many received compensation for their losses (admittedly rarely to the full amount) and 
were given land in Canada. Had the war ended differently, the soldiers of the Loyalist 
regiments could have emerged as popular heroes but as it was they were outcast and 
badly treated by history. 
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Chapter 2 
The Loyalist Regiments Organisation, Themes and Issues. 
Introduction 
Military Organisation does not seem as interesting a subject as battles, raids and 
ambushes but to properly study armies in wars it is just as vital. Before they go on the 
battlefield soldiers have to be recruited, mustered, disciplined, trained, clothed, paid, 
organised into specialties and supplied with weapons. This is never an easy task even 
with the full weight of a government organised for war behind an army. On the surface, 
the Loyalists had an advantage that their Patriot countrymen lacked in that they were 
backed by the British Army who could finance and supply anything they required. The 
reality is somewhat more complicated. Although Loyalists Regiments after 1776 were run 
by the Provincial Department this department did not oversee all aspects of military 
organisation. Much of this was arranged within the regiments themselves. Therefore there 
is a great deal of variation in how regiments were administered and this chapter will 
attempt to untangle some of the confusion. It will also address the thematic issues that 
will be discussed in greater detail in the case study chapters such as what motivated men 
to join the regiments and their backgrounds. 
 By investigating how the Loyalists regiments were organised, composed and 
what motivated them this chapter will add to a much neglected area of Revolutionary War 
historiography. Military organisation reveals as much about how wars are won and lost as 
any study of the battlefield. Napoleon‘s oft quoted remark about armies and stomachs is 
one of the truest statements about soldiers ever made. From the earliest days of warfare 
soldiers have needed some forms of administration. As historians like Hew Strachan, 
John Brewer and J.A. Houlding have demonstrated the eighteenth century was where 
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military organisation began to become far more sophisticated.1 Problems were 
encountered and the winning sides seemed to be able to invent new solutions to overcome 
them. The American Revolutionary War was for both sides one of the hardest tasks for 
military administrators. The Patriots had to organise a whole new army and the British 
had to manage a war fought 2000 miles from Whitehall. There are countless works about 
Revolutionary War battles but very few on the organisation of the soldiers. Sylvia Frey, 
Holly Mayer and Robert K. Wright have all have examined organisation of the armies of 
the American Revolutionary War but no-one has attempted to do it for the Loyalists. 2 By 
examining the motivation and composition it is possible to gain a fuller comprehension of 
the kind of men who became Loyalist soldiers. To understand the Loyalist regiments as 
entities it is vital to understand all aspects of their Revolutionary War experiences and not 
just the battles.  
 Recruiting  
The first experience a man had when he joined a Loyalist regiment was the 
recruiting process. Until 1777 there was no dominant method of recruiting Loyalists. The 
method that the British Army preferred to use was to advertise the new regiment in local 
newspapers, wait for recruits to come to an appointed place, and then to appoint recruiting 
officers and sergeants and send them out to recruit men, enticing them with the offer of a 
bounty.3 This method was used for many of the first Provincial Regiments such as the 
Nova Scotia Volunteers. As the British Army was a volunteer army, all soldiers joining 
were paid a sum─called a bounty─ to induce them to join. This sum varied enormously 
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depending on the regiment. For example, the recruits who joined the Queens Rangers in 
the autumn of 1776 were paid the sum of twenty three shillings but some soldiers 
recruited later on in the war received as much as five guineas.4  Bounty monies were 
often only part paid by the government and the commanders and officers often made a 
contribution particularly if there was competition for recruits.5 However, this still left the 
British Army in America with a large bill, which considerably added to the expense of the 
Loyalist units.  
There was an alternative system of recruiting, which was considerably cheaper, 
and provided inducements to potential officers. This was the system of raising units for 
rank.6 This system had been used in the French and Indian War and previous American 
wars.7 It involved recruiters being rewarded with rank according to how many recruits 
they could bring in. It still involved a bounty for the recruits but had the advantage that 
the potential officers gained increased rank─usually up to the rank of Captain─ for 
getting as many recruits as possible, which encouraged them to pay the bounties 
themselves. In some respects it is like the modern inducement of performance related pay. 
It was regarded as a way to raise as many recruits as possible in a rapid time. Smith points 
out that the recruiters were encouraged to bear many of the expenses for recruiting and 
were not included on the officers Half-Pay list, all of which reduced expenses for the 
British Government.8 However, the system had numerous disadvantages. It meant that the 
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British had no direct control over who became officers, thus leading to men who were 
regarded as ―improper persons,‖ becoming officers.9 Anderson argues that even in the 
French and Indian War the system of raising for rank was distrusted and used in 
desperation.10  George III disapproved of the system and tried to discourage its use.11 In 
1776, several early Provincial regiments were raised for rank, notably Robert Rogers‘ 
incarnation of the Queens Rangers. In early 1777 because of numerous alleged ―abuses‖ 
which the new Inspector General of Provincial Forces, Alexander Innes regarded as 
having brought ―disgrace and ruin to the Provincial Service‖ the system was scrapped for 
Provincial units.12 The Queens Rangers were radically reformed and the regular system of 
recruiting introduced to them and all other Provincial regiments.13 This system was 
adhered to until the end of the war in Provincial regiments. However, in the Southern 
Campaign of 1780 new Loyalist recruits were needed urgently and cheaply so the raising 
for rank was resurrected for militia units. However, the ranks assigned were junior to any 
regular British or Provincial rank. For example, the militia commanded by Major Patrick 
Fergusson in 1780 contained several Major Generals of Militia all under the command of 
the aforesaid major.14 The Provincial officers were junior to regulars of their rank but 
senior to regulars of lower rank which at least gave them some status. 
Prohibiting recruiting for rank amongst the Provincial Regiments brought some 
problems, however. It was a good way of rapidly attracting recruits and without it there 
                                                 
9
 For an excellent contemporary critique of this system see Alexander Innes to Henry Clinton, 9 
November  1779, TS11/220. 
10
 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 488. 
11
 George III to Lord North, 26 August 1775, in John Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, vol. III, 
No. 1702; Paul Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats p. 35. 
12
 Alexander Innes to Henry Clinton, 9 November 1779, TS11/220; Paul Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats 
p.71. 
13
 See various documents in TS 11/220 examined in detail in Queens Rangers Part 1. 
14
 The Cornwallis papers contain the appointments of these militia officers. They were usually men of 
standing in their local communities: PRO 30/55/1-11. 
 81 
were few inducements for potential recruits other than loyalty and the bounty, much of 
which the soldiers would have to spend on equipment. In the latter stages of the war when 
demand for Loyalist recruits was especially high, individual regiments tried various 
inducements to secure men. Some offered men land in Canada and others offered other 
financial inducements.15 An example is the Volunteers of Ireland who in 1778 advertised 
that ―any person, who shall bring an approved good Recruit, shall receive Half a Guinea 
for each.‖16 This is extremely interesting as it seems very similar to recruiting for rank but 
with a financial rather than a status inducement. While it did not tie the British Army into 
appointing officers they did not want, it seems that this method could attract those with 
little concern for the cause, but concern for their own financial gain. At least offering rank 
had attracted people who wanted to hold a commission and as the bounties offered under 
that system were much lower than those offered later in the war it is arguable that it could 
have attracted less mercenary men.  
There has been some historiographical controversy over the recruiting methods 
employed by the British. Phillip Ranlet has questioned whether the New York Loyalists 
were truly volunteers. Ranlet concluded that the Loyalist regiments in New York were 
often made up of Patriot prisoners, convicts and in some cases impressed men. The last 
charge is the most controversial. The British Army, unlike the Navy, was a volunteer 
force. Although the practice of emptying the prisons to staff regiments was fairly 
common in Britain, it was not to have been employed with the Loyalist Regiments.17 The 
hope was for loyal Americans to flock to the colours. However, Ranlet concludes that the 
supply of recruits was not as free flowing as hoped and other measures has to be taken to 
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fill up the ranks of the Loyalist regiments. He contends that recruiting parties were often 
sent out into villages in New York State with quotas that they were supposed to meet and 
that men were often forced into service.18  To support Ranlet‘s view there is the testimony 
of the Native American Loyalist Joseph Brant who related of story of some of his 
warriors having to go into hiding to avoid being pressed into Butler‘s Rangers on the New 
York frontiers.19 Sir John Johnson formed the Kings Royal Regiment of New York 
largely from his tenants.20 Whether this makes them volunteers in the strictest sense is a 
difficult question as Johnson could have made threats about their tenancies.  
 It is possible to take issue with some of Ranlet‘s arguments by stating that there 
is little evidence of the practice taking place outside of New York and if it had been truly 
widespread the Loyalists would have been far more numerous than they were. Forced 
recruiting was never authorised by the Provincial Service but was carried out by 
individual recruiting parties taking matters into their own hands and exceeding their 
remit. As impressing men was illegal, it has to be argued that it was a dangerous practice 
and most recruiting was done legally with bounties being offered. Corruption did happen 
and there were instances of fictional bounties being claimed but again where this occurred 
action was taken to prevent it happening again.21  The British were always very conscious 
of their need to attract rather than discourage Loyalists and nothing could be more 
discouraging than widespread enforced recruitment. 
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The Recruiting Poster below is for the Pennsylvania Loyalists, raised by 
Colonel Isaac Allen in late 1777. The rewards it offers are quite significant, not only a 
sizable bounty of five pounds but fifty acres of land after the war.22 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the main reasons for the Southern 
campaigns of 1779-1781 was the view that the South was the ideal place to find recruits, 
to create new units and augment existing ones. There was certainly a major recruiting 
drive in Georgia in 1779 and South Carolina in 1780. Several new regiments were created 
and high bounties were offered to attract recruits to the various new regiments, given the 
increase in competition. A recruiting poster from Georgia in 1779 stated that Bounties for 
an infantry regiment had risen to the sum of five guineas, over five times the sum of 
twenty shillings that was common in 1776.23 This brings up the issue of whether there 
was a distinction in the type of recruits the Loyalists attracted in the later stages of the 
war. Were the most enthusiastic men recruited in the earliest stages of the war and 
therefore did the later men have to be induced by increased offers? The potential risks 
were certainly greater as British victory was by no means assured by 1779 so the men 
would have had to consider their choices more carefully. This makes inducements a vital 
part of recruitment. It is possible that many of the later recruits were motivated by 
financial gain but against this there is the issue of the brutality of the Southern campaigns 
and the fact that potential Loyalists were at risk of their lives even after they had been 
captured, which may have put many men off. 
Yet despite the larger bounties, the new regiments did not attract as many recruits 
as they had hoped for in the South. The new regiments created competition for recruits 
with the existing regiments, who naturally were given priority as they were frequently in 
combat and had high rates of attrition. This meant that many of the new Southern units 
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found it difficult to get recruits and therefore they were not used in combat as they were 
too small. Smith contends that the opportunity to recruit Southerners had been in 1776 
and not in 1780.24 It is hard to argue with Smith on this issue. The Provincial regiments 
did attract recruits and several new units were formed but not in the numbers hoped for.25  
The case studies will highlight many of the recruiting issues raised above in 
respect to the individual regiments studied. The Queens Rangers chapter will examine 
raising for rank in depth and will also look at recruiting patterns over time in that 
regiment. The Butler‘s Rangers chapter will look at the problems of how commanders 
financed recruiting drives. On balance there were many mistakes with the recruiting 
system and many mistakes were made, both by the Provincial Service and by individual 
regiments and even recruiters but it is hard to see what else could be done as none of the 
recruiting systems were perfect. Some latitude had to be given to individual regiments in 
their practises as they were often risking life and limb to do the recruiting. Had the British 
used British recruiters under a strictly managed system then they might have had 
uniformity but they might not have recruited so many men as at least the recruiters from 
the Loyalist regiments were Americans who could attract their fellow countrymen. If 
there was a fall in the number of recruits towards the end of the war it is not from lack of 
effort but because the war was going badly. 
Composition 
One of the biggest questions hanging over any study of Loyalist soldiers, is who 
were they? Where were did they come from, and what were their backgrounds? To 
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answer these questions, is not an easy task as the records that could provide answers to 
these questions are widely spread and often incomplete.26 Militant Loyalists were diverse 
socially, geographically and ethnically. Nelson‘s idea of ―conscious minorities‖ defined 
the Loyalists as a political group drawn together because of the oppression they had 
received. Nelson‘s thesis is relevant to Loyalist soldiers, although there are distinct 
differences from his ―American Tories‖ and the soldiers who made up the rank and file. 
The people that he and Wallace Brown studied were largely political Loyalists, educated, 
wealthy people, who left much more in the way of recorded testimony of their thoughts 
and actions.27 The soldiers were from all stations in life with no one background 
predominating. Establishing the composition of the regiments, however, is important to 
forming a wider picture of the militant loyalists, especially as they are much so socially 
different to the political Loyalists who left in 1775. 
How then to set about evaluating the composition of the Loyalist regiments? Each 
of the Loyalist regiments was different in terms of the backgrounds and origins of the 
soldiers in it but there are patterns which can sometimes be identified. Where a regiment 
was from a clearly defined geographical location, such as the South Carolina Loyalists, 
then there is some shared identification between the men. Equally there were regiments 
designed to be composed of men from the same national background, such as the Royal 
Highland Emigrants or the Volunteers of Ireland. However, none of these distinctions 
were absolute as by the end of the war all the Loyalist regiments would have to recruit out 
of the originally defined parameters due to casualties and desertion. 
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The factor which diversified even the most geographically defined regiment was 
that of social class. Loyalist soldiers were from a wide variety of class backgrounds and 
previous occupations.28 In the Revolutionary War British Army, class differences were 
clearly defined. Officers were aristocrats and gentry and the men largely came from the 
lowest strata of society.29 The Loyalist regiments were far more diverse than this. 
Commissions were not purchased, which therefore meant that all commissions were down 
to the whims of senior officers, both in the British Army or the Provincial Service. This 
often led to a far greater diversification in background amongst Loyalist officers.30 Many 
of the officers had served in the French and Indian war or were men of standing in their 
local communities. This does not necessarily mean that they came from wealthy or 
privileged backgrounds. This is not to say that a social divide between officers and men 
did not exist in the Loyalist Regiments. There was a variance from regiment to regiment. 
Frontier units like Butler‘s Rangers tended to have experienced frontiersmen both as 
officers and in the ranks whereas other regiments, particularly those commanded by 
British Officers like the post 1777 Queens Rangers or the British Legion had officers who 
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were approved for commissions by the British High command and often tended to be 
from a landed or professional background.31 
Social distinctions amongst the rank and file were also varied. There were 
loyalists who had been artisans, labourers, farmers and farm workers and clerks.32 The 
overwhelming profession of most eighteenth century Americans was agricultural work 
and this is also reflected amongst the Loyalists.33 While some Loyalists owned land 
others were tenants or farm labourers.34 Many of them had been forced off their farms in 
upper New York and New England and fled to the British Lines in Canada and New City 
where they joined regiments. Various artisans were represented in the regiments. The 
former professions of these men were often put to use in the regiments. Loyalists also 
served in the various ancillary departments of the British Army in America, such as the 
Commissary or the Wagon Master‘s departments.35 
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There was also considerable variance in national and ethnic groups amongst the 
Loyalists. Nationality of Loyalists is an oft discussed area.36 Were British born men more 
likely to become Loyalists than American born men?  Harry M. Ward has argued that 
―three fourths of Loyalists were European born‖ by the end of the war.37 This would 
suggest that it was indeed the case that there was a distinct preponderance of non 
American born men in the Loyalist ranks. Most muster rolls do not give nationality so it 
is a very difficult thing to prove.38  So while Ward‘s claims are debateable, particularly 
considering the fact that most Loyalist regiments recruited extensively in the south in 
1780 and 1781,  it does bring up the issue of just how ―American‖ the Loyalists were. In 
some respects it could be said that nationality did not really matter if all the nationalities 
were treated equally. However, there were some regiments which were formed with the 
express intention of recruiting British born men. The question is, were these units treated 
better than more ―American‖ units? 
Three Loyalist Regiments were originally designed to consist of British born 
men.39 These regiments had British regular commanders and all saw considerable service. 
This might suggest that the regiments may have been shown more favour than regiments 
with a preponderance of Americans. However, despite the original recruitment intentions 
of these regiments they were all forced to withdraw their stringent recruitment policies as 
the War progressed as both of these regiments while originally designed to consist of 
British born soldiers, had high casualty rates in 1780 and 1781 and could not afford to be 
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choosy as to the nativity of their recruits.40 This meant that even the most ―British‖ of 
Provincial regiments would almost certainly have contained a sizeable number of 
American born men. However, if there was a difference in how the regiments were used 
due to the nationality of their commanders then it is an issue worth investigation.  
Were the Queens Rangers, the Royal Highland Emigrants, the Volunteers of 
Ireland or the British Legion given superior treatment because they had British 
Commanders? They were well equipped and saw a lot of combat. The previous chapter 
has demonstrated that many American commanded regiments were used extensively in 
combat. In 1778 Lord Germain wrote that Loyalists would be happier being commanded 
by Americans.41  There were several American born Brigadier Generals and one Major 
General. However, none of them were ever given command over British regulars in the 
field. Yet the British Loyalist commanders, MacLean, Rawdon, Tarleton, and Simcoe all 
commanded British regulars alongside their Loyalist units and Alexander Innes, the 
British born  Inspector General of Provincials, was also given a Provincial regiment, the 
South Carolina Royalists. The British also introduced a considerable number of regular 
junior officers into the provincial ranks. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Muster 
Master General, Edward Winslow, complained about the British using the Provincial 
Regiments as a repository for officers who fell short of the standards required in frontline 
regular units. 42 Yet, of the Provincial regiments raised after 1778, the most successful of 
them had British commanders. So is it a case of American officers not being trusted to 
command British regulars whereas the British born Provincial officers─of junior rank to 
the Provincial Brigadiers─were given independent commands, on the basis of 
nationality? 
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The issue is very complex. Possibly it was not the nationality that was the issue 
but that of professionalism over amateurism. British regulars would not accept being 
commanded by a soldier they regarded as an amateur and none of the American 
Provincial commanders had held regular rank, whereas, the abovementioned British 
officers all held regular commissions even if their ranks were relatively junior. Even these 
men were not entirely trusted by regular older officers. Many of them complained about 
being commanded by these very young men.43 So it is possible to suggest that if there was 
an issue that prejudiced the British Army against the Provincials it was not of ethnicity 
but of professionals over amateurs and experience over youth. This would also hold for 
the ordinary soldiers. Once the Provincial units were considered trained enough they were 
used in combat and if they proved themselves then they would be used more often. This is 
not to suggest that the British were without prejudice, but it is possible to argue that 
especially after 1778 the need for Loyalists outweighed any prejudices. 
The composition of the Loyalist Regiments can be compared to that of the 
Continental Army.44 The Continentals contained many men of similar backgrounds to the 
Loyalists. Niemeyer‘s investigated the social backgrounds of Continental Army soldiers 
and found considerable variance. This is because  continentals were able to choose from a 
large range of the population in areas where the British Army were not present. There 
were also a wide variety of national backgrounds represented in the Colonial Army, 
including British born citizens. While it is often estimated that such men were more likely 
to be Loyalists this is by no means necessarily the case and the reasons for picking a 
particular side were often more complex than nationality. 
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As stated earlier it is very difficult to accurately establish the social and national 
composition of the Loyalist regiments. What is definite is that there was no one pattern. 
The regiments were socially and nationally diverse, which makes them in some ways a 
genuinely American Army as they share the diverse characteristics of America itself in 
the eighteenth century and later. 
 
Motivation 
This section will examine what motivated men to fight in the Loyalist Regiments. 
Investigating what motivated men, who have been dead for 200 years, to fight for a cause 
is by its nature a speculative affair. It is made more complicated that the American 
Revolution was a Civil War yet unlike the American Civil War, it was not a war that was 
constructed almost entirely on geographical as well ideological lines. So how does a 
historian construct a model as to what motivated Loyalist soldiers to risks their lives, 
homes, reputation and families? There is no one answer and no one model. It depends on 
numerous factors. Ideology did play a part, so did geography, ethnicity, comradeship, 
intimidation and potential rewards.45 The problem is that for all the attractions of these 
factors each of them can be partially deconstructed as single factor.  
 Ideology was undoubtedly an important factor in influencing military 
Loyalists. While there were certainly many who fully believed in the British cause right 
or wrong, for others the decision was more complicated. The concept of the Whig 
Loyalist is an interesting one. Many Loyalists, although not completely agreeing with the 
actions of the British Government in the years before the Revolution, thought that 
violently leaving Britain and declaring independence was a step too far. Three of the most 
prominent militant Loyalists, Timothy Ruggles, Robert Rogers, and Cordlandt Skinner all 
fit into this grouping. Ruggles had represented Massachusetts at the Stamp Act Congress, 
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and Rogers and Skinner had played their cards close enough to their chest until 1775, that 
they were both offered high commands in the Continental Army.46 As men joined the 
Loyalist regiments throughout the war and not in one mass group in 1775 or 1776, this 
would suggest that many who would have violently disagreed with the Stamp Act in 1765 
could have been found amongst the Loyalist ranks. 
The problem with proving ideological convictions, however, is a lack of evidence. 
There are some testimonies of Loyalty from Loyalist soldiers, although far more from 
officers than from ordinary soldiers. The testimonies from Sergeants Mundy and Jarvis─ 
examined in the Queens Rangers case studies─ provide unique insights into the 
motivation of enlisted men, but they are rare. By far the most common document in 
which these sentiments were expressed were memorials, which were usually sent to a 
senior officer by junior officers. The following memorial is a good example of a Loyalty 
declaration by officers of the Guides and Pioneers: ―That your Memorialists from pure 
principles of Loyalty and Attachment to His Majestys Person and Government, left their 
plentifull habitations, to support that Government by Acting in the most precarius 
Station.‖47 This would seem to be an ideological declaration, yet a memorial was a 
document asking for some sort of compensation, be it financial or otherwise, and this 
document is no exception.48 There are occasional testimonies of Loyalists taunting 
                                                 
46
 Ruggles had fail to sign the declaration against the Stamp Act and became identified as a Loyalist 
after that, Skinner was Speaker of the House of Representatives in New Jersey until 1775 only making 
his decision in December of that Year. See Chapter 1; Rogers played both sides off against each other 
until he was forced to make a decision by being imprisoned on Washington‘s orders, see Chapter 3. 
47
Natl. Vernon, Abraham Ireddel, Abraham Pastorius, John Knight, Lts of the Guides and Pioneers to 
General Guy Carleton 3 September 1783  PRO 30/55/10162 online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/g&p/gpmem1.htm accessed 12/8/2009. 
48
 The chapter Queens Rangers Part 2 includes a letter from Sgt Mundy which expresses his zeal for the 
cause, but also asking for a commission. This document is a rare example of one from a Non 
 94 
enemies and expressing their Loyalty but again this was often in the heat of battle and 
was as much to gain an advantage over their enemy as anything else. In 1783, Major 
Dulany of the Maryland Loyalists, gave a very interesting testimony in which he 
expressed the complicated ideological situation that many Loyalists found themselves in. 
He wrote to the Commander in Chief, Guy Carleton, stating that if America received 
Independence he could no longer fight for the British. He stated: ―My duty as a subject, 
the happiness which America enjoyed under the British Government, and the miseries to 
which she would be reduced by an independency, were the motives that induced me to 
join the British Army; nor are there any dangers, or difficulties, that I would not 
cheerfully undergo, to effect a happy restoration. But, at the same time, that I acted, with 
the greatest zeal, against my rebellious countrymen, I never forgot that I was an 
American.‖49 This is an excellent declaration of principles and demonstrates just exactly 
what Loyalists had to put themselves through to serve the British. Not only a material 
risk, but one which troubled many a conscience.  
The other factors are equally complex. There were no clear-cut geographical 
divisions in the Revolutionary War. Loyalist soldiers came from all the colonies. While it 
was more likely that they would come from colonies that were occupied by the British, 
for example New York, there were no colonies that were split exactly one way or the 
other. Equally, colonies that were held to be predominantly Patriot in sympathy, like 
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Massachusetts and Virginia, contributed considerable numbers of Loyalists to the 
Regiments. 
Ethnicity is an interesting factor. Would a soldier join because everyone else in 
his ethnic group was joining?  Numerous ethnic groups contributed considerable numbers 
of Loyalists, notably African Americans, Native Americans, Scots, Irish and other 
Europeans. There were several thousand Black Loyalists and they have attracted recent 
work by Simon Schama.50 Native Americans were equally divided, depending on which 
side their tribe allied with.51 Other ethnic groups were represented on both sides although 
there certainly did seem to be a preponderance of Highland Scots in the British Ranks. 
The Highland Scots may have chosen the British out of Loyalty but there is also the factor 
of intimidation. 
Scottish Highlanders living in North Carolina complained of intimidation on 
ethnic grounds, which may have been a factor in their decision when war came.52 They 
certainly provided considerable numbers of soldiers to the Royal Highland Emigrants and 
the Queens Rangers. Many people became Loyalists, not through choice, but because 
they would not commit to the patriots. An example of this was the Loyalist spy and 
officer of the New Jersey Volunteers James Moody, a Sussex County, New Jersey, farmer 
who was attacked for refusing to declare his Loyalty to the Patriots.53 Thousands of 
Refugees flooded into Niagara and other Canadian frontier posts in 1776 and 1777.54 
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Their reasons for being forced from their farms were often that they had refused to sign 
declarations similar to that proffered to Moody. They had taken no active role in opposing 
the Revolution; they had just not actively supported it. Of these refugees, many joined 
Loyalist Regiments so that they could take a more active revenge against their 
tormentors.55 As well as being forced from their farms Loyalists frequently had their land 
seized from them formally by Patriot local authorities. This was a common occurrence 
throughout the war.56 
The question of vengeance is one that will emerge as a motive for Loyalists 
frequently throughout this dissertation. This could be for the factors mentioned above, 
intimidation and land seizures or reprisals. This often created conditions for brutality 
especially in areas where full British authority was not present. The frontiers of New 
York, Georgia and the Carolinas are examples of these conditions. The case studies will 
examine vengeance as a motivating factor,  in respect of the men of the British Legion 
and Butler‘s Rangers Thomas Humphrey has chronicled how the tenants of the Hudson 
Valley in New York rose up against their Patriot landlords the Livingstone family in 1775 
and 1776. 57 Many of them went on to join Loyalist regiments. 
All these factors can go part of the way to explaining what motivated men to join 
the regiments but not what kept them there. James Macpherson‘s brilliant study of 
American Civil War soldiers, ―Of Cause and Comrades‖ defined factors that kept men in 
the ranks during a long war. He looked at comradeship, religion, ideology and vengeance, 
all factors relative to the Loyalists.58  Wallace Brown examined religion and particularly 
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Anglicanism as a motivating factor for Loyalists.59 Many Loyalist soldiers were Anglican 
but equally many were not, there were would have been Presbyterians in regiments with 
large numbers of lowland Scots in regiments like the Queens Rangers or the British 
Legion and there was also a regiment consisting entirely of Roman Catholics.60 
Comradeship is one of the most important factors. Friendship and a shared sense of 
experience are common factors in all wars and by developing relationships out with 
family groups the men had an additional reason to remain with the colours.61 As stated in 
the introduction there is no single motivating factor for Loyalist soldiers. Each man would 
have been entirely different. Even recorded testimonies do not tell the full story. Yet this 
is the ultimately the case for volunteer soldiers in all wars. 
Supplies 
The most important priority for any regiment, after recruits, was supplies and 
equipment. Every Loyalist regiment had to be fully equipped before they could be used in 
combat. A divisional commander would be reluctant to risk troops whose weapons might 
let them down. Ranlet argues that Loyalist units were often under equipped and were 
given second choice of weapons after the regular units.62 He ascribes the slow start of the 
New York Volunteers to the fact that the British were reluctant to spend money on the 
Loyalists in early 1776. He says that the British refused to equip the New York 
Volunteers properly because of the financial outlay it would have entailed.63 Ranlet 
argues that this treatment had a negative effect on recruitment. He also cites the evidence 
of the Muster master General of Loyalist forces Edward Winslow who in 1779 described 
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the poor supply situation of the New York Volunteers in 1776, he stated that:  ―Sensible 
Men who were zealots in the Kings cause had anticipated the most cordial welcome and 
ample support to such as should join the troops. They were exceedingly disconcerted at 
the treatment of these volunteers. It was not credited that a General whose command was 
so excessive could possibly want the power to furnish the common necessaries for 200 
men.‖64  As the man responsible for administering the Loyalist regiments, Winslow‘s 
evidence can be regarded as a reliable guide which demonstrates that the Loyalists were 
not General Howe‘s main priority in 1776. In Howe‘s defence the context of the war has 
to be taken into account. He was at the start of his campaign in New York and the 
frontline regiments were his priority rather than new untrained units. However, after 
1776, while there is evidence to suggest that some Loyalist units were still given low 
priority for arms, it generally tended to be those who were far from combat.65  
As with so much relating to the Loyalists there were two classes of regiment and 
some Provincial units were better equipped than others. For example no expense was 
spared on the Queens Rangers and the British Legion, many of whom were equipped with 
more expensive rifles. These regiments both had British officers in command, and both 
the commanders, Simcoe and Tarleton, would have had more leverage with the 
Quartermasters and Commissary department, particularly as they were highly regarded by 
General Clinton. However, the nationality of the commanders is not necessarily the sole 
reason for them being better equipped than some units, rather that they were regularly 
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used in combat and even the most obstinate clerk in charge of supplies would have 
trouble denying them to front-line units and therefore risking the wrath of senior officers. 
The New York Volunteers and the New Jersey Volunteers had American commanders 
and both saw much combat and were equipped accordingly.66  
This brings up an important point about many Loyalist Regiments. Those who did 
not actively serve in combat were often given low priority for recruits, arms and supplies. 
This meant that the men often became disheartened and were tempted into desertion. A 
regiment with a high desertion rate was therefore less likely to be put into combat as it 
would have been feared that they would not stand up well to the stresses of combat. It is 
hard to blame the British entirely for this, they needed the most efficient regiments in the 
fighting zone and once a regiment had fallen into a state of neglect it was not an easy 
thing to bring the regiment out of neglect. Thus the neglect, if there was any, was not for 
any ulterior motives but simply because regiments that were threatened by the enemy had 
a greater need than those who were not in immediate danger. 
If there was any neglect, there were also attempts from the Provincial Service to 
do something about it. It was Colonel Alexander Innes‘ job to ensure that that all the 
Provincial regiments were properly equipped to fight. In April 1778 he inspected the 
Kings Orange Rangers in New York City and found them in a ―wretched situation.67‖ He 
found evidence of ―neglect and inattention in every part of duty.‖ This situation prompted 
Innes to take a strong line in regards to the poor standards of equipment in Provincial 
units as a whole. He wrote: 
The Inspector General is also obliged to remark in 
general that proper attention has not been paid to the repeated 
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orders relative to furnishing the troops with a proper supply of 
necessaries. He therefore begs leave to request that the 
Provincial Troops should be cleared with to the 24 April and 
previous to such clearance they should be furnished with three 
good shirts, three pairs stockings, two pairs of shoes, two pairs 
of linen trousers and a black velvet stock, those necessaries to 
be examined by the Inspector or Deputy at the next inspection 
and a report made accordingly to the General commanding in 
New York.68 
This would suggest that the there was a serious problem with supplies in the 
Loyalist regiments. However, it also suggests that the British command was ordering that 
they were to be properly equipped, and that these orders were not being met by the 
auxiliary departments responsible for equipping the troops. There was no separate 
Provincial Commissary department, and therefore all supplies came from British stores, 
who might naturally favour British regiments unless they were specifically told otherwise. 
The fact that Innes had to go to the lengths of writing to the Secretary of State for 
America to ensure these basic supplies, demonstrated that there was indeed a problem, 
but the fact that such an influential man as Innes, who had Clinton‘s respect, was able to 
raise the issue ensured that it was more likely to be dealt with. The problems would not 
necessarily be solved but the fact that Innes was alive to the issues ensured that there was 
official recognition of the difficulties. E. Wayne Carp demonstrates that the Continental 
Army faced similar supply problems.69 They were beset with supply problems which 
were exacerbated by misappropriating of supplies by both soldiers and civilians. Carp 
argues that while these issues remained for the whole war they were considerably 
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improved by the changes instituted by Baron Von Steuben in 1778. Innes does not 
explicitly mention that the Loyalist‘s supply situation suffered as a result of criminal 
behaviour there is strong chance that this was the case. 
By 1781, Innes had improved the situation somewhat and there were Provincial 
storage facilities in New York and Charleston. The following table is compiled from a 
document drawn up by Innes in 1781 which lists the total amount of clothing for 
provincials held in store in New York and Charleston: 
Table 1: State of Cloathing for Provincials In New York and Charleston April 1781. 
Items Sergeants Drummers Privates 
Coats 494 200 9708 
Jackets 80 38 654 
Waist Coats 631 204 10089 
Breeches 495 199 8279 
Sashes 210   
Belts and Slings  101  
Leather Breeches   1700 
Shirts   12201 
Stocks and Buckles   8233 
Shoes Pairs   16220 
Stockings Pairs   8134 
Buckles Pairs   3416 
Boots Pairs   1128 
Shoe Soles pairs   18554 
Hats   6166 
Mittens   3343 
Leggings   21121 
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White Epaulets   718 
Yellow Epaulets   692 
Gold Epaulets   22 
Source: State of Cloathing in New York and Charleston, Alex. Innes, 25 April 1781, Clinton Papers 
Vol. 53, f. 25, Clements Library, online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/supp/supstat1.htm 
accessed 12/11/2008. 
 
This table demonstrates the vast range of equipment that the British had to provide to its 
Provincial soldiers. It is roughly equivalent to that issued to British regulars, although 
there were differences in style and colour. While some of it is ceremonial or for 
decoration much of it was essential to the soldier‘s survival in harsh weather. Also it is 
important to point out that this was the clothing that was in Army storage and not the 
clothing that the soldiers were actually wearing or those that were in regimental stores for 
day to day use. The document does not include officer‘s clothing which they were 
expected to provide themselves. 
The British appear to have improved supplies to the Loyalists from 1778.70  They 
had to supply not only Loyalist soldiers but civilian Loyalists. Most British regiments had 
some women and children attached to them, who were on the regimental strength, but 
many of those in the Provincial regiments had their wives and children with them when 
they were not on campaign.71 These families were catered for by the British, which meant 
that they spent a considerable amount of time and money on Loyalists of all ages and 
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genders. The following table is a list of Provincial units supplied by the British Army and 
compiled by Mackenzie‘s department: 
Table 2: Provincial Regiments Victualled at New York and Outposts on 25 September 
1780. 
Battalion Men Women Children 
New Jersey Vols. 643 188 122 
Delancey‘s 
Battalion 
384 93 189 
Loyal American 
Regiment 
589 95 55 
Kings American 
Regiment 
264 75 173 
Gov. Wentworth‘s 39 5 6 
Bucks County 
Dragoons 
23 2  
Loyal New 
Englanders 
56 13 27 
Guides 181 52 58 
Detachments of 
Absent Provincial 
Regiments72 
146 94 126 
Provincial Light 
Infantry 
318 9 4 
Loyal American 34 3  
                                                 
72
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Rangers 
Source: Victualling Report at New York and Outposts, 25 September 1780, MacKenzie Papers, 1780 f. 
60, Clements Library. 
 
Examining the table it is clear that Loyalist regiments were complex ―military 
communities.‖  Future research in this area could yield rich results especially in 
comparison with the work undertaken by Holly Mayer on the British Army. Loyalist 
regiments were not solely groups of men but family units all under the care of the British 
Army. The presence of women and children would have greatly altered the ethos of the 
regiment, although none of them were present anywhere near combat zones. Most of 
these regiments were based around New York. The New Jersey Volunteers had non 
combatants of almost regimental strength for the British to feed. This is possibly because 
many of the men were from a relatively local location and were able to transport their 
families to them easily. What is clear is that the British had quite a burden of 
responsibility to the Loyalist regiments. The ―Detachments of absent Provincial 
Regiments‖ would be soldiers from regiments on campaign who for whatever reason 
were unfit or unsuited to combat as well as some administrative or ancillary staff not 
required on campaign. The high number of women and children attached to them would 
indicate that regiments on campaign would leave women and children for the British to 
take care of while they were serving. Also if potential Loyalists could ensure that their 
families would be safe and taken care of then they would be more likely to join. The 
threat of retribution to families behind Patriot lines was a very real one. Both Sir John 
Johnson and John Butler‘s wives and families were held under open arrest by the Patriots 
and there was a real danger of the activities of these regiments being limited by fear for 
the safety of their families. Thus it was in British and Loyalist interest to provide for the 
families of their soldiers. Silvia Frey has argued that British regiments had ―group 
consciousness‖ and were in many ways like a family for men who had no other families. 
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Loyalist regiments were different as many of their men had left secure family 
backgrounds to volunteer.73 In some respects Loyalists had more in common with Patriots 
who had families behind British lines and were faced with the same fears. Subsequent 
chapters will look at the problems of supplying Provincial regiments while on campaign, 
which brought with it ethical difficulties as well. The British were attempting to win over 
the population yet the easiest- and cheapest- way to attain supplies, particularly livestock 
and horses was simply to seize it from the enemy. Loyalist Regiments were faced with 
these dilemmas and in many cases a great deal of ―liberation‖ of supplies went on.74 
Payment 
Although volunteers, the Loyalists did not risk their lives for free. They had to be 
paid by the British. There is very little discussion of this issue in the historiography and 
the issue should be examined as payment was an important factor in encouraging the 
soldiers to fight. As with so many other things about the Loyalists there was no set rate of 
pay for all Provincial regiments. Rates varied enormously as did frequency of payment.75 
At first most provincial units were paid less than British regular units although there were 
exceptions. Because of their value as scouts and as liaison with the Native Americans, 
Ranger units were paid far more than even regular units. For example, Indian-speaking 
privates in Butler‘s Rangers (approximately half of the regiment) were initially paid four 
shillings, four times the normal daily salary of a private in the regulars.76 Cavalry were 
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also better paid than line infantry.77 However, there was a catch, the more a soldier was 
paid, the more he was expected to contribute towards his own upkeep. Cavalry had to 
provide their own fodder for their horses and pay for the upkeep and wellbeing of the 
horse. Although regiments all had their own separate pay scales, the following table gives 
an idea of how much a standard Provincial infantry regiment was paid. It is a pay-scale 
for the Royal Highland Emigrants in 1779: 
Table 3: Daily Pay Scale for the Royal Highland Emigrants  March 1779. 
Rank Pay per Day 
Col. in Chief 14s78 
Lt. Col. 17s 
Maj. 15s 
Capt. 10s 
Lt. 4s 8d 
Ens. 3s 8d 
Chaplain 6s 8d 
Adjutant 4s 
Quarter Master 4s 8d 
Surgeon 4s 
Surgeon‘s Mate 3s 8d 
Sgt. 1s 6d 
Cpl. 1s 
Drummer 1s 
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Pvt. 8d 
Source: Compiled from Establishment of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Highland Emigrants, 9 March 
1779, WO 28/4 f.239, PRO. 
 
The Royal Highland Emigrants were a regiment who from their earliest days, 
were treated as regulars in a combat capacity but not paid as regulars until they were 
taken onto the British Establishment in 1781. As the table demonstrates a private in the 
Royal Highland Emigrants was paid 8d per day, 4d less than a regular private. 
Although soldiers were paid daily they would often have to go for weeks and 
months without being paid. In such a case the commander could pay for the men himself 
and claim it back at a later date.79 This of course caused resentment among both the men 
and the officers and could conceivably have had a negative effect on the fighting qualities 
of the men. However, to put things into context,  irregular payment was common amongst 
eighteenth century soldiers and the Provincial soldiers were paid far more regularly than 
their counterparts in the Continental Army where in some cases men were not paid for as 
long as six years.80 
Accurate data on how much each regiment was paid is scattered and hard to come 
to by, However, the below gives some idea of how much some of the  Provincial 
Regiments were paid over a four month period in 1777-78.  
Table 4: Money Paid out to Regiments serving in America 25/12/1777-24/4/1778. 
Regiment Number of 
Companies 
£ S d 
New Jersey 
Volunteers 1st 
7 1892 3 10 1/2 
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Battalion 
New Jersey 
Vols. 2nd Batt. 
8 2946 7 6 1/2 
New Jersey 
Vols. 3rd Batt. 
6 2341 11 11 
New Jersey 
Vols. 4th Batt. 
8 3938 12 11 1/12 
New Jersey 
Vols. 5th Batt. 
6 2201 11 11 
New Jersey 
Vols. 6th Batt. 
4 1682 17 5 
Royal Highland 
Emigrants 2nd 
Batt. 
10 5702 17 11 
Kings American 
Regiment 
10 2967 14 5 
Queens Rangers 10 3362 16 4 
Source: Audit of Provincial Regiments, Monies Paid out 25 December 1777 to  4 April 1778, Audited 
16 February 1790, AO 1/325/1287. 
Table four demonstrates that the soldiers were paid according to how many men 
served in the unit. For example, ten companies of the Queens Rangers were paid slightly 
less than eight companies of the New Jersey Volunteers and considerably less than ten 
companies of the Royal Highland Emigrants. This is because no one company was the 
same size as another. A company might have had 100 men all claiming wages or it might 
have had twenty, thus the cost of the company could vary from month to month 
depending on fluctuation of numbers. If a soldier was paid at 8d a day then their yearly 
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cost would be approximately £12 a year. Therefore a company of 100 men would cost 
£1200 a year in pay alone, not counting the higher wages of officers and NCOs.  
One of the most important issues regarding pay matters with Loyalists is one that 
seems like a minor one. This is the issue of half pay rights for officers. 81 Retired officers 
were entitled to half their pay for the rest of their lives even if their regiment no longer 
existed. It was basically a pension in a society where no universal government pensions 
existed. It was a major inducement for officers and potential Loyalists viewed the 
prospect of half pay as a compensation for the risks they ran in joining the British. 
As stated in the previous chapter, in 1776 it had been decided not to grant half pay 
rights to Loyalists. So long as Loyalists were deprived of these rights they were on an 
unequal footing to their British counterparts. There were many appeals from Loyalists, 
and those connected with them, for their officers to be put on the half pay list. One appeal 
was written by John Simcoe of the Queens Rangers. Simcoe was a British officer and a 
close friend of Henry Clinton. He wrote that despite the ―excellent service‖ of his 
regiment his officers were not on the ―half pay list unlike the officers of the Bermudan 
regiments.‖ If this appeal had been written by another Loyalist commander then it would 
have possibly been easier to dismiss its impact but the fact that it came from Simcoe, who 
Clinton regarded as one of his finest officers, would have meant that it would have struck 
home with Clinton and by extension, Lord Germain.82  
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In 1779, the situation changed dramatically. The Loyalists had become vital to the 
British effort in America, and on 23 January Lord Germain authorised selected regiments 
to be placed on the half pay list upon reduction of their regiments. He stated that he would 
be making ―the rank of officers permanent in America and allowing them half-pay on the 
reduction of their regiments.‖83 It was by no means every regiment, regiments had to be 
staffed with the regulation number of companies and men and even when they had 
attained the required numbers it was still to be at the discretion of the Commander in 
Chief whether or not they were placed on the half pay list.84 The hope was that by 
granting half-pay rights, it would encourage more volunteers to take up arms against the 
Patriots. However, not everyone thought it was a good idea. In May 1779 Clinton wrote 
to Germain, stating that, senior British Officers had protested against giving Loyalists 
equal status with their British counterparts.85 Also the restrictions upon numbers caused 
problems. Many regiments raised in the closing years of the war were unable to recruit 
the required numbers and their officers were not placed on the list when the war ended. 
Raising new regiments was an expensive business and many argued that they deserved 
the half pay because of the costs they had incurred in paying bounties without immediate 
compensation. Benedict Arnold was one of those who had raised a regiment late in the 
war, and in 1783 he appealed to General Clinton to provide his officers with half pay. He 
wrote that his American Legion officers had been ―ruined by the very great expence 
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incurred by recruiting‖ a regiment so late in the war (1780-81.) 86 His appeal was not 
successful. However, the very act of making it possible for Loyalists to achieve half pay 
was a major advance, which proved the importance of Loyalists to the British.  
Discipline. 
The issue of discipline and the Loyalist Regiments can be roughly divided into 
two different areas. The first, which has not attracted a great deal of historiographical 
notice, is that of internal discipline, for example the behaviour of the soldiers on a day- 
to-day basis. The second issue is that of battlefield discipline, the behaviour of Loyalist 
towards the enemy and civilians and is one that historians have dealt with in respect of 
individual regiments to quite large degree. 
 Eighteenth century armies operated under quite different disciplinary codes to 
current armies but in general behaviour they were relatively similar. The Loyalist troops 
were expected to behave in a generally disciplined way, to obey orders, to show respect to 
superiors and to conduct themselves like British soldiers. Infringing these standards 
would lead to punishments within the regiments. The punishments for the worst crimes, 
(desertion, looting, rape and murder) ranged from floggings to execution. These crimes 
were usually tried out-with regimental authority, by general court martial, and justice was 
served entirely by the army itself rather than by civil courts.87 The British Army had a 
formal set of rules for its soldiers which regulated the behaviour that was expected of 
them. These were the Articles of War which were updated every few years and every 
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officer was expected to have them in his possession.88 There were also a few unofficial 
training manuals for soldiers which dealt with the issue of discipline. 89 
The Loyalists were subject to the same disciplinary restrictions of the British 
Army and the same punishments. Most muster rolls record serious infringements that 
were punished and or reported, at least for the rank and file. Desertions, executions and 
prison sentences are all recorded.90 The nature of the crime is rarely given but there are 
courts martial records which record this. The orderly books of the British Army also 
recorded floggings and executions carried out under the sentence of a court martial.91  
Officers that committed crimes were tried by court martial and usually dismissed from the 
service if found guilty rather than any more serious punishment, although they were not 
technically immune from the death penalty.92 Only five men were executed by the British 
Army general court between 1778 and 1781 although according to Cole and Braisted, 
more men may have been executed in the Southern campaigns, away from general court 
martials.93 
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The Loyalists do not seem to be any more or less undisciplined than their British 
comrades. They committed crimes and breaches of discipline relatively often and 
occasionally were guilty of capital offences such as rapes or murders. The Headquarters 
papers of the British Army in America reveal that offences seemed to occur more often 
with regiments that were away from the fighting and therefore had less to do and more 
opportunity to get into trouble.94 Although the bulk of offences were carried out by men 
in the ranks, Loyalist officers were not immune to indiscipline. They fought duels and on 
at least one occasion killed men in bar room brawls.95 Most minor crimes were punished 
within the regiments themselves, and some Colonels tried to keep as many of their 
soldiers away from Court Martials as they possibly could. The Court Martials reveal that 
Loyalists were no different from any other soldiers. They could be prone to drunkenness 
and misbehaviour when unoccupied. It was up to the British Army to provide them with 
that occupation.96 
There has been some work on the internal discipline of the Continental Army so 
and it is interesting to compare the Continentals with the Loyalists.97 Harry M Ward 
argues that discipline was often hard to enforce in Continental army units and that 
enlisted men often bonded together against officers. Ward argues that it took until the 
institution of the German professional Baron Von Steuben before the situation 
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Continental Army got complete control of internal discipline. The Loyalists faced similar 
problems in to the Continentals in being a newly raised force but they were under long 
established British army discipline. So while they would have committed similar crimes 
the British had long experience of detecting and punishing  the transgressions of soldiers. 
The issue of battlefield discipline of the Loyalists is one that has attracted a good 
deal of historiographical attention. While there are no individual works on the issue many 
general works on the Revolutionary War look at individual Loyalist regiments and accuse 
them of inappropriate or criminal behaviour towards Patriots and civilians.98  It is 
important to remember that the Loyalists were fighting a civil war. The people they were 
fighting were in many cases, friends, neighbours and relatives.99 Many Loyalists also had 
their property and all other assets seized from them and in some cases their families were 
held under house arrest.100 Many of them had given up well paid occupations and 
comfortable family lives to serve the British crown and the chances of them ever 
returning to these previous lives diminished with each passing year of the war. Therefore 
in many ways it could be seen as almost natural that many serving Loyalists would 
harbour vengeful feelings towards the Patriots. This could have lead to and in many cases 
did lead to instances of brutality or over stepping the bounds of acceptable behaviour. 
This issue will be looked at in depth in the chapters on the British Legion and Butler‘s 
Rangers─both of whom had reputations amongst the Patriot population, for cruelty and 
various other crimes. 
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 It is important to state that it was in the Patriot interest to accuse the Loyalists of 
brutality and acts of revenge. They took seriously anything that would discourage 
Loyalist recruitment so the Patriot authorities and the Press took any chance they could to 
blacken the reputation of the Loyalists. Patriot newspapers contain frequent accusations 
against ―Tories‖ and there were undoubted exaggerations and even downright lies.101 The 
trend has of course persisted in the popular history of the Revolution, to the present day. 
The film ―The Patriot‖ contains a scene where a Loyalist burns a church with civilians in 
it, which never happened. John and Walter Butler and a thinly disguised Banastre 
Tarleton have all appeared as villains in Hollywood films.102 The question is, were the 
Loyalists guilty of breaching the accepted rules of war? Were they worse than their 
British allies or the Patriots? Were they a vengeful mob intent on regaining their lost 
pride by rapine and slaughter? 
The first issue to deal with is the codes that governed the conduct of eighteenth 
century soldiers towards enemies and civilians. British soldiers and Loyalists were bound 
by the Articles of War which contains detailed rules on conduct towards civilians but 
nothing on conduct towards enemy soldiers.103 There were no formal rules on Prisoners of 
War which governed all armies until the 19th century. Armies were bound by an honour 
system which maintained that prisoners of sovereign nations would be treated with 
decency and in some cases even exchanged.  
The Revolutionary War, however, created problems because the British viewed 
the Patriots as rebels, rather than foreign combatants and the Patriots viewed Loyalists as 
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traitors. Therefore the designations were cloudy. On 19 July 1776, General Howe wrote 
to General Washington. He stated that he would punish all those within his command 
who had committed ―acts of cruelty, rapine or oppression.‖ This is uncompromising but 
his next sentence confuses the issue somewhat as Howe states that ―examples of 
moderation will be the sharpest reproach to those who violate the laws of honor and 
humanity.‖104 In other words Howe stated that while major offences were to be punished, 
the best way to prevent inhumanity was by good example. This attitude seems naïve 
especially when considered in the light of some of the acts of indiscipline committed by 
British soldiers in the New York campaign just a month later.105 As shown above Ward 
argues that the Continental Army took a similar attitude of self-policing. 
 In the frenzied climate of a battle, wrongdoing was often hard to prove and while 
there was frequent communication between the Patriot Commanders and the British 
commanders regarding prisoners, there was usually little done on other side to punish 
transgressors. Where there was damage to civilian lives and property punishment was 
severe and often capital but again designations between civilian and military property 
were sometimes blurred. Loyalist raiding parties frequently burnt supplies and buildings 
that were of use to the enemy. These supplies were in many cases civilian owned and 
often it would have been difficult to prove that they were specifically earmarked for 
troops. However, no cautious commander would take the chance of allowing goods that 
could give the enemy an advantage, to remain intact. 
  As well as supplies Loyalist raiding parties sometimes destroyed symbols of 
Patriot governmental authority such as courthouses.106 These were not acts of indiscipline 
but calculated acts of intimidation that were ordered by commanders. This is why the 
question of conduct towards the enemy is such a difficult one. At what point are troops 
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following orders and when are they acting on their own initiative? Butler‘s Rangers 
undoubtedly were guilty of extreme brutality towards civilians at Cherry Valley in 
November 1778 but even now there is doubt over who was ultimately responsible for the 
crimes committed.107 
When Loyalists did transgress, it had consequences for all other Loyalists. The 
killing of surrendered men by the British Legion at Waxhaws in May 1780 doomed ten 
completely innocent Loyalists at Kings Mountain in October 1780, when they were hung 
by Patriot militia in an act of vengeance for the earlier events.108 While this act was 
carried out by Patriot militia rather than the main Continental Army several Loyalists 
were executed on Washington‘s orders, usually when it could be proved that they were 
either a spy or a Patriot deserter.109 All of this ensured that Loyalist regiments had to be 
very careful in their behaviour in and after combat. Acts which stepped outside the 
bounds of accepted conduct could have consequences on other Loyalists. Individual cases 
will be examined in depth in other chapters but it is enough to say here that while the 
Loyalists were not immune from unacceptable behaviour towards the enemy neither were 
they rampaging beasts. Most of the time they behaved no differently from the other 
soldiers in the war, this possibly explains why the major incidents of Waxhaws and the 
Cherry Valley stand out because there are few other precedents on the same scale. 
 
Combat Types 
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 The eighteenth century saw armies modernise and develop new tactics to cope 
with new technology and developing theories of warfare. The improvement of firearms 
saw new types of specialist soldiers come into existence in order to exploit modern 
weaponry to the fore.110 There is little historiographical material on combat types about 
the Loyalists.111 The Provincial Regiments followed the same basic designations of 
combat types as the British Regulars. These were: infantry and cavalry. There were no 
formal Provincial artillery regiments although many regiments carried light cannon, either 
horse drawn or pushed by the troops.112 By far the most numerous designations for 
Loyalists were infantry, or foot as they were known. This is because they were the 
cheapest troops to equip and were also regarded as the most versatile. Foot made up the 
majority of most eighteenth century armies. On the battlefield they usually bore the brunt 
of the fighting. They were equipped with muskets and bayonets which enabled them to be 
offensive and defensive. They were trained to fight in line in platoons which were 
grouped together to create a large group of men all firing at once.113 They were drilled 
extensively in this system by sergeants from when they joined the army. Loyalist 
                                                 
110
 These would be infantry: foot (or hatmen- general infantrymen); fusiliers and grenadiers (originally 
men equipped with explosives but by the 1760s these had become infantrymen); riflemen, 
sharpshooters and light infantry (see section below). Cavalry: hussars, lancers, dragoons (armed with 
muskets). There were also artillerymen, engineers and pioneers. For a good summary of the types of 
soldiers in the Eighteenth century British Army see Alan J. Guy the Army of the Georges in David 
Chandler (ed.) The Oxford History of the British Army, pp. 93-111. 
111
For works on eighteenth century soldiers and warfare see Houlding, Chandler, Lenman and Strachan, 
The closest comparisons are the works by Frey on Revolutionary War British soldiers and Wright, on 
the Continental Army. David Chandler (ed.) The Oxford History of the British Army, (Oxford, 1994); 
J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service; Hew Strachan European Armies and the Conduct of War; Bruce 
Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars 1688-1783; K. Wright, The Continental Army, (Washington, 1983); 
Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America. 
112
 The 2nd Battalion New Jersey Volunteers served alongside the Royal Artillery for two years as 
artillerymen but they were not designated an artillery regiment and they later returned to infantry 
duties. 
113
 For a model of the Platoon firing system see ibid. p. 103. 
 119 
regiments were drilled using the 1768 or 1778 drill books, although commanding officers 
were given some latitude in how they trained their troops.114 The Loyalist regiments who 
fought as standard infantry were equipped and fought in a similar way to the British line 
infantry. An example of these would be the Volunteers of Ireland, who wore red coats 
and fought as line infantry in several successful battles in South and North Carolina in 
1781.115 Loyalists Regiments also served as light infantry, and it was in this area that they 
arguably had the greatest potential and found the most success. 
Loyalist Light Infantry 
 Light Troops were troops who fought outside the main formations and often 
fought small skirmishes and guerrilla style operations. The Patriots created their own 
Light Troops which had great success particularly at Saratoga in 1777. Loyalists served 
extensively in this capacity and could possibly have had the potential to match the 
Patriots using their own tactics against them. As explained in chapter one, Americans had 
created their own designation of light troops, known as Rangers.116  This meant that there 
was a strong tradition of light tactics amongst Americans as these tactics were suited to 
American terrain. 
One of the most important innovations to come out of the French and Indian War 
was the use of light infantry tactics.117 At a level lower than the High Command, the 
British had learned greatly from the tactics used by Major Robert Rogers and Colonel 
Bouquet and had formed their own light infantry units based loosely on the American 
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Ranger units as well as the German Jaeger Corps. In 1771 the British Army added a light 
infantry company to every regiment.118 This was a practice that many Loyalist regiments 
followed also. In 1774 General Howe had organised a group training camp for the British 
light infantry in England.119  Yet there were some problems, Houlding, claims that 
although the specialised regiments were good units, the light infantry companies became 
places where every regiment put the men they could not find a use for elsewhere.120 This 
suggests that they were not held in high regard by many senior officers in the British 
Army who preferred standard line tactics which involved soldiers working as part of a 
group of at least thirty men, under tight control by NCOs, rather than tactics which 
encouraged them to use their own initiative and fight on their own. This theory is given 
support when considering the fact that the highly trained light infantry brigade were used 
as normal infantry to storm Bunker Hill and suffered appalling casualties.121 The irony is 
that it was their greatest advocate General Howe, who used them in this way. They were 
not used for their intended purpose which was to range ahead of the army and snipe at the 
enemy but as part of a mass attack, which could have been carried out by standard troops. 
The loss of the British light infantry would have major consequences for the Loyalists; it 
left a gap in the British forces in America. Light infantry took a long time to train and 
were expensive too. As the Americans had a tradition of their own light infantry and some 
of those experts, notably Robert Rogers and John Butler, were available for commands, 
the Loyalists were targeted to replace the lost light infantry. 
When the Loyalists were trained as light troops they were in most cases 
successful and in the case of the Queens Rangers one of the best regiments of the war on 
any side. Butler‘s Rangers kept the Canadian/New York frontier a dangerous and volatile 
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area for many years and the regiment gained a fearsome while not wholly enviable 
reputation.122 Banastre Tarleton‘s British Legion was half cavalry and half light infantry 
and gained an equally fearsome reputation in the South in 1780 and 1781. Don 
Higginbotham outlines reasons for thinking that Americans made good light troops 
quoting Jefferson stating that ―every soldier in our army had been intimate with a gun 
from his infancy.‖123  There was a general assumption that rural Americans, through 
necessity and the threat of the Native Americans, were well acquainted with firearms and 
the best ways in which to use them in their local terrain. 
Senior British officers had very fixed ideas of how a war should be fought. Many 
were of the opinion that shooting from the trees was cowardly and sniper tactics were 
barbaric.124 Honour demanded that battles take place in the open and that troops be visible 
to each other. Skulking behind a tree in a buckskin shirt was not gentlemanly behaviour. 
In contrast, the Patriots used sharpshooters to great effect. At the battle of Saratoga, a 
sniper famously killed the second in command, General Simon Fraser.125 After this there 
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was some attempt to form a British unit of sharpshooters under the command of Major 
Patrick Fergusson, who was held to be the finest shot in the army.126  
  Around 1778-1780 a select band of officers began to utilise light infantry tactics 
with their battalions. These officers were by and large young men not hidebound by 
tradition just as the pioneers of the French and Indian war had been twenty years before. 
Also and not coincidentally many of these young officers commanded Loyalist regiments. 
They were able to see that their men were ideally suited for light infantry. They knew the 
terrain and could move through it with greater rapidity and stealth than their British 
counterparts.127 Many of the covert operations and raids of the Revolutionary War were 
conducted by Loyalist troops. It is also not a coincidence that these regiments wore green 
jackets and frequently hid behind trees. 
One of the problems with Light troops was they required time consuming 
training. Thus in the early part of the war the British did not spend as much time training 
Light troops as they had done in the Seven Years War. There seems to have been a 
collective amnesia in the British high command as to how successful Light tactics had 
proved in the last American war. Had they done so and used the Americans most 
successful tactics against them it is possible to argue that they could have been far more 
successful earlier on in the war.  
Loyalist Cavalry 
It took several years for Loyalists to be allowed to form mounted units, but by the 
end of the war they would form the vast majority of cavalry available to the British Army 
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in America. Traditionally, cavalry and dragoons were used for scouting off the battlefield 
and flanking and shock tactics off it. Cavalry were designed to be mounted as often as 
possible in combat whereas dragoons were originally designed to be able to fight on foot 
or on horseback. In practice in the Revolutionary War the distinctions between the two 
were somewhat blurred and dragoons were mostly used as cavalry in combat. Mounted 
units were also the most effective units with which to combat artillery, as infantry were 
too slow to reach guns in time before they were limbered and taken to safety. Cavalry was 
expensive and regarded as elite. They took time to train and horses and tack had to be 
provided. The first British troops used in America were largely infantry as it was an epic 
task to transport cavalry across the Atlantic. Therefore, American-raised cavalry would 
have been an ideal solution. The Patriots  had created cavalry units in 1775 which would 
serve throughout the war and cause the British great problems. However, it was 1778 
before there were any Loyalist cavalry raised and there were only ever five Loyalist 
Regiments which contained cavalry, two of these were combined units with cavalry and 
infantry.128 The combined units actually proved to a great innovation. There were no 
British regiments that fulfilled the purpose of allowing cavalry to be supported by their 
own infantry.  
In addition to this, the Loyalists can claim to have invented a new designation of 
troops. Major Cochrane of the British Legion claimed to have pioneered the use of 
mounted light infantry in the Revolutionary War.129  Cochrane‘s men were light infantry 
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mounted on horses deemed not good enough for the cavalry but still capable of carrying 
infantry long distances in short periods of time, to keep the enemy guessing as to their 
whereabouts. Once they had reached their destination, they dismounted and fought on 
foot. However, in a 1783 memorial, Lt Col. Thomas Brown of the East Florida Rangers 
(later the Kings Carolina Rangers) states that his regiment was raised in 1776 as 
―mounted infantry.‖130 Cochran had claimed to have pioneered the concept of mounted 
―light‖ infantry so there does appear to be a distinction but Brown‘s regiment, as Rangers, 
were the American form of the British designation light infantry, so Cochrane‘s claims 
are possibly a little misleading. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the issue, it was still a 
very successful idea for the British Legion. The New York Volunteers used the same 
tactic. This demonstrates that Loyalists were at the forefront of military thinking and that 
their ideas were tried by the British. Loyalist cavalry was very successful in the Southern 
campaign of 1780 and 1781. The Queens Rangers and the men of the British Legion 
frequently defeated their patriot counterparts despite often being outnumbered. 
 Conclusion. 
This chapter has examined several key issues that affected the Loyalist regiments. 
The reason for investigating these issues in a broad and sweeping form is that they will be 
discussed again in the case studies and it is necessary to have a frame of reference. These 
issues have not been discussed together for the Loyalists as a whole in previous works on 
the Loyalists so the chapter is breaking new ground in this respect. So what do these 
diverse issues tell the historian of the Loyalist regiments? They confirm that the Loyalists 
were a unique entity in some ways but that they have similar characteristics to just about 
any group of soldiers. They were unlike the British in that they were fighting a civil war 
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but like them in that they were fighting the same enemy and faced the same conditions. 
They were different from the Patriots but they shared similar military origins and used 
similar military tactics. The administrators of the Continental Army faced similar 
problems in forming their new army. The issues discussed in this chapter, pay, supplies, 
types of combat, discipline and nationality can be repeated for all groups of soldiers. Yet 
these issues have not really been dealt with for the Loyalists in this specific fashion. The 
focus on them allows a more detailed view to be formed of the complexities of 
administering the Loyalists. It was no easy task, either for the British or the Loyalists 
themselves to raise a large new force.  Examining composition allows a wider view of the 
Loyalist soldiers, who they were and what they did before the war and by examining the 
motivation of the men the chapter can make some estimate as to why the men took the 
risks that they did.   The Loyalists have previously been seen as an adjunct of the British 
Army or unfortunate Americans who chose the wrong side. This chapter and indeed the 
thesis as a whole is attempting to view the Loyalist soldiers as an entity in themselves 
with their own set of characteristics that are both unique to them and universal to all 
soldiers.
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Chapter 3 
The Queens Rangers 1776-77. 
Introduction 
In the spring of 1780, Robert Rogers, hero of the French and Indian War and at 
that point once more serving under British command, was in dire danger. He was not, 
however, under threat from any enemy but from himself. His conduct had led to him 
being suspended from the commands of two regiments consecutively and he was being 
confined in Montreal under various charges of embezzling funds which ought to have 
been reserved for recruiting. His dependence on alcohol had affected his judgment to the 
extent that this once brave man seemingly had no desire to take himself and his regiment 
against the enemy as he had been ordered to do. He wrote to his commanding officer, 
Gen. Haldimand, apologising for being an ―embarrassment.‖1 Haldimand, who had given 
Rogers a second chance in allowing him to form a new regiment, wrote in despair to his 
subordinate, Brig. Gen. Allan MacLean, that Rogers had ―given himself up to the worst 
kind of debauchery and unworthy methods of procuring money to gratify it, that he has 
disgraced the service and renders him incapable of being depended upon.‖2 James Rogers 
summed up the sorry situation by stating that ―the conduct of my brother has almost 
unman‘d me. I told him my mind in regard of his conduct as often as he promised to 
reform. I am sorry his good talents should so unguarded fall prey to intemperance.‖3 
Robert Rogers had fallen a long way from his former situation. The war hero was 
now a seemingly hopeless alcoholic, resorting to stealing the money earmarked for his 
men to feed his habit. This was not the first time allegations of ―intemperance‖ had 
threatened his career. Three years before he had been dismissed from the command of the 
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Queens Rangers for allowing them to fall into a state where they were ―unfit for service.‖4 
Yet there were those in the British Army who believed that this deeply flawed man could 
have been the answer to their problems, and that having him on their side gave them a 
recruiting tool that the Patriots could sorely have done with. It was in expectation of this 
that Rogers was given permission to raise the regiment he called the Queens Rangers. 
Of all the regiments that fought in the American Revolution on any side, one of 
the most successful in terms of victorious actions was the Loyalist regiment: the Queens 
Rangers. The following two chapters are case studies of this unit. The Queens Rangers 
had more successful actions and more commendations from the British High Command 
than any other Loyalist unit. Their success owed as much to careful organisation and 
planning as well as an adept use of a very particular style of tactics. This first chapter 
covers the first year of their existence from their inception in 1776 under Robert Rogers 
until the autumn of 1777 when John Graves Simcoe took command. Both commanders 
carefully shaped the regiment. The two incarnations, while sharing many of the same 
personnel and regimental characteristics, were differentiated by many factors, not least of 
which, was the extent to which they enjoyed the confidence of the British High 
Command. 
This regiment is worth studying because they fought in nearly every campaign of 
the American Revolutionary War, which allows the historian to assess the unit‘s 
effectiveness for the duration of the war. Among other things this enables a careful 
evaluation of field tactics. The Queens Rangers embodied in their first period Robert 
Rogers' ideas on American warfare. These tactics had been tried and tested in the French 
and Indian War. With his regiment, Rogers Rangers, he had drawn on traditional 
American tactics, the kind which had been developed as a response to Native American 
attacks and often involved replicating their tactics. These early tactics which have been as 
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examined in chapter one of this thesis, were appropriate to the terrain that the French and 
Indian War was fought over.5 
Rogers continued to adapt Indian tactics, and updated them for the French and 
Indian War. He developed a list of twenty eight rules for ranger companies.6 Rogers 
taught his men to camouflage themselves, instructed them in close quarters fighting with 
tomahawks and above all taught them to use the terrain to the unit‘s advantage. He 
employed Native Americans as scouts and actively took their advice. His regiment's 
name, Rogers' Rangers, was an accurate depiction of their role. They were intended to 
―range‖ over large areas of country, rarely staying long in the same place and to keep the 
enemy guessing as to their whereabouts. Rogers applied his principles to great effect in 
the French and Indian War and intended that his Revolutionary War regiment would 
practise similar tactics.  
The Queens Rangers never had the chance to become what Rogers envisaged as 
they were reformed in 1777. This is another reason for the Queens Rangers‘ historical 
importance; they were the first existing Loyalist regiment that the British seriously 
restructured. This chapter will investigate why the British did this and what effects it had 
on this regiment and its operations and by extension on all the other Loyalist regiments. 
The next chapter will investigate how the reforms and restructuring influenced the 
Queens Rangers‘ military effectiveness. After allowing the regiment's first commander, 
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Robert Rogers, a large degree of autonomy, the British changed their policy and very 
definite requirements concerning the background and character of the Queens Rangers 
officers and made requirements on the ethnicity of the recruits.7  
The national origins of the Queens Rangers are important for considering the 
composition of the regiment and the motivation of rank-and-file Loyalists. John Cuneo 
has claimed that the first incarnation of the Rangers was more ―American‖ than the 
second.8  By combining some prosopographical methods with analysis of eighteenth 
century small-scale tactics the two chapters will ultimately consider the extent to which 
nationality shaped the effectiveness of the regiment. 
New papers were recently found in the Treasury solicitor‘s files in the National 
Archives relating to the changes the British made to the Queens Rangers in the spring of 
1777.9 By synthesizing these newly discovered sources with other material on the early 
Queens Rangers it is possible to provide the first comprehensive study of the Queens 
Rangers. This is important in a historiographical sense because of the Regiment‘s 
undoubted importance to the British Army, as an effective fighting force and as an 
exemplar of the best way to run a provincial regiment. All of this would arguably 
influence the way the British ran their provincials for at least the next fifty years. 
A database has been constructed using the muster rolls that refer to the Queens 
Rangers. Although most of the muster rolls refer to the period from November 1777 to 
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September 1783 the above mentioned sources allow a partial picture to be formed of the 
personnel in Queens Rangers in the Rogers period.  
Secondary sources on the Queens Rangers provide limited coverage of the 
regiment‘s origin with the exception of one article written in 1958 by John Cuneo.10 
Cuneo argues that after Rogers' dismissal the unit lost its American character and that this 
was largely intentional on the part of the British High Command. Cuneo concluded that 
the British did not appreciate the strategic value of Robert Rogers or the Queens Rangers 
in military operations and his study paved the way for Paul Smith‘s comprehensive 
critique of the role of the Loyalist Regiments in British strategy.11 This chapter will 
reassess the Cuneo-Smith interpretation. While accepting that the British made some 
serious errors in 1776 and 1777, the thesis will argue that the British had no real agenda 
about the suitability or otherwise of American officers beyond improving the battlefield 
performance of the regiments. The fact that they made these changes at all shows that 
they did respect the importance of the Loyalists. They wanted to make the regiments 
efficient and they felt that the best and quickest way to do this was by appointing 
experienced officers. As there were few officers then in America with experience of 
running Regular regiments, they appointed British officers. 
The Queens Rangers were mustered by Robert Rogers in September 1776.12 They 
were largely recruited from what is now the upper part of New York and Connecticut, but 
their recruits hailed from all over the American Colonies, including a sizeable proportion 
from Virginia, survivors of the short-lived Queens Loyal Virginia regiment formed by the 
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Earl of Dunmore earlier that year.13 They fought an action at Mamaroneck in New York 
in 1776 and sat out the rest of the winter behind the British lines. They were reorganized 
in March 1777 after heavy desertion over the preceding winter and accusations of 
corruption and recruiting of unsuitable men. They were commanded successively by 
regular British officers Maj. Christopher French and Maj. James Wemyss, before in 
October 1777, another regular, Maj. John Graves Simcoe, took command, which he held 
until the siege of Yorktown in 1781.14 The Queens Rangers saw action in all the major 
campaigns of 1777-78 in the Northern theatre, including the battles of Brandywine Creek, 
Germantown and Monmouth Courthouse. In late 1779 they were sent to South Carolina, 
where they served at the siege of Charleston and were active and victorious in numerous 
engagements that summer. They then embarked with Gen. Clinton‘s Army for New York 
and New Jersey where they served in several minor actions and raids. In the winter of 
1780 they headed a largely Loyalist expedition to Virginia under the brilliant former 
Patriot general, Benedict Arnold. They fought in several small battles and skirmishes 
there. In October 1781, they were besieged at Yorktown with the rest of Cornwallis‘s 
army and surrendered along with them, after Simcoe‘s plans to lead them in a breakout 
were refused. Simcoe then returned to England in broken health and the surviving 
Rangers were once more commanded by an American, John Saunders, an original recruit, 
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and a founder of the Loyal Virginians. They remained at New York until the British left 
in the autumn of 1783 and they were demobilised at Halifax, Nova Scotia. 
Robert Rogers. 
Robert Rogers, then one of the most famous Americans living, formed the Queens 
Rangers, in 1776. This section will look at Rogers' career in the early part of the 
revolution and his reasons for forming the regiment. Robert Rogers was born in 1730 in 
Methuen, Massachusetts, but soon moved to Dunbarton, New Hampshire, which would 
be where many of the initial recruits for his French and Indian War regiment originated.  15 
In the introduction to his journal Rogers gives a brief account of his early years. He 
mentions his familiarity with Indian customs and languages. He also mentioned that he 
spent many years exploring "the unculticated [sic] desert, the mountains, valleys, rivers, 
lakes and several passes" and became inured to "hardship" in a way that would "qualify 
me for the very service I have since been employed in."16 This early grounding in the both 
the geography and customs of the American frontier would, as he says, influence Rogers‘ 
as both a soldier and frontiersman. 
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 His regiment, Rogers‘ Rangers, would win themselves lasting fame after 
successful several actions and an expedition beyond the recognised frontiers.17 Rogers 
was befriended by Viscount George Howe (Gen. William Howe's elder brother) who set 
up a light infantry regiment based on Rogers' unit and employed his tactics of fast-
moving, lightly-equipped, camouflaged soldiers.18 In many ways Rogers was an exponent 
of tactics already used by all colonial troops but he was the first person to set them down 
in an organised fashion. He did this for a company of British troops he was training in 
Ranger tactics, and he lists these rules in his journals.19 The rules discuss, among other 
things, concealment, tracking, sniping, close quarters fighting and the art of scouting. 
They have a ring of common sense about them and would have been easy for his soldiers 
to grasp.20 This list would be used by the British when they formed their own light 
infantry units in 1758.  
There is however, another viewpoint of Rogers, which minimises his military 
effectiveness, even in the French and Indian War. Fred Anderson argues that the French 
Marines and Indians were markedly superior to the Rangers. Anderson says that Rogers 
was a superb "self publicist" who created the image of himself as "the very model of the 
frontier guerrilla leader."21  In the Revolution, Rogers always seemed able to explain what 
he wanted to achieve, yet he was not always able to live up to his claims. It has to be said 
though that Anderson barely mentions Rogers in his work, and does not include any in-
depth analysis of his tactics, therefore his critique is not fully sustained.  
Rogers was undoubtedly a significant figure in eighteenth century military history 
if only because he wrote coherent account of colonial military tactics and put them into 
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print. The journal was a best seller, particularly popular among young British officers 
many of whom would serve in the Revolutionary War a few years later. In his analysis of 
eighteenth century military manuals, J.A. Houlding argues that Rogers' work stands out 
because it conveys a "striking realism and a most consummate professionalism, and any 
officer reading them would benefit greatly should he be assigned to petite guerre duties."22 
It is also interesting to note that Rogers does not shy away from mentioning any of his 
defeats, but states that he was able to hold his men together and to go on to undertake 
other, more effective actions. He provides letters of commendation from his superiors to 
prove this.23 
Rogers retained his commission on half pay after the war, the only American 
officer to do so and he went to live in Britain.24 In 1775, bankrupt, he returned to America 
with the avowed intention of joining the Patriots. The Patriots arrested Rogers at 
Philadelphia principally because he was still a half-pay major in the British service.25 His 
friend John Stark, the Patriot general and subsequently one of the heroes of the Saratoga 
campaign testified on his behalf and he was allowed to give his word that he would not 
serve against the Americans and was released.26  He gave a written parole in which he 
stated he would not "bear arms against the American United Colonies, in any manner 
whatever, during the present contest between them and Great Britain; and that I will not, 
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in that time, attempt to give intelligence to General Gage, the British Ministry, or any 
other person or persons, of any matters relative to America".27 
This is important, as there were charges levelled at Rogers that during his 
command of the Queens Rangers he was actually a Patriot spy.28 The fact that he had 
given his parole, swearing not to take up arms was held as one of the proofs of these 
charges. However, it is more likely that Rogers was just being duplicitous to secure his 
release. Rogers proved time and again that his word counted for little. However, while at 
Patriot held New York in 1775, Rogers took the opportunity of affirming his loyalty to 
the British.  
"Since my arrival here, on every occasion I told these people now under an 
unhappy delusion that I never heard while in England one word fall from 
the lips of anyone in Administration tending to enslave them but the 
language of humanity breathed forth: that Lord North‘s motion as 
explained to me and as it was generally understood in England was 
certainly the groundwork of a conciliatory superstructure, if not an ample 
compliance with the demands of America, and that each colony by giving 
way of requisition money to defray a part of the expense of the kingdom 
seemed reasonable; that I did not think the quantum was so much the 
object as an acknowledgement of that superintending power always 
exercised by Great Britain over it‘s external dominions; and that on the 
other hand if the Americans succeeded it must be in the course of many 
                                                 
27
 Parole given by Robert Rogers to the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety, Philadelphia, 23 September 
1775, Peter Force, American Archives, S.4 vol.3, p. 866, online at http://colet.uchicago.edu/cgi-
bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/projects/artflb/databases/efts/AmArch/IMAGE/.7381 6/11 2006. 
28
 Cuneo, Rogers of the Rangers, p. 261. 
 136 
hard fought battles and that success on their side would not be equivalent 
to the loss they must sustain.‖ 29 
The document shows that Rogers was an eloquent writer who was aware of the 
wider implications of the war but it also demonstrates to some extent his political naiveté. 
The idea of making financial reparation to the British Crown was repellent to the Patriots 
and was a principal reason for fighting in the first place. Far from seeming to have Patriot 
sympathies, Rogers in this letter comes across as being far more in concert with the views 
of the moderate Loyalists particularly where he discusses "the superintending power" that 
he believed Britain had and had to go on having. Whether these were his real views, is 
open to debate: Rogers and the truth often had a somewhat tenuous relationship. This 
letter was written not essentially as a declaration of loyalty but as a means of securing 
employment, as Rogers was in a dire financial state. It is possible that by professing his 
loyalty, Rogers was trying to cover all the angles: by coming across as very strongly 
Loyalist he bought himself some time to make his mind up. The other possibility of 
course is that he was trying to mislead the British. This view is given credence by the fact 
that two months letter Rogers was writing to Gen. Washington assuring him that he had 
"leave to retire on my half-pay, and never expect to be called into the service again. I love 
North-America; it is my native country, and that of my family, and I intend to spend the 
evening of my days in it. "30 Rogers was attempting to reassure Washington whilst giving 
nothing away. He does not say he will not serve the British, just that he did not "expect" 
to. 
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Within weeks of Rogers' assurances to Washington, the British were making 
moves to recruit Rogers to their cause. In January 1776, Lord Dartmouth received a letter 
from Phillips Callbeck, Administrator of St John‘s Island, Canada.31  Callbeck was a 
friend of Rogers, stating that the King had recommended that the British Army make use 
of Rogers' services, stating ―we are sure you will find means of making him useful.‖32 
Whether or not Rogers knew of Callbeck's overtures on his behalf is not known.  
Callbeck‘s letter shows, that whatever grievances certain officers had against 
Rogers, the British, at the highest levels, were aware of his usefulness and recognised the 
importance of recruiting him. This would be the case throughout his career. Whatever 
enemies he made, there were always seemed to be high ranking British officers, like Gen. 
Henry Clinton and Brig. Gen. Allan MacLean, willing to go to any effort to extricate him 
from whatever trouble he was in, because they believed that his past efforts and his 
obvious talents negated any wayward behaviour on his part and that he was still a useful 
recruiting tool.33 In February 1776, Rogers turned down an offer from General Clinton of 
a regiment in the British Army because of his parole. Clinton, "told Major Rogers that if 
he chose to join me, I did believe that his services would be such as to induce me to 
recommend him to the gov‘t and commander in chief…he said if he could get rid of the 
oath he would.‖34 This shows that Rogers was at least honest in keeping his parole, but it 
adds more to the evidence of him having Patriot sympathies.  
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In late June of 1776 whilst at New York City, Rogers was again arrested on the 
orders of Washington. Washington wrote Congress that Rogers had told him that he had 
―with Congress, a secret offer of his services,‖ and that he carried documents to prove it. 
Washington advised Congress that they ―should ask themselves if it would not be 
dangerous to accept the offer of his services,‖ and that Rogers was ―not sufficiently to be 
relied on.‖35 This would suggest that there were those in Congress who were not only 
considering employing Rogers, but going over Washington‘s head to do so. Washington 
had his suspicions of Rogers because of a letter from a Rev. Eleazer Wheelock, who had 
written to Washington in December 1775 claiming that Rogers was active with the 
Indians against the Patriots. Wheelock had only heard this second hand Washington may 
have been swayed by it. Wheelock did, however, see Rogers spend the night in a tavern. 
He told Washington: ―he went to the aforesaid tavern and tarried all night; the next 
morning told the landlord he was out of money and could not pay his reckoning — which 
was three shillings — but would pay him on his return, which would be within about 
three months, and went on his way to Lyme; since which I have heard nothing from 
him.‖36 This may seem like a trivial episode but it is proof that Rogers was drinking 
heavily and that Washington, unlike the British, knew about it. 
Rogers seems to have actively courted both sides for nearly a year and it seems 
that it was the fact of his arrest rather than any deeply held belief─despite his Loyal 
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testimonies─that made him eventually choose the side he did. He seems to have made the 
running in respect of any offer to the Patriots, however, as demonstrated earlier, the 
British were actively offering him commands. This is not to say that the Patriots were his 
first choice, it is unclear whether Rogers even knew his own mind. It is also interesting to 
speculate on Washington‘s reasons for taking the decision he took, as it shows the 
influence that Rogers had in American society at that time. Washington may have been 
right not to trust Rogers, but Rogers had emerged from the French and Indian War with 
considerably more credit than had Washington. He was a military hero, and had he 
accepted a Patriot command there may have been calls from Congress for him to be at 
least equal to Washington in rank. Washington‘s popularity was often fluctuating in 
Congress and a proven hero may have seemed an attractive alternative to the sometimes 
difficult Virginian. This is speculative, but as several years later Washington would be 
accused of jealousy and protecting his position by undermining Benedict Arnold, it is not 
beyond the bounds of possibility that he deliberately did not court Rogers for fear that 
Congress would promote Rogers over him.37 However, in some respects Washington may 
have just been a little more perceptive in his measuring up of the state of Rogers in 1775 
than the British. Rogers had by this time severe problems with alcoholism and his 
marriage had broken down.38 It is possible that Washington saw where Rogers‘ personal 
debilitation could lead and therefore did not want his services for reasons of potential 
unreliability. 
On 8 July, 1776, the resourceful Rogers broke out of prison, (not for the first time 
in his life) and joined the British Army at New York. He came to them with a proposal: 
that he would resurrect the Rangers and help the British to defeat the Patriots. Gen. Howe 
writing to Secretary of State Lord Germain, welcomed Rogers' initiative. "Major Rogers 
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having escaped to us from Philadelphia is empowered to raise a battalion of Rangers‖ 
which he hoped might "be useful in the course of the campaign."39 The fact of his coming 
late to the army may have influenced Howe‘s decision to give a Rogers only a regiment 
and could account for the close watch the British High Command paid to the Queens 
Rangers and for their subsequently quick dismissal of Rogers. If they did not entirely trust 
him─although there is no concrete evidence to support this view─then a regiment would 
have seemed safer than a brigade. Americans with considerably less experience than 
Rogers were being given brigade rank in the Provincial service, such as Cordlandt 
Skinner.40 However, there is no record of any dissatisfaction on Rogers‘ part. He took the 
command he was given and set about forming his regiment. 
Rogers‘ behaviour and his state of mind immediately prior to setting up the 
Queens Rangers undoubtedly influenced his conduct in the brief period he commanded it. 
Rogers is a well known historical figure and this thesis aims to change perceptions of how 
he was regarded by his superiors. The Cuneo thesis is that the British underestimated his 
value; on the contrary, many of the British Generals, particularly Clinton, recognised 
what a useful recruiting tool he was, nevertheless Rogers‘ conduct was far beyond 
anything they were used to and could deal with.41 They had justifiable concerns about the 
way he had joined them but still thought he could be useful, as witnessed by the fact that 
even after all the controversy surrounding his command of the Queens Rangers they still 
gave him the means to set up another regiment. 
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Formation 
This part of the chapter will focus on the formation of the Queens Rangers. As 
one of the first Loyalist regiments to be formed by the new Provincial Service, the 
Queens Rangers was in some ways a test case for how Loyalist regiments were to be 
recruited and run thereafter. It was intended to be formed quickly and to be ready for 
combat in as short a time as possible. The early recruitment methods were discredited and 
different techniques were soon brought in. A study of the formation of the regiment will 
highlight how different things were in the early months of the war and facilitate 
judgement on which was the most efficient or effective recruiting system.  
Rogers had a very clear picture of the kind of regiment he wanted. It was to be 
similar to his earlier regiment, to be composed of tough backwoodsmen, "who were used 
to travelling and hunting‖ and he envisaged their role as similar to his earlier one which 
was to; "distress‖ the enemy by destroying their ―barns, barracks etc and at all times to 
endeavour to waylay, attack and destroy their convoys of provisions by land and water.‖42  
Rogers wanted to recruit his men from all over the colonies and have them ready 
to fight by October of 1776. This seems a very ambitious time scale─the events of 22 
October 1776, discussed later in the chapter, would suggest that this was the case─yet no 
questions were asked of Rogers and he was allowed to proceed with his plans. Rogers set 
about recruiting his new regiment in August and September of 1776. He recruited from 
the many refugees newly-arrived in New York and sent out men to the countryside, often 
far behind rebel lines. He soon had several hundred recruits.43 The men were raised by the 
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traditional method of raising for rank. This was where a recruiter was awarded a 
commission based on the number of recruits they could assemble. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, this was laid down in the regulations that the British had set out for 
Provincial recruitment in 1775 and was deemed to be the most effective way of raising 
troops quickly. Rogers issued each recruiter with a warrant signed by him, which 
authorised them to recruit men and issue them with a bounty of forty shillings. This was 
considerably less than the three guineas which would be paid by the Queens Rangers in 
1780. This was because in 1776 the bounty was paid largely by Rogers and claimed back 
from Gen. Howe, whereas later it was paid directly to the regimental commanders and 
distributed to the recruiters so there was presumably more money budgeted for 
recruiting.44 The money would be paid largely by Rogers at first but would be claimed 
back from the budget of General Howe in the form of vouchers issued.45 
The recruiting was carried out in upper New York and Connecticut.46 Many of the 
recruiters braved patriot patrols and recruited behind enemy lines. Just how dangerous a 
practice this was, is illustrated by the case of Daniel Strang. Strang was one of Rogers' 
first recruiting officers and he was sent to recruit in upper New York. He was captured by 
Patriot troops at Peeksgill and was charged with "holding correspondence with the enemy 
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and lurking around the camp as a spy."47 He was condemned to death by Washington 
himself and duly hung.48 These events would arguably have repercussions on future 
recruitment. After this, there was recruitment behind enemy lines but it was more likely to 
be informal and on a small scale.49 However, this meant that the recruiting area of the 
Rangers was restricted. Many of the tough backwoodsmen types who Rogers envisaged 
joining, resided in areas under Patriot control. A large number of the recruits came from 
urban areas, like New York City and other large towns.50 Therefore Rogers‘ dream for the 
Queens Rangers was hampered right at the outset because of the difficulty of securing the 
kind of men he wanted.  
What convicted Strang was the fact that he carried his recruiting certificate on his 
person. This was unfortunate for him, but fortunate for historians as it is one of the few 
examples of Loyalist recruiting certificates from so early on in the war. The certificate 
shows how recruits were signed on before March of 1777, giving essentially the 
guidelines of raising for rank. It states that recruiter was rewarded for the number of 
recruits that they had brought in. It gives the bounty paid to each man, of forty shillings. 
A document in the Treasury solicitor's files lists payments made to Queens Rangers 
officers with the date that their warrant was issued. This money was to have been used for 
bounties and was issued in the form of vouchers to be claimed back at a later date.51 
Generally their rank seems to go with how much money they have received for recruiting. 
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The most successful, Captain Robert Cook, received £68 5s and 9d but one Lieutenant, 
Stephen Hunter received as little as 9s 8d. The total paid out in the document is £154 1s 
2d.52 Several of the dismissed officers were accused of keeping the bounties or giving less 
than forty shillings and indeed Rogers would be accused of doing this again in 1779 with 
his later regiment the Kings Rangers.53 At this point however, there was no evidence to 
substantiate these accusations and no court-martials were brought. The last two points of 
Strang‘s certificate are the most interesting. 
They [the recruits to the Queens Rangers] will have their proportion of all 
rebel lands, and all privileges equal to any of his majesty's troops. The 
officers are to be the best judges in what manner they will get men in; 
either by parties, detachments, or otherwise, as may seem most 
advantageous.54 
The first part is an offer to recruits of captured Patriot lands. This, while a major 
inducement to recruits, was undoubtedly a controversial measure. This certificate would 
have caused real resentment when it fell into Patriot hands. The second point essentially 
leaves it up to the recruiter who they are to recruit. Nothing is said about the social 
background of the recruits and as the chapter shall demonstrate, it was this very latitude 
that was to cause some of the Queens Rangers officers from Virginia, so much disquiet. 
There is no exact way of telling how many recruits joined in September 1776 
many but the statements made by some of the officers for a later court case, suggests at 
least several hundred men.55 Raising for rank seemed to be an effective way of quickly 
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gaining large numbers of men. Yet it was no guarantee of quality. While it brought in 
large numbers of recruits, the promise of increased rank for volume of recruits could lead 
to the recruiter having little concern for traits like physical fitness and intelligence, 
something that a recruiter for a regiment as specialised as the Queens Rangers should 
have had at the forefront of their mind. Rogers' orders in the French and Indian war had 
instructed him to enlist only men that he or his officers could vouch for personally.56 The 
situation in the Revolutionary War made this almost impossible. Many of the survivors of 
the earlier unit were in the Patriot ranks or at the very least far behind enemy lines and ill-
disposed to risk everything to follow Rogers. In the report made by the Inspector General, 
one of the principal complaints was the alleged inappropriateness of many of the men 
enlisted.57 Rogers' recruiters seemed to take every man that volunteered with no regard 
for quality. If this complaint had stayed focused on the age and fitness issue then it would 
seem eminently sensible, However, it also chose to focus on and ethnicity and social 
background of the recruits and officers. The complaint focused on the ―mean extraction‖ 
of the officers and the fact that many of the recruits were ―Negroes, Mulattos, Indians and 
sailors.‖58  The objections thus take on an altogether more sinister hue, in that they 
address issues other than the efficiency of the regiment but appear prejudicial to the 
backgrounds of the recruits. The nature of this issue and the British Army's response to it 
will be dealt with fully in the section on the reorganisation of March 1777. It is enough to 
note here that the trouble originated from Rogers' indiscriminate recruiting. 
Documentary evidence however, suggests that Rogers‘ warrant gave him scope to 
recruit whomsoever he wished.59 There is no mention of recruiting restrictions on the 
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actual warrant and the Rangers were indeed given permission to recruit from Patriot 
prisoners in a way that most other Loyalist regiments were not. This is confirmed in a 
letter written by Lt. Col. Simcoe in 1778 in which he describes who the Queens Rangers 
were allowed to recruit: "No Corps to entertain Irish recruits except the Queens Rangers, 
Roman Catholic Volunteers and the Volunteers of Ireland …Major Rogers warrant was to 
all extents and purposes a free battalion."60 This means that Simcoe was using Rogers' 
warrant as binding and therefore nothing had been changed in terms of who the Rangers 
could and could not recruit, which invalidates Innes‘ restrictions.  
Rogers' recruiting policy seems sensible on some levels. He was recruiting 
everyone he could get and the idea was that he would choose the best men as and when he 
had them. However, the question should be asked whether or not he was an adequate 
judge of the quality of recruits. Considering the fact that the British would frequently 
struggle to recruit Loyalists any selectivity based on criteria other than fighting potential 
seems somewhat foolish. There is also the issue that the actions they took with the 
Queens Rangers possibly discouraged many potential recruits. While the British 
understandably had to be wary of recruiting potential Patriot spies, they could not afford 
to turn away too many volunteers. Most Loyalist regiments were under-strength, and it is 
more than likely every man they turned away might discourage others from joining. If as 
Ranlet claims, the British or existing Loyalists in New York, sometimes had to resort to 
―pressing‖ men for their Loyalist units it makes criticism of Rogers‘ recruitment Queens 
Rangers doubly baffling and strategically unwise.61 On balance, a recruit coerced into 
joining a regiment is more likely to desert or collude with the enemy than a volunteer. 
The act of volunteering presupposes that the recruit had some faith in the rightness of the 
British cause and was therefore less likely to desert or turn traitor. However, if a recruit 
was turned away for no other reason than their background, or skin colour, then they 
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could understandably have become resentful, and may have been inclined to act on this 
resentment possibly going as far as switching sides. Yet, if the men were turned away 
because of infirmity or lack of the soldierly qualities then by dismissing them, the British 
were acting sensibly. No complaint was made or investigated during the actual recruiting 
processes which at the time in terms of recruits brought in it seemed to be initially 
successful. A man who recruited enough men to form a company could reasonably expect 
to be commissioned a captain, which was quite an inducement to recruiting.  
Because of the scarcity of data it is impossible to put an exact figure on the 
numbers in the early Queens Rangers but estimates are possible. Of the ten companies of 
the original Rangers there are muster rolls for four companies so the records are 
incomplete but they are the only existing rolls for this period on which to base 
estimates.62 Each company has around sixty or seventy (a bit less than the 100 men an 
eighteenth century infantry company was supposed to have but in practice, rarely did) but 
still a good number by comparable figures.63 So if there were ten companies then it is 
reasonable to estimate between six or seven hundred recruits.64 Thus Rogers was 
successful in recruiting a large number of men in a short time. To put this into context 
many later Loyalist units struggled to reach two hundred men and contained companies of 
barely forty men.65 The below demonstrates the rapid recruitment that took place in a 
relatively short space of time.  
Table 5: Four companies of the Queens Rangers, 24 August 1776 to 24 December 1776. 
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Company 
 
Officers 
(including 
NCOs.) 
Privates 
 
Total strength 8 
August 24 -
December 
1776. 
Fit For Duty 24 
December 
177666 
Capt. Frazer 10 63 73 47 
Capt. Eagles 9 55 64 22 
Capt. Griffiths 10 52 62 43 
Capt Brandon 10 60 70 45 
Total 39 230 269 157 
Source: Muster Rolls for the companies of Capt. John Brandon, Capt. Daniel Frazer, Capt. John 
Griffiths and Capt. John Eagles all 24 December 1776, TS 11/221 
 
This table demonstrates that quite large numbers of men had been recruited in the 
four month period. Two hundred and sixty nine men represents a good total for four 
tenths of the regiment (many complete regiments numbered less than this) but also that by 
December large numbers of these men were absent from duty. The reasons for this rapid 
decline in numbers will be discussed below. Muster rolls are frustrating sources as all that 
is recorded are the names of recruits. It is notable that there are far fewer Scottish and 
Irish names in these muster rolls than those compiled in the 1780s.67 While this of course 
proves nothing, it is possible to surmise that a greater number of the recruits were 
American born.68  
The recruits were assembled at Flushing on Long Island in August and September 
of 1776 where they were mustered and the process of forming them into companies was 
begun. Their training also commenced. There is no documentary evidence to describe 
their training. The closest the historian can get is to examine the training methods Rogers 
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briefly outlined in his journals and to surmise that he used the similar methods to train his 
troops in autumn of 1776.69 Rogers may have intended to operate his original strenuous 
training methods but in 1776 he was twenty years older and alcohol had taken its toll, so 
whether the methods were exactly similar to his original training regime is debatable. 
What is the case is that Rogers only had few weeks in which to implement his training 
regime so whatever methods he used would have been rushed. 
Certainly, there were problems in recreating the French and Indian War regiment. 
Cuneo writes that the men assembled in the autumn of 1776 were not of the same calibre 
as those that had served fifteen years previously saying that the recruits were ―farmers 
and townspeople who scarcely knew one end of a gun from another.‖ He compares them 
unfavourably with the ―experienced and sturdy New Hampshire men of 1756.‖70 Yet it is 
hard to see how he can fully substantiate this claim given the lack of evidence about the 
men. The only real evidence that the men were not up to the same standards as 1756, is 
from the report of the Inspector General Alexander Innes of 14 March 1777, who would 
complain that many of the original Queens Rangers were old and infirm and were unfit 
for service.71 Yet this was only some of the men of course. There is also evidence to 
suggest that not all of these men were dismissed when Innes reported. In the introduction 
to his journal, Simcoe states that one of his first tasks was to create a unit of "young men, 
active and fit for the service.‖72 The way Simcoe expresses this, gives the impression that 
some of the men who were still with the unit when he took command in October 1777 did 
not fit into this category. This would suggest that not all of Innes‘ recommendations had 
been acted upon by the two British officers who had commanded in the interim. There are 
two possible solutions to this. One being that to dismiss too many men would have 
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completely destroyed the regiment and that there were not enough potential recruits to 
start again. The other suggestion is that many of these older men were experienced 
soldiers who provided the regiment with something that young raw troops couldn't. As 
the chapter will show, the Queens Rangers performed well in the post Rogers, pre Simcoe 
period, so the age of the men could not have hindered them. 
It is interesting to consider why the quality of the troops was allegedly so poor. 
The troops that Rogers had had available to him in 1756 were admittedly drawn from 
many parts of America, but why were so many of the new troops so "old and infirm?"  
The average age of the recruits in 1775 to the Boston Association was over 40.73 Is this a 
reflection on the kind of men that the British were able to recruit in the first years of the 
war? Were young men less likely to become Loyalists? There were many young men who 
volunteered for the later Queens Rangers so this is unlikely to have been the case. It is 
also possible to say that Rogers was recruiting older men because of their cumulative 
combat experience.74  
If there were differences in the men Rogers recruited in 1776 from those he had 
enlisted in 1756 it has been commented on that the Rogers‘ attitude had changed too. 
Mary Beacock Fryer and Christopher Dracott, comment that Rogers had undergone a 
change, stating that he had gone from treating his men as ―equals‖ to taking a more 
authoritarian attitude.75 This may explain why desertion rates were higher as Rogers was 
less likely to inspire Loyalty amongst the men. It also may have discouraged talented 
recruits from joining as this statement by a potential recruit, Steven Jarvis, demonstrates: 
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I set off to Mr Jarvis [his cousin] to procure an exchange; when to 
my great surprise I saw the Lt Col. of the Regt.[Rogers], who was 
mounted, attack the Sentinel, at his Marquee, and beat him most 
unmercifully with his cane, over the head and shoulders. After viewing this 
transaction I wheeled about, took my knapsack, and marched off with my 
Regt., without even taking leave of my relations.76 
This is a very different Rogers from the popular perception of the tough, good-
natured man of the people who appears in Kenneth Roberts‘ novel Northwest Passage.77 
Fryer and Dracott are possibly subtly comparing Rogers to Simcoe, a man from a far 
more refined background than Rogers yet who praised his men at every opportunity, 
officers and ranks alike.78 Fryer and Dracott put Rogers' attitude down to alcoholism 
although it could be that Rogers had a greater sense of his own importance than he had 
previously. Certainly his letters often appear to be written in a self important style, as 
witness his declaration of Loyalty quoted earlier in the chapter.79 This authoritarianism is 
not the best way to encourage recruits and in a small unit like a regiment an unpopular 
commander is one of the surest ways to encourage desertion and indiscipline. It is also 
noticeable that of all the testimonies supporting Rogers, none comes from an enlisted man 
although this may be due to scarcity of sources and the fact that at that time an enlisted 
man would rarely have been asked, or trusted, to testify to the fitness of a commissioned 
officer. 
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Rogers did have friends in the regiment though, particularly the officers he had 
appointed. The officers of the Queens Rangers until 1777 were basically split into two 
separate groups: the original group consisting of those chosen by Rogers for bringing in 
enough troops; and a group of "Virginia gentlemen" merged into the Queens Rangers on 
the orders of Howe.80 The information available on the first group of is largely confined 
to those officers who brought the legal suits against Howe and Innes. These men would 
be dismissed for not being officer material and were described as: "Tavern Keepers" and 
"keepers of bawdy houses" by their more respectable comrades.81  The testimonies of the 
dismissed officers will be investigated in greater depth when the legal suit is discussed 
later in the chapter, but it is enough to say that they praised Rogers and his vision for the 
Queens Rangers. 
 The second group however, were not as enamoured of their commander. These 
officers had been recruited in Virginia by Gov. Dunmore. They had helped form the 
Queens Own Loyal Virginia Regiment in the autumn of 1775 and had participated at the 
disastrous battle of Great Bridge in Virginia, in December 1775, where a hastily 
organised Loyalist force was defeated by the Patriots. They were a mixture of native 
Virginians and British emigrants, many of whom were Scots. Their background was 
different to that of Rogers‘ original officers; Simcoe described them as ―Virginia 
gentlemen.‖82 Several of these men were former British officers and thus used to British 
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Army discipline.83 The documentary evidence suggests that they did not get on well with 
Rogers and his officers. Led by Rogers‘ second in command, Capt. (later Maj.) Richard 
Armstrong, an Englishmen and Virginia landowner, they petitioned Gen. Howe for 
Rogers‘ removal.84 They would be allowed to remain with the new Queens Rangers after 
March 1777 and would form the nucleus of its officer corps.85 They will be described in 
detail in the second part of the chapter when they formed the mainstay of Simcoe's 
battalion. However, there is no evidence to show that these tensions had manifested 
themselves in October 1776 when the Queens Rangers were moved up to the frontline to 
commence their activities against the Patriots. 
This concludes the section on the formation of Queens Rangers. By mid October 
1776, Rogers had assembled a unit of at least several hundred men and had them in the 
field close to the enemy lines in New York. This rapidity of training was similar to the 
speed in which the Continental Army had been put in the field in the summer of 1775. 
Rogers had hastily assembled a fighting unit and committed them to combat with little 
training within a few short weeks. The thesis will demonstrate that while this could be 
said to have worked for the Patriots this would be the last time the British would utilise 
such approaches with the Loyalists in the Northern theatre of war. This was because of 
what happened on the night of 22 October 1776. 
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Map 2: New York Campaign, Showing Mamaroneck, 22 October 1776. 
 
Source: Hugh Bicheno, Rebels and Redcoats (London, 2003) p.43 
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Winter 1776-1777. 
On the night of 22 October 1776 the Rangers were in camp at Mamaroneck, near 
Oyster Bay in New York, when they were ambushed by a Patriot force consisting of 750 
men from Delaware, Virginia and Maryland, under the command of a Colonel John 
Haslett. Haslett was acting on the orders of Lord Stirling who had seen the chance to 
humiliate Rogers.86 Rogers played into Stirling's hands by failing to assign adequate 
sentries and the Patriots took full advantage of this. There was confused fighting before 
the Queens Rangers managed to beat a fighting retreat. However, they had taken quite 
heavy casualties and thirty-six of their number were captured.87 This was to be the only 
major action the Rangers would fight in 1776, and the Patriots claimed it as a major 
victory. John Cuneo‘s detailed account of the skirmish argues that it was not really a 
defeat and that the Americans exaggerated their success for propaganda purposes because 
they saw Rogers as an important recruiting tool for the British and thus he had to be 
discredited.88 However, much of the evidence points towards it being a grievous defeat. 
It is certainly the case that it was in the Patriots‘ interest to make great capital 
about defeating Rogers. Washington had expressed his fears about the recruitment of 
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Loyalists and Rogers‘ role in particular in a letter written two weeks before Mamaroneck, 
in which he opined that, ―it is absolutely necessary, that the Measures of the Enemy [in 
respect to Loyalist recruitment] should be effectually counteracted in this Instance, or, in 
a little time, they will levy no inconsiderable Army of our own People. The influence of 
their Money and their artifices have already passed the Sound, and several have been 
detected of late, who had enlisted to serve under their banner and the particular Command 
of Major Rogers.‖89 Washington was clearly aware of the propaganda value of Rogers 
and was thinking of ways to counteract him. So when the Patriots realised they had the 
chance show up Rogers they grasped it fully and used the result to their advantage. 
Evidence suggests that Rogers' ineptitude did much of the Patriots work for them. 
He was undoubtedly taken unawares and there is a strong argument, based on evidence in 
Patriot sources, for suggesting that the regiment was lucky to escape more or less intact. 
A letter from Washington‘s aide de camp, Tench Tilghman, estimates the Queens 
Rangers at around four hundred; they were outnumbered by two hundred and fifty men if 
Cuneo's figure of 650 for the Patriots is correct.90 The same letter goes on to suggest that 
it was only by sheer luck that the Queens Rangers escaped at all.  
They attacked Rogers about daybreak, put the party to flight, 
brought in thirty-six prisoners, sixty arms, and a good many blankets; and 
had not the guides undertook to alter the first disposition, Major Rogers, 
and his party of about four hundred, would in all probability have fallen 
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into our hands. We don't know how many we killed, but an officer says he 
counted twenty-five in one orchard. We had twelve wounded.91 
This demonstrates that the Queens Rangers came off badly. The difference 
between defeat and victory is sometimes purely a matter of interpretation, but the fact that 
Rogers took the greater casualties and lost the field makes it very hard to suggest that 
Mamaroneck was anything other than a humiliating defeat. 
 Cuneo argues that Rogers was not censured too harshly by the High Command 
by quoting a letter from Howe which stated that Rogers put up a ―spirited exertion.‖  
However, Cuneo does not quote the whole letter, which censures Rogers for the 
carelessness of his sentries, which, "exposed him to a surprise from a large body of the 
enemy.‖ 92 This would seem to suggest that had Rogers and his officers been doing their 
duty properly they should never have allowed themselves to be ambushed at all. Indeed, a 
letter from the Patriot politician Charles De Witt suggests that had the orders of Lord 
Stirling been carried out properly the Patriots "should have had the whole party with their 
infamous leader.93"  
The use of the phrase ―infamous‖ shows how important it was to the Patriots to 
humiliate Rogers. Had Rogers been captured his fate could have been a dire one, given 
that he had given his parole not to take up arms against the Patriots. The Patriots would 
certainly have been able to have made great political capital out of a trial, and this was 
why Rogers had been such a target for them in the first place. 
  The later Queens Rangers under Simcoe were never ambushed in this way as 
Simcoe always took the precaution of posting adequate sentries possibly as a result of the 
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lesson of Mamaroneck.94 The forested terrain in New York, where the Rangers were 
posted – in 1776 and on and off until 1780─makes long-range visibility difficult, 
therefore the sentries had to be extra vigilant. Simcoe would develop these techniques to a 
fine art and was equally adept at catching out inattentive Patriot sentries. 
 Rogers‘ men were barely trained and certainly not yet as proficient as his French 
and Indian War soldiers had been at forest fighting. It is possible that he did take what 
would have been adequate precautions with a well-trained regiment; however, this in 
itself could be a criticism. Rogers and his company commanders should have taken extra 
care. If the men were not ready to be on the front line then they should not have been 
there. It was Rogers‘ duty as commander to state this to higher authority and he would 
have been well within his rights to keep them in a safer position until he had felt that they 
were ready. Was it therefore bravado on the part of Rogers that saw them transferred to 
the frontlines so quickly? The Queens Rangers were a small part of the British invasion of 
the mainland New York. The British Army had remained on the islands on the coast of 
New York for most of the summer and it was only in October that the main army crossed 
over to the mainland taking the Queens Rangers with them. After a summer of relative 
inactivity the British were finally moving and Rogers was keen that his new regiment 
should be involved. Yet the fact that Mamaroneck ended as it did suggests that the 
Queens Rangers were rushed into a combat which they were not ready for. 
In many ways the Patriots‘ scheme to ruin Rogers was accomplished, but by the 
man himself. Before Mamaroneck, Rogers had been able to live off his reputation from 
the French and Indian War but it was becoming clearer that now he was lazy and 
frequently drunk. Rogers' intemperance and other bad habits would have dire 
consequences for him and his command of the Queens Rangers. After Mamaroneck the 
Queens Rangers saw little action. Some recruiting parties tangled with the enemy and 
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they conducted some small-scale raids but for most of the winter they sat behind their 
own lines. While this would have normal for most regiments, a ranger regiment was 
supposed to be active during the winter. Rogers' journals had spelled this out, in the 
French and Indian War; he had gone to the effort of fitting his men with snowshoes so 
that they could keep the enemy pinned down when least expected it.95 Yet it seemed that 
the days of Rogers being innovative were over; his alcoholism had worsened to the point 
where many in his regiment began to despair of their accomplishing anything. Morale 
plummeted in camp and many soldiers deserted.  
The following table compiled from the extant muster rolls from January 1777 
shows how the numbers had indeed declined over the winter but actually not 
dramatically. The biggest decline was from the initial muster to the December 1776 
muster from 269 to 157. Much of this is attributable to Mamaroneck. However, on 
examining the figures what becomes apparent is that the some of the companies of the 
Queens Rangers do not look like functioning units. Twenty two men is less than platoon 
strength and not enough to operate as a functional military body. 
Table 6: Four companies of the Queens Rangers, 24 December 1776 to 30 March 1777. 
 
Company 
 
Officers 
(including 
NCOs.) 
Privates 
 
Total 
strength 24 
December 
1776 to 30 
March 1777. 
Fit For Duty 24 
December 177696 
Total Fit for 
Duty  March 
177797 
Capt. Frazer 7 55 62 47 52 
Capt. Eagles 7 25 32 22 22 
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Capt. 
Griffiths 
7 32 39 43 22 
Capt Brandon 9 41 50 45 44 
Total 30 153 183 157 140 
Source: Muster Rolls for the companies of Capt. John Brandon, Capt. Daniel Frazer, Capt. John 
Griffiths and Capt. John Eagles all 30 March 1777 except Griffiths roll which was taken on March 7, 
TS 11/221. 
 
 
It was at this low point, in December 1776, that someone took a stand against 
Rogers. Nearly a third of the Queens Rangers officers, largely consisting of those men 
transferred from the Loyal Virginians, took a step which verged on mutiny. They wrote to 
General Howe, stating that Rogers was unfit for command and that they would not serve 
under him any longer. The fact that Rogers' second in command, Capt. (Maj. by 
provincial rank) Richard Armstrong, signed this petition shows the seriousness of it. 
Armstrong sent the petition to the British High Command protesting about the conduct of 
Rogers and several of his appointed officers.98 It accuses Rogers of contravening a 
general order from Howe about who should be appointed to commissions. The petition 
reads: 
Many of these officers were men of mean extraction, 
without any degree of education sufficient to qualify them to bear 
his Majesty‘s commission… Gen‘l Howe had been deceived by 
Colo Rogers who recommended these men for commissions in the 
Queens Rangers in direct violation of a General order of October, 
76 - by which Commanding officers of Provincial Corps were 
ordered to be particularly careful to inform themselves of such 
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persons as they intended should bear commissions in the Corps and 
to recommend none such as were Strictly unexceptionable.99 
This document seems to be criticizing the officers not because of lack of merit but 
because of their class. It goes on to criticise the professions of the officers they are 
complaining about. To put it into the context of the time however, regiments were run by 
officers from a specific class. In the British Army, commissions were purchased, which 
made it a very hard system to break into, almost a caste system. There was an expectation 
not just amongst the officers but arguably amongst the rank and file too that officers 
would behave in a certain way.100 It was often very difficult for men who were raised 
from the ranks to be accepted by those both above and below them. Yet, traditionally, 
American provincial regiments were different. Recruiting for rank was the common 
practice and by that system anyone could conceivably get a commission. The crucial 
point, however, is that the men who complained were American, or had all least lived in 
America.101 Some of them had served in British regiments but they would all be familiar 
with the colonial system which was replicated in all the Loyalist regiments at this time –
excepting the Royal Highland Emigrants, the Nova Scotia Volunteers and the 60th Royal 
Americans- where officers were appointed. By explicitly criticising their commander they 
also laid themselves open to serious charges. This petition commenced a chain of events 
which would end in the radical reformation not only of the Queens Rangers but the whole 
provincial service. In a wider context it can be connected with the wider strategy British 
stepping up their effort in America in 1777. The campaign of that year would see several 
major battles and a new aggression on the part of the British and would prove to be one of 
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the most decisive years of the war, and it was equally decisive for the Queens Rangers. 
They would be transformed as fighting force. 
 The fact that these men had waited for the whole winter to put in their petition 
shows that it was no rapid decision. They were potentially risking not only their military 
future but potentially their lives, had Howe chosen to back Rogers. However, as the 
chapter will demonstrate in the next section, they not only got away with it but got 
exactly what they wanted. 
 
The Inspection  
Howe acted swiftly on the Petition by taking prompt action in respect to the 
Queens Rangers that signified a new attitude towards the provincial corps by the British 
High Command in early 1777. Smith argued that the British changed their strategy 
towards the Loyalists as a result of the French intervention in 1778.102 However, while 
this is undoubtedly the case, the British had actually commenced reforming their 
provincial regiments on a smaller scale, the year before. The model for how future 
Loyalist regiments would be organised was the Queens Rangers.  
Over the winter of 1777 Howe created the Provincial Service which made several 
administrative appointments aimed at turning the Loyalist regiments from a loose 
collection of regiments into a coherent body.103 The most significant of these for the 
Queens Rangers, was the appointment of Alexander Innes as Inspector General of the 
Provincial Corps.104 In January 1777 Innes, as a trusted aide of Howe, was promoted to 
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the provincial rank of colonel and given authority over all administrative matters relating 
to the Loyalist Regiments. Innes would have a major influence on the Loyalist regiments 
as he had the power to recommend changes in the command and the structure of the units. 
Innes‘ first major assignment was the Queens Rangers. Howe, having just 
received Armstrong's petition, decided to act upon it and ordered Innes to inspect the 
regiment. What Innes found and the recommendations he made would have major 
repercussions for the Queens Rangers and the Loyalist regiments as a whole. Innes 
discovered abnormally high rates of desertion and several other ―irregularities‖ which he 
detailed in a report to General Howe. He based his evidence upon examining the regiment 
and the muster rolls and accounts.105  His conclusion was that the Rangers were ―unfit for 
service.‖106 He then proceeded, with the authorization of General Howe, to take steps to 
make the Rangers ―fit for service.‖ He dismissed Col. Rogers and twenty-three officers 
and allowed over two hundred of the rank and file to leave the regiment.107 Innes stated in 
his report that many of the men that had been enlisted by the dismissed officers had 
chosen not to serve with anyone else so he recommended that they be allowed to leave on 
condition that they paid back ―the Kings Bounty, if they have received it.‖108 This codicil 
seems harsh. By necessity much of the bounty would have been spent on uniforms and 
other military accoutrements.  
There were also allegations made against one of the recruiting officers, Captain 
John Griffiths, that bounties had been never been handed out in the first place. If this was 
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the case, then recruits would have to have to found money that they had never received.109 
Griffiths had previous convictions, he had served a prison sentence for counterfeiting 
before the war and the claim that he later made to the Loyalist Claims board was turned 
down as entirely fraudulent.110 Lt. Col. Rudolphus Ritzema, who knew Griffiths, claimed 
the captain was ―one of the greatest scoundrels he ever knew.‖111 Rogers  himself would 
wrongly appropriate bounty money in 1780 while commanding the Kings Rangers in 
Canada, and his pre-war record included numerous allegations of counterfeiting, and 
possibly even treason with the French.112  While these events are not materially relevant 
to the charge of officers withholding bounties, they certainly make the claims of Innes 
and Armstrong more believable. The allegations of appropriating the bounties were never 
successfully upheld. 
In the margins of Innes‘ report the Adjutant General, Lord Frances Rawdon, 
states the action that Howe had ordered for each of Innes' recommendations. Rawdon 
recommended that if the troops chose not to leave they could be transferred into another 
regiment. So essentially the choice was, pay back the money or be drafted into a unit they 
had not chosen to serve with. In some respects as the recruits had signed on to fight 
anyway this does seem reasonable, but the issue was that they had refused serve under 
anyone else. It brings up a complicated issue about volunteer soldiers. If a soldier 
volunteers for a specific regiment, is it right to force him to move into a regiment that he 
did not sign up for? However, to have stuck rigidly to this would have been virtually 
impossible. Regiments were depleted by service and it was far quicker and more efficient 
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to transfer experienced soldiers to another unit than it was to train up new recruits. This 
was common practice in the British Army at the time, although it was new to the Loyalist 
service. 
The next section of the report refers to plans to provide compensation for the 
dismissed officers. Rawdon states that Howe ordered that they be given three months pay 
and "such of them as are deserving" were to be given the chance serve as officers in 
another provincial unit when "vacancies" arose.113 This would suggest that some of the 
officers were judged inadequate for the Queens Rangers yet perfectly acceptable for other 
regiments although the use of the word ―deserving‖ demonstrates that some of them were 
judged unfit for any commission. However, what Howe's order raises is that he intended 
that the Queens Rangers were to have the best officers. It suggests that, despite 
everything, they were regarded as a specialist unit and care was to be taken with them. 114 
Innes' report highlighted the serious doubts the High command was beginning to 
have over the recruitment process for Loyalists.115 It is arguable that the discoveries Innes 
made when investigating recruiting for the Queens Rangers would lead the British into 
changing the way in which Loyalists were recruited. Howe began to debate the wisdom of 
raising for rank because of the officers it produced. The main objection that the British 
had to raising for rank was not corruption, which after all could go on (and did) in the 
system that the British normally employed to raise troops, but that technically anyone 
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could become an officer providing that they raised enough men.116  At a wider level the 
changes were not made immediately as Smith demonstrates, they were carried out in a 
widespread way in 1778, but the changes to recruiting followed the pattern set by Innes 
for the Queens Rangers in 1777.117 
In Innes‘ opinion, Rogers had promised companies to men "totally unfit for the 
service".118 Raising for rank was phased out in 1777 and only resurrected for the loosely 
structured militia companies of the Southern campaign, in 1780. As the chapter will 
show, the new documentary evidence proves that the British did have reasons for 
changing the regiment.119 It is possible to argue that some of the measures do equate to 
some form of social control─in respect to the complaints about the ethnicity of some 
recruits, as well as those complaints about the pre-war background of the officers.120 
Certainly, not everyone involved was prepared to accept that the measures that 
were taken were solely for the benefit of the regiment. In 1784 four dismissed officers 
would attempt to sue for wrongful dismissal stating that several of them had had previous 
military service in the British Army and they had all risked their lives to recruit troops. 
The crucial point of the suit was, were the Rangers truly "fit for service" in March 1777?  
If they were not then Innes was entirely justified in making his changes. The problem for 
the historian in trying to answer this question is that the evidence is so conflicting. The 
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four plaintiffs argued that the Queens Rangers would have been capable of serving 
without the re-organisation.121 All regiments suffered from desertion over the winter and 
they argued that it would only have taken a short time before the regiment was up to 
strength again. Given the fact that they had recruited so many men in the autumn of 1776, 
there is validity in this claim. Innes However, contended the opposite. He argued that 
because of the poor leadership qualities of some of the officers, the poor standard of the 
recruits, and ultimately the incapacity to command of Rogers, the regiment was incapable 
of serving in the spring campaign. If this was the case then wholesale changes were 
necessary. 
The question that the controversy over the changes to the Queens Rangers raises 
is this: was this was a case of the British misunderstanding the nature of how Americans 
conducted warfare or were they just trying to make the unit more efficient? Arguably the 
Queens Rangers in 1777 were, in the way they conducted themselves and the tactics they 
planned to use, the epitome of an American unit. Rogers and his officers were wild, 
rumbustious men and their manners would have seemed strange to senior British officers 
used to deference from their juniors. Yet almost every Loyalist regiment raised until then 
would have shared at least some of these characteristics. Cuneo argues that after the 
changes, the Queens Rangers were "no more provincial than any other regular 
regiment."122 Therefore was this change the start of a de-Americanising process of the 
Queens Rangers and by extension the Loyalists? The probable answer is no, not to any 
great extent. There would be other changes to other Loyalist regiments but little on the 
scale of that carried out on the Rangers. However, many new Loyalist regiments raised 
after 1777 and before the Southern campaign of 1780 had British commanders and many 
British subalterns and would follow a similar pattern to that devised by Innes for the 
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Queens Rangers in respect to the appointment of American officers.123 Whether this was 
deliberately ―de-Americanising‖ is doubtful. It is more likely that it was to keep up 
standards of efficiency and to ensure that the Loyalists were run the way the High 
Command wanted them to be run. What was undoubtedly the case was that the British 
would keep a far closer eye on their Loyalist units after March 1777. In some respects, 
while this could be seen as denying them autonomy, it simplified a lot of processes. 
Payments and supplies were not delayed quite as much. The advantage of British 
commanders was that they had access to the channels that were often blocked for 
American commanders and the ability to get things done, by having closer contact with 
the commanding generals. This would particularly be the case with John Simcoe, who 
was a close friend of Henry Clinton. While the Queens Rangers lost their American 
commander they gained a commander who would enable the Queens Rangers to join the 
elite of the British Army in America, a unit who were the first request of any general 
commencing a new campaign. However, before Simcoe, the regiment had two other 
commanders, Maj. Christopher French and Maj. James Wemyss. 
The French and Wemyss Commands March-October 1777 
This section will look at the administration and battlefield experiences of the 
Queens Rangers in the brief period between the dismissal of Rogers and the coming of 
Simcoe. There is very little documentary evidence on this period on which to make any 
kind of assessment. What is known is that the Rangers began to be an efficient and 
trustworthy unit in the eyes of the British. This is the only way the historian has of being 
able to tell anything about the French and Wemyss commands.124 
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The task facing the new commander of the Queens Rangers, Maj. Christopher 
French, was to make the regiment fit for service for the coming campaigns. To 
accomplish this he set about changing the Queens Rangers. The only evidence extant for 
the changes that French made is a list of recommendations that he drew up on taking 
command of the regiment and he sent to the high command. French‘s proposals call for a 
complete reform of the regiment.125 The first request reveals something about the 
character of the Rangers under Rogers. French asks that he be given permission to move 
the Queens Rangers to Upper Brookland, away from New York City, so ―he can prevent 
their coming to town from thence.‖126 From this it can easily be deduced that the men 
were used to going to New York taverns and other establishments. French asked to be 
given NCOs drawn from the ―Privates of the Line‖. In other words a British private is 
suitable to be a NCO in a provincial regiment. While many British soldiers were 
undoubtedly very good, if they had not been promoted in their own units were they really 
suitable to be promoted in Provincial units? Fortunately for the Loyalist identity of the 
Queens Rangers, French was not given permission for this, as under Simcoe the NCOs 
were American-born like Sgt. Maj. Mundy, or pre-war European immigrants.127  
Most of the rest of the document is taken up with practical considerations such as 
getting better weapons and asking for permission to recruit more men, but the last 
paragraph is interesting. French asked for Rogers to line up his troops so that he could 
pick ―the fittest.‖ While this may of course mean the fittest in terms of physical 
considerations, it could also be those that French deemed suitable in terms of their 
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backgrounds or conduct. Certainly the testimonies of the dismissed officers claim that 
many of those dismissed were perfectly ―able-bodied men‖.128 However, as a specialist 
unit, the Queens Rangers were always entitled to pick the kind of men who were most 
able to perform the kind of light infantry duties that the regiment was assigned to. 
Of the ten original company commanders under Rogers only two remained under 
French, Richard Armstrong and Job Williams.129 Of the eight new Captains, four were 
promoted from the existing Lieutenants. These were Robert Macrae, James Dunlop, John 
Buchanan and John Saunders, all Virginians.130 The remaining four were brought in by 
Maj. French.131 Several of the original Lieutenants and ensigns would eventually become 
company commanders under Simcoe.132 Simcoe, in his journal described the change in 
officers: 
Their officers had undergone a material change; many of the 
gentlemen of the southern colonies who had joined Lord Dunmore, and 
distinguished themselves under his orders, were appointed to supersede 
those who were not thought competent to the commissions they had 
hitherto borne; to these were added some volunteers from the army, the 
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whole consisting of young men, active, full of love of the service, emulous 
to distinguish themselves in it, and looking forward to obtain, through their 
actions, the honour of being enrolled with the British Army.133 
Simcoe states that some of the officers had come from the regular army. While this would 
suggest that the British were trying to pack the unit with regular officers it is noticeable 
that the Rangers retained their Loyalist second in command, Richard Armstrong, and that 
Simcoe's eventual successor, John Saunders, was one of the original Lieutenants.134 These 
officers that he found when he joined were in many ways as responsible for the success of 
the unit as he was to be. They had helped hold the unit together through the traumatic 
times of Rogers‘ dismissal and throughout the hectic summer campaign of 1777 when the 
regiment performed well enough to earn the thanks of General Howe. Therefore many of 
the qualities that the regiment would show under Simcoe must have been formed in the 
six months before he assumed command. 
French had been called in to make the regiment efficient and the most important 
step in doing this was the change of officers. As the first line of command under him, he 
had to have complete confidence in his captains. In a way he was doing exactly the same 
thing as Rogers had done six months before. He was appointing men he could trust. The 
regiment needed to be brought up to a standard where it was fit for battle within a few 
weeks so therefore experience was needed. Contrary to the Cuneo thesis, there does not 
appear to be any underlying anti-American motives, and the appointments were made out 
of expediency.  
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 French did not remain as commander for long, being replaced by Maj. James 
Wemyss in May 1777. However, in just over two months in charge he had had a 
substantial effect on the regiment. The major changes to the company commanders were 
taken not by Simcoe but by French and Wemyss.135 If there is little information on 
French‘s command there is even less on Wemyss‘. It is difficult to tell what innovations 
Wemyss made beyond battlefield ones. Because the muster rolls are incomplete for 1776 
and not extant until November 1777 there is no way of determining who he recruited. The 
November Muster roll records that 103 men were recruited in October 1777. This would 
mean that 390 men were in the Regiment in August 1777. It is impossible to tell how 
many of them were recruited by Wemyss as there is no surviving record of those men 
who were dismissed by French in March 1777. However, there must have been a 
considerable number as the regiment took casualties before August of 1777 that had to be 
replaced.136 The recruiting practices did change from Rogers‘ command but there is no 
direct evidence to show this until Simcoe‘s command. Simcoe, we know, changed little in 
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regard to recruiting, and used the bounty system.137   The methods of financing the 
regiment –including bounties─were established under Wemyss but the evidence available 
is for the Simcoe period so the issue of finance will be discussed later. 
Stephen Jarvis‘s journal gives some clues to the state of the Rangers in the early 
summer of 1777. He joined the regiment during this period but because he transferred 
from another regiment he does not shed any light on recruiting practices and enlistment of 
volunteers. However, he does give some detail about the regiment that he found when he 
joined.138 Jarvis says little about the character or effectiveness of Major Wemyss but he 
does make some interesting comments about the state of the regiment at this time.139 He is 
full of praise for many of the officers he came into contact with particularly Captain 
MacKay and Lt. Fitzpatrick ―a generous open hearted Irishman‖ but some of problems 
that had earlier dogged the Queens Rangers still remained.140  He is particularly critical of 
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the existing sergeants in his company. Jarvis had been appointed sergeant on joining and 
says that within days of his arrival ―the whole duty of the Non-Commissioned Officers 
devolved on me as the other Sergeant was a drunken vagabond and was of little use to the 
company or Service.‖141 This would suggest either that not all the offenders from the 
Rogers era had been weeded out or that the recruits from the subsequent period were not 
as efficient as they should have been. Jarvis says the men claimed that the third sergeant 
in his company Sgt. Purdy, had deserted to the Patriots the day after Jarvis joined, taking 
several of the men with him. However, on consulting the database constructed for the 
Queens Rangers, it can be established that a year later a Sergeant Purdy was serving in 
Captain Stephenson‘s company. While it might not necessarily have been the same man, 
it is possible that he had been captured instead of deserting— it is not uncommon for the 
muster rolls to record a man as deserted and later amend it to captured— and had found 
his way back to the regiment. Jarvis sheds no light on the mystery.142  Jarvis later recounts 
a successful action where his company engaged the American Horse and Jarvis personally 
captured an American and his horse. The horse was appropriated by Captain Mackay 
despite the Horse being given to Jarvis by ―order of the commander in chief.‖143 Jarvis‘ 
account is often gossipy and full of anecdotes like this but is invaluable as being the only 
lengthy account by a Queens Rangers ranker. If not all his tales are verifiable or even 
accurate after comparison with sources like the muster rolls they undoubtedly add colour, 
and as Jarvis says himself he wrote ―from memory only.‖144 
 In this period, the Queens Rangers began their transition from colonial Rangers 
to organised light infantry. Again there is no record of their training, although they would 
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not have been used in such a capacity if they had not received adequate training, so it is 
certain that Wemyss implemented new drills and training exercises. From June 1777 the 
Rangers were used as light infantry alongside the Hessian Jaeger corps, a unit they would 
serve alongside frequently on later occasions.145 Becoming light infantry entailed the 
Rangers serving as skirmishers for the main army. Skirmishers were placed in front of the 
battle line. Their duties were to engage the enemy skirmishers and to inflict damage to the 
organisation of the enemy lines by shooting officers and NCOs from long range with 
rifles.146 Although this may seem extremely dangerous, the fact that skirmishers were not 
restricted to a tight formation and could move about freely and make use of cover, 
mitigated this danger. Fuller, the tactician and historian, states that ―to attack agile 
skirmishers by means of a shoulder to shoulder formation is like attacking a swarm of 
angry wasps with a sledgehammer.‖ 147 Fuller‘s highly descriptive phrasing conveys a 
sense of the effect successful skirmishers would have in a battle; fast moving and able to 
seem to be in several places at once.148 They were also able to disrupt formations to make 
it easier for the heavy infantry to break them. The Rangers were able to master these 
tactics rapidly until they were used as the main skirmishers for Howe's army at 
Brandywine-which will be discussed in this section- but they had a few early setbacks. 
The Hessian officer Captain Ewald relates in his journal how the Queens Rangers 
under Major Wemyss suffered a heavy defeat on 23 June 1777. "The Queens Rangers had 
been assigned to cover the right flank but had strayed too far from the army and were 
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attacked so severely by a superior force that half the corps were killed and wounded."149 
This seems as severe a defeat as that suffered under Rogers the previous autumn but 
hardly seems to have caused any ripples.150  It could seem in this case that Wemyss was 
guilty of the same kind of incompetence and overconfidence that Rogers was accused of. 
Just as Rogers had not placed proper sentinels so Wemyss had pushed his men too far 
forward which resulted in them being outnumbered by and enemy and taking heavy 
casualties, the greatest danger to skirmishers. However, it could also be argued that the 
Queens Rangers as light infantry were intended for offensive and scouting operations 
rather than defensive operations. It could also be said that this they had not yet been 
adequately trained for this kind of responsibility. Just over a year later, on 28 June 1778, 
the Rangers would perform a similar defensive duty after the battle of Monmouth 
Courthouse and carry it off with aplomb. Given Wemyss‘ later successes this would also 
imply that everyone was learning by practice, including the officers. 
From the sketchy evidence it appears that Wemyss was beginning to have a 
largely positive effect on the regiment as they were at least performing their duties 
adequately. This is demonstrated by the fact that Howe had enough faith in them to use 
them in a prominent role at Brandywine. As with French there is little documentary 
evidence on Wemyss yet he was effective in turning the Queens Rangers into a regiment 
trusted by Howe. In a few short months Howe had gone from having extreme to concerns 
about their ―fitness for duty‖ to trusting them taking a major role in the autumn 
campaigns of 1777 and after the Battle of Brandywine singling the whole unit out for 
special praise.  
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Map 3: Brandywine Creek, showing the movements of the Queens Rangers, 11 
September 1777. 
 
 
Source: Hugh Bicheno, Rebels and Redcoats, (London, 2003) p. 73. 
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Brandywine Creek, 11 September 1777 
The Battle of Brandywine Creek, on 11 September 1777, is vitally important in 
the forming of the reputation of the Queens Rangers. It was the first major engagement 
that the Queens Rangers served in and the first in which they would receive 
commendation from the highest level. In a wider sense it was the one of the first actions-
excepting MacLean‘s Royal Highland Emigrants‘ stand at Quebec in 1775- where a 
Loyalist regiment would receive this kind of recognition. It was recognition equal and in 
some cases superior to that which regular British units received. One of the major 
questions which this thesis will ask is whether British-commanded Loyalist regiments 
attained more praise and recognition or at least had more chances to attain it. Certainly, 
the Queens Rangers from spring 1777 as well as MacLean‘s corps would fit this pattern.  
The basic facts of the battle are as follows. Howe‘s army marched to meet 
Washington‘s at Chadd‘s Ford in Pennsylvania on the afternoon of 11 September and the 
battle ended that evening when the British forced Washington to retreat. Two weeks later 
the Patriots abandoned Philadelphia. Howe‘s plan was to split his army into two 
divisions. The first, under Lord Cornwallis, was to attack the Patriot positions on their 
right flank and the second, under General Knyphausen was to advance on the Patriot 
centre and assault their dug in positions on the banks of the Brandywine Creek, once the 
flank attack had started. The plan was so successful, Mackesy argues, that had Howe 
pushed on he could have utterly defeated Washington instead of just pushing him back.151 
The Rangers were placed in front of Knyphausen‘s division as skirmishers to harass the 
enemy as the main attack went in.152  
The performance of the Queens Rangers at Brandywine makes clear that in a few 
short months the Queens Rangers had mastered light-infantry tactics. At Brandywine, the 
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Queens Rangers fought through three American defensive lines and in combination with 
Ferguson‘s Riflemen they forced the American light infantry under Colonel Maxwell to 
retreat across Brandywine creek.153 This is particularly impressive. Not only were they 
effective against regular infantry but against their own kind of light infantry. This was a 
case of a Provincial unit beating the Americans at their own tactics.154 Captain Ewald, 
who served alongside the Queens Rangers at the battle, records that the Rangers, despite 
being ambushed and taking casualties, continued on and ―attacked the enemy with 
bayonets so courageously, without firing, that he lost ground."  He goes to on to relate 
that with a combined attack with Ferguson's riflemen they "forced the enemy across the 
creek".155 It is interesting to note that the Rangers performed skilfully with the bayonet. 
The use of the bayonet was to be the cornerstone of Simcoe‘s tactics and the successful 
use of a bayonet charge at Brandywine makes clear that Wemyss must have taught the 
regiment these tactics during the summer of 1777, adding to the credit that this officer 
should receive and has not always been accorded.156 The diary of John Andre, the ADC of 
Howe, gives great credit to the regiment. Although Andre was only a captain at this point, 
his influence was considerable, and it is reasonable to suppose that if Andre noticed this 
then so did the commanders.157 This shows the progress made by the Rangers in the 
summer of 1777.  
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The regiment took heavy casualties at the battle. Their casualties at Brandywine 
included fourteen officers killed or wounded.158 George Washington recorded that they 
took among the heaviest casualties, stating that ―from the best Accounts I have been able 
to collect, their loss [the British Army] was pretty considerable and chiefly fell on their 
Grenadiers and light Troops, composing their flying Army; The Queens Rangers (Rogers' 
Corps), who formed their advanced Guard, and who were first attacked in the Morning, 
are said to have Suffered severely.‖159  The muster rolls do not specifically list the 
casualties for this battle but losses for the period of August to November are shown as 
68.160 This would have included Brandywine and Germantown but the figures seem 
incomplete. Simcoe gives the number of casualties as at least a hundred and Ewald‘s 
account would suggest heavy casualties.161 The total of British casualties was 587, 
including 57 officers killed and wounded.162 If Simcoe‘s figures are correct, this would 
suggest that the Rangers took seventeen percent of the total casualties, their strength at 
the battle was under four hundred men out of a total of almost ten thousand which shows 
a disproportionate number of casualties.163 Like in the summer, they lost men in an 
ambush, but this time the fault was that of the commanding general, Knyphausen, and not 
the fault of their commander, and they fought bravely and skilfully. The Queens Rangers 
division commander Maj. Gen. Knyphausen, wrote to Howe in a dispatch that the 
―behaviour of the Rangers‖ had made him ―want for words to express my own 
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astonishment to give him [Howe] an idea of it‖.164  Acting on this praise Howe sent out an 
order to the Rangers two days after Brandywine which read: 
―The Commander in Chief desires to convey to the Officers and 
men of the Queens Rangers his approbation and acknowledgement for 
their spirited and gallant behaviour in the engagement of the 11th instant, 
and to assure them how well he is satisfied with their distinguished 
conduct on that day.‖165 
That this approbation should come so soon after the regiment was changed only six 
months before could demonstrate that the changes were ultimately successful. Yet it is 
possible to say that the previous Rangers had only seen action on a large scale once, 
and that was only a few weeks after formation.166 The personnel had changed since 
Mamaroneck but not completely, so can Rogers‘ influence be denied entirely?167 
Alternatively it may be that French and Wemyss were excellent teachers or that they 
had an unusually responsive group of men. Whatever the reason, Howe, who had 
ordered the changes to the Rangers, would naturally have been well pleased at being 
proved right.168 
Thus Brandywine was in some cases a watershed for the Queens Rangers and by 
extension for the Loyalist regiments in general. The Queens Rangers had proven that not 
only could Loyalists fight, but also that could outfight their nearest equivalents amongst 
their enemies. They had proved also that Americans could do not only as well as other 
Americans but as well as Redcoats and the legendary Jaeger Corps.  
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The Rangers under Wemyss then performed equally well at Germantown on 4 
October 1777. At this battle the Rangers proved equally adept at defensive duties. Placed 
on their own on the extreme right flank of the Army, they held off a far superior force of 
Patriot infantry.169 The burgeoning combat abilities of the junior officers of the Queens 
Rangers was demonstrated when a junior lieutenant, David Shank, with his platoon of 
skirmishers held of a flanking movement by an entire column of Patriots until help 
arrived.170 Shank‘s tactics with a platoon of skirmishers bears out Fuller‘s points on the 
effectiveness of skirmishers against far larger formations.171 They were able to disrupt the 
enemy at little cost to themselves by being able to move freely. 
 Germantown was costly for the regiment, however. They lost their commander, 
Major Wemyss, who was severely wounded, as well as taking several casualties.172 The 
two battles coming in quick succession had certainly improved the skills and cohesion of 
the unit but they had also severely weakened them in terms of their strength. Simcoe 
notes that the regiment were ―greatly reduced in numbers‖ and were in dire need of 
augmentation, which they got on 20 October 1777 when Captain Smyth brought in 103 
recruits.173 Thus the Rangers—which John Simcoe had taken over five days before—were 
vastly different in terms of personnel than they had been six months before.174 
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The performance of the Rangers in the campaign of the autumn of 1777 attracted 
notice outside of the Army. A newspaper report from December 1777 observed ―No 
regiment in the army has gained more honour this campaign than Major Wemyss‘ (or the 
Queens) Rangers; they have been engaged in every principle service and behaved nobly; 
indeed most of the officers have been wounded since we took the field in 
Pennsylvania.‖175 While the opinion given is a highly subjective one, the behaviour of the 
Rangers had obviously been notable enough to attract attention and elicit this kind of 
praise.  
This praise also draws attention to the achievements of Maj. James Wemyss. 
Rarely mentioned in any of the accounts of the Queens Rangers, which are either about 
the Rogers or Simcoe commands, he deserves credit for turning the regiment into an 
effective fighting force. Despite the lack of evidence, it is clear by the tactics he used that 
he must have practised similar drills to those later used by Simcoe and the commitment of 
the Regiment in battle shows that he was as capable of motivating the men as his 
successor. Arguably Wemyss was faced with the harder task. He inherited a disheartened, 
chastened unit, which he had to turn around rapidly, whereas Simcoe inherited a 
successful one. It is apparent that in six months, the Queens Rangers had come from 
being a unit almost dispensed with by the British Army to one that was rapidly becoming 
indispensable. Under their next commander, John Graves Simcoe, this upward trend was 
to continue. 
Conclusion 
The first six months in the history of the Queens Rangers, were, on initial 
examination, not particularly successful. They had been formed, they had fought one 
small battle; and then they had stagnated for several months before a group of the senior 
officers had grown so disgusted with conditions that they had complained to the 
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commanding general; the general‘s inspector was so displeased with the regiment that he 
recommended a complete overhaul.  
Much of the blame for this must be placed on the first commander Robert 
Rogers. He was a man of undoubted talent, who had had great success with his own brand 
of tactics and who had the vision to see that these tactics would be needed by the British 
Army because the Patriots would undoubtedly use similar tactics against them. The 
Continental Army would raise its own Light Infantry which was in many ways influenced 
by Rogers. It is possible to suggest that the early Queens Rangers would not have looked 
of place in the Continental Army. Rogers mooted the idea of an effective fast marching 
guerrilla unit that would constantly harass the enemy. His idea was successfully realised, 
but not by him. As this chapter has demonstrated, Rogers was unfit to do this at this stage 
of his career. The Rogers of 1765 would have been a real asset to the British yet his 
reputation was still a recruiting tool for the Loyalists. When he came to form the Queens 
Rangers he was ten years older, had suffered personal disappointments, his emotional 
commitment to the British was by no means certain and his reliability was in question, as 
his later conduct shows. He made a number of mistakes including appointing officers who 
the British judged were not up to the task and allowed his unit to fall into a state where it 
was considered "unfit for service." Rogers made an error of judgment in failing to realise 
that his unit would be under scrutiny and that he would not be allowed to do what he 
pleased with them. There was too much at stake for the British even at this stage of the 
war. They needed a successful Loyalist unit to act as a beacon for recruiting and their eye 
fell on Rogers' regiment. So why did the British chose the Queens Rangers as a test case 
for their plans for the future of the provincial corps? In some respects it was because 
Rogers' idea was a good one. The kind of regiment that he envisaged was exactly what 
the British wanted, and Howe as a pioneer of light tactics himself saw how useful it 
would be to be able to hit the Patriots back with their own tactics. Once Rogers had 
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shown himself incapable of seeing his vision through, Howe decided to appoint a 
succession of young, regular officers who he knew and trusted. The third, John Simcoe, 
would be the officer who would successfully implement many of Rogers' ideas and the 
next chapter will be about his command of the Queens Rangers. 
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Chapter 4 
The Queens Rangers Under Simcoe 
 
Introduction. 
The history of the corps under his [Simcoe‘s] command is a series 
of gallant skilful, and successful enterprises against the enemy, 
without a single reverse. The Queens Rangers have killed or taken 
twice their own numbers.1 
   General Henry Clinton, 1780.  
The chapter aims to consider whether Henry Clinton‘s high opinion of the Queens 
Rangers was justified. It has three aims: first, to provide an overview of the composition 
of the regiment; second, to examine those aspects of the administration of the regiment 
which had an effect on military operations of the unit—in particular recruitment training 
and discipline; and third, to consider how these features shaped the regiment‘s 
effectiveness in battle. All of this will help to build a wider picture of the regiment than 
has previously been attempted in an attempt to establish the validity of Clinton‘s claims.  
The literature on the later Queens Rangers is mostly Canadian in focus and thus 
of limited use in examining the regiment‘s composition and evaluating its military 
effectiveness in the Revolutionary War.2 The same can be said of Mary Beacock Fryer 
and Christopher Dracott‘s recent biography of Simcoe,  which is useful and well written, 
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although the bulk of the work is concerned with Simcoe‘s tenure as Governor of Upper 
Canada between 1791 and 1796.3 Of the three areas discussed in this chapter, regimental 
historian Ingles is most concerned with battlefield effectiveness.4 The vast majority of his 
work is spent on recounting the military exploits of the unit. At this he is knowledgeable- 
as befits an experienced soldier- and full of praise for Simcoe and his regiment. Fryer and 
Dracott only really mention the regiment in relation to Simcoe and how he impacted on it 
and vice versa. They too say little about composition or administration but also recount 
some of the regiment‘s battlefield adventures. Their work also uses Simcoe‘s Journal 
extensively but they have not consulted the Simcoe Papers in the Clements Library.5  
There has been significant work on the British Army that deals with several of the 
issues that are relevant to this chapter. Sylvia Frey has worked with the soldiers of the 
British regiments of the Revolutionary War. Frey came up with the concept of group 
consciousness for British soldiers.6 This is entirely relevant to the Queens Rangers and 
will be discussed later on as will several other relevant works.7  
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 This chapter has undertaken new research in an attempt to broaden knowledge of 
the Queens Rangers. In addition to the sources used in the previous chapter, this chapter 
makes extensive use of the regimental musters. This involves quantitative analysis 
undertaken by means of a database whose findings are reported in tables included with 
this chapter; the muster rolls constitute a near complete series from November 1777 until 
October 1783 but have not hitherto been systematically analysed in their entirety.8 The 
reason for constructing the database and why this chapter will make extensive use of it is 
to build up a clear picture of the life of the regiment in a way that has never been 
attempted before. The muster rolls have occasionally been analysed, but never in so 
complete a manner. This chapter aims to provide an account of the Queens Rangers by 
investigating both their service and synthesizing this with the administrative information 
provided by the muster rolls. It is therefore hoped to provide a complete account of the 
regiment from inception to Yorktown.  
Equally valuable in terms of qualitative analysis are the papers and journal of the 
regiment‘s commander John Simcoe.9 The testimony of other officers like Clinton, 
Cornwallis, Arnold and Ewald provide anecdotal evidence of administrative history and 
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military operations.10 Simcoe‘s journal is an essential source. It is considered to be one of 
the outstanding works of its kind by military historians and by contemporaries like Henry 
Clinton.11 It is by intention, a narrow work concerning itself with little beyond the 
operations of the Queens Rangers; Simcoe did not feel it appropriate to comment on the 
wider battles in print, which he left to his private correspondence with Clinton in the late 
1780‘s.12 Simcoe‘s work is not a personal memoir —he refers to himself in the third 
person throughout—but rather an account of the exploits of his regiment. The Simcoe 
papers held in the William L. Clements Library have also been vital to the completion of 
this chapter. Although fragmentary and often undated they provide a valuable picture of 
the Queens Rangers. It is of note that none of the other works on the Queens Rangers has 
made significant use of them.13 
 In some ways the most valuable sources are a letter of Sgt. Nathaniel Mundy and 
the memoir of Sgt. Stephen Jarvis, which enable the chapter to examine something which 
is all too rare: primary evidence left by those serving in the ranks. While they both praise 
their commander unreservedly they are not without criticism of the regiment. Jarvis in 
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particular does not hold back in his opinions of several officers, which will be examined 
in detail. 
John Simcoe 
John Graves Simcoe took command of the Queens Rangers on 15 October 
1777. He inherited a unit on the cusp of success but one which also been damaged by 
heavy casualties.14 The task he faced was to maintain the success of the regiment. To 
do this, the following factors had to be in place: the regiment had to be supplied with a 
constant stream of recruits, the regiment had to be financially secure, it had to be well 
trained and it had to be well disciplined. Simcoe was the longest serving commander 
of the Queens Rangers so for that reason alone this chapter needs to discuss him in 
depth. Simcoe, however, also employed novel methods to train and utilise his men. 
While he undoubtedly drew on the methods of Rogers and Weymss, he invented many 
of his own, and detailed them, both in his published journal and his unpublished 
papers. Simcoe was arguably one of the most successful officers of the Revolutionary 
War, albeit he only commanded at regimental level, and through the influence of his 
journal, he arguably made an impact on the future usage of light infantry by the British 
and other armies. 
John Simcoe‘s background could not have been more different from Robert 
Rogers‘; his personality too was the opposite of Rogers‘ but both men shared a skill and 
devotion to light tactics.15 Simcoe arrived in America in 1776 as a lieutenant. After seeing 
combat in the New York campaign, he applied for permission to create and command a 
Loyalist regiment consisting of African-Americans, but was turned down. This indicates 
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that he was either a highly enlightened man for his time or that he was desperate for a 
command. After Rogers' dismissal he applied for command of the Queens Rangers, but 
was turned down in favour of Major French. Simcoe was a young man of no great fortune 
or army connections, and a command of Loyalists was an ideal way for him to rise in the 
army. It would avoid the prohibitive costs of purchasing rank in the regular army, which 
often meant that the higher echelons of the army were reserved for the wealthy and the 
aristocratic.16 Thus Simcoe, like his contemporaries Tarleton and Ferguson, sought 
advancement by this route.  
Most of the accounts of Simcoe, both contemporary and secondary, describe him 
as a gallant and gifted officer. Simcoe was unusual in that he was also an intellectual. By 
his own account, his academic background made him different to most of his brother 
officers and he was an avid student of military tactics, particularly Tacitus and 
Xenophon.17 After distinguishing himself in several engagements, most notably at 
Brandywine Creek, where he was wounded, Simcoe achieved his ambition and gained 
command of the Queens Rangers at the age of just twenty-six.18 To put this into context, 
it was quite common for commanders of regiments to be in their fifties and there are cases 
of officers who were still only captains with forty years service, although this was less 
common in wartime.19 Certainly John Simcoe could never have afforded the cost of 
purchasing a colonelcy in a British line regiment. The king was aware that the command 
of Loyalists was a route to quick advancement for young inexperienced men and was 
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wary of it, as he wrote in a letter to Lord North.20 However, he made no complaints about 
the promotion of Simcoe and would praise him highly on several occasions.  
Simcoe was clearly an ambitious young man driven to rise in the army, yet the 
way he went about his command was very different from conventional regimental 
commanders. This talent for innovation could have held him back under unsympathetic 
senior commander but fortunately he had already found favour with Howe and Clinton. 
The next section will detail the way in which he rapidly set about putting his ideas into 
practice on his new command. 
Section 1: Organisation of the Queens Rangers 
Training and Company Organisation. 
This section will discuss Simcoe‘s methods in training and preparing his men for 
combat and examine the changes he made in respect to the organisation of the regiment. 
The reasons for this are that training and organisation are vital to the smooth running of 
the regiment and its battlefield effectiveness. Simcoe set about improving the Queens 
Rangers as quickly as he could, building upon on the innovations of Weymss rather than 
starting from scratch. A grenadier company existed already, Simcoe added a highland 
company, a light company and a few of the men were mounted in 1778, and in the 
fullness of time they would be augmented to two troops of cavalry and as a troop of 
dragoons.21 This breadth of types of military branches, demonstrates that the Rangers 
were an elite unit equipped for all exigencies of combat. This was a rare in the eighteenth 
century as it is now. The only unit similar in the British Army was the British Legion, 
which did not have artillery. It shows the originality of Simcoe‘s approach.  
There are several published and unpublished accounts of how Simcoe trained his 
troops. His techniques were unusual, although they certainly owed something to the 
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techniques of Rogers and Colonel Bouquet as well as to the undocumented methods of his 
predecessor, Weymss. Judging by the studies of British military training undertaken by 
historians Sylvia Frey and J.A. Houlding, Simcoe‘s techniques, while not breaking any 
established rules, were anything but standard.22  Simcoe placed little stress on the 
standard training manual, holding that ―a few motions of the manual exercise were 
sufficient.‖ He was of the opinion that time would be better spent instructing the men in 
marksmanship and bayonet fighting rather than complicated drills or inspection parades.23 
He stressed a "total reliance" on the bayonet in skirmishes and that his men should only 
open fire if it was absolutely necessary.24 Yet when they did open fire he wanted them to 
experts. The Queens Rangers also spent long periods shooting at targets until the whole 
corps could be classified as "useful marksman".25 This would not be unusual in a modern 
regiment but eighteenth century regiments rarely practised musketry and no great stress 
was put on aimed fire at all. It was not unusual for regiments to enter combat with 
soldiers who had never actually fired a live round.26  Marksmanship and bayonet practice 
were also carried out at regular intervals throughout Simcoe‘s command especially when 
the Queens Rangers were in winter quarters. 
The Simcoe papers contain an account of his rules for the tactics practised by his 
unit. Simcoe aimed to improve his men‘s combat readiness in a way that had not been 
attempted with Loyalist regiments before and by setting it down in an organised fashion 
he set an example for other regiments. The extant document is a copy of what would have 
been issued to the company commanders. It is not a coherent plan of training schedules, 
rather of series of loosely linked ideas but it does provide an insight into how Simcoe 
                                                 
22
 Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America; J.A. Houlding, Fit For Service. 
23
 John Simcoe, Simcoe’s Journal, p.3-5; Passim in drafts in Simcoe Papers, William Clements Library 
24
 John Simcoe, Simcoe’s Journal, pp.3-4. 
25
 Ibid. p4. 
26
 J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 92. 
 194 
expected his regiment to conduct themselves.27 These ―rules‖ are worth examining as they 
demonstrate the innovative methods of Simcoe and by extension help explain the 
successes of the Queens Rangers. The rules relate to the behaviour of the unit whilst in 
winter quarters and on garrison duty. Traditionally winter was a quiet time for an army on 
campaign. The armies would confine themselves to barracks and wait for the warm 
weather. There would be activity but it would be on a small scale and would involve 
specialist units of which the Queens Rangers were one.28 Simcoe believed that he had to 
keep his men alert at all times even during winter. He was very much aware of what 
Washington had accomplished at Trenton on 26 December 1776 and again on 2 January 
1777, and saw no reason for lying inactive over winter. In a letter written sometime in 
early 1781 he mentions that the ―rebels train over winter‖ and that he felt that they should 
be doing the same thing. He says those troops in ―garrison had nothing to think of‖ and 
that this ―led to indiscipline.29  Therefore he devised training exercises to keep his men 
occupied as well as engaging in actual operations as frequently as possible. 
Simcoe‘s rules state: ―Soldiers even at barracks to be armed at all times, they are 
to join the first party under arms that they can.‖  The British were susceptible to raids 
even in the ―safety‖ of their barracks and Simcoe drew up these rules to ensure that his 
men were never surprised as well as to build up familiarity with weapons. He goes on to 
deal with how the officers were to conduct their men if they were attacked by stating that 
"the most profound silence to be kept and the Lt. Col. recommends it to the officers not to 
fire if it can be avoided, they must judge for themselves.‖ He rationalized that it was 
better to keep the enemy guessing than to engage in sporadic and confused firing if there 
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were a night attack. This also ties in with Simcoe‘s insistence that the Rangers be expert 
bayonet fighters.  
Simcoe wanted constant readiness, ―whatever quarter is attacked must be 
defended." Much of this seems like common sense but he was writing it down so his 
officers could have no excuse for being taken by surprise. ―Every soldier must have his 
part in it. Their arms must be arranged, bayonets always fixed. When in barracks the 
corps officer must report to the Lt. Col. who will inspect them.‖30 The reason for fixing 
bayonets was not only to preserve powder but also to maintain surprise. Simcoe‘s orders 
are unusual by the standards of the time, particularly for troops on garrison duty; troops 
were not usually trusted with fixed bayonets too often because of the risk of injury.31 
Also, Simcoe gave his junior officers far more scope for initiative than was customary. 
The phrase ―they must judge for themselves" is revealing. While obviously in a combat 
situation it was difficult for company commanders to receive clear orders from battalion 
commanders, British Army officers were often hindered by rigid orders, which prevented 
them from acting as the situation demanded.32 Simcoe‘s orders, while specific, allow for 
his officers to act as the situation dictates. This type of document personifies why the 
Queens Rangers are worth studying. They were a regiment who in their training methods 
and conduct in the field differed greatly from other units. The 1764 Drill Manual contains 
nothing like these instructions. It mentions deportment and discipline on guard duty but 
has no mention of what troops were to do on guard duty.33  
Simcoe also reorganized the regiment to allow the men to specialise in what they 
were best in. One of his most important actions was to add specialist companies to the 
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regiment which gave the regiment a far greater potential choice of tactics than the 
majority of infantry regiments. As mentioned above, within days of assuming command 
he had added a Highland company. This was commanded by Captain John MacKay, and 
consisted originally of survivors of the battle of Moore's Creek in North Carolina.34 While 
this could be dismissed as merely a tool for attracting recruits of this background, this 
company had a more practical use. Highland troops were intended— although it was not 
always so in practice—to be used in a particular way by the British. Their main function 
was primarily as shock troops, based on the concept of the Highland charge, which had 
been used successfully against the British Army at Prestonpans only thirty years 
previously and used by the British at Quebec in 1759. The Highland troops were trained 
to be expert with the bayonet and this was the role of the Highland company within the 
Queens Rangers. The whole regiment was trained extensively in bayonet drill of course 
but the Highland Company was held to be expert in the use of the bayonet charge.  
The other specialist troops were the Light Company and the Grenadiers. From 
1770 all British Line regiments had a Light Company, but as Houlding mentions they 
often became repositories for the troublemakers in the regiment. However, under Simcoe, 
the Light Company held to its original purpose in that it consisted of the best marksmen. 
The Queens Rangers were Light Infantry as a whole anyway so therefore the Light 
Company were the best sharpshooters amongst a regiment of marksmen. The Grenadiers 
were armed with rudimentary grenades as well as operating the few three pounder 
cannons that the regiment carried. 
Simcoe claimed that the Queens Rangers had the distinction of forming ―the first 
horse raised in America in 1778.‖35  Simcoe cites the reason for forming his own cavalry 
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as one related to camouflage. The existing horsemen serving with the British at the time 
were the redcoated dragoons and Simcoe felt they would stand out beside his green-
coated Queens Rangers.36 This shows that he was thinking in a similar way to Rogers and 
other tacticians of American warfare. He engaged a sergeant from the 16th Dragoons to 
train the men and they quickly became Simcoe's personal favourites. By 1780 the cavalry 
had become crucial to the success of the regiment. They enabled them to hit the enemy 
quickly while the infantry took advantage of the confusion the cavalry had created. To do 
this properly the infantry were trained to keep up with the cavalry as best they could. This 
necessitated the troops learning a new march, the quick time, a march that was new to 
them but would later be standard to all light infantry units.37  Simcoe also added in 1779 
fifteen dragoons, initially as part of the Hussars.  
Thanks to the addition of the cavalry and dragoons the Queens Rangers were able 
to offer far more than standard infantry regiments. Most regiments, then as now, were 
specialists in one particular area. In the eighteenth century, the distinctions were infantry, 
cavalry, artillery and more specialist units such as engineers and pioneers. The Queens 
Rangers were then almost a microcosm of an eighteenth century army in that they had 
infantry, cavalry and even some three-pounder cannons.38 This meant that they could be 
deployed independently in the field and be relied upon to be reasonably self-sufficient 
provided they were not outnumbered too greatly. They also had the ability to move at a 
far faster rate than most infantry regiments.  
Finance. 
An eighteenth century regiment was in many ways more self contained than 
modern military units. This applies to the administrative side of the regiment as much to 
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its fighting duties. Initially, Loyalist regiments were raised by commanders who were 
given a certain amount of money to do the job, money which they did not always receive 
up front. When the British took more control of their provincial regiments in late 1776 
and appointed Alexander Innes to administrate them, they took greater control over the 
running and financing of the units. The Queens Rangers were, from 1777 onwards, 
funded and run in a similar way to the British line regiments. Simcoe was not a rich man 
and could not have afforded to finance a regiment himself as was done in some cases. But 
he was given a budget to run the regiment which varied from month to month depending 
on the strength of the regiment. As there are very few documents relating to the financing 
of the Queens Rangers it is very difficult to estimate how much the regiment cost to run. 
The table below, sets out the daily wages for two companies: 
Table 7: Daily Wages for Two Companies of the Queens Rangers. 
Rank £ s d 
Capt.  10  
Capt. Lt.  4 8 
Lt.  4 8 
Ens.  3 8 
6 Sgts.  9  
6 Cpls.  6  
1 Drummer  1  
194 Privates 6 9 4 
Total for 2 
companies 
8 8 4 
Source: Daily Pay for two companies of the Queens Rangers, undated loose document, Simcoe Papers 
Clements Library. 
 
Thus, by dividing £6, 9s 4d by the one hundred and ninety four privates it is possible to 
calculate that in this period a soldier received 8d per day.39 Therefore, one soldier cost 
approximately £12 a year in wages alone. With average company strength of thirty five 
rank and file, a company of thirty five men would cost £420 p.a. in wages for the rank 
and file alone. Multiplying this figure by fifty gives a rough estimate of today‘s values, 
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which works out at £21,000. In 1779 the costs of running the regiment increased 
dramatically when they were put on the American Establishment and the wages became 
comparable to British line regiments. Private soldiers wages increased to a shilling a day, 
the standard wage for British soldiers until the First World War. 
Given the scarcity of sources, accurate judgments on the finances of the regiment 
are difficult as many expenses have to be taken into consideration above and beyond 
running cost. One of the most significant costs was recruiting bounties, which will be 
considered in the following section.  
Recruiting 
The increasing renown of the Queens Rangers meant that they were often used in 
combat. The frequency of combat meant high battlefield casualties which combined with 
attrition from sickness and disease ensured the regiment was always in need of recruits. 
Their combat successes brought prestige which ensured that there seemed to be a 
reasonable supply of new recruits and the Rangers had a steady stream of new recruits. As 
mentioned earlier, from March 1777 these men were recruited by recruiting officers or 
sergeants. These men were existing appointees of the regiment and did not gain extra rank 
from the number of recruits they brought in. The inducement to recruits was a bounty. 
The bounties that the Queens Rangers offered varied on the type of troop, thus a 
cavalryman would be given a large bounty but was expected to provide his own tack and 
if possible a horse. The Rangers recruited by sending out recruiting parties into the 
countryside but also by newspaper advertisements. They advertised in Loyalist 
Newspapers and offered bounty and a full uniform. A standard recruiting poster for the 
unit read: 
ALL able bodied men who are free and willing to serve his Majesty King 
GEORGE the Third, by bearing arms in the cavalry or infantry of the Queens 
Rangers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Commandant 
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J. GRAVES SIMCOE, 
Each approved Recruit shall immediately receive Three Guineas Bounty 
Money, by applying to Capt. SHANK at No. 3, Fletcher Street, between Burling-
Slip and the Fly Market, or to Lieutenant MATHESON, at No. 1033 Water-
Street. 
Whoever brings a Recruit shall instantly receive One Guinea Reward. 40 
The bounty of three guineas was a dramatic increase from the earliest known 
figure for bounties (for the Rangers) of twenty-three shillings in early 1777.41 Out of this, 
the soldier would be expected to buy his uniform and equipment, although not his 
firearm. The differences between this style of recruiting and raising for rank is that the 
latter could be said to offer some social status whereas this poster offers a financial 
reward to recruiters. As argued in chapter two it could be said that this could attract 
recruits who were more attracted by pecuniary advantage rather than motivated by a 
political ideal or increasing their standing in society.42 An earlier recruiting poster from 
the New York Gazette in August 1777 does not mention a reward so it is possible that 
desperation for recruits had caused a relaxation in how they were encouraged to join.43  
Establishing accurate figures for recruits is very difficult due to the absence of 
data. Some of the muster rolls record when a man was recruited but not all and there are 
gaps between rolls which mean that the information may have been recorded but is now 
lost. The table below is a breakdown by company of those men who were recorded as 
being recruited by company. 
 
Table 8: Men recorded as enlisted in the Muster Rolls 1777-1783. 
Company 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 Total 
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McGill‘s  19 27 13 3    
Wickham‘s  7 33 19     
Saunders‘s 13 2 2 1   3  
MacKay‘s  5 3 4     
Murray‘s 16 12 27 7     
McCrea‘s 2 4 34 15 1    
Dunlop‘s 4 8 10 10     
Stephenson‘s 11 6 19 2 8    
Shank‘s  1 13 69     
Agnew‘s  6 1 4 2    
Smythe‘s 59  4      
Kerr‘s 3 6 8 8 5    
Moncrief‘s    2     
Armstrong‘s 12        
Shaw‘s    3 3    
Whitlock‘s    6 3    
McNab‘s     2    
Smith‘s     2    
Cooke‘s     40    
Total 120 76 181 163 69 0 3 612 
Source: Source: C Series Muster Rolls, Vols. 1861-65, TS 11 221, WO 12/11035. Compiled using 
Queens Rangers Database 
 
All these men were officially recorded as having being recruited. The muster rolls give 
date enlisted and sometimes the man who enlisted them. Shank‘s company shows a lot of 
recruits in 1780. This is because Shank was put in charge of a newly formed cavalry 
company in that year and recruited new men. However, far more men joined the Rangers 
than are shown here. A more comprehensive way of establishing recruits is to take the 
first date the man appeared on the muster. The table below does this: 
 
Table 9: Soldiers Recorded For the First Time on the Muster Rolls.44 
1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 Total 
320 664 394 375 298 199 32 112 2019 
Source: Source: C Series Muster Rolls, Vols. 1861-65, TS 11 221, WO 12/11035. 
Compiled using Queens Rangers Database. 
 
 
So what do these figures tell us? The table demonstrates there was considerable 
recruiting done in 1777. This conforms to the known facts as this was when the regiment 
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was reformed. The recruiting after that was done when men were available and were 
needed. There is an overall downward trend from 1777, with the exception of 1783. This 
is possibly because at the end of the war men joined because of the promise of land in 
Canada. They may also have been moved in from other regiments who had already 
disbanded. 
Another avenue of recruits for the Queens Rangers was their enemy. In 1777 
General Howe wrote: The provincial corps except Wemyss corps [The Queens Rangers] 
is not to enlist deserters from the rebels"45 This regulation goes back to the command of 
Rogers and under Simcoe the Rangers went on enlisting deserters. Turncoats would have 
been regarded with suspicion, although they would also have been able to provide 
valuable information about the enemy. Once these men had earned the trust of Simcoe 
they would prove invaluable to the Queens Rangers, as they not only brought detailed 
local knowledge but knowledge of Patriot positions and emplacements that could be used 
on raids. Simcoe mentions gaining valuable intelligence from deserters in a letter to 
Clinton.46 Six men are recorded on the rolls as having ―joined from desertion‖ but there 
were more, as it is known that Simcoe smuggled men aboard the hospital ship the 
Bonnetta at Yorktown in October 1781, to prevent them being hung by Washington for 
desertion.47 The recruits, from whatever source, once acquired had to be turned into 
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 Orders of General Howe 3 July 1777, PRO 30/55/6; quoted in a draft letter from Simcoe to Clinton, 
Simcoe Papers; John Simcoe Journal, pg. 19. 
46
Simcoe to Clinton, (n.d, 1780), Simcoe Papers, Clements Library. 
47
 Te term used in the enlistment column of the rolls is ―Joined from desertion.‖ Some men are listed as 
having ―returned from Desertion‖ which presumably means they have deserted from a Loyalist 
regiment. As none of the 6 appear on the rolls before it is possible to assume that they are Patriot 
deserters. Peter Edor is definitely identified as a Patriot deserter. These men were James Bentley, Peter 
Edor, William Mead, Stephen Sands, Nathaniel Shelley and Pater Woods. Another man, Richard Doyle 
deserted from the Queens Rangers and was ―claimed by the rebels‖ presumably meaning he had 
previously deserted from them. Queens Rangers Database; John Simcoe, Simcoe’s  Journal, p. 147 
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effective combatants. The accepted way of doing this was by training and discipline. The 
next section will discuss the disciplinary record of the Queens Rangers. 
Discipline 
The essential differences between the Rogers' Queens Rangers and Simcoe's Queens 
Rangers are not so much in fighting style but in discipline. Rogers‘ Rangers were allegedly more 
democratic than Simcoe‘s unit, which was run with tight discipline.48 This section will look at how 
the Simcoe regiment fared. As has been shown in the previous chapter the men in the earlier 
incarnation of the Queens Rangers frequently went absent without leave to drink and carouse in 
New York. Yet the Rangers, after 1777, had a very good disciplinary record, which, if it not 
perfect, was certainly comparable to the best British regiments. A report by Colonel Innes, 
Inspector General of Provincial forces, on several Provincial regiments demonstrates this. Innes 
writes: 
The indefatigable pains and attentions of the last of those gentlemen 
[Simcoe] first established that character which Lt. Col. Simcoe has so 
honourably supported. During the campaigns in Pennsylvania the whole 
army did ample justice to their merit and services and your Excellency is so 
perfectly acquainted with Lt. Colonel Simcoe's abilities and spirit and the 
good behaviour of his corps, on every occasion that it is perfectly 
unnecessary to mention either." 49  
The telling phrase in Innes' report is ―good behaviour.‖ Analyzing his earlier letters on the 
state of the earlier Queens Rangers it sometimes seems as if in Innes‘ estimation, good 
disciplinary behaviour and good combat behaviour go hand in hand. Yet in one regard the 
Queens Rangers under Simcoe did not improve greatly from the Rogers period. Analysis of 
the muster rolls has demonstrated the Queens Rangers suffered from desertion throughout 
their lifespan as a regiment.  
                                                 
48
 John Cuneo, The Early Days of the Queen‘s Rangers, pp. 71-72. 
49
 Innes to Clinton 22 September 1779, New York. CO 5 98, ff. 314-316. PRO. 
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Table 10: Desertion rates November 1777-1783 compiled from the Muster rolls. 
Year Number of desertions 
August 1776-March 177750  32 
  August- November1777 19 
1778 105 
1779 70 
1780 26 
1781 35 
1782 42 
1783 14 
Source: C Series Muster Rolls, Vols. 1861-65, TS 11 221, WO 12/11035. Compiled using Queens 
Rangers Database. 
 
It is noticeable that 1778 is by far the highest period for desertions of the Simcoe period. 
This is possibly related to the fact that not all those remaining from the previous regime 
would have accepted the changes that Simcoe made, as well as the Rangers not yet 
settling on the type of man they wished to recruit. However, as the war wore on and the 
regiment got better and the soldiers more experienced it is possible that they would have 
been less likely to desert their comrades. This assumption is given credence by James 
McPherson‘s work on the soldiers of the American Civil war. McPherson noted that 
soldiers were given courage by the men around them and their continued experience of 
surviving combats.51 McPherson‘s theory that desertion amongst Confederates 
dramatically increased as it became clear the war was lost, is not echoed in the Queens 
Rangers experience.52 The figures show that after 1781 the desertion rates were small. 
This is possibly related to the fact that the Queens Rangers as Loyalists were loath to 
                                                 
50
 Compiled from the extant rolls of four companies out of ten in the regiment. 
51
 James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, (Oxford, 1997), pp. 77-89 
52
 Ibid, pp 156, 162, 168-169. 
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return home as they did not know what punishment awaited them for their decision to 
back the British. At least by remaining with the regiment they would be looked after and 
they were also promised land in Canada, which the vast majority of them took. 
An order of Simcoe's from May 1779 exemplifies how he secured devotion and 
respect from his men, important qualities in maintaining discipline in a unit. He addresses 
his sergeants and praises their "soldierly behaviour" that has attracted "universal notice" 
and promises that they may "depend upon his utmost support in the execution of their 
duty and his protection in every situation." However, he promises that genuine 
transgressions will be punished and the offender reduced to the ranks "without court-
martial."53 This is borne out by the muster rolls as there are several instances of NCOs 
being reduced to private. For example, Thomas Collins was demoted to from sergeant to 
private on 6 July 1781 and spent the rest of his career as a private.54 The details of his 
offence are not recorded but he had been Sergeant since 1779, so his offence must have 
been relatively severe for Simcoe to demote an experienced Sergeant. Another letter 
mentions a sentence of 1000 lashes given to an offender, effectively a death sentence. The 
decline in desertion over time would demonstrate that it may have taken some of the men 
some time to accustom themselves to his methods, but those who stayed were far less 
likely to rebel against them. Analysis of the muster rolls reveals few punishments serious 
enough to cause a long term absence from duty and therefore a mention in the rolls. There 
are nineteen cases in the muster rolls of soldiers being held in prison at the time the roll 
was taken.55 
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 Letter to the Sergeants of the Queens Rangers May 1779, New York, Simcoe Papers. 
54
 Collins served between 1778 and 1782 and was in Armstrong‘s, Moncrief‘s, McGill‘s and Shaw‘s 
companies: C Series Muster Rolls vols. 1861-1864. 
55
 See Queens Rangers Database. 
 206 
As mentioned in chapter two, the Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies website 
has transcriptions of the General Court Martials held involving Loyalists.56 They have 
three for the Queens Rangers, one for the Rogers era, one for the Weymss era and one for 
the Simcoe era.57 The Court Martial from the Simcoe era is worth examining briefly here 
as it sheds light on some aspects of eighteenth century behaviour. In May 1778, Lt. 
Nathaniel Fitzpatrick—the same man who Jarvis described as being ―a warm open 
hearted Irishman58‖—was accused of contracting a ―violent venereal disorder‖ described 
in the court martial (possibly syphilis or gonorrhoea) and passing it on to his company 
commander Captain James Murray through their shared mistress, a Mary Duche.59 
Fitzpatrick was accused of behaving in a ―scandalous and infamous manner,‖ and of 
rendering both himself and Captain Murray unfit for duty. He was accused of knowing 
about his condition and not doing anything to stop Murray catching it. He was acquitted 
of this charge but the court ruled that his behaviour was highly improper, and ―doth 
therefore adjudge that he should make a public apology to the Officers of the Corps to 
which he belongs.‖60 The database of the muster rolls reveals that Murray was sick for 
much of the next year before returning to duty in 1780. It is possible that the disease made 
a recurrence, although Fitzpatrick was obviously fit enough to go back on active service 
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 http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/courts/crtlist.htm  
57
 The Court Martials listed are selective and there are only a few for each regiment. The two pre 
Simcoe Court Martials are: Private Peter Brady who in April 1777 was accused of trying to persuade a 
British soldier to desert to the Patriots. He was found guilty and sentenced to 1000 lashes. Brady is not 
listed in the Muster Rolls for 1777 (he served in the Rogers period where the rolls are incomplete) but a 
Pvt. Peter Brady served in the regiment in 1779-80 so it is possible that he survived his sentence and 
reenlisted, see Queens Rangers Database and WO 71/83 ff.351-354 online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/courts/cmbrady.htm  accessed 13/3/2009; Captain Job 
Williams, see footnote 21. 
58
 See footnote 24. 
59
 Court Martial of Nathaniel Fitzpatrick, WO 71/83 ff.291-310 online at: 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/courts/cmfitzpatrick.htm accessed 12.3/2009. 
60
 Ibid. 
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as he was captured with the rest of the regiment –Capt. Murray included- at Yorktown in 
1781.61 
The Fitzpatrick episode is a fascinating insight into the sexual mores of soldiers in 
the eighteenth century. The court martial is very frank in its discussion of sexual matters 
and there seems to be an acknowledgment by both witnesses and those in authority that it 
was common behaviour for officers to pay for the upkeep of mistresses in taverns. This 
incident shows also that soldiers never really change, these problems probably faced the 
commanders of Roman soldiers in the Punic wars. 
Other serious acts of indiscipline were severely punished. For example, Simcoe 
had two men hung for rape in 1781 although as it was on campaign the men were not 
tried by General Court Martial. Simcoe informed Cornwallis of the measures he took, 
stating ―I have not the least doubt that Jonathan Webster and Lewis Trepan private 
Dragoons in Captain Cooke‘s troop of the Queens Rangers were guilty of rape on Jane 
Dickenson yesterday.‖ 62 Trapand and Webster only appear once in the muster rolls, in the 
roll for February 1781 which would suggest they were recent recruits. Trapand‘s 
nationality is given as ―French‖ and Webster‘s as ―American.‖63 These men were the only 
men executed for capital crimes in the Simcoe tenure. 64 There is no evidence relating to 
the effect that Trapand and Webster‘s crimes and punishments had on the regiment. Had 
Jarvis still been the regiment it is likely he would have mentioned it and his testimony 
would have been invaluable. It is difficult to speculate what effect it had on the morale of 
the men in the regiment. It is noticeable that both the executed men were recent recruits, 
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 See Queens Rangers Database. 
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 Simcoe to Cornwallis Price Mile 2 June 1781 Cornwallis Papers PRO 30/11/6 f. 156. PRO. 
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 Muster Roll of Captain Cooke‘s company 24 December 1780 to 24 February 1781, C Series, 1863. 
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The only other documented execution was of Richard Carny of McGill‘s company, which was carried 
out during Wemyss ‗command. No details exist of his crime. Carny was executed on 29 September 
1777. Muster Roll of Captain McGill‘s Company 24 August to 22 November 1777, Vol. 1861, C Series 
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probably hastily recruited in Virginia and the other soldiers would have little time to get 
to know them in the way that the long term soldiers knew each other, so possibly the 
effect was minimal.  
Simcoe had political reasons for keeping his men disciplined as well. Simcoe 
appreciated that the Queens Rangers and other regiments needed recruits and that the 
British had to maintain the support of the civilian populace to gain them and as such it 
was in his interest to keep the Rangers from plundering and looting civilian property. 
There was sometimes a temptation by Loyalists to take revenge on the Patriots and the 
British were obliged to take action to prevent this. Simcoe by and large kept his men from 
any deliberate reprisals against civilians and appears so that the reputation of the Queens 
Rangers in this regard was relatively untarnished, unlike the British Legion. When some 
Queens Rangers soldiers were accused of plundering civilians Simcoe severely 
disciplined them, which shows that he personally did not approve of the practice.65 He did 
not even approve of his men plundering captured soldiers although he allowed his men to 
relieve prisoners of their watches on raids behind enemy lines.66 It was, however, seen as 
acceptable to destroy as much military property as possible and indeed the Rangers were 
expert at such. This issue will be discussed more fully in the section on combat 
operations. This section has demonstrated that while the Queens Rangers were not 
without disciplinary problems they were generally reasonably well behaved and this is 
reflected by the trust that was placed in them as a combat unit. 
The Soldiers 
This section will examine the service of men in the Queens Rangers. It will 
examine length of service and provide some comments on motivation. It will be 
principally based on the database and will make calculations and examine patterns of 
service. The table below is provides calculations based on every man recorded in the 
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 Untitled report of disciplinary Measures, (n.d.), Simcoe Papers, William Clements Library. 
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 Walter Wilkin, Some British Officers in America (London, 1914), p. 97. 
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muster rolls based on their length of service. There are two figure used. Recorded service 
and maximum length service. Recorded service is the amount of time they are recorded 
on the muster rolls.  
Table 11:  Length of Service, Queens Rangers 1776-1783. 
121 Distribution of 
Service 
      
    Observed 
Values 
    
Interval Recorded Days in Service67 Maximum (Projected) Length of 
Service68 
  
6169 Soldiers % of total Soldiers %  
of 
total 
          
0--60 199 9.06 199 9.07 
61--121 725 33.01 646 29.43 
122--182 213 9.70 100 4.56 
183--243 144 6.56 156 7.11 
244--304 95 4.33 73 3.33 
305--365 75 3.42 90 4.10 
366--426 69 3.14 48 2.19 
427--487 92 4.19 45 2.05 
488--548 69 3.14 35 1.59 
549--609 52 2.37 65 2.96 
610--670 49 2.23 55 2.51 
671--731 50 2.28 28 1.28 
732--792 39 1.78 29 1.32 
793--853 26 1.18 66 3.01 
854--914 24 1.09 28 1.28 
915--975 24 1.09 31 1.41 
976--
1036 
26 1.18 35 1.59 
1037--
1097 
23 1.05 14 0.64 
1098--
1158 
27 1.23 19 0.87 
1159--
1219 
23 1.05 37 1.69 
1220--
1280 
27 1.23 15 0.68 
                                                 
67
 These are the number of days by which the men are actually recorded on the rolls. 
68
 Maximum length of service a projected figure based on the individuals first appearance on the rolls 
and his last. This figure takes accounts of gaps in the rolls. 
69
 The interval is set at 61 days which is the usual length of time covered in a muster roll. 
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1281--
1341 
16 0.73 22 1.00 
1342--
1402 
26 1.18 24 1.09 
1403--
1463 
28 1.28 20 0.91 
1464--
1524 
17 0.77 13 0.59 
1525--
1585 
7 0.32 15 0.68 
1586--
1646 
4 0.18 22 1.00 
1647--
1707 
6 0.27 18 0.82 
1708--
1768 
2 0.09 11 0.50 
1769--
1829 
5 0.23 35 1.59 
1830--
1890 
4 0.18 9 0.41 
1891--
1951 
1 0.05 9 0.41 
1952--
2012 
1 0.05 25 1.14 
2013--
2073 
1 0.05 38 1.73 
2074--
2134 
0 0.00 23 1.05 
2135--
2195 
4 0.18 9 0.41 
2196--
2256 
0 0.00 46 2.10 
2257--
2317 
0 0.00 1 0.05 
2318--
2378 
2 0.09 0 0.00 
2379--
2439 
0 0.00 17 0.77 
2440--
2500 
0 0.00 4 0.18 
 Total 2196 100.00 2195 100.00 
Source: Source: C Series Muster Rolls, Vols. 1861-65, TS 11 221, WO 12/11035. 
Compiled using Queens Rangers Database 
 
 This table demonstrates an extraordinary variety of lengths of service. The 
patterns that emerge are that there are two distinct groups of soldiers: the short term 
soldiers and the long term soldiers. The largest numerical group are the short term 
soldiers. Approximately fifty-six percent of soldiers are recorded on the rolls for a year or 
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less and forty nine per cent served a year or less as their maximum length of service. This 
means that half the regiment only served for a short time. Were these men they as 
committed as their long term counterparts? It is possible that the rigid demands placed on 
them were too much for many of them. Many of the men would have been killed or 
incapacitated of course. It is noticeable that the largest group of men served for two 
musters. This means that they completed their training and then left. In some cases they 
were transferred to other units but this is actually a rare occurrence on the rolls so they 
obviously did not always stay with the army. Ambrose‘s work on World War Two 
examines how replacements were more likely to disappear from the unit for whatever 
reason-admittedly desertion was a far more difficult proposition in World War Two.70 
The second distinct group that emerges is the long term soldiers.71 What becomes 
clear when looking at the figures is that despite all the casualties, desertions and other 
absences there was a large block of men who remained with the regiment for several 
years. 655 men or 30 percent of the overall total served for two years or more. Of these 
335 or fifteen percent served for four years or more. 158 men, or seven percent served for 
six years or more, which was essentially the whole war for the Queens Rangers. So what 
do these figures mean? While they seem by far the lesser group, on closer examination of 
the rolls shows that these are the men who made up the bulk of the men in the companies 
on a muster by muster basis. The table below demonstrates the average regimental and 
company strengths of the Queens Rangers. 
Table 12: Average Strength of the Queens Rangers 1776-1783. 
Average Company strength 44.26354 
Average Regimental Strength 412.2903 
                                                 
70
 Stephen A. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, (London 1997), pp. 272-289. 
71
 There are some anomalies in this table. A few soldiers are shown as having served for nearly ten 
years, obviously impossible. This is because they are men with common names, for example, John 
Brown, and they are obviously more than one person but it is impossible to differentiate between them 
especially if they appear in the same company as they do on more than one occasion. 
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Source: Source: C Series Muster Rolls, Vols. 1861-65, TS 11 221, WO 12/11035. Compiled using 
Queens Rangers Database. 
 
If there was a regimental average of 412 per muster then the bulk of these men were the 
335 men who served four years or more. If it was otherwise the Queens Rangers would 
have 1000 plus men in every muster.72  
 These long term men therefore, were dedicated Provincial soldiers. Whether they 
were dedicated Loyalists is open to question, but to serve for so long, something was 
keeping them with the regiment even if it was only loyalty to Simcoe or to an NCO. 
Sylvia Frey argues what makes soldiers stay together is what she terms ―group 
consciousness.‖73 She equates it with family life, maintaining that these are men denied a 
normal family life and that they find it in a regiment. It is possible to say this is true with 
the Queens Rangers, Jarvis‘ testimony supports it, but that there are some crucial 
differences. Unlike the British soldiers Frey deals with, many of the Queens Rangers 
came from stable and secure family backgrounds. They did not have to serve for reasons 
of poverty or deprivation. Their service actually endangered that secure life. Ultimately, 
many of them were serving because they wanted to, out of some sense of loyalty, similar 
to many volunteers in the American Civil War. In some ways they are more similar to 
their American counterparts dealt with by Don Higginbotham and Holly Mayer and also 
to descendants in the volunteer elites of World War Two dealt with by Stephen 
Ambrose.74  
It is useful to examine a few long term soldiers in depth. The first is Private 
Gabriel Barton. He joined the Queens Rangers in the autumn of 1776 and remained with 
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 Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America, p 137. 
74
 Don Higginbotham, the Early American Way of War; The War of American Independence:Miltiary 
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the regiment through to August 1782, appearing on twenty-three rolls. He served a total 
of 2,188 days. This is the total of his service including gaps in the muster rolls. The total 
amount of time he appears on muster rolls is 1,967 days.75 The reason that these two 
figures are different is that all muster rolls have a beginning and end date. If the period 
from the beginning of one roll is significantly after the end date of the last roll, then a gap 
will appear. In Barton‘s case the two hundred day gap is largely accounted for by the fact 
that there is a gap in the rolls from March of 1777 until November 1777. He served 
initially in Captain Frazer‘s company and then in Captain McCrea‘s company. His 
nationality is given as American on the one roll that lists this. 76 The February 1780 roll 
shows that he was in hospital between 24 December 1779 and 23 February 1780.77 After 
this he does not appear to be on active service again. He is listed as wounded in February 
1781. Barton was then put on furlough in New York until August of 1782 when he was 
invalided out of the unit due to his injuries.  
Another long term soldier is Solomon Parent who appears on the rolls for 1,270 
days. He was recruited in autumn 1776 by Captain Eagles and captured at Mamaroneck in 
October.78 He is back on the muster in March 1777, which means he was either 
exchanged or he escaped and it was not recorded. He served in the Grenadier Company 
and appears to have seen much service, having only one spell as sick in hospital. He is 
listed as an American on the August 1780 muster.79 He served with the regiment up until 
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 Queens Rangers Database. 
76
 Muster Roll of Captain McCrea‘s company 25 June 1779 to 24 August 1780. C Series Muster Rolls 
Vol. 1863. 
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 Muster Roll of Captain McCrea‘s company 24 December 1779 to 23 February 1780. C Series Muster 
Rolls Vol. 1863, National Archives of Canada. 
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 Muster Roll of Capt Eagles Company to 24 December 1776, TS 11/221, PRO. 
79
 Muster Roll of Captain McGill‘s company 25 June 1780 to 24 August 1780. 
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his death on 21 October 1781.80 The cause of death is not given but it is likely to be 
related to the siege of Yorktown where he would have served with his company.81  
It is inevitable that in a unit where personnel changes often, the men who had 
been there the longest tend to stick together and disassociate themselves from new 
recruits until they too had served their apprenticeship. There is of course little direct 
evidence to support this view, and it is necessary to turn to other more recent studies of 
small military units. James McPherson examined the behaviour of Civil War soldiers and 
suggested the behaviour of veterans is markedly different to that of raw recruits.82 
Stephen Ambrose‘s work also provides good evidence for taking this view.83 Although 
the Civil and Second World Wars are far removed from the Revolutionary War, the 
characteristics of a close knit, highly motivated elite body of men are similar. The 
veterans in the Queens Rangers fit into this model. They were highly skilled men-like 
Ambrose‘s paratroops in ―Band of Brothers‖- who had prolonged exposure to combat. 
Therefore, while combat casualties were unpreventable, avoidable losses due to 
indiscipline were kept to a minimum.  
Two Long term soldiers who deserve a section of their own have in many ways left the 
most intriguing documents about the Queens Rangers. Sergeants Mundy and Jarvis. 
Mundy and Jarvis. 
On the 22 August 1780 Sergeant Major Nathaniel Mundy took a risk. He took the kind of 
risk that even a veteran and senior NCO with years of combat experience might have 
been expected to have winced at. He wrote a letter that could very well have been 
regarded by some regimental commanders as highly impertinent and therefore a severe 
breech of discipline. This made Mundy liable to the severest punishment. As a NCO 
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Mundy was not entitled to ask to resign his rank or request a transfer to another unit. Yet 
this is precisely what he did. He wrote to John Graves Simcoe, then commander of the 
Queens Rangers and requested either a commission to ensign or a transfer, either only 
applicable only if Simcoe left the unit. Mundy asked for a commission ―to relieve him of 
his current unpleasant rank‖. This reads as almost a threat. It is doubtful whether any 
British sergeant would have written in the same way to his colonel and escaped without 
punishment. He further wrote― ―Notwithstanding it is his utmost wish to serve in any 
capacity, whilst Col. Simcoe personally commands, that his present rank being 
disagreeable to him in your absence, he does not wish that you sir should imagine he has 
the least intention of quitting the army. So far from that, that he would take the first 
convenient opportunity in some other corps as long as there is a rebel under arms in 
America. As he cannot imagine he would choose to leave the corps he is so thoroughly 
acquainted with and where he cannot expect to meet with its equal in the field but when 
its head is gone its glory has eclipsed.‖84 Mundy then said that his ―presumption‖ would 
be forgiven because of his ―pure zeal for his Majesty‘s interest for a dependence founded 
upon the event of this unnatural Rebellion and that every suffering Loyalist may receive 
the reward due to his merit.‖ Mundy hopes Simcoe will pardon his presumption and that 
he will ―seriously consider that the sacrifice an ample [unreadable] from his pure zeal for 
his majesty‘s interest for a dependence founded upon the event of this unnatural 
Rebellion and that every suffering loyalist may receive the reward due to his merit.‖ 
Mundy demonstrates his ―zeal‖ for the cause; his phrase about ―any rebel under arms‖ is 
particularly resonant. Mundy, despite his presumption, obviously was a gifted soldier 
because Simcoe had no hesitation in arranging his commission, which was ratified two 
days after the letter was sent. 
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 Sergeant Major Nathaniel Mundy to Lt. Col. John Graves Simcoe, 22 August 1780. Oyster Bay. 
Unlabelled bundle, Simcoe Papers, Clements Library. 
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Mundy‘s letter is also one of the few pieces of evidence relating to the enlisted 
men of the Queens Rangers. The letter is both glowing testimony to Simcoe and a 
reflection of Mundy‘s belief in the cause he was fighting for. For this latter it is 
invaluable. Very little is known about the motivations for serving of rankers or indeed of 
junior officers. The testimonies of the dismissed officers in the PRO also have some 
justifications for service but there are none by non-commissioned officers. Mundy was 
writing asking for a commission, which may seem presumptuous and indeed his language 
often seems to be insubordinate.85 
 Stephen Jarvis, a Sergeant in the Hussars, was similar in many ways to Mundy, 
indeed they were friends. Jarvis came of a similar background and like Mundy he was 
desperate to receive a commission as he felt he was worthy of it. In their own minds they 
were both ―gentlemen rankers.‖ In one memorable passage, he describes how when his 
company commander, Captain Alexander Wickham lost control in combat, he seized the 
initiative, he writes:  
Now is the time I said to myself, this day I must either 
obtain me a commission or I must be left dead in the field. I 
immediately took charge of the Division, which Wickham had 
left, and encouraged them to keep their ranks and behave like 
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 Mundy appears on twenty rolls which detail his rise from Sergeant to Ensign. He would serve with 
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The data on Mundy in the database is incomplete due to an error which will be rectified. At the 
moment he is not listed in the query days in service. 
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Rangers, and I urged strongly to charge back and bring off the 
body of our beloved Colonel.86 
This demonstrates that Jarvis was desperate enough to court death in order to 
secure a field commission. Jarvis attempted to procure a commission from his earliest 
times in the Provincial Service and was eventually successful in 1780.87 It is interesting to 
speculate on the shared desire of increased status by Mundy and Jarvis. While officers 
were paid more and enjoyed greater material comforts than even senior NCOs like Jarvis 
and Mundy, it was obviously something greater than mere comfort that made Jarvis risk 
his life and Mundy his position. It would seem that in many ways they felt it was their 
due because of their service and abilities but seems to indicate a desire to serve the cause 
the best they could, which would be as officers. 
Jarvis‘ account also mentions his ―beloved commander‖ again echoing Mundy‘s 
regard for Simcoe. Jarvis did not find all his superiors so friendly. A particular target of 
Jarvis‘ ire was his company commander, Captain Wickham, who he describes as a 
―drunken, malicious unprincipled, cowardly and malicious officer.‖88 Simcoe himself 
makes no critical comment on Wickham, although Jarvis relates that Simcoe was able to 
force out of Jarvis some condemnation of him which Simcoe seems tacitly to have agreed 
with.89  Yet, in his journal Simcoe has nothing but praise for Wickham, who was killed in 
1781 in South Carolina.90 This condemnation of Wickham demonstrates that not all of the 
Queens Rangers officers were able and beloved of their men. However, Jarvis was later 
able to come to an understanding with Wickham and the two parted on reasonable terms, 
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when Jarvis left the Rangers to join the Kings Royal Americans. Jarvis is listed on the 
muster rolls for 1,110 days.91  
  The testaments of Sergeant Mundy and Sergeant Jarvis provide a valuable insight 
into the predicament of Loyalist soldiers. Letters from officers giving cogent reasons for 
serving the Loyalist cause are rare, while letters from men serving in the ranks are almost 
non-existent. Mundy‘s letter is a vital piece of evidence in piecing together why men 
served in this particular cause. Officers –by 1780 anyway- were generally expected and 
supposed to be of ―respectable‖ character and possibly more naturally inclined to the 
―Tory‖ cause than the soldiers who served in the ranks. It is debatable whether Mundy‘s 
personal demonstration of Loyalty to the Crown reflects any wider anti-revolutionary 
sentiments from all of his comrades in the ranks. What is not in doubt is his loyalty to the 
regiment‘s longest serving commander, John Simcoe. Simcoe‘s standing with his men is 
surely demonstrated by the fact that his most senior and experienced NCO would rather 
risk severe punishment than serve under anyone else. It is testament to the measure of 
respect that Simcoe obviously had for Mundy that he commissioned Mundy two days 
after the letter was written.92  
The later Queens Rangers are almost impossible to divorce from their charismatic 
commander, whose influence on both officers and men would extend far beyond his 
tenure as commander. When he returned to North America as Governor of Upper Canada 
in 1792 it was the officers and men of the Queens Rangers he turned to, to help him 
establish a defensive force, forming the beginnings of the Canadian Army, Mundy and 
Jarvis were among several he asked for.  
Section 2 Battlefield Effectiveness 
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4.1 The Commander 
This part of the chapter will examine the combat record of the Queens Rangers 
under Simcoe. The ultimate goal of any regimental commander is to create an efficient 
and effective combat unit and all the methods that have been discussed up to this point 
were intended to make the Queens Rangers so. A well-run, well-trained, properly 
equipped and well-disciplined unit, stands a better chance of being successful in combat 
than one which does not have these attributes. The aim of this section is to investigate the 
battlefield effectiveness of the Queens Rangers by discussing in brief the various 
engagements and campaigns they took part in. Battlefield effectiveness of a regiment is a 
difficult thing to assess, as it is not always possible to quantify why one regiment 
performs better in combat than another.93 The most obvious indicator is length and variety 
of service. If a regiment is used constantly then this would indicate that the High 
Command view them as reliable on previous performance. However, it is not foolproof. 
Troops were often used because they were in the right place at the right time. For 
example, if an attack happens where a unit is serving then obviously they would have 
been used unless they were completely unfit for combat for whatever reason. This would 
happen several times to the Queens Rangers, when the area they were in was attacked and 
they were automatically involved in the fighting. However, when a unit is deliberately 
moved to be where a planned attack or campaign is taking place then it becomes easier to 
classify their effectiveness. The fact that the Queens Rangers were frequently shipped 
back and forth between theatres of war would show that the High Command of the British 
Army had faith in their reliability in combat and thought of them as an asset to any 
campaign. Much of this was due to the great regard the High Command had for Simcoe 
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but they also had great respect for the regiment itself. The letter cited in the introduction 
to this chapter demonstrates this regard that the Regiment had from Gen. Clinton. As well 
as the section quoted earlier he stated: 
 Col. Simcoe himself has been thrice wounded: and I not scruple to assert, 
that his successes have been no less the fruit of the most extensive 
knowledge of his profession which study and the experience within his 
reach could give him, than of the most watchful attention and shining 
courage.94  
This letter shows Clinton‘s regard for Simcoe but its implications are that the Queens 
Rangers were also a very efficient regiment. 
 This brings up the question of how important a commander is to a regiment‘s 
battlefield effectiveness. Grossman‘s study of the psychology of soldiers emphasises the 
importance of leaders in warfare. Using in-depth studies of soldiers in war throughout 
history, Grossman theorises that a good leader has a massive effect on the efficiency of 
the men under his command. He identifies three rules for this. They are: ―Proximity of the 
authority figure to the subject; killer‘s subjective respect for the authority figure; intensity 
of the authority figure‘s demands for killing behaviour.‖ 95 By applying these rules to 
John Simcoe, the evidence presented in the subsequent sections will demonstrate that 
Simcoe was a good combat leader. 
 Every aspect of the running of the regiment was in the commander's 
hands.96Although Brigade and Division commanders took larger decisions the every day 
running of the regiment from pay to training was handled by the regimental commander. 
This was particularly the case in respect to the Queens Rangers because of the nature of 
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their duties. They often operated independently in small scale actions which were decided 
and planned by the commander.97 The officers and NCOs of the Queens Rangers 
demonstrated time and again their considerable abilities as Simcoe frequently noted in his 
Journal.98 The obvious regard that Simcoe had for his NCOs is at odds with Frey‘s ideas 
on the formal relationship between officers and men in most British units.99 Yet, 
Grossman argues that it is important for a leader to ―bond‖ with his men.100 Sgt. Jarvis 
demonstrates that he had a close relationship with Simcoe, stating ―In Colonel Simcoe I 
had found a friend, who was ready to redress any grievance I had to complain of.101 Given 
what Frey says about lack of fraternisation between officers and men—including a few 
extreme cases of officers being punished for drinking with their men—would suggest that 
the Rangers were an unusually close unit and this might possibly have contributed to their 
battlefield effectiveness.  
Combat 
  Simcoe's Queens Rangers were masters of light infantry tactics. They conducted 
several raids on the Americans, most of which were victories. These raids would consist 
of the Rangers going behind enemy lines, often by boat, destroying enemy munitions or 
transport and making their way back. In their way they were the Eighteenth century 
equivalent of the British Commandos of the Second World War or the American Rangers, 
who took their name from Rogers' Seven Years War regiment.102 
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Simcoe claimed that the Rangers‘ never lost an engagement in which they were 
not outnumbered.103 Whilst this may be a slight exaggeration, the Rangers combat record 
was certainly impressive. They were rarely used in set piece battles but served instead as 
Scouts. They performed a valuable service at the battle of Monmouth Courthouse, on 28 
June 1778, before and after the battle as General Henry Clinton notes in his memoirs. In 
making a decision to fight at Monmouth Clinton was ―convinced by the report of the 
Queens Rangers and the observations I had made myself that the enemy had not yet 
passed 1000 men.‖104  This would suggest that the Clinton decided to engage at 
Monmouth at the time and place he did, largely on the recommendations of the scouts of 
the Queens Rangers. This demonstrates the trust that Clinton placed in the regiment and 
in Simcoe.  
Their performance at Monmouth during the actual battle was also highly praised 
and they served as the rearguard after that battle while the rest of the army retreated. It 
was to be the last major battle they would take part in until the siege of Charleston in 
1780. Their actions in the intervening period were small-scale raids and skirmishes. This 
however, did not negate their value to the British but in many ways added to it. They kept 
up constant pressure on the patriots in New York and New Jersey and their name became 
known and feared by the Patriots. 
The Queens Rangers had a proud record in patrols and raids and were usually 
entrusted with intelligence gathering missions and prisoner snatches. Also their Loyalist 
status worked in their favour. Simcoe states in journal that he had a little book containing 
the names of all the men in his unit and where they came from in America so that he 
would never be short of local knowledge.105 Unfortunately, the book no longer exists but 
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the knowledge it provided was to prove invaluable in raids and skirmishes.106 Having 
guides allowed Simcoe to choose ambush sites and utilise footpaths normally known only 
to the Patriots. Line infantry regiments had to do without this knowledge and as such 
Simcoe made himself indispensable to General Clinton. The Queens Rangers local 
knowledge meant that they were often used as scouts for the main army. In many ways 
they may be seen as having the best of both worlds. Their Loyalist status gave them local 
knowledge yet their British commander insured that they were trusted by the high 
command in a way that few other Loyalist regiments were. Also Simcoe was constantly 
pressing for his unit to be used. He wrote that; ―they are so well disciplined. And ―should 
this succeed [a projected raid involving 100 men in New Hampshire in 1778] it will 
contribute to the ascendancy the provincial corps are gaining over the rebels a point that 
seems to be of general desire.‖107 Admittedly as their commander Simcoe, may be biased 
but there are enough testimonies to the effectiveness of the Queens Rangers from those in 
high command, such as Clinton and the King himself and even patriots like Colonel 
―Light Horse‖ Harry Lee, to support Simcoe‘s statement.108  
One of the Queens Rangers most successful raids was on the coast of New Jersey, 
on 25 October 1779, where they destroyed a patriot powder magazine, 50 boats and 
assorted armaments.109 Simcoe had received intelligence of a projected Patriot attack on 
New Jersey across the Delaware River. The Patriots had assembled numerous large 
flatboats at Van Vesser‘s bridge in New Jersey with plans of using them to move a large 
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body of men into New York.110 Simcoe resolved to destroy these boats as well as any 
munitions they found. On the 25th the Rangers crossed into New Jersey and accomplished 
this mission, burning 18 large boats and destroying much other equipment besides. The 
also destroyed the Courthouse in the town of Somerset. This destruction of Patriot 
Government property will be discussed in the next section. The aims of the raid—that of 
diverting the planned patriot attack on New York—were fully achieved and the Rangers 
returned in to Richmond in New Jersey in triumph on the evening of the 26 October. 
They had covered a massive amount of ground, Simcoe states: ―the cavalry had covered 
upwards of eighty miles without halting or refreshment, the infantry thirty.‖111 
Despite the success of the raid in damaging Patriot supply lines it was extremely 
costly to the Rangers as it deprived them of Simcoe for several months as he was 
wounded and captured.112 They also took several casualties but the accounts of how many 
they took are confusing. Simcoe‘s own account states that they were minimal whereas 
Simcoe‘s friend Captain Ewald (who admittedly was not on the raid) states that the 
―majority of his (Simcoe‘s) men were shot down.113 Ewald however, never gives exact 
figures, instead frequently making statements like ―almost half the corps were either 
killed or wounded‖ which he does on at least two occasions.114 This could cast doubt on 
the validity of his evidence but it should be remembered that he would not have access to 
accurate figures, especially when editing his account in Denmark in the 1790s.  
Simcoe takes the blame for the disastrous epilogue to his successful raid when the 
regiment was ambushed and he was captured, by stating that he should have stayed 
farther from the town and thus attracted less attention.115 However, as Simcoe had just 
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blown a powder magazine it is likely that the patriots would have found the Rangers no 
matter what route they had taken home and the area was full of patriot informers. When 
writing about Simcoe‘s misfortune Ewald does not apportion blame to his friend, instead 
stating that it was an example of how dangerous a business raiding behind Patriot lines 
was. This threat however, meant that the Rangers often had more reason than most to be 
hostile to the enemy and their symbols of power. The New Jersey raid of 1779 while a 
military success was arguably damaging to the cause at large because of certain actions 
that Simcoe took and that cast a more negative moral light his actions, which admittedly 
were largely impressive in a tactical sense. These actions and others will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
 Intimidation and Reprisals 
In early Patriot historiography the British and their Loyalist allies often have a 
poor reputation, in terms of their conduct towards civilians and treatment of patriot 
prisoners. This issue will come up several times throughout the thesis. The most obvious 
example of this is the reputation of the British Legion, but there is some evidence that the 
Queens Rangers were not blameless in their dealings with civilians and prisoners.  
When discussing these events it is important to recognize the vast differences in 
how these events were reported on each side. What the Patriot media described as a 
massacre would be reported very differently by British and Loyalist sources. An example 
of this is the events of Hancock‘s Bridge New Jersey 21 March 1778. Two hundred and 
seventy of the Queens Rangers under Simcoe himself were part of a foraging and raiding 
party under Colonel Mawhood in New Jersey.116 The party consisted of Loyalist 
irregulars as well as the Queens Rangers. A large force of Patriots assembled at 
Hancock‘s bridge and in the ensuing battle the Queens Rangers surrounded and captured 
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the house of Judge Thomas Hancock, a prominent New Jersey Loyalist, which was 
occupied by Patriot militia.117 It is at this point that the evidence becomes conflicting and 
confusing. According to Simcoe, the house was seized by the Rangers in a fierce fight 
and the judge and his brother were accidentally killed. However, some Patriot evidence 
claims that the men were bayoneted while sleeping. They also put a different emphasis on 
the death of the Hancocks, saying that he was murdered in cold blood.118  Simcoe claimed 
that he had had been unaware that the judge was being held a prisoner there and that he 
deeply regretted the incident describing it as one of ―the real miseries of war.‖119 He does 
not mention whether the men they killed, he claims thirty, were asleep or not but does say 
that ―surprise had been fully achieved‖ which could suggest that they were but that he did 
not disapprove of killing them in this state.120  
This kind of incident was highly damaging to the Rangers‘ reputation amongst 
civilians and could have damaged recruitment. The event was something that happened in 
the heat of battle and is an example of how it is not always possible to maintain battlefield 
discipline in towns. On this occasion the crimes committed against civilians appear 
largely to have been unplanned. However, on at least one occasion the Queens Rangers 
appear to have taken deliberate action against Patriot government property and threatened 
civilian property. 
One particular incident demonstrates this and also casts light on the motivations 
of the Queens Rangers. On the aforementioned raid on New Jersey on 29 October 1779 
the Rangers burnt the Somerset county courthouse and threatened to burn civilian houses. 
Leonard Lundin comments that ―officers of Simcoe‘s type seemed to feel a peculiar 
hatred for courthouses, as physical symbols of American government‖ and further 
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accuses Simcoe of ―intimidatory tactics‖ and ―bullying‖ the civilian populace.‖  121 The 
issue is a fascinating one. As a raiding regiment it was the Rangers‘ job to harass and hurt 
their enemy behind the lines but a Court House had little strategic value and its loss 
would not really harm the Patriot war effort. It would seem to be a purely political move 
and casts an interesting light on the motivations of the Loyalist corps. Jarvis mentions that 
the ―Court-House had been set on fire‖ but does not mention the houses.122 The raid is 
covered in depth in Simcoe‘s journal and the incident is not denied but what is interesting 
is that Lundin approaches it the incident from a critical stance, which is quite rare, where 
Simcoe and the Queens Rangers are concerned. However, were also they trying exact 
some form of revenge? Many of the Queens Rangers officers had lost property and status 
and there would have been a great deal of bitterness.123 By striking at government 
buildings the Rangers could alleviate their anger at the enemy. Damage to Patriot 
Government property was common and actively encouraged. However, it could be 
counter productive. Fires once started, are hard to control and it is possible that civilian 
property was destroyed in the process. The Queens Rangers were desperate for recruits 
yet they were hardly likely to win them by threatening to destroy people‘s property.  
While damage to property might be regarded as unacceptable but at least 
understandable when behind Patriot lines, one incident highlights that the Queens 
Rangers were not averse to intimidating civilians who were behind British lines. In March 
1780 the payroll of the Queens Rangers was stolen from its courier in Smithtown New 
York. As the culprit could not be identified, the sum of £80 was levied from the 
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inhabitants of the town to compensate the regiment. This kind of rough justice was hardly 
likely to win them recruits from Smithtown.124 
There is also some evidence of where the accepted rules of war in relation to 
surrendering soldiers were said to have been breached. In March 1781 Captain MacKay‘s 
company were charged with having shot a Patriot soldier who was deemed to have 
surrendered. He was cleared of the charge by court martial. Also in 1781, Captain 
Saunders was cleared of having executed a prisoner.125 Although both these officers were 
cleared of all charges, it potentially gave ample opportunity to Patriot propagandists to 
accuse Loyalists of brutality and the British of ignoring it. 
It is easy for recent historians to criticize soldiers for acts of inhumanity but often 
this does not take into account the complicated and confusing nature of partisan warfare 
and in the ―fog of war‖ it is often difficult for company commanders to have full control 
over their men. This was as much the case in the American Revolution as it is in present 
wars. The task for the historian is to decide to what extent these incidents were accidental 
or intentional. Certainly Lundin implies that the Rangers had a grudge against obvious 
symbols of patriot government in a way that possibly made them different to regular 
troops. Yet they appear rarely to have harmed civilians, which is in their favour. 
Yet these actions, although Simcoe and his men justified them as necessities of 
war, put them in fear of Patriot reprisals, which were commonplace. Simcoe cites an 
example of Sergeant Adams of the Rangers Hussars, who was mortally wounded while on 
a raid with Simcoe in Virginia in January of 1781. Adams told Simcoe that he "didn't 
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mind dying but for God's sake don't leave me in the hands of the rebels."126 This is an 
extreme example of the fear Loyalists had of their Patriot compatriots. Simcoe illustrates 
the dangers facing his regiment when he stated: 
 ―From this example one can perceive how dangerous is the 
service of Light troops in this country. One never sets true the 
information from the enemy. Each step that one makes is soon 
betrayed. And then one is likely to be surrounded by armed country 
people who are all excellent shots, without considering the regular 
troops of the enemy.‖127  
This meant that the Rangers faced more than just regular troops; they faced a 
hostile population and one especially hostile to Loyalists. Captured Queens Rangers 
soldiers faced the possibility of tarring and feathering or in extreme cases, hanging. The 
most obvious example of this was the action that Simcoe was forced to take at Yorktown, 
in October 1781. Simcoe knew that Cornwallis was doomed and asked him if he could 
take the Queens Rangers to cut their way out through a secret path that he was told about 
by a spy. Given the skill of the unit it is possible that they could have done so.128 
Cornwallis reacted badly to this, and insisted that everyone must surrender together, 
Loyalists and British alike. Yet this was no act of self-preservation on Simcoe‘s part. He 
did genuinely fear for the lives of his men. The patriots had not always treated Loyalist 
soldiers as magnanimously as they had British POWs and all the Loyalists commanders 
waiting for surrender at Yorktown feared for the lives of their men. After the surrender at 
Yorktown, several Patriot deserters were extracted from the British and Loyalist 
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regiments and hung.129 Mindful of this Simcoe smuggled out as many as he could on the 
hospital ship the Bonnetta, which it was tacitly agreed in the articles of surrender that it 
could contain ―such Soldiers as he may think proper to send to New York to be permitted 
to sail without examination."130 Of the soldiers hung, none were from the Queens 
Rangers, testifying to Simcoe‘s quick thinking.  
The Last Days.131 
 The Queens Rangers were in many ways at their most active in the last two years 
of campaigning, between 1779 and 1781. There are several reasons for this. One reason is 
connected to a trend, universal to the Loyalist regiments. This is the increasing reliance 
by the British on their American Provincial troops after the American-French Alliance, as 
Paul Smith has shown.132 The Queens Rangers however, had been used extensively since 
1777, before the French Alliance, so in some ways this change in policy did not affect 
them as much as other regiments, who had scarcely been used at all. A major reason for 
this is simply that they were a very good regiment. It is often the way in wars, to overuse 
an experienced regiment until they are exhausted, as to rotate would mean using 
inexperienced troops. This may seem counter-productive but it is often seen as an easy 
way out. The reasoning would be that it is better to put new troops in with experienced 
troops—even depleted ones—rather whole units of inexperienced men. The Queens 
Rangers were experienced in combat and could be relied upon to operate under the 
severest pressure. The Queens Rangers never broke and ran and indeed had they been 
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allowed were ready to break out of Yorktown and harass the enemy in Virginia.133 This is 
not to say that the British Army used the Queens Rangers recklessly, they were usually 
given a rest period over part of the winter but in last winter of the war, 1780-81, this was 
denied them and they were sent from New York to Virginia, after making two lengthy sea 
voyages in 1780 and serving in both the Southern and Northern campaigns of that year. 
A principle reason for their continued use is related to the light infantry and 
guerrilla tactics British were using more and more in the last two years of the war. The 
British attempted to avoid large scale battles that would be costly in men and equipment 
so raids and skirmishes were deemed to be an economical way of hurting the enemy.  134 
As has been mentioned at length, the Queens Rangers were experts at this type of fighting 
and were indeed considered the leading exponents of it. Therefore they were much in 
demand.  
The Queens Rangers performed extremely well in the Virginia campaign of early 
1781. The Simcoe papers give a very good example of the kind of operation the Rangers 
excelled at. Simcoe's friend Captain Ewald of the Jaeger corps was forced to hold off at 
least 300 rebels in a ravine before Simcoe and two companies of the Queens Rangers 
came to the rescue. Thus the light troops were able to combine and beat back a superior 
Patriot force.135  
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The Queens Rangers fought on nearly every day of the Virginia Campaign and 
this chapter does not have the space to deal with all the engagements. 136 The aim of this 
chapter is to examine the Queens Rangers success or otherwise as a regiment and military 
community and to give examples of actions where they relate to their effectiveness rather 
than giving full campaign histories. Other works have examined individual engagements 
in depth. Fryer and Dracott give an excellent account of the action at Spencer‘s Ordinary 
on 20 June 1781 in which the Rangers were victorious over a far larger force. This is an 
interesting exercise and while the action itself was little more that a skirmish in the wider 
scheme of the 1781 Virginia campaign they demonstrate that the action brought out the 
best in Simcoe‘s and his regiment‘s courage and skill.137  
The combats that the Queens Rangers took part in, while almost always 
successful on a small scale, did not affect the outcome of the war. The Rangers along with 
Cornwallis‘ whole army were captured at Yorktown and in effect their war ended there. 
Despite this grim fate, on so many levels they were a successful unit as this chapter has 
shown, however, they did take heavy losses as the next section will demonstrate. 
Combat Losses 
No matter how brave and skilled a unit, casualties due to combat or illness could 
severely hamper a unit‘s battlefield effectiveness. The numbers serving in the Queens 
Rangers were constantly fluctuating due to illness and combat losses. This section will 
examine how the Rangers battlefield effectiveness was affected by attrition. The table 
below, compiled from the Database of the muster rolls, examines the total recorded 
absences from 1777 to 1783: 
 
Table 13:Absences from Duty 1776-1783. 
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Muster 
Period 
Total 
Recorded 
on Muster 
Fit 
for  
Duty 
Sick Deserted Dead Wounded Prisoner Total 
absences.138 
 
31 August 
1776 to 24 
December 
1776 
262 150 34 17 6  33 112 
24 December 
1776 to 31 
March 1777 
181 136 21 15 4  1 45 
24 August to 
24 
November 
1777 
490 422 12 19 19 4 5 68 
24 December 
1777 to 25 
February 
1778 
416 324 28 34 1 2 11 92 
23 April to 
24 June 1778 
340 284 27 9 1 5 3 56 
24 April to 
27 July 1778 
156 105 15 19 1  7 52 
 25 June to 
24 August 
1778 
355 262 26 21 2 1 8 93 
25 August to 
24 October 
1778 
460 359 38 22 4 4 8 101 
25 December 
to 1 March 
1779 
473 395 18 20 4 4 6 78 
 24 February 
to 24 April 
1779 
406 375 7 3  5 10 31 
25 April to 
24 June 1779 
350 324 4 10   8 26 
 24 June to 
24 August 
1779 
437 365 20 22 2 7 11 72 
 25 August to 
24 October 
1779 
459 374 41 12 2 1 15 85 
25 October 
1779 to 24 
December 
1779 
543 454 32 3 8 6 18 89 
 25 
December to 
23 February 
608 538 17 10 4 2 14 70 
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 Figure includes all absences including leaves and dischargements not given in separate columns.  
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1780 
 25 February 
to 24 April 
1780 
489 449 17 1   9 40 
25 June to 24 
August 1780 
552 442 77 11 3 2 8 110 
25 August to 
24 October 
1780 
541 479 30 3 2  11 62 
25 October 
to 24 
December 
1780 
391 353 20 1 2  5 38 
12 
September 
1783 
320 270 7 12 1   48 
31 December 
1780 to 24 
February 
1781 
574 548 11  6 3 1 26 
25 June 1781 
to 24 August 
1781 
638 563 26 8 12 1 18 75 
25 August 
1781 to 24 
October 
1781 
495 199 10 27 28 1 222 296 
25 December 
1781 to 23 
February 
1782 
552 113 6 1 2 2 402 439 
24 February 
1782 to 24 
April 1782 
563 136 18 7 3 1 364 427 
25 April 
1782 to 24 
June 1782 
553 194 12 25 4  291 359 
25 June 1782 
to 24 August 
1782 
430 113 11 2 6  278 307 
25 August 
1782 to 24 
October 
1782 
166 71 11 7 1  71 95 
25 October 
1782 to 23 
December 
1782 
99 78 1 2   17 21 
24 December 
1782 to 23 
February 
1783 
102 79 1  2  17 23 
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24 February 
1783 to 24 
April 1783 
382 195 2 7 1  167 187 
Total 12783 9149 600 350 131 51 2039 3271 
Average 412.3 295.1 19.3 12.1 4.8 3 67.9 116.8 
Average 
Simcoe 
Period 
413.4 340.4 26.2 14.7 4.2 3.5 10.4 67.5 
Average 
Summer 
periods 
431.3 321.1 23.3 13.9 6.4 2.6 48.6 122.7 
Average 
Winter 
periods 
424.3 290.4 28.3 11.7 7.3 2 71 127.3 
Average on 
Southern 
Campaign 
513.8 452.3 26.3 8.4 4.6 2 9.2 164 
Average 
Northern 
theatre 
407 275.1 21.5 13 5.1 3.2 75.7 102.9 
Source: C Series Muster Rolls, Vols. 1861-65, TS 11 221, WO 12/11035. Compiled using Queens 
Rangers Database. 
 The most important statistic is those men fit for duty. This is the total number of 
men ready to fight on the date of muster. The table records variations over time, season 
and in the Northern and Southern Theatres. The average regimental strength is 412 men 
per muster. The later section on the rank and file will examine length of enlistment in 
detail. What this table demonstrates is that there was a lot of movement of personnel 
within the Queens Rangers. The average long term absences per muster are 116, which 
works out at twenty-eight percent of the average regimental strength. This meant that on 
any month over a quarter of the regimental strength was absent. This is not counting 
absences on regimental or company duty. The average number of men leaving the 
regiment permanently is eighty-eight per muster. The single greatest cause of absence is 
being taken prisoner with an average of sixty-seven men per muster being captured. This 
however, is slightly misleading as the majority of the regiment was taken prisoner at 
Yorktown. The average number taken prisoner before Yorktown was ten per muster. The 
second greatest cause of permanent absence is desertion with an average of twelve men 
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deserting per muster. It is the intention to compare these figures to other Loyalist 
regiments. The Queens Rangers status meant they were well treated by those in authority 
and in terms of equipment they had the best of everything? Would another regiment not 
quite so favoured have a higher desertion rate?139  
A total of 131 men were listed as dead in the whole period. There are some gaps 
in this particular figure as the full casualty figures for Brandywine and Germantown are 
not recorded due to gaps in the muster rolls. This figure is relatively low by later 
standards. An average of five men died in every muster period. The figures are far higher 
in the summer campaigning period and lower in the winter periods. Not all of these men 
were killed on the battlefield for a considerable percentage would have died of disease. 
The cause of death is rarely recorded, unfortunately.  
The figures change slightly when the musters are separated into summer and 
winter musters. The average number of men in the regiment is significantly lower in the 
winter, 387 as opposed 444 in the summer. This would suggest that more recruits were 
added in the summer. There are also a slightly higher number of absences in the winter, 
127 as opposed to 123 and ninety-seven men permanently leaving as opposed to eighty-
seven in the summer. Average numbers of men killed in the winter is down to under three 
as opposed to over four in the summer.  
The most interesting difference in figures is between the periods when the 
Rangers served in the Northern Theatre and their service in the Southern Campaigns. The 
average number of men serving is significantly up, 534 in the Southern Theatre as 
opposed to 384 in the Northern theatre.140 This would suggest that recruitment was easier 
in the south. This would conform to the known facts. The move to the South opened up 
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John Simcoe, Simcoe’s Journal, passim.  
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 The regiment served in the Northern theatre from 1776-1780 and in the Southern theatre from 1780-
1781. In 1780 they served in the Southern theatre from January until May before returning to New 
Jersey. They returned to the South when they were sent to Virginia in December 1780. The musters for 
the summer of 1780 were counted in the Northern theatre calculations. 
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new areas for recruitment and brought in many new troops. The Queens Rangers did have 
many native southerners –particularly amongst the officer corps- from their earliest days 
but it is impossible to tell how many, from the muster rolls.141 The most startling 
difference in figures between North and South is the number of men permanently leaving 
the regiment. An average of 126 men left the unit per muster in the South as opposed 
sixty-seven in the North. This is partly because of the high number of prisoners taken at 
Yorktown but the figures are still higher in the South when those taken prisoner are 
discounted, nineteen in the South, as opposed to eighteen in the North. The numbers 
killed in the Southern theatre are far higher than in the North. An average of nine  men 
died per muster in the South, as opposed to an average of four per muster in the North. 
This is possibly related to the disease factor as well as to the fact that the fighting in the 
South was more intense.  
Conclusion 
Despite the many successes that the Queens Rangers had in 1780 and 1781 the war 
ended badly for them as it did for all British and Loyalist units. Ironically their only major 
defeat was when they along with every other regiment in Cornwallis's army were captured 
at Yorktown. They were eventually returned to New York, where Captain John Saunders, a 
Virginian, who had been with the unit since 1776, took command of the remains of the 
unit. Saunders had not been captured at Yorktown – he had been on detached duty in South 
Carolina- so was under no parole obligations. Those not bound by parole regulations-
largely just Saunders company and any new recruits- took part in the occasional raid and 
skirmish before being demobilized in Canada in 1783.  
After Yorktown, and after Simcoe had returned to England, the Queens Rangers 
were castigated by the new commander in chief, General Guy Carleton for allegedly 
pillaging civilian property. John Saunders wrote in the strongest terms to Carleton, 
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protesting their innocence saying that their ―honor and reputation‖ had been ―highly 
injured‖.142  They were cleared of the charge but it could not have done their reputation 
with the patriots a lot of good and further damaged their soldiers chances of returning to 
America after the war.  
The Queens Rangers‘ importance to the study of the Loyalist regiments or indeed 
the study of eighteenth century light infantry tactics cannot be exaggerated. By 
intervening in the Queens Rangers the British created a template for their ideal Loyalist 
regiment. In the Queens Rangers the British Army had almost a perfect little unit; 
experienced, highly motivated, skilled and –usually- disciplined and the database has 
allowed the chapter to analyse this as never before. They became, in effect a military 
community similar to Frey‘s concept of group consciousness.143 The rest of the 
dissertation will investigate whether this template was successfully applied to other 
regiments. The Queens Rangers can be seen as the bridge between the old style provincial 
regiments of the Seven Years war era and the later Loyalist regiments that would emerge 
after 1777 and set a pattern for future British provincial regiments in India and other 
places.  
The survivors of the Queens Rangers would go onto to have a major influence in 
the military and governmental affairs of Canada. Several ex-officers would hold high 
commands in the war of 1812 and several would hold high office in the judiciary.144 Little 
is recorded of the careers of the rank and file, with the exception of Jarvis. Many of them 
settled in the town of Simcoe in Upper Canada, which was originally inhabited 
exclusively by Queens Rangers veterans.145 
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So, despite the fact that they served in a lost war, the Queens Rangers left a 
legacy that would serve the British and Canadian Armies well. Their commander perhaps 
sums them up best in his concluding words to his journal when he wrote: 
Thus conclude the principal events of a light corps, whose 
services can best be estimated by observing, that for years in the 
field, to use the language of a former age, they were the forlorn of 
the armies in which they served, 146and that even in winter quarters, 
when in common wars troops are permitted to seek repose, few 
hours can be selected where the Queens Rangers had not to guard 
against the attacks of a skilful and enterprising enemy. 147
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Chapter 5 
The British Legion 
Introduction 
This Chapter covers the British Legion and its role in the campaigns of the 
America Revolutionary War. It is not intended to be a biography of the regiment‘s second 
commander, Banastre Tarleton, tempting though this would be. Tarleton‘s well lived life, 
rich as it is with allegations of extreme brutality, financial and sexual scandals, has been 
well covered by historians and he even appears, under a barely disguised name, as the 
villain in a recent film.1 This chapter will instead focus on its role in the Campaigns of 
1778-81, the controversy surrounding its actions. The chapter will not provide as detailed 
an administrative history of the British Legion as the other two case studies, because of 
the need to offer a chapter concentrating on largely on the Loyalists in combat, but the 
organisation of the unit will be dealt with. The coverage of battles and actions will not be 
exhaustive as there is not the space in one chapter but the actions picked are all 
demonstrative of the themes of the chapter, namely military effectiveness and battlefield 
discipline.  
The British Legion, while in many respects a very successful and effective 
regiment due to several impressive victories, is surrounded by controversy. This relates to 
the men‘s behaviour in the Southern Campaigns, where on more than one occasion they 
were accused of breaching the accepted rules of war in respect to their conduct towards 
surrendering prisoners and in respect to their conduct towards civilians and civilian 
property. Also, despite their many victories, their battlefield tactics have been called into 
question and they were arguably outfought and outthought by the Patriots several times in 
1781. It is necessary here to draw comparisons with the Queens Rangers. Arguably, the 
men of the Queens Rangers can be seen by many as victims of the Yorktown Campaign, 
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that they did everything that was asked of them and still ended up on the losing side 
through little fault of their own, whereas the soldiers of the British Legion, while at times 
truly superb in combat, arguably created some of the problems faced by the British in the 
Southern campaign by their conduct on the battlefield and must face some of the blame 
for its defeat. The chapter will examine the role that the actions of the Legion played in 
discouraging recruitment as well as their role—if any—in hastening Cornwallis‘s 
decision to march to Yorktown by having significant parts in the defeats of Cowpens and 
Guilford Courthouse in early 1781. 
Historiography and sources 
The literature on the British Legion is in some ways more diverse than that on the 
Queens Rangers, yet less detailed. The regiment‘s history is often shrouded in 
controversy and this is reflected in the literature on it. Anthony Scotti‘s recent work on 
Tarleton also deals with the British Legion.2 The rest of the historiography is largely split 
into two groups; that on the regiment‘s role in the Southern campaigns of 1780-81 and 
that on Tarleton. The first group is general literature on the Southern campaigns that 
address the Legion in some depth because of the major role it took in these campaigns. 
John Pancake‘s account of the Southern campaigns gives a brief account of the origins of 
the Legion whilst Lawrence Babits‘ work on the battle of Cowpens gives a brief account 
of the history of the Legion and a detailed account of its behaviour at that battle.3 
Interestingly Babits states that ―the history of the British Legion, or Tarleton‘s Legion as 
it came to be known, was the history of Tarleton in America.‖4 This is a statement that 
this chapter will attempt to challenge, by putting the British Legion in a context of their 
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own. John Buchanan takes a critical view of Tarleton and the Legion but he does 
acknowledge their skill frequently.5 David Lee Russell takes a similar highly critical 
stance while Dan Morril attempts to put the Legion‘s behaviour in context.6  John Shy‘s 
work on early American military behaviour takes a strong stance on the Legion; accusing 
them of ―terrorism‖ similarly Smith states that the ―worst atrocities‖ of the Southern 
campaign were ―attributed‖ to the British Legion.‖7 
  The second group of literature deals with the reputation of Tarleton and the 
frequent accusations of brutality against him. The starting point is Tarleton‘s own History 
of the Southern campaigns.8 The 1780‘s saw the leading lights on the British side of the 
American Revolutionary War rushing into print to salvage their damaged reputations and 
there was a flurry of publications about the Southern Campaign many of which seemed to 
lay much of the blame for defeat on Tarleton.9 In 1787 he decided to publish his own 
account of events which will be referred to extensively throughout this chapter.  
Tarleton‘s History added to the debate that had already flared up when Clinton 
and Cornwallis had engaged in a heated printed duel in which both tried to salvage their 
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reputation at the expense of the other.10   Tarleton was highly critical of Cornwallis who 
was much offended by the supposed betrayal, but left it to others to respond.  11  It was 
Roderick McKenzie, a very junior officer, who defended Cornwallis and who also took 
on the task of criticising perceived errors in Tarleton‘s work.12 Major George Hanger, 
Tarleton‘s friend and the sometime second in command of the British Legion, published a 
defence of Tarleton and his actions in the war.13 Mackenzie and Hanger‘s publications, 
while entertaining, were largely focused on airing personal grievances. However, both are 
useful in evaluating the controversy surrounding the actions of the British Legion and it is 
necessary to read both in order to take an objective stance. Both offer comments on the 
operations and discipline of the British Legion which providing the kind of contrasting 
accounts rarely available on the Queens Rangers due to the scarcity of sources critical of 
them. 
After the immediate controversy subsided there was little written directly on 
Tarleton or the Legion until Robert D. Bass published his work on Tarleton and Mary 
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Robinson in 1956.14 This work is a well written biography of Tarleton and his celebrated 
lover, Mary Robinson. It does deal at some length with Tarleton‘s record in the 
Revolutionary War but does not devote much space to discussing the British Legion 
beyond the usual ―Tarleton, at the head of the Legion‖ which is so common to works on 
the Southern Campaign. Anthony Scotti‘s 2002 work put Tarleton‘s conduct into the 
context of the brutal Southern campaign.15 This chapter will make use of a variety of 
sources some of which have been used in previous chapters.16  There is one excellent 
website on Tarleton which also contains a great deal of primary material on the British 
Legion.17  
Section 1 1778-1780 
 Formation of the British Legion 1778 
The British Legion was formed at a time of change for the British Army. Clinton 
and Germain were evolving their strategy for the war towards less reliance on British 
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regulars and more on American recruitment.18 However, as they were to replace and 
augment regular British regiments, there was a need for high quality Loyalist units. 
Because of this the British decided not to entrust the new commands to Americans but to 
seasoned British officers. They had already gone down this route with the Queens 
Rangers twelve months before and it had proved effective. Clinton appointed two young 
aristocrats whom he trusted implicitly to two new regiments, the Volunteers of Ireland 
and the British Legion. Clinton wrote ―The foundation of a legionary corps was also at 
the same time laid, [the same time as the Volunteers of Ireland] for the reception as such 
other Europeans as might choose to join it, the command of which I gave to a Scottish 
nobleman Lord Cathcart, with the same views and expectations as had influenced me with 
respect to Lord Rawdon‘s.‖19 
 Clinton‘s intention was that the units were to have explicit links to recruits of 
British and particularly Celtic origin. Cathcart (a Scot) went to the Caledonian 
Volunteers, soon to be called the British Legion, and Lord Rawdon (an Irish peer) to the 
Volunteers of Ireland. However, while Ireland was not catered for by a Loyalist unit, 
Scotland was already represented by the Royal Highland Emigrants and the Queens 
Rangers (which had a Highland company) so the decision was made to change the name 
to the British Legion. This is clear justification that the British clearly targeted British 
born Loyalists and the fact that two promising officers were assigned to these units and 
not to more American based ones surely reflects that British born Loyalists were being 
given the same priority as they had been in 1775 with the creation of the Royal Highland 
Emigrants. 
The First Commanders 
On 15 July 1778 Lord William Schaw Cathcart was appointed to be commander, 
and on 1 August 1778 Banastre Tarleton was appointed Lt. Col commanding the Legion 
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cavalry and Major Thomas Cochrane was appointed to command the infantry.20 This 
section will briefly examine the three initial commanders of the British Legion. It will 
discuss the reasons for their appointments in light of the new strategy the British were 
adopting towards officering the Provincial regiments. 
 William Schaw, Tenth Lord Cathcart, was a university educated, career soldier, 
who was well-connected in high society.21 The significance of both his and Lord 
Rawdon‘s appointments to command new provincial regiments should be noted. The 
British had been raising Provincial regiments for two years and arming Loyalists since 
1775, yet the British Legion and the Volunteers of Ireland were radically different in 
command structure than most Provincial regiments. The initial method of raising a 
Provincial Regiment was to find a rich or influential American or British Colonial 
official, appoint them commander and let them raise the unit. This began to change in 
1777 when British regular officers were appointed to the command of the Queens 
Rangers. Most of the other Provincial regiments of the time were commanded by 
Americans, like Cordlandt Skinner, Beverly Robinson, Sir John Johnson, and John 
Butler.22 Although they lacked local knowledge, the new commanders did have the 
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respect of the High Command, which could only be reflected in the treatment that their 
units received from authority. Rawdon and Cathcart had proved themselves able, both in 
combat and staff duties. Both had been and were about to be entrusted with the top 
administrative posts of the army in America; Rawdon as Adjutant General and Cathcart 
as Quartermaster General.  
The fact that the units of Rawdon and Cathcart were formed by British officers 
from the beginning was a radical change from previous regiments. Rawdon and Cathcart 
were also different from the ambitious but poorly connected British officers appointed to 
the Queens Rangers. Both were young aristocrats intended to be future army commanders 
as befitted men of their background and influence.23 The command of a Loyalist regiment 
was seen by both as an additional string to their bows. It could also be argued -and indeed 
it was- that by appointing these particular officers to commands Clinton was putting two 
close allies in positions of authority.24 This trend would continue with the appointments 
of Alexander Innes to the South Carolina Royalists, and Patrick Fergusson as Inspector 
General of militia in 1780.  
Lord Cathcart did not however, take much of an active role in the British Legion 
beyond forming it. The Legion infantry was under his command until August 1778, when 
he was appointed Quartermaster General of the Army in America when Major Thomas 
Cochrane became the field commander of the Legion‘s infantry. Cathcart would remain 
attached to the regiment in a formal capacity until spring 1780. He was supposedly 
involved with recruiting at the outset of the South Carolina Campaign in April but he did 
not serve in a combat capacity. 
Two weeks after the initial formation of the Legion, on 1 August 1778, a young 
Captain of Dragoons from Liverpool was appointed to the rank of Lt Col. of Provincials 
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 Franklin and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis,  (London,1973) 
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and given command of the cavalry that was now attached to the Legion. Banastre 
Tarleton would assume full command of the whole unit from spring 1780 (there is dispute 
over the exact date of his assuming command) when they took part in the South Carolina 
campaign.25 Tarleton was not an aristocrat like Cathcart or the Legion‘s infantry 
commander Major Cochrane, but he was a regular British officer of promise. His 
numerous contemporaries have noted he had considerable personal charm and had 
already shown himself to be an extremely capable cavalry officer.26  
As mentioned above, the Legion infantry was under the command of Major 
Thomas Cochrane, who, like Tarleton and Cathcart, was a regular British officer, 
although not one as well connected to the high command as them.27 He commanded the 
                                                 
25
 Banastre Tarleton was born in Liverpool in 1754 the son of a wealthy merchant. He was educated at 
Liverpool Grammar School and briefly University College Oxford, before attempting to train for a 
legal career at the Middle Temple in London. Due to a fondness for gambling and other less than 
intellectual pursuits Tarleton managed to lose the money he had inherited from his father  and in April 
1775 persuaded his mother to purchase him a cornet‘s  commission in the 1st  Dragoons. He inherited 
£5000 in 1773, by 1775 there was little left. In 1776 he was posted to America with his regiment and 
arrived in America on 3 May 1776. Tarleton was part of the force sent to extend the war into the 
Carolinas under Henry Clinton. This expedition was a complete failure and Tarleton left with the rest 
of Clinton‘s army to join in the attack on New York in July 1776. On 13 December 1776 Tarleton was 
one of a patrol of Light Dragoons that captured the Patriot General Charles Lee. Tarleton would see 
service with his unit in 1777 being promoted to Captain and then Brigade Major of his unit in early 
1778.  During this period Tarleton made a number of friendships and alliances which would help him 
during his command of the legion. He became close to Lord Rawdon, Lord Cathcart, John Simcoe, and 
John Andre. All of these men were socially as well as professionally close to General Howe. Thus 
when Henry Clinton assumed command in May 1778 it was to these trusted young officers that he 
turned. See Robert D. Bass, The Green Dragoon pp. 15-16; Oxford DNB; Anthony Scotti, Brutal 
Virtue. 
26
 See Robert D. Bass the Green Dragoon; George Hanger An Address to the Army (1787); Mary 
Robinson The False Friend (1801); Henry Clinton Memoirs; Johann Ewald, Diary 
27
Cochrane was a Scot, born in 1749, the son of the Eighth Lord Dundonald. He had been a regular 
officer since 1764 and a Captain since 1774. He formed and recruited the Legion infantry from August 
1778 see Don Gara, Biographical Sketches of Infantry Officers of the British Legion, in 
http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/odds/bl_infantry.html accessed 19/5/2008.; Muster Rolls of the 
British Legion, C Series. 
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infantry in their first combats of 1778 and 1779 through to the Charleston campaign in 
spring and summer of 1780. In August 1780 he returned to New York suffering from ill 
health brought on by the Southern climate.28  
The appointment of Cathcart, Tarleton and Cochrane to the Legion demonstrated 
that the while this was to be a Provincial unit it was to be an elite one. Like the Queens 
Rangers, it was a self contained unit in that it contained infantry and cavalry and was 
designed to operate independently as well as with the main army. If a unit was to operate 
independently, rather than within a strict tactical command structure such as a brigade or 
a division, then the commanders had to be experienced officers who the High command 
could trust to act in a way expected of them. This meant, not only that they had to be 
competent in action, but disciplined and intelligent as well. Whether this was a deliberate 
judgement against American officers is a moot point. More likely it was a choice of 
professionals over amateurs.  
Recruitment and Appointments 
The British Legion was formed in July and August 1778 in New York. It was not 
an entirely new corps but an amalgamation of several existing companies augmented by 
new recruits. They consisted of several existing infantry and cavalry companies, all of 
which had been formed in the previous six months. The infantry consisted of: the 
Caledonian Volunteers, raised initially in May 1778; the Scottish Volunteers raised by 
Lord William Cathcart in Philadelphia at an unknown date in 1778; the English 
Volunteers raised in spring 1778 and the American Volunteers also raised in spring 
1778.29 The Caledonian Volunteers were originally intended to be an infantry regiment 
                                                 
28
 He would return to active service in 1781 and was sent to Yorktown as a messenger by Clinton. He 
was decapitated by a cannonball while standing next to Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown. See ibid. 
29
 See Muster Rolls August 1778, C series vol 1883; Don Gara Biographical Sketches of British Legion 
Infantry Officers http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/odds/bl_infantry.html accessed 17/7/2008. 
There is little information on the previous existence of these companies. It is probable that they were 
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made up of British born and particularly Scottish men.30 Because of the Clinton‘s retreat 
from Philadelphia in June, recruiting and training were halted and the recruits that had 
been enlisted in these new companies were taken along with the main army, although not 
in a fighting capacity. In July the recruits from these four companies became the newly 
formed British Legion with the addition of the three cavalry troops. 
The Legion cavalry came from three existing companies: the Philadelphia Light 
Dragoons raised in January 1778; the Chester County Light Dragoons raised in December 
1777 and Kinloch‘s Light Dragoons raised in 1778.31 Unlike the infantry, these units were 
fully formed by the time they were merged into the Legion and two of the troops had seen 
combat. The Chester County Light Dragoons were raised by Jacob James, a former 
Innkeeper from Goshen, Chester County, Pennsylvania, in December of 1777.32 No 
                                                                                                                                            
only partially raised before the retreat from Philadelphia which would account for the absence of 
information. 
30
The unit was to be commanded by Captain William Sutherland of the 55
th
 foot an a.d.c to Clinton. 
However, command was actually given to Captain Charles Stewart who would subsequently command 
an infantry company in the British Legion. There is no information on Stewart prior to his tenure in the 
British Legion. See Royal American Gazette, 7 May 1778; Donald Gara, Biographical Sketches of 
British Legion Infantry Officers, http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/britlegn/blinf1.htm  
accessed 15/8/08. 
31
 Clinton commenced raising the Caledonian Volunteers in May 1778, see recruiting notice Royal 
American Gazette, 7 May 1778; the Chester County Light Dragoons were raised by Captain Jacob 
James, subsequently of the British Legion in December 1777 under the orders of William Howe, see 
Warrant to Jacob James, (nd. December 1777) PRO 30/55/827, PRO; The Philadelphia Light Dragoons 
were raised in January 1778 by Richard Hovenden, see Don Gara, Biographical Sketches of British 
Legion Cavalry Officers, http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/britlegn/blcav1.htm accessed 
15/7/2008. 
  Kinloch‘s Light Dragoons raised April 1778, Donald Gara, Biographical Sketches of British Legion 
Cavalry Officers, http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/britlegn/blcav1.htm accessed 
15/7/2008. 
32
James had been a guide for Howe since the autumn of 1777 and was given permission to outfit a 
troop of Dragoons by Howe at Philadelphia see Donald Gara, Biographical Sketches of British Legion 
Cavalry Officers, http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/britlegn/blcav1.htm accessed 
15/7/2008; Proclaimed Traitors to the United States by the Supreme Executive Council of 
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muster rolls exist for the unit but they did fight at the battle of Crooked Billet along with 
Richard Hovenden‘s Philadelphia Light Dragoons on 4 May 1778.33 The third troop of 
Dragoons to be merged into the Legion was Kinloch‘s troop.34 Kinloch raised his troop 
on Long Island in April 1778. These three troops were merged into the Legion in late July 
and early August of 1778.  
The existing troops and companies were kept together and the same officers 
remained as troop and company commanders in the newly formed Legion.35 There were 
seven partially formed companies or troops to which one company of infantry were 
recruited in August and September 1778 by Major Cochrane and two companies of 
cavalry recruited by Lt Col. Tarleton and his company commanders. The company that 
was formerly the English Volunteers was amalgamated into all the other infantry 
companies in October 1778.36 
Officers and Companies 
                                                                                                                                            
Pennsylvania, 8 May 1778, in  the Pennsylvania Packet May 13 1778 in 
http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/friends/ch_proscribed.html accessed 15/7/2008. 
33
Richard Hovenden was a Trader from Newton in Bucks County Pennsylvania who was authorized to 
raise a troop of Dragoons in January 1777. John Simcoe, Simcoe‘s Journal, pp 56-60; Howe to 
Germain 5 May 1778, CO 5/96 ff. 15-17; Royal Pennsylvania Gazette, 5 May, 1778; Donald Gara, 
Biographical Sketches of British Legion Cavalry Officers, 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/britlegn/blcav1.htm accessed 15/7/2008; Proclaimed 
Traitors to the United States by the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, 8 May 1778, in  the 
Pennsylvania Packet 13 May 1778 in http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/friends/ch_proscribed.html 
accessed 15/7/2008. 
 
34
 David Kinloch was a Scot and a former officer of the 71
st
 Foot. See Army List 1777 for 71
st
 Foot. 
35
 No muster rolls exist for the Troops and companies under their previous incarnations the first muster 
rolls for the British Legion contain the vast majority of the men who served in these troops. 
36
 See Muster Rolls Vol. 1883; Don Gara: Summary of Infantry Companies. 
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This section will be an examination of the formation and structure of the Legion.37 
The Legion officers were a mixture of Americans and British emigrants, some of whom 
had served in the British Army. The following table is a list of company commanders 
with dates of service and nationalities where known: 
 
Table 14: List of Company Commanders of the British Legion with 
nationality given. 
Name Nationality38 Military Arm Dates of Service 
Captain Richard 
Hovendon39 
A Cavalry August 1778-
August 1782 
Captain  Jacob 
James 
A Cavalry August 1778-
August1782 
Captain Thomas 
Sandford 
A Cavalry December 1780-
October 1782 
Captain David 
Ogilvy 
B/S Cavalry August 1780-April 
1783 
Captain Christian 
Huck 
A Cavalry October 1779-July 
                                                 
37
 Don Gara has constructed an admirable series of short biographical sketches of Legion officers 
which is available online and is constructed from various sources including the muster rolls. The rolls 
themselves provide additional information as do the accounts of Tarleton, McKenzie and Hanger: Don 
Gara, Biographical Sketches of Infantry Officers of the British Legion: Biographical Sketches of 
Cavalry Officers of the British Legion, in http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/odds/bl_infantry.html 
accessed 19/5/2008.; Donald Gara, Biographical Sketches of British Legion Cavalry Officers, 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/britlegn/blcav1.htm, accessed 15/7/2008; C series 
Muster Rolls, Vols. 1883-1885; Banastre Tarleton, History (1787); Roderick McKenzie, Stricture 
(1788) George Hanger, Address to the Army (1789) 
38
 B=British; B/S= British Scottish; B/I= British Irish; B/E= British English; B/W- British Welsh; 
A=American; NK= Not Known. 
39
 Compiled from the Muster rolls. 
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1780 
Captain Nathaniel 
Vernon 
A Cavalry August 1781-
December 1782 
Captain John 
Scott 
A Infantry October 1778-
April 1779 
Captain Charles 
Stewart 
B/S Infantry August 1778- 
October 1779 
Captain Patrick 
Stewart 
B/S Infantry August 1780-
August 1782 
Captain Francis 
Gildart 
A Cavalry February 1781- 
December 1782 
Captain James 
Edwards 
B/I Infantry October 1778- 
December 1782 
Captain Donald 
McPherson 
B/S Infantry December 1780-
December 1782 
Captain David 
Kinlock 
B/S Cavalry August 1778-
August 1781 
Captain John 
Rousselet 
NK Infantry April 1779-August 
1781 
Captain Thomas 
Miller 
B/S Infantry October 1779-
August 1782 
Captain Charles40 
McDonald 
B/S Infantry August 1780-
August 1782 
Captain Kenneth 
McCulloch 
B Infantry September 1778-
                                                 
40
 Captain Charles McDonald was Flora MacDonald‘s son. 
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August 1780 
Source: Muster Rolls of the British Legion, C Series Vols. 1883-1885; Don Gara, Biographical 
Sketches of Infantry Officers of the British Legion: Biographical Sketches of Cavalry Officers of the 
British Legion, in http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/odds/bl_infantry.html  accessed 19/5/2008. 
 
There were in total seventeen company or troop commanders in the British 
Legion between August 1778 and April 1783. When assessing their nationalities, a 
pattern emerges, which is that the vast majority of cavalry Commanders were American 
whereas the vast majority of Infantry commanders were British. Of these officers, all but 
three were definitely Scottish.41 The infantry company recruited by Major Cochrane in 
September 1778 had had no restrictions and consisted of the best men available in New 
York and New Jersey. Two infantry companies were recruited in the South in 1780. 
Again while no concrete data is available for the nationality of these recruits, they were 
all civilian volunteers rather than transfers from regular British units so they were likely 
to be Americans or pre-war emigrants. The infantry was partially destroyed at Cowpens 
which meant that they were reformed with new Southern recruits between February and 
August 1781 and a completely new infantry company was recruited in Virginia in August 
1781.42 This demonstrates that the Legion while commanded by a British officer was a 
Loyalist regiment in that the bulk of their members were Americans or pre-war European 
immigrants under the definition given in the introduction to this thesis. 
                                                 
41
This is because of the origins of the regiment. The cavalry came from existing troops of American 
raised cavalry, from Pennsylvania and New York, whereas the original infantry came from the 
Caledonian Volunteers, the Scottish Volunteers and the English Volunteers, hence the nationality of 
their officers. It is harder to gauge the nationality of the enlisted men as the muster rolls do not contain 
this information. The cavalrymen were recruited around Pennsylvania and New York and later on in 
the South so it is reasonable to suggest that the majority of them were either American born or pre-war 
emigrants. The infantrymen were initially to consist of British emigrants but this rule was relaxed on 
the formation of the Legion. Muster Rolls for August 1778, C Series, Vol 1883 NAC. 
42
 Muster Rolls for 1780 and 1781 C series, vols. 1884-1885; S. Pancake, This Destructive War, The 
British Campaign in the Carolinas 170-82, (Alabama, 1985) pp. 20-21; John Shy,  A People Numerous 
and Armed, (Oxford, 1976), p.222; Donald Gara Service Summaries of British Legion Officers 
http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/odds/infantry_troop.html accessed 17/7/2008. 
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Numbers and types of Service 
This section will examine the numbers of rank and file serving in the British 
Legion. The following table gives data on the numbers of enlisted men serving in the 
Legion from 1780-1782.43 The recruits shown are those listed in the minutes of muster. 
They do not include transfers from other regiments. 
Table 15: British Legion: Regimental Totals 1780-1782. 
Regimental 
Totals 
Sgt Cpl Dr/Tr Pvt Cav Inf. Rec. Total 
25 October 
1780 
28 25 16 450 261 191 81 519 
25 
December 
1780 
26 27 14 427 273 154 18 494 
24 
February 
1781 
23 19 12 296 218 78 1 350 
25 April 
1781 
24 16 11 287 209 78 3 337 
24 August 
1781 
23 17 11 273 202 71 6 324 
23 
February 
1782 
8 8 5 184 146 38 7 205 
24 April 
1782 
9 9 4 148 112 36 1 170 
Average 
1780-1782 
20.1 17.2 10.4 295.2 203 92.2 19.3 342.7143342. 342.7 
 
Source: Muster Rolls of the British Legion C series Vols. 1883-1885; Murtie June Clark, Loyalists in 
the Southern Campaign, Vol. 2 (Ontario 1985) pp. 246-251. 
 
 There were usually nine companies serving in the legion at any one time. 
Before Yorktown in October 1781 there were always between five and six cavalry troops 
and four infantry companies. The numbers undergo considerable fluctuation over time. 
                                                 
43
 The figures give a list of all men serving with the regiment. There are few numerical discrepancies 
with the counts from the muster rolls. The rolls between 1778 and 1780 are incomplete and do not 
contain minutes of muster, which are tables of all men serving in the regiment. Thus, it is impossible to 
create reliable figures for this period from the muster rolls.  
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This is due to recruitment and casualties. There are some patterns that are apparent. The 
numbers of men serving in the regiment throughout 1780 are the highest. They decrease 
considerably from February 1781 but remain around the same until August 1781. After 
that they decrease and go on decreasing. This can be tied in with the combat service 
record of the British Legion. The regiment had a successful 1780. It saw combat many 
times that year but several notable victories meant that although they took casualties, 
there were many recruits willing to join them, particularly the cavalry. The figures for 
August 1780 demonstrate that 81 recruits joined in the period from June to August that 
year. Considering this was one of the Legion‘s most active periods this is a considerable 
number. In January 1781 the regiment suffered a severe defeat at the battle of Cowpens 
which saw the infantry substantially routed and only a few avoided capture. The cavalry 
took heavy casualties in this battle but escaped in good order. The infantry were reformed 
in February and March 1781 but not in the same numbers. The regiment again took heavy 
casualties at Guilford Courthouse and after this battle were largely withdrawn from active 
service although they did remain with Cornwallis until Yorktown. The cavalry served 
until Yorktown. Both the infantry and cavalry did active recruiting in the Southern 
campaigns. The table demonstrates that there was an average of 295 private soldiers 
recorded per muster and an average of 343 rank and file in total. To put these figures into 
context the Queens Rangers had an average of 324 private soldiers and 384 total rank and 
file for the period 1776 to 1783. This is higher than the British Legion, however, the 
Queens Rangers did not suffer a cataclysmic defeat such as the Legion did at Cowpens 
which may account for the lower average.44 The comparison is a worthwhile one as the 
units were similar in structure and in type of service. They also served in roughly the 
same campaigns over the period with the exception of the autumn and winter of 1780 
                                                 
44
 Compiled from the Queens Rangers Database. 
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where Queens Rangers served briefly in New York and then in Virginia and the Legion 
remained in the Carolinas before joining the Rangers in late spring 1781.  
Pay 
The Legion were paid roughly equivalent to most other provincial regiments. The 
table below is the pay-scale for the British Legion from 1782-83: 
Table 16: British Legion Rates of Pay 24 Dec. 1782 23 Feb. 1783. 
 Rank Daily Pay Numbers Daily Total 
Cavalry Officers    
Lt. Col 24s6d 1 £1 4s 6d 
Maj. 20s6d 1 £1 
Capt. 15s6d 6 £4 13s 
Lt. 9s 10 £4 10 s 
Cornet 6s 5 £2 
Adj. 5s 1 5s 
Surgeon 6s 1 6s 
Surgeon's Mate 3s6d 1 6s 
Qrtr Mstr 5s6d 6 6s 
Infantry Officers    
Capt. 10s 4 £2 
Lt 4s8d 3 14s 
Ens 3s6d 3 11s 
Adj. 4s 1 4s 
Total officers Pay 
for one day 
  £18 14s 6d 
Total Officer Pay for 
61 Days 
  £1142 4s 6d 
Rank and File 
Cavalry 
   
Sgt. 1s7d 19 £1 11s 3d 
Cpl. 1s1d 17      19s 7d 
Trumpeter 1s1d 9      10s4d 
Pvt. 9d 219 £9 
Rank and File 
Infantry 
   
Sgt. 1s 10 10s 
Cpl. 8d 9 6s 
Drummers 8d 4 2s8d 
Pvt. 6d 156 £3 16s6d 
Total Rank and File 
Pay for one day. 
  £16 17s 11d 
Total Rank and File 
Pay for 61 Days 
  £1030 1s 4d 
Total Regimental 
Pay for 61 Days 
  £2220 15s45 4d 
                                                 
45
 This figure includes an additional £27 13s 6d for various expenses. 
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Source: Compiled from British Legion Abstract of Pay for sixty one days from 24 December 1782 to 
23 February 1783 C Series Muster Rolls Vol. 1885, f.1, National Archives of Canada. 
 
The above table details the amount that the Legion was paid. Cavalry were paid 
almost double that of the infantry. The Legion was paid almost half as much as Butler‘s 
Rangers and slightly less than privates of the Queens Rangers and the Royal Highland 
Emigrants.46 Interestingly the officers cost more on a daily basis than all the rank and file 
combined.  
First combats, 1778-79. 
The period of August 1778 until January 1780 was in many respects a quieter 
time for the British Legion than the following eighteen months. It was a period where the 
Legion formed itself from a loose amalgamation of independent Loyalist companies into 
a cohesive regiment. Although the regiment did not see as much action or have as much 
success as it would do in the Southern campaign, it did see combat and got used to the 
tasks that they were designed to fulfil. They acted frequently as scouts and guides and 
took part in numerous raids against the Patriots in New York and New Jersey. It was 
during this period that Banastre Tarleton emerged as the de facto commander of the unit. 
Lord Cathcart was officially the regimental commander until 1780 but he spent little time 
with the regiment after September 1778 as his duties as Quartermaster General took 
precedence.47  
The first actions of the Legion occurred within a few weeks of their formation.48  
The Legion cavalry under Tarleton were involved in several raids and skirmishes 
                                                 
46
 See Chapters 2, 4 and 6. 
47
There is no documentation for the training of the unit. Tarleton does not describe it in his history and 
there is no existing collection similar to the Simcoe papers relating to Tarleton, Cathcart or Cochrane. 
DNB (Earlier Ed.): Bass: The Green Dragoon, p 48; John Peebles Diary of a Scottish Grenadier 1776-
1782 (Mechanicsburg, 1998) p.302, cited in Biography of William Schaw Cathcart at 
http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/friends/cathcart.html#n17 accessed 15/7/2008. 
48
The best sources for documenting movements in the Northern Campaign of the British Legion are the 
Journals of Simcoe and Ewald as well as a few mentions in the journal of the Hessian Adjutant 
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alongside the Queens Rangers and Ewald‘s Jaeger Corps. The infantry was with Cathcart 
and Cochrane at Greenwich New York where they presumably were training.49 The 
reason that the infantry was not able to be committed for several months was that the 
Legion infantry mostly consisted of raw recruits whereas the cavalry was composed of 
existing companies many of whom had already seen action. Thus they were able to be 
used in combat, alongside the Queens Rangers, less than a month after Tarleton‘s 
appointment.  
The first action of the British Legion cavalry was against the Stockbridge Indians 
and Continental infantry at Valentine‘s Hill New York on 31 August 1778. The action 
was a spectacularly successful skirmish against a superior force.50 This victory shows that 
the cavalry showed a great deal of skill even this early into their careers. While they were 
serving with highly experienced soldiers in the Queens Rangers and Emmerich‘s 
Chasseurs they certainly acquitted themselves well. Ewald‘s diary mentions this action. 
He states that on the previous day the ―newly raised English [sic] Legion under Lord 
                                                                                                                                            
General, Bauermeister. Don Gara has constructed an online chronology for their movements in this 
period using largely Simcoe and Ewald. John Simcoe, Simcoe‘s Journal, passim; Johann Ewald, Joseph 
J.Tustin (ed) Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal, ( New Haven, CT, 1979), passim; Don 
Gara, Calendar of the Operations of the British Legion in West Chester New York for 1778-1779 
http://home.golden.net/~marg/bansite/odds/bl1778.html  
49
 Bauermeister gives a plan of Distribution for all forces in New York for November 1778 in which is 
shown that the British Legion have moved to Jericho, Long Island see Carl Leopold Bauermeister, B.A. 
Uhlendorf (trans.) The Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and Journals 1776-1784, of 
Adjutant General Major Bauermeister of the Hessian Forces, (New Brunswick 1957)  pp. 151, 264, 
n.37. 
50
 Bauermeister relates: ―On the 31 August the Queens Rangers, Emmerich‘s Corps and Lord 
Cathcart‘s Light Dragoons surprised the enemy outpost at De Voe‘s House, one and a half miles this 
side of Valentines Hill. It was a Corps of Indians of the Stockbridge Tribe and was commanded by 
their Chief Nimham. They fell upon the front and both flanks of this outpost so quickly that only two 
men escaped. The chief his son and the common warriors were killed on the spot. About two hundred 
Continental Troops hastened to their support, but withdrew as quickly losing 12 men and one captain. 
Our loss was five dragoons killed, sixteen of the Queens Rangers killed and wounded and nine horses 
killed.‖ See Ibid. p.208 
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Cathcart which consisted of five hundred fusiliers and two hundred light dragoons joined 
Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe today.‖51 He goes on to describe how ―the enemy party‖ 
attempted to ambush Simcoe, Emmerich and Cathcart at Phillips Manor but that splitting 
their forces they outflanked them and ambushed the ambushers.52 He relates that 
Emmerich‘s Chasseurs and the Legion cavalry had hidden in woods and were able to take 
the enemy completely by surprise: ―The cavalry of Emmerich and the Legion burst forth 
and drove back the enemy.‖ He relates that by ―6 o clock in the evening, However, most 
of the enemy were killed, shot dead and partly cut down by the cavalry. No Indians 
received quarter, including their chief Nimham. Only two captains, fifty men were taken 
captive‖53 
This account is interesting particularly in light of the subsequent reputation of the 
Legion. Ewald seemed to suggest that some of the enemy attempted to surrender but were 
not given the chance. This is an accusation that would be infamously levelled at the 
Legion at Waxhaw‘s two years later. There also appears from Ewald‘s account to be a 
difference between how the Indians were treated and how the Continental soldiers were 
treated.54 
                                                 
51
  These numbers seem to be very high. They will be checked against the original muster rolls. Ewald, 
Diary, p.144. 
52
 Ibid.pp144-145. 
53
 Ibid. p. 145. 
54
 Simcoe also gives an account of the action and unlike the other two accounts he relates the actions of 
Tarleton: 
―Lt Col. Simcoe, who was halfway up a tree on top of which was a drummer boy, saw a flanking party 
of the enemy approach. The troops had scarcely fallen into their ranks when a smart firing was heard 
from the Indians, who had lined the fences of the road and were exchanging shot with Lt. Col 
Emmerick whom they had discovered. The Queens Rangers moved rapidly to gain the heights, and Lt. 
Col Tarleton immediately advanced with the Huzzars, and the Legion cavalry: not being able to pass 
the fences in his front, he made a circuit to return further upon their right. They were driven from the 
fences and Lt Col. Tarleton with the cavalry got among them, and pursued them rapidly down 
Courtland‘s ridge: That active officer had a narrow escape; in striking at one of the fugitives he lost his 
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The Legion cavalry were again in action on the 16 September, where they once 
more were victorious, Simcoe relates how they ―fell in with a patrole of cavalry and 
dispersed it.‖55 This is particularly significant. In their first action the Legion fought 
against infantry who had already been partially dispersed and were therefore open to 
attack and already weakened. Here, only a few weeks after formation, they were taking 
on Patriot cavalry and succeeding against them. The Legion would go on to give the 
Patriot cavalry a torrid time in the years ahead. After this action Washington moved his 
troops from White Plains which he had occupied for two years and Simcoe relates how 
―the country people among other reasons, attributed this measure to the continual checks 
which his light troops had received.‖56 What this emphasises is that the Legion had, 
within a short space of time, been included with the elites of the British Army in New 
York, and that they had more than proved to be up to the task. The aforementioned units 
were Clinton‘s first line of attack and defence. The legendary Hessian corps of Ewald and 
Emmerich were vastly experienced mercenaries who would be used time and again by 
Clinton and were proven experts at Light warfare.57 The previous chapters have 
demonstrated the regard Clinton had for the Queens Rangers, so it can be shown into 
what company the Legion had very quickly become accepted. The only other major 
combat that the Legion saw in 1778 was a successful repulse of Patriot troops while they 
                                                                                                                                            
balance and fell from his horse; luckily the Indian had no bayonet and his musket had been 
discharged.‖ See John Simcoe, Simcoe‘s Journal, pp. 84-85. 
55
 Ibid. pp.86-87 
56
 Ibid. pp. 88-89. 
57
 Ewald, Diary; Treatise on Partisan Warfare, Robert Selig, David Skaggs (eds.) (New York, 1991); 
Treatise on the Duties of Light Troops (Translation, London 1803); Lt. Col. A. Emmerich, The Partisan 
in War, of the Use of a Corps of Light Troops to an Army, (London, 1789) 
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were protecting a convoy of timber between 2 and 5 November 1778.58 After that they 
withdrew to winter quarters on Jericho, Long Island.59 
Although the year 1779 was a not quiet one for the British Legion, it was to be 
less strenuous than later years. For most of the summer they fought alongside the Queens 
Rangers in actions and raids in New York state and New Jersey.60 None of them appear 
to be particularly significant, but each successful contact with the enemy was developing 
the legion into the skilled unit they would become.61  
Meanwhile the infantry under Major Cochrane were not inactive. Major Cochrane 
was in the process of teaching them an innovation that would have a major impact on 
their effectiveness, he was equipping them with horses.62 In a 1780 memorial Cochrane 
described this innovation. 
He [Major Cochrane] was the first who introduced into the army 
the species of service of the mounted light infantry, a kind of 
corps heretofore unknown, though the subsequent advantages 
have been found from much experience to answer the most fullest 
expectations. The cavalry and infantry of the Legion has ever 
moved together, and have gone with confidence any distance from 
the main army when mutually supporting one another. Zealous for 
the honour of the corps and to promote the service, the infantry 
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have cheerfully often rode eighty miles in twenty four hours 
without either bridel or saddle, and only a blanket and piece of 
rope substituted for a bridle, assisting their cavalry to surprise and 
beat the enemy. With confidence Captain Cochrane can say that 
no cavalry can or has acted in America until the co-operation of 
mounted infantry was introduced with them, and that upon every 
occasion the infantry of the Legion have borne an ample share of 
either fatigue or honour in all actions since the formation of the 
corps.63 
The reason for including such a long passage is that what Cochrane describes so 
eloquently here is very arguably a huge leap forward in military tactics. It demonstrates 
that a Loyalist regiment were at the forefront of military thinking. Cochrane suggests that 
the addition of light infantry makes cavalry complete. There had been light infantry 
before, the Queens Rangers being the obvious example but not mounted up to this point. 
Dragoons were also equipped to fight on horse or foot and they were not a new 
innovation, but they largely acted as cavalry. Consultation of Tarleton‘s work shows that 
the Patriots used mounted infantry in the 1780 campaign and that the Loyalist New York 
Volunteers also had mounted infantry in 1780.64 Certainly Tarleton got most of his horses 
whilst on campaign by buying them from local farms or taking them from those classed 
as enemies. While it is likely that the horses used by the infantry were inferior to those 
used by the cavalry any kind of horse would allow the infantry to move at far greater 
speeds than their opponents. In many ways what Cochrane writes of here is an almost 
perfect regiment. The cavalry and infantry were able to move quickly to support one 
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another. Certainly this proved to be very effective. Arguably the Legion‘s biggest defeat 
came at Cowpens when they were fighting in conventional battle order with ordinary 
infantry beside them and therefore required to move at normal pace and to be tracked by 
the enemy. It is possible that had these combined tactics been adopted in a more 
widespread fashion then the British could have had a different result in the Southern 
campaign as they could have moved their troops far faster. However, mounted troops 
were expensive and it would have been an easy proposal to turn down. 
The first major example of the Legion‘s use of mounted infantry was also their 
most significant action of 1779 It was a raid on Pound-Bridge and Bedford in 
Connecticut on the 7 July.65 Tarleton was overall commander of the expedition, which 
consisted of seventy troopers of the 17th Light Dragoons, the Legion infantry and cavalry, 
Queens Rangers Hussars and some of Emmerich‘s cavalry, totalling two hundred men.66 
Tarleton‘s report of the action was published by the Government later that year and 
helped make him a person of note in Britain.67 Before the raid, he knew he would be up 
against ―Sheldon‘s Regiment of Dragoons, about 100 Continental foot‖ and Moylan‘s 
Regiment of Dragoons.68 The expedition attacked Sheldon‘s Dragoons at Pound-Bridge 
and forced them to retreat causing twenty-six casualties and taking the standard of the 
unit─a great embarrassment to any regiment─as well as many prisoners and ―the 
regimental baggage.‖69 They then ―broke and dispersed‖ the Continental infantry. The 
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inhabitants of the town then commenced firing on the expedition which forced Tarleton 
into an action of the kind that would bring him great notoriety amongst the Patriots for 
years to come. As he relates: 
The inveteracy of the inhabitants of Pound-Bridge and near 
Bedford, in firing from the houses and out-houses, obliged me to 
burn some of their meeting and some of their dwelling houses 
with stores. I proposed to the militia terms, that if they would not 
fire shots from buildings I would not burn. They interpreted my 
mild proposal wrong imputing it to fear. They persisted in firing 
until the torch stopped their progress; after which not a shot was 
fired.70 
This action shows the kind of ruthlessness that Tarleton and the Legion were to become 
notorious for. Tarleton‘s use of the phrase ―mild proposal‖ is interesting as is arguable 
that the militia had little choice but to fire from the safety of the houses rather than 
putting themselves in the open against a well armed enemy. The action is similar to the 
raid by the Queens Rangers in September of that same year, described in the previous 
chapter, yet unlike that occasion, Tarleton destroyed civilian houses as well as 
government property. It is necessary here to evaluate his actions. While his decision was 
arguably tactically necessary, the effect that the destruction of civilian property had, went 
far beyond the actual destruction of property. It gave the Patriot press ample ammunition 
to attack the British and to turn people against them. 
 A newspaper account of the raid outlines how the incident was viewed from the 
opposing perspective. The article states that Sheldon‘s unit, consisted of 90 men and that 
Tarleton‘s force was ―about 360 or 400 in number.‖71 Tarleton does not give a number for 
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Sheldon‘s forces so the first part could be accurate but it is unlikely he would diminish his 
own numbers in a report to the commanding General. The report ascribes the Patriot 
retreat to the ―great superiority of the enemy‖ and the ―mountainous and rocky‖ nature of 
the terrain which caused several of their horses to ―Blunder‖ and ―fall into the hands of 
the enemy.‖72 It is necessary to point out that the British/Provincial force faced these 
conditions too. The report describes how with the assistance of militia they forced the 
enemy to ―move off with such great precipitation, that we could not come up with 
them‖.73 This makes the outcome of the raid sound very different to Tarleton‘s 
description, which says ―the enemy hovered just out of sight‖ until Tarleton withdrew 
after firing the houses.74 The newspaper of course mentions this which makes the 
statement about the withdrawal harder to believe as the firing was done, which would 
indicate that Tarleton‘s forces were not in a great hurry. The report relates: 
Before the enemy moved off they burnt the meeting house at 
Poundridge, the dwelling house of Major Lockwood, together 
with nearly all his furniture, the house of Benjamin Hays of 
Bedford. They as usual plundered most of the houses they came to 
as well as setting fire to several other houses which were 
fortunately extinguished.75 
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This part of the report is the most damning towards Tarleton‘s conduct, 
interestingly it does not name him, and as yet his name was not synonymous with this 
kind of action. An interesting phrase is ―as usual‖ suggesting looting and plundering were 
commonplace occurrences. Simcoe prohibited the practice, but Tarleton does not appear 
to have done the same. The two accounts give different casualty reports as well. The 
Patriot report gives eight missing killed and ten wounded on their side and one killed one 
wounded and four prisoners taken on the British.76 Tarleton‘s report states one killed and 
one wounded in total. He does not give a full account of enemy casualties rather than the 
aforementioned twenty-six he claims earlier in the report.77   
Despite the controversies and differences of opinion, it is clear that the mission was, in 
the words of Henry Clinton, a ―success.‖78 The Legion cavalry had performed admirably 
but so had the mounted infantry. The experiment of using the cavalry and infantry 
together had worked. Tarleton closes his report by stating, ―the infantry of the Legion 
mounted on horses, are extremely fatigued by a march of sixty-four miles in twenty-three 
hours.‖79 The distance itself would have been remarkable at a time where marches of a 
maximum of twenty miles a day were the norm. The oft-neglected Legion infantry were 
thus able to be an effective part of what was to become a formidable force against the 
Patriots. This action was also to be one of the last against the Continental Army dragoons 
in Brigade formation, as Washington would break up the Dragoon brigade in the winter 
of 1778.80 Although the reason given was ―forage problems‖ the fact that they had been 
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comprehensively defeated when up against British Dragoons and Hussars may have had 
some influence in the decision.81 
Section 2: 1780: A Year of Success and Controversy 
The year of 1780 was to be the year in which the British Legion and its 
commander, Banastre Tarleton achieved the peak of their success and controversy. Their 
reputation was made in a series of skirmishes, raids and pitched battles in which they 
were often spectacularly successful but where they laid themselves open to severe 
criticism for their conduct towards their enemies and the civilian populace. The terms 
―Bloody Ben‖ and ―Tarleton‘s Quarter‖ became commonplace to describe their 
commander but it was ultimately the actions of the whole regiment that originated them. 
This section will look at the Legion in 1780 and assess these two issues: how effective the 
Legion were as a fighting force; and their reputation as a brutal band of property 
destroying avengers. While the purpose of this section is not to give a blow by blow 
account of the events of 1780, that has been done before, and in greater length than this 
chapter has available, it is necessary to pick out major incidents as having significance to 
the themes of this chapter. These being the skill or otherwise of the Legion and their on 
field discipline. 
On the 26 December 1779 General Henry Clinton and an army of 8500 men left 
New York City en route for Georgia and South Carolina.82 With them was the entire 
British Legion. They were still under the nominal command of Lord Cathcart for a few 
more weeks but his duties as Quartermaster General –a hectic job during an embarkation- 
meant that the de facto commander was Banastre Tarleton. He would be given full  
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Map 4: The War in South Carolina 1780. 
 
Source: Craig L. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution, (Baltimore, 1986) p. 85. 
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command in April 1780.83 It is at this point that one of the most invaluable sources 
becomes Tarleton‘s ―Campaigns.‖84 
The summer campaign of 1780, arguably one of the most successful of the 
Revolutionary War, started badly. This was not because of any fault of Clinton‘s except, 
possibly his decision to sail in January. This decision, designed to surprise the Patriots 
and to ensure a full year of active campaigning, initially seemed like a bad one when the 
fleet was scattered by terrible storms. Tarleton described how most of the artillery and all 
of the horses were lost, he stated that ―these accidents greatly deranged and impeded the 
attack upon Charleston. The loss of stores, cavalry and military equipage would have 
been sensibly felt in any situation, proved nearly destructive to the expedition.85 All the 
British Legion‘s horses were lost. The fleet put ashore in Georgia, where the resources of 
the garrison of Savannah were put at its disposal and they were leant cannons by the 
navy.86 Thus because of this disastrous start it was the 1 April before Clinton was able to 
land his army before the city of Charleston.  
The British Legion put ashore in Savannah in late February 1780. The first task of 
the regiment was to secure some horses and then march to Charleston. Tarleton secured 
as many horses as he could from the local countryside and he paid for them out of his 
own pocket.87   However, he commented that the ―quality was ―inferior to those embarked 
at New York‖ and realised that the best way of securing horses was to take them from 
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enemy cavalry. This was one of the Legion‘s first priorities.88 The infantry under Major 
Cochrane went on first on foot and after a few skirmishes they reached Port Royal Island 
just opposite Charleston.89 An order was then sent to Tarleton, to join them. Tarleton then 
brought on the cavalry and during the march to Charleston they met with enemy cavalry 
several times, having mixed results.90 By the 1 April they had arrived at Charleston and 
linked up with the infantry. On arriving at Charleston, a report from the Commissary 
Department shows their strength as 287 cavalrymen and 200 infantry. They were also 
accompanied by ―11 blacks, 12 women and 8 children.‖91 However, this was only a 
fraction of the women and children that they had had under their care in Long Island.92 As 
chapter two has shown, Loyalist regiments were ―military communities‖ in which women 
and children mixed in with the soldiers. 
 The Legion had a clearly defined role in these early encounters. General Lincoln, 
in Charleston was effectively besieged by the British forces, but he was able to 
communicate with the main Continental Army in New York, by means of his cavalry, 
which was also used to harass the British Army and its supply lines. The job assigned to 
the Legion and to Major Patrick Fergusson, and his light infantry,93 was to neutralise the 
Continental cavalry as quickly as possible and thus ensure that Lincoln was trapped inside 
Charleston.94 The first significant action of the Charleston campaign in respect to the 
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British Legion occurred at Monck‘s Corner on the 14 April.95 The Legion, operating with 
Fergusson had orders to surprise the cavalry of Brigadier General Huger at Goose Creek. 
Tarleton was to secure as many of the enemy supplies as possible and ―destroy them‖ if 
he had to, and to be ―constantly moving.‖96 The Legion successfully accomplished this on 
the night of the 13 and 14 April. At three o‘clock in the morning the cavalry and Mounted 
infantry attacked the American camp, charging in on horseback supported by the fire of 
the infantry. Tarleton records that ―The Americans were completely surprised.‖ As well 
as inflicting heavy casualties the Legion captured ―four hundred horses belonging to 
officers and dragoons, with their arms and appointments fell into the hands of the victors; 
about one hundred officers, dragoons and hussars, together with fifty wagons, shared the 
same fate.‖97 This was a considerable haul and would enable the Legion to operate 
effectively for the next few months. 
Clinton was delighted by the ―surprise and defeat of the collected cavalry and 
militia of the rebels‖ which enabled the regular British infantry under Colonel Webster to 
secure the country side and ―threw into his hands great supplies of provision.‖98 This is an 
example of the effectiveness of the British Legion. The regiment had neutralised the 
greatest threat to the besieging army, provided supplies and secured their own future by 
capturing ample numbers of horses and forage. 
The action though was not free from controversy. A French officer serving with 
the Americans, surrendered but was ―mangled by sabres‖ after this.99 He died of his 
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wounds and as he lay dying he was ―frequently insulted by privates of the Legion.100 The 
witness to this was not a Patriot, but a serving Loyalist, Charles Stedman. This brutality 
was towards a beaten enemy was a foreshadowing of what was soon to come. After the 
action, several British Legion dragoons were found guilty of ―attempting to ravish‖ a 
group of women as well as looting their house. The men were arrested and Major 
Fergusson demanded that they be shot in situ but they were instead flogged.101 
Interestingly when two of the Queens Rangers were found guilty of similar crimes, they 
were hanged.102 Although there was no official censure to the regiment, Tarleton was 
warned by Cornwallis on 25 April to prevent his men from ―committing irregularities.103‖ 
The action at Monck‘s Corner was of great strategic importance. The 
neutralisation of a large part of the Patriot cavalry allowed the British infantry under 
Colonel Webster to push into the backcountry and to eliminate any possibility of the 
Patriots in Charleston receiving help. As a consequence of this and the bravery and skill 
of the besieging forces, Charleston capitulated on the 12 May 1780 and force of 5600 
patriot soldiers, 1000 sailors and 400 cannons were captured.104 The Legion, while not 
actually involved in the siege, had played no small role in the success. They had 
accomplished the role that Clinton had intended for them on formation. To provide a fast 
moving, skilled, Loyalist force which was able defeat the Patriots and by doing this 
provide an example for prospective Loyalists. In many ways the Legion had reached their 
apex. There would be future victories after this, but their reputation would be 
permanently tarnished in Patriot propaganda, when just one month later, an event 
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occurred that would not only hamper recruitment but arguably provide justification to acts 
of brutality against Loyalists and severely damage their cause and the wider British cause 
in terms of attracting support. 
Waxhaws 
On 29 May 1780 at Waxhaws, South Carolina, the Legion fought a victorious 
action which added to the Legion‘s growing dominance over the Continental cavalry.105 
The victory made the British the dominant force in South Carolina, as Clinton 
acknowledged: ―that the Earl [Cornwallis] by detaching his corps of cavalry and with 
them the Legion Infantry (mounted) has completed the destruction of every thing in arms 
against us in this province.‖106 Events would prove that the last statement was a premature 
one but there is no doubting that the victory at Waxhaws eliminated any immediate threat 
to the British in South Carolina and allowed them to commence the recruiting of Loyalist 
Militia on a large scale.107 Yet the battle would have serious repercussions for recruitment 
and for the safety of captured Loyalists. The events of the battle were seized upon by 
Patriots and Tarleton and the British Legion became notorious as ruthless murderers in 
Patriot propaganda. The battle has been well covered in historiography but it is necessary 
for any study of the Legion to devote a sizeable section to what was undoubtedly its most 
infamous encounter.  
 Waxhaws was the culmination of a two day chase by Tarleton and the 
British Legion of  four hundred Patriot infantry and artillery under Colonel Abraham 
Buford 108 and a small detachment of cavalry in an attempt to prevent them joining up 
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with another infantry regiment in North Carolina.109 On the 6 May Tarleton had defeated 
the last major formation of Patriot cavalry under Colonels Anthony White and William 
Washington.110 Buford had been ordered to join up with them but had mistimed his 
march. Tarleton had 170 cavalry, 100 of the legion infantry, and he was ordered by 
Cornwallis to ―consult his own judgement as to the distance of the pursuit or the mode of 
attack.‖111 This gave Tarleton considerable latitude. It also reflected that a lot of trust was 
being placed in a Loyalist regiment. Although there were forty regulars along, the vast 
majority of the force was Loyalist. In tactical terms the Legion was once again covering 
all the main fighting arms, being equipped to fight on horseback or on foot, and supported 
by cannon. In this way they were following the example of the Queens Rangers who had 
been similarly equipped since 1778. The Patriots had also adopted these tactics of single 
regiments with all three arms, which were also known as Legion units.112 The basic facts 
of Waxhaws are that, Buford dithered in his march, continued marching even when he 
knew the Legion was behind him, left his artillery limbered at the front of his column and 
made no attempt to turn and organise a defence until it was too late and fled the scene 
accompanied by only a handful of his men.113  
According to Tarleton, the Legion had covered, ―105 miles in 54 hours,‖ two 
modern sources give the distance as 154 miles making the feat even more impressive, and 
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especially for the mounted infantry many of whom were two to a horse.114  Because of 
this the Legion were exhausted and it was decided first to put out a summons to Buford to 
surrender, claiming that Buford ―was now encompassed by a corps of seven hundred 
Light Troops on horseback; half of that number are infantry with artillery the rest 
cavalry‖.115  There were in fact barely half that number and the artillery was one small 
cannon. Buford turned this proposal down with the pithy reply of ―I reject your proposals 
and shall defend myself to the last extremity.‖116 
The Legion then attacked and quickly overwhelmed the infantry, breaking any 
semblance of a formation. The fight then broke off into small scale skirmishes during one 
of which Tarleton was unhorsed. At some point in all this (the exact time is heavily 
disputed) Buford hoisted the white flag of surrender, but the Legion went on killing their 
opponents.117 This fact is not disputed even by the Legion‘s defenders but the extent of 
this breach of accepted conduct is surrounded by differing opinions, ranging from a full 
blooded massacre to a lapse of control that lasted for a few minutes until Tarleton got to 
his feet and stopped it. 
To make some sense of the mass of views on Waxhaws is not an easy task. There 
are numerous Patriot eyewitness accounts, that suggest that it was a massacre and many 
historians, including recent works such as those Russell, Buchanan and Wilson agree with 
them.118 Yet other contemporary accounts argue that it was not a deliberate massacre and 
they are supported by historians Boatner, Pancake and Morrill.119 
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The main Patriot witness is Dr Robert Brownfield, the surgeon of Buford‘s 
regiment, who left a full account of events. Brownfield claimed that Buford sent an 
Ensign forward with the white flag and he was ―instantly cut down.120‖  Brownfield‘s 
account is damning: 
The demand for quarters, seldom refused a vanquished foe, was at 
once found to be in vain; not a man was spared, and it was the 
concurrent testimony of all the survivors that for fifteen minutes 
after every man was prostrate, they went over the ground plunging 
their bayonets into any one who showed signs of life, and in some 
instances where several had fallen over the other, these monsters 
were seen to throw off on the point of the bayonet the uppermost, 
to come at those beneath.121 
Brownfield‘s account makes Waxhaws reminiscent of Culloden. He also mentions how a 
Captain Stokes was bayoneted several times until protected by a Legion sergeant. 
Miraculously Stokes survived to live to old age.122  
 Brownfield‘s version of events was written forty years later, but it does 
come across as vividly. However, it suggests that all the wounded were killed, which is 
not the case. According to the official reports, there were one hundred and thirteen killed, 
one hundred and fifty wounded- these were paroled and left in the care of local people- 
and fifty three prisoners.123 The fact that the seriously wounded were released on parole 
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shows that some semblance of order was restored. Pancake, commenting on Brownfield‘s 
account, claims that the bayoneting of the wounded is ―hardly consistent‖ with the 
paroling of the wounded and ―the fact that surgeons were sent from Charlottetown and 
Camden to assist them.‖ He contends that the whole tale was an attempt to play down the 
fact that the Legion had defeated a ―force that outnumbered them three to two.‖124 Morril 
takes a similar view stating ―if he [Tarleton] was completely insensitive to the accepted 
conventions of warfare, why for example, did Tarleton let the wounded patriots go and 
allow them to be hauled away by the Presbyterian Ladies.‖125 Both these views have some 
sense in them, but the paroling of the wounded after the battle does not mitigate what 
happened during it. It is possible to argue that Tarleton saw what had happened, realised 
the effect if news leaked out and desperately tried to make amends. In his ―Campaigns,‖ 
Tarleton would acknowledge that his men had behaved ―with a vindictive asperity not 
easily restrained‖ because the men thought that ―they had lost their commanding officer‖ 
but his official report at the time was silent on events. His report contains nothing but 
praise for his men after what was admittedly a great victory.  
 The attacks were pointed at both flanks, the front and reserve 
by 270 cavalry and infantry blended, and at the same instant all 
were equally victorious, few of the enemy escaping on horseback. 
It is above my ability to say anything in the commendation of the 
bravery and exertion of my officers and men. I leave their merit to 
your Lordship‘s consideration.126 
This is consistent with Tarleton attempting to play down the events, for either self 
preservation or an attempt to stop Patriot propaganda seizing on the story. Clinton‘s 
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above cited letter shows he was either unaware of events or chose to ignore them at the 
time as he was happy with the result of the battle.127 
 Whatever the contrasting views and controversies of the affair of 
Waxhaws it is apparent that while it was a major tactical victory for the British and 
specifically their Loyalist forces- who made up the vast majority of the combatants- it 
was strategically a disaster. Russell gives the opinion that ―this act of barbarous 
inhumanity would do much to settle the case against the British for those that remained 
neutral‖ and it is hard to argue with his second statement, although several historians take 
issue with his first.128 It may have been something that happened in the heat of the 
moment but Patriot propaganda, much of it passed by word of mouth, ensured that the 
moment would last for the remainder of the war and beyond. John Buchanan claims that 
―Tarleton and his legion stoked embers that became a fire nearly raging out of control for 
it roused a people whose heritage was border fighting in all its barbarous excesses.‖129  It 
gave the Patriots an excuse for reprisals against Loyalists under the justification of paying 
them back for ―Tarleton‘s quarter.‖ The survivors of the battle of Kings Mountain who 
were hanged to cries of this chant had every reason to damn the conduct of the British 
Legion because without Waxhaws it is unlikely that the justice meted out to them would 
have been so harsh. The chant of ―Tarleton‘s quarter‖ is also somewhat misleading. It was 
the conduct of the regiment as a whole and not just their commander that gave the patriots 
a propaganda victory. Much of the propaganda focused on the cruelty of ―Bloody Ban‖ 
but as shown, Tarleton‘s conduct, while absolutely questionable, was not the sole reason 
for events. It was the ordinary soldiers who did the killing after the flag of truce had been 
put up that ultimately did the damage. This chapter is about the British Legion as a whole 
and nowhere can this be better illustrated than here. Tarleton took the blame in mythology 
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and the soldiers only really took reflected blame. While as commander, Tarleton takes the 
ultimate responsibility for the conduct of his men, it is arguable that being briefly 
indisposed he could do little to stop events once they had commenced.  
So why did the men behave as they did? What makes soldiers lose the discipline 
that has been trained into them? Grossman‘s work on the psychology of soldiers assesses 
what he calls ―surrender executions.‖130  He argues that actually it is surprising that there 
are actually so few of them given the circumstances of close quarter‘s conflict. For it to 
happen en masse there has to be a trigger. The possible triggers at Wraxhaws were: 
Buford‘s men allegedly firing at the flag of truce the Legion sent out; Tarleton being 
knocked off his horse and the fear that he might have been killed. It could of course been 
a combination of the above triggers mixed in with a  general desire for revenge which 
boiled over without the presence of Tarleton to check it. This raises questions of the 
motivations of Loyalist soldiers. Were they out for vengeance? Were the men of the 
Legion recruited in the South avenging wrongs over Land seizures such as those 
documented by Leslie Hall?131 This is possible there were certainly native Southerners in 
the Legion. 
In their favour it can be said that Waxhaws, while not an isolated incident was by 
far the biggest event of its kind. Was the British Legion a special case? Other than 
Butler‘s Rangers it certainly has the worst reputation of all the Loyalist regiments. Did 
Tarleton foster an atmosphere of brutality and lack of restraint or was it there anyway? 
The Queens Rangers had a number of incidents that are also questionable but they largely 
avoided gaining the same reputation as the Legion. It could be that Simcoe was a stricter 
commander than Tarleton; he was certainly a more serious man. The Legion does not 
appear to have a bad record in acts of indiscipline off the battlefield. They appeared to be 
remarkably well behaved while in rear quarters and they did not have reputation for 
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brawling with each other.132 Possibly Tarleton‘s example of the devil-may-care rake did 
not encourage the same atmosphere of strict adherence to the Articles of War as Simcoe‘s 
command did.  
Most of the other incidents when the Legion were accused of brutality, were 
either on a small sale or were acts that were open to interpretation. A good example, is 
early twentieth century historian Edward McCrady‘s accusation that the Legion had 
―sabred the fugitives‖ after Camden. 133 From a Patriot viewpoint this may seem like an 
atrocity, the men were running and thus unable to fight, but Tarleton was actually ordered 
by Cornwallis to do this. While perhaps questionable if viewed by the lights of 
―gentleman‘s war‖, it was a militarily sound thing to do. A running man has not yet 
surrendered and no commander can afford to assume that the man will not stop running 
and turn around and fight. The man is at a disadvantage and is therefore vulnerable, but 
military common sense would dictate that he may not be at this disadvantage for long. It 
was common practice to run down fugitives, examples being Prince Rupert, at Edgehill in 
1642. The difference at Waxhaw‘s, was that the men HAD surrendered. They were no 
longer a threat and therefore under common military practice, were allowed to be spared 
their lives.  
So why did the High Command ignore the incident and why were there no court 
martials? The Articles of War are unclear on treatment of Prisoners of War. The closest 
Article is one which deals with crimes contrary to the Laws of the Land, but this would 
seem to relate to treatment of civilians.134  This does not mean that it was accepted 
behaviour to kill surrendered men, it was regarded as wrong and dishonourable, but the 
Articles of War, the disciplinary manual for the Army, is quiet on it. The other reason for 
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a lack of punishments, is that Clinton and Cornwallis were both exuberant about the result 
of the battle, which as they saw it, quelled the last of the Continental Army in South 
Carolina.135 
  
1780: Summer and Autumn. 
This section will look at the British Legion after Waxhaws. It will discuss their 
role in the battle of Camden-probably their biggest triumph- and the skirmishes and 
battles in the rest of the year. The events of summer of 1780 can be traced in the 
Cornwallis papers which give excellent details of all that was happening both militarily 
and administratively.136 The attempts to recruit large numbers of Loyalists both to the 
militia and the Provincial regiments were of great concern to the General and all 
regiments were encouraged to recruit as much as possible. The Legion conformed in this. 
In August 1780 two new infantry companies were raised and which added 80 men to the 
strength, as well as constant augmenting of the existing companies.137 Supplies for the 
Legion were at a premium but at this time they were able to buy horses and livestock 
from confiscated patriot estates. 138 Other supplies were attained by raiding and capturing 
Patriot supply trains and taking horses from Patriot troops.139 
The Legion was in action frequently throughout the summer and detachments 
were sent on raids deep into the Carolina backcountry. One of these resulted in one of the 
Legion‘s few defeats in 1780. In July 1780 Captain Christian Huck led a raid on Fishing 
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Creek South Carolina in an attempt to put down resistance on the farms.140 He had with 
him, thirty Legion Dragoons, twenty mounted infantry of the New York Volunteers and 
sixty newly recruited Loyalist militia.141 Huck aroused the anger of the local inhabitants 
by burning civilian property, including an empty church and was ambushed by a small 
force of Patriot militia.142 Cornwallis reported to Clinton, that Huck ―encouraged by 
meeting no opposition, encamped in an unguarded manner, was totally surprised and 
routed. The captain was killed and only twelve of the Legion and as many of the militia 
escaped.‖143 Tarleton does not hold back on criticising his unfortunate subordinate, 
claiming that ―he neglected his duty.‖144 The event sparked some correspondence but did 
not really put out the warning sign that the backcountry was not safe for unsupported 
detachments in the way it should have done. At this point the British were still confident 
of having subdued the Continental forces in the South Carolina and the Patriot militia and 
guerrillas were not held to be a major threat. 
Camden and Fishing Creek 
Throughout the summer months the cavalry of the Legion served as scouts for the 
main army and also kept enemy cavalry occupied. In August 1780, the Patriots again took 
the offensive against the British in the Carolinas. Thomas Sumter formed a large irregular 
force that was intended to wage a guerrilla war against the British in North and upper 
South Carolina. General Horatio Gates with 4000 men marched from the Northern 
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Theatre to join him.145 Cornwallis, now commanding on his own in the Carolinas after 
Clinton‘s return to New York, marched to meet him with 2000 men, including the 
infantry and cavalry of the British Legion.146 On the 15 August the Legion cavalry, by 
scouting and intentionally capturing three Patriot soldiers, fulfilled one its key functions 
and was able to provide Cornwallis with accurate intelligence of the enemy‘s numbers, 
movements and whereabouts enabling him to plan the upcoming battle.147 
 On the 16 August the British comprehensively defeated the larger American 
force and forced Gates into a solo flight of 200 miles.148 The Legion took a key role in the 
battle. The infantry served in Rawdon‘s division on the left flank of the army and 
alongside the Volunteers of Ireland, the Royal North Carolina regiment and North 
Carolina Volunteers and completely defeated their immediate opponents.149 John 
Buchanan describes the Legion infantry as ―high quality Tory regulars‖ and they certainly 
proved it at Camden.150 They were facing the Maryland Regulars a seasoned Continental 
regiment.151 They took casualties; had to reform and faced a stiff assault which they held 
off until the right flank under Colonel Webster defeated their militia opponents and 
Cornwallis threw in his reserves in forced the Patriots‘ full retreat.152 It was at this point 
that the Legion cavalry joined the battle by attacking the rear quarters from both flanks. 
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They were split into two sections, Major George Hanger commanding one and Tarleton 
the other.153 The cavalry attack was spectacularly successful, and ―rout and slaughter 
ensued in every quarter.‖ As Tarleton put it, ―in a pursuit continued for twenty two miles, 
many prisoners of all ranks, twenty ammunition wagons, one hundred and fifty carriages, 
containing the stores, ammunition and baggage, of the whole army.‖154 The capture of the 
baggage was one of the most important tasks the Legion performed that day. George 
Hanger, the Legion cavalry‘s second in command at Camden described the haul as ―an 
immense quantity of arms and ammunition for the supply of the whole province of 
Carolina‖.155 Again the Legion had supplied Cornwallis‘s army, which was now away 
from the port at Charleston with the means to continue the campaign inland for several 
months. Examining the casualty figures, it would seem that although the cavalry won 
most of the plaudits, the Legion infantry had the harder part of the battle. 156 Table 
fourteen shows that there were far less infantry than cavalry.157 At this point they had no 
overall commander as Cochrane had left, and they were fighting by company. The oft-
neglected Legion infantry held under extreme pressure at Camden and proved to be a 
skilled and efficient unit. 
The entire British Legion followed this victory two days later with a 
comprehensive defeat of Sumter at Fishing Creek or Catawba Fords. Some 350 of them 
surprised a force 700 men, including 100 Continentals, killed 150 and captured 310 and 
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took forty-two wagons of stores and ammunition.158 In return they lost nine men killed 
and six men wounded.159 This despite the regiment being in Tarleton‘s words so 
―overcome by fatigue…the greater part of the corps could not be moved forward in 
compact and serviceable state.‖160 The attack was therefore carried out by just 100 of the 
cavalry and sixty infantry. The cavalry and infantry ―fought together as one body‖ and 
used the wagons as cover so that they completely surprised Sumter who he fled on an 
unsaddled horse, in a state of partial undress.161 It was a warm afternoon and many of the 
patriots were asleep. James Collins, a Patriot who fought at the battle, wrote: ―Before 
Sumter could wake up his men and form, the enemy were among them cutting down 
everything in their way. It was a perfect rout and an indiscrimate slaughter.162 
There does not appear to be the same controversy in historiography about this 
action than there is about Waxhaws. The Legion surprised a sleeping enemy but they did 
not raise the white flag. Indeed as it was afternoon, the Legion would not have expected 
their enemy to be caught off guard so easily. It was actually a massive gamble by 
Tarleton that paid off. Cornwallis wrote in his report to Clinton that:‖ The action was too 
brilliant to need any comment of mine, and will I have no doubt highly recommend Lt. 
Col. Tarleton to his majesty‘s favour.‖ 163 
The Battle of Camden and the action at Fishing Creek were in many senses the 
high water mark of the British Legion. There would be victories after this but its days as a 
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unified regiment were numbered and the next major battle it would fight at would end in 
the regiment being badly defeated. These two actions had shown the Legion to be 
superbly efficient regiment. They had fulfilled all the trust placed in them by Cornwallis 
and Clinton and defeated enemies outnumbering them at times by as much as five to one. 
There would still be question marks placed over the men‘s on field behaviour, but at this 
point their reputation had not really affected them. The August recruitments had shown 
that they could still attract recruits and their successes had made them one of the most 
feted units in the British Army. It had also, however, made the Regiment one of the most 
attractive targets for the Patriots, every Patriot commander wanted to humiliate Tarleton, 
for strategic as well as propaganda and personal reasons. The next section will examine 
the reversal in fortunes of the Legion. 
Section 3: 1781: Defeat 
 In the months after Camden the Legion fought several actions and skirmishes. 
These are well documented in the Cornwallis Papers and in the work of John 
Buchanan.164 One of the differences - it is debatable whether it was an advantage or 
disadvantage- of fighting in the South, is that regiments were able to fight throughout the 
winter. The Legion spent the autumn and early winter of 1780 acting as intelligence 
gatherers for the main army and trying to neutralise Patriot resistance in North and South 
Carolina. They got into a long drawn out game of chasing the ―Swamp Fox,‖ Frances 
Marion. There were some victories but not on the scale of the summer months. This also 
had the effect that supplies and forage became hard to come by. The Legion, were now 
far from Charleston and with no spectacular raids on the enemy they were forced to buy 
horses and supplies, and even that was not that easy, as prices were high.165 
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 Finding supplies over the winter –even a mild one- was not a problem the British 
Legion had ever had to face before, having been in winter quarters in 1778 and 1779. The 
shortage of supplies meant that the regiment had to keep moving and not stay in the one 
place for long. This, however, also gave the Patriots problems in tracking them down. The 
war in the backcountry had changed greatly from the summer. Nowhere other than 
Charleston was really safe for the British, as the Patriots had mobilised militia and 
guerrilla units who were adept at surprising unwary British units. Fergusson‘s defeat at 
King‘s Mountain, North Carolina, had created a new Patriot hero and recruiting beacon, 
Daniel Morgan, and in December regular Patriot cavalry arrived from the Northern Army, 
under Colonel ―Light Horse Harry‖ Lee and Colonel Muhlenburg. Tarleton wrote that he 
was not phased by this as ―the more the difficulty the more the glory.‖166 However, the 
forces of Morgan and Lee began to be a great threat to the British campaign in the 
Carolinas. Morgan was rampaging through North Carolina. In January 1781, Cornwallis, 
seeing the problem gave Tarleton an independent command with orders to neutralise 
Morgan.167 Cornwallis initially asked the Legion to track Morgan‘s movements, but when 
it became clear that he would not be able to reach him with the main army in time, he 
ordered Tarleton to ―push him to the utmost.‖168 On 9 January Cornwallis moved, 
intending to join up with Tarleton and trap Morgan, but on the 11th he was unable to cross 
the Broad River due to floods.169 
 The British Legion now faced what could have been their greatest 
achievement. Wiping out Morgan and the Patriot cavalry with him, would have dealt a 
severe blow to the Patriot cause in the South. It could have forced Washington to move 
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south with the main army and freed Clinton to aid Cornwallis with the main British 
Army. They now had the chance to land one of the most decisive blows of the war. 
However, the Legion were not with the main British Army but with a force of about 
1100.170.  
The battle that now faced the Legion would be a very different affair tactically 
from most of their previous battles. With the exception of Camden, where they had fought 
alongside Cornwallis‘ main army, most of the Legion‘s successes had been skirmishes 
and large scale raids and ambushes. Here they would be asked to fight in line against 
seasoned American troops under a commander as seemingly invincible to his men as 
Tarleton was to his. 
―The Unfortunate Affair of 17 January‖171 
Cowpens was the British Legion‘s first proper defeat as a full regiment. It is 
possible to argue that the regiment was never the same after it, especially the infantry 
which was almost wiped out. The battle has been well covered in historiography.172 
Therefore this section will not give a blow by blow account of the battle but will instead 
discuss its consequences for the British Legion. Tarleton‘s account of the battle does not 
shrink from addressing the defeat but mitigates his share of the blame in it as much as he 
can, instead laying much of the blame on Cornwallis for vague orders and being tardy in  
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Map 5: The Battle of Cowpens 17 January 1781. 
 
Source: Craig L. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution, (Baltimore, 1986) p. 91 
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coming to his aid.173 To be fair to Tarleton he does praise the ―bravery and good conduct 
of the Americans.‖174 Cornwallis would absolve Tarleton from blame for the disaster in a 
letter written a few days later: 
You have forfeited no part of my esteem as an officer by the 
unfortunate event of the 17th. The means you used to bring the 
enemy to action were able and masterly. Your disposition was 
unexceptionable; the total misbehaviour of the troops alone could 
alone have deprived you of the glory that was justly your due.175 
This appears a harsh comment on the British Legion, many of whom were no longer 
around to defend themselves. Interestingly, Tarleton has no criticism of the conduct of the 
Legion in his journal.176  
The cavalry fought well and pushed the enemy back at one point before being 
beaten by Colonel Washington‘s cavalry and then being forced to retreat after the infantry 
had broken. They managed to retreat with Tarleton, and 200 of them escaped.177 It was 
the infantry that took the worst of the battle and the casualties. The seasoned Legion 
infantry was largely wiped out. They fought very hard until the 71st and the 7th broke and 
they too were forced to break. Most of those not killed were captured and very few 
escaped. Morgan‘s sharpshooters made a special tactic of shooting officers and sergeants, 
so the command of the Legion infantry and their seasoned NCOs was largely lost before 
the mass of men broke. 
Accurate casualty figures for the battle of Cowpens are extremely hard to come 
by as there are massively contrasting numbers given. Morgan claimed twelve killed and 
sixty wounded on the patriot side, but according to Babbits he did not count the militia 
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casualties.178 British casualties were around one hundred killed (this is Babits‘ figure, the 
other figures vary enormously) and anywhere between five hundred and eight hundred 
captured.179 The British Legion‘s casualties are equally hard to put a firm figure on. 180 
The muster rolls do not record officers killed or wounded but several were. They 
also do not record all soldiers killed as there were certainly more killed than was recorded 
here. This would account for the discrepancies in figures between the December and 
February rolls even counting the recorded losses. The last complete muster for the 
infantry was taken in October 1780, where 191 privates are recorded, plus thirty NCOs 
making 221. If there were 162 infantry casualties this leaves fifty-nine remaining, there 
may have been some decrease in numbers before Cowpens. The April minutes of muster 
show that there were ninety-one rank and file and NCOs men in the four infantry 
companies. This would suggest some recruitment, which there was, as there was some 
attempt to reform the companies. From December 1780 to February 1781 the cavalry had 
gone from 319 NCOs and rank and file to 267.181 This would suggest that the cavalry still 
retained its form and structure and were still a viable fighting force. However, the 
following table compiled from Cornwallis‘ figures of men fit for duty would suggest that 
a much smaller number of Legion soldiers were operational after Cowpens. 
 
Table 17: British Legion Rank and File Fit for Duty with Minutes of Muster January- 
October 1781. 
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Date Fit for Duty182 Minutes of Muster183 
January  451 494 
February 174 350 
March 174  
April 174 337 
May 173  
June 173  
July 173  
August 183 324 
September 168  
October 168  
November   
December  205 
Source: Compiled from State of the Troops that marched with the Army under the Command of Lt 
Gen. Earl Cornwallis: Rank and File Present Fit for Duty in Earl of Cornwallis,  An Answer to that Part 
of the Narrative of Lt. Gen Henry Clinton that Relates to the Conduct of the Earl of Cornwallis During 
the Campaign on North America in the Year 1781 ( London 1783) pp.53, 77,237; Minutes of Muster 
Rolls in C Series Muster Rolls Vols. 1884. 
These were the figures that Cornwallis submitted to Clinton throughout the campaign. 
The repetitiveness is intriguing because throughout this period the Legion cavalry was 
continually in action so naturally there would be a decrease or increase in figures. 
Cornwallis had reasons for playing down his figures as he was agitating for 
reinforcements.  
Guilford Courthouse and Beyond. 
Cowpens was a disaster not just for the British Legion but for the whole British 
Army. Clinton stated in March that it made him ―dread the consequences‖ of it.184 It 
severely affected Cornwallis‘ offensive operations and was undoubtedly one of the 
reasons for his abandoning the Carolinas in May, as he stated in a letter to Germain 
written after the battle of Guilford Courthouse, when he said ―the unfortunate affair of the 
17th January was a very unexpected and severe blow, for besides reputation our loss did 
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not fall below 600 men‖.185 For the Legion the consequences were also ominous. They 
had lost not only a considerable number of men, but also their invincible reputation.  
The cavalry were back in action on 1 February and would not slacken their pace 
until Guilford Courthouse on 15 March.186 Tarleton was anxious to forget Cowpens and 
to keep the cavalry as an active arm and Cornwallis could not afford to lose the cavalry 
by too severe a reprimand of their commander. For the British Legion infantry the first 
priority after Cowpens was to reform. In the two months prior to Guilford Courthouse the 
regiment managed to reform enough infantry to take part in the battle, but the men were 
very different to their experienced predecessors lost at Cowpens, and they played little 
part in the battle.  
The Legion infantry did not take further part in offensive operations and as a 
result the survivors missed being captured at Yorktown. A new company under Captain 
Donald McPherson was formed in August 1781 but they attracted few recruits and 
according to the muster rolls seem to consist mostly of paroled prisoners from 
Cowpens.187 The Legion infantry had performed a valuable service for over two years of 
hard campaigning but their usefulness to the British Army really ended at Cowpens. They 
do not receive a lot of attention in historiography but they took a key role in all of the 
British Legion‘s victories of 1779 and 1780 and their use of horse for transport was 
undoubtedly innovative. Like the Queens Rangers, they were a successful Loyalist Light 
infantry unit who succeeded in taking on the patriots at their own tactics and for a time at 
least, being successful at it. Ironically their defeat came when they fought a traditional 
style battle and as Tarleton acknowledged, the loose formation that had served them so 
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well up to that point, let them down, when faced by a closely formed and determined 
enemy.188 
The cavalry saw several actions against Patriot militia and went some way to 
retrieving their reputation. On the 15 March they served as the main cavalry at Guilford 
Courthouse, but their role was a very different one from Camden. They were to be held in 
reserve and used only if a British regiment was breaking or the enemy was. ―Earl 
Cornwallis did not think it advisable for the cavalry to charge the enemy‖ wrote 
Tarleton.189 This was not because of any lack of faith in them but from a necessity to 
preserve the only cavalry they had.190 However, they did see action and were able to 
defeat to drive back a flanking force of Patriots and steady the British Line. 191 Guilford 
Courthouse was a marginal British victory and proved that the Patriots could not yet 
easily defeat British regulars even when they were severely outnumbered. However, the 
British also took heavy casualties which they could not afford. The Legion lost three 
killed and fourteen wounded, including Tarleton who lost three fingers of his right hand 
from a sabre cut.192  
The Legion cavalry had proved that they were still a viable offensive force and 
still useful to the British Army. They had shown that they could recover quickly from a 
massive defeat and still be an essential part of Cornwallis‘ force. It is a credit both to 
them and their commander that the defeat at Cowpens did not end their effectiveness as a 
unit, indeed examining how quickly they were back in action, it seems almost like just a 
small setback. However, in the long term their reputation had been damaged and their 
reduction in numbers meant that the British Legion were now just a cavalry unit, indeed 
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one of the few such units the British Army now had and as such very valuable resource. 
Over the next campaign they would be used sparingly, and they would not be allowed 
quite the same freedom to range far and wide that they had been permitted in the 
Carolinas. However, they also would never face such a large defeat again other than a 
corporate one at Yorktown. 
Virginia 
This section will briefly examine the role of the British Legion in Cornwallis‘ 
Virginia Campaign. The reason for not focussing on this period in any great detail is that 
the Legion were essentially part of Cornwallis‘ army, functioning largely as scouts and 
intelligence gatherers, although there were some independent actions. Throughout the 
campaign they functioned effectively and did not let the army down. 
The Legion cavalry arrived in Virginia on 3 May 1781. The Cornwallis papers 
reveal that throughout this period of open movement in Virginia, supplies and forage 
were a constant problem.193 The populace of Virginia were in general not friendly to the 
British and Loyalists and were heartened by the recent Patriot ascendancy in the 
Carolinas. Tarleton again had to buy horses from his own funds to replace those lost in 
the spring.194 This demonstrates that the technique of simply taking them from beaten 
enemies was no longer to be relied on, although they were still able to capture supplies.195 
The Legion would still be involved in raids. On June 4, the Legion with the 
Queens Rangers, raided Charlottesville Virginia. The raid was largely successful and a 
great deal of supplies were captured or destroyed, but the fact that they did not utterly 
defeat the Patriot mercenary Baron Von Steuben, led, in later years to a duel in print 
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between Simcoe and Tarleton which terminated any friendship that they had enjoyed.196  
It was on this raid, when the Legion captured a number of Patriot officers, that they 
missed capturing Thomas Jefferson by a few minutes.197  
For most of June and July the Legion was involved in raids in Virginia. They had 
returned to the tactics that had served them so well in 1780, keeping the enemy confused 
as to where they would strike next and bewildering them. However, the larger events of 
the war would put a stop to these tactics. They were undoubtedly effective but 
independent raiding meant that Cornwallis was denied the Legion‘s services as scouts so 
on 20 July, Cornwallis decided to order Tarleton to join him and cease the raiding and 
effectively kept the Legion close to the main army until Yorktown.198 Thus the Legion‘s 
active days were more or less over. They were actually captured at Gloucester, not at 
Yorktown.199 The members of the Legion not at Yorktown remained at New York where 
in 1783 they were placed on the British establishment. They were evacuated in 1783 and 
many settled in Canada. Tarleton returned to Britain to a career of scandal and politics. 
In military terms they had been a very successful regiment. The chapter on the 
Queens Rangers has included some comparisons with the work of historians of later wars. 
In a similar way the Legion demonstrated a lot of these characteristics. They fought for 
each other and for their commander. Like the Rangers and like Ambrose‘s paratroops, 
they were elite troops with a long continuous run of success. For all Tarleton‘s faults he 
inspired a similar devotion amongst his men to Simcoe. Unlike Simcoe he would largely 
forget them after he returned home although he does praise them highly in his work. 
The Legion‘s Reputation and conclusion 
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The chapter has given several examples of the breaches of on field discipline that 
the patriots were able to seize upon and use as an anti British recruiting tool. The question 
to be asked, is did they do the British cause a disservice? Even in their first operations, 
several issues that would arise again can be found. The first is the Legion cavalry‘s 
undoubted competence. Until the Battle of Cowpens in January 1781 they would have a 
largely uninterrupted run of successes in combat against both cavalry and infantry. The 
second issue is the question of their conduct towards defeated enemies. Did the Legion 
cross the line between accepted conduct and brutality? The reputation they gained 
amongst Patriot and American civilian folklore is an unenviable one and even in their first 
combats there are question marks placed over them.  
The situation in the South was very delicate. By 1780, the British cause in 
America depended jointly on the recruitment of Loyalists and by suppressing or 
discouraging fresh Patriot recruitment, particularly to the state militias. Any action that 
discouraged Loyalists from joining and encouraged people from taking up the Patriot 
cause could only be damaging the wider British cause. Undoubtedly the British Legion 
was guilty of this on more than one occasion. For all the claims that any crimes of 
inhumanity were exaggerated, which they certainly were, the fact is that they happened 
and gave the Patriot propagandists something to base their stories on. What the claims 
also did was to encourage Patriots to join the cause, not just in the main Patriot army, but 
in guerrilla groups in North and South Carolina, behind enemy lines. It was this 
development that arguably kept the Patriot cause active in the Carolinas after the main 
Continental forces had been defeated-something that the Legion had had no little part in- 
and gave the regular continentals time to reorganise because the British regulars like the 
Legion were tied up chasing the likes of Frances Marion and Thomas Sumter. Also the 
Legion was not entirely innocent of damaging Civilian property, something which 
certainly pushed many a neutral towards the Patriots.  
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The other question is, was the Legion an effective Loyalist recruiting tool? It is 
arguable that they did not lack for recruits at the height of their notoriety. It was only after 
they had been beaten that they really struggled for recruits. In some ways the humiliation 
of defeat was harder on recruiting than brutality. What the brutality claims did do, 
however, was to discourage neutrals from going with the British, especially those whose 
property had been damaged. 
The Patriots were not free from blame of similar charges to those laid at the 
Legion‘s door. On several occasions Loyalists were killed after they had surrendered and 
some were even hanged after capture.200 Yet, these actions were often carried out as acts 
of revenge for the actions of the British Legion. The cry of ―Tarleton‘s Quarter‖ or 
―remember Buford‖ was frequently used as a justification for reprisals. John Buchanan 
states that Waxhaws acted as a recruiting beacon for Patriots, whereas Patriot reprisals 
such as Pyle‘s massacre in February 1781, discouraged Loyalist from joining the British 
for fear of reprisals.201 Buchanan‘s argument is a valid one, but there is also the fact that 
by early 1781, the Patriot cause was very much in the ascendant and anyone choosing to 
join the British cause at this late date would be joining a cause that looked at the very 
least to be faltering. The French at last seemed to be offering concrete support and the 
two notable victories of Daniel Morgan, at Kings Mountain and Cowpens and even the 
pyrrhic British victory at Guilford Courthouse, all added to the feeling that the British 
were fighting a losing war. Cornwallis‘s abandonment of Carolina would have certainly 
contributed to this as well. 
The wider situation in the South also contributed to towards the brutality of the 
conflict between the Loyalists and Patriots that the men of the Legion were caught up in. 
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Struggles over land─ such as those detailed by Leslie Hall, in Georgia, and Walter Edgar 
in South Carolina─ inflamed local jealousies over land seizures and may have caused the 
southerners in the regiment to act vengefully towards Patriot authorities who had been 
confiscating the land of those who refused Loyalty oaths.202 Many of the Legion‘s 
southern recruits would have felt this keenly and it may have been in their minds when 
they had the opportunities to vent their anger on the Patriots, particularly in occasions like 
Waxhaws when formal authority was temporarily removed. 
So where do the Legion stand in terms of their role in the war? They were 
undoubtedly a highly skilled and successful regiment. Their victories brought them and 
other regiments recruits in the summer of 1780. They were even able to add recruits as 
late as August 1781. They played a notable part in some of the biggest British victories of 
the Southern campaign and some of their achievements against far greater odds would 
give them the right to be ranked against some of the best regiments to have served in the 
British Army and the best soldiers to have served in America. Their cavalry in particular, 
at times earned the right to mentioned in the same sentence as Cromwell‘s Ironsides or 
Stuart‘s Confederate cavalry in terms of lightning cavalry raids, and serving as a mobile 
aggressive arm in a conventional battle. Yet their defeats were arguably as damaging as 
their actions after some of their victories. This could seem a harsh judgement as they only 
really suffered one major defeat, but it was a cataclysmic one both for them and the wider 
British cause. Not only were they defeated but they were defeated by an army consisting 
of a large proportion of irregulars, the kind of men who had been discounted as a threat as 
late as autumn 1780. The British Legion, by no means take all the blame for Cowpens but 
as the commander‘s regiment the men were at the forefront of the action. Their role as 
Loyalist avengers is also a damaging one. Despite being commanded by a British regular, 
the vast majority of the Legion‘s officers and men were Loyalists and therefore they were 
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civil warriors fighting against their compatriots. Although they did not indulge in the 
killing of civilians such as that wrongly depicted by a  unit resembling the British Legion 
in the film the Patriot, they did loot and damage civilian property. None of this helped the 
recruitment of Loyalists as it aroused resentment and hostility amongst the civilian 
populace. The actions of the men of the Legion also helped inflame the already brutal war 
in the south. Ultimately the story of the British Legion is rather like that of the British 
cause as a whole; in most of its actions they were successful, sometimes outstandingly so, 
but in the end they failed. While they were not to blame for the surrender at Yorktown, 
they have to take a small share of the blame for the failure of Loyalists to rise in great 
numbers in the south, which was something that played a major role in the eventual 
British defeat. 
 302 
Chapter 6: Butler‘s Rangers. 
 
 If Jabez Stone had been sick with terror be- 
fore, he was blind with terror now. For there 
was Walter Butler, the loyalist, who spread fire 
and horror through the Mohawk Valley in the 
times of the Revolution‖.1 
This quotation from the classic 1936 short story ―The Devil and Daniel Webster,‖ 
illustrates just how Captain Walter Butler, second in command of Butler‘s Rangers until 
his death in 1781, is regarded in American popular mythology; a man bad enough, to be 
on the Devil‘s ―jury of the damned.‖  W. Max Reid, writing in 1901, further illustrates the 
popular view of Walter Butler and his father, Lt. Col. John Butler, commander of Butler‘s 
Rangers: 
The Butlers appear to have been not only arrogant and 
supercilious in a high degree, but barbarous, treacherous, 
revengeful, ferocious, merciless, brutal, diabolically wicked and 
cruel; with the spirit of fiends they committed cruelties worthy of 
the dungeons of the Inquisition. No wonder their lives are not 
attractive to historians.2 
Yet, to showcase the cross border differences, in 2006, the Canadian government 
unveiled a bust of John Butler on the Canadian National War memorial, in Ottawa. 
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However, despite all this notoriety, the regiment that these men founded has only 
attracted a relatively small amount of historical notice. 
This chapter is about Butler‘s Rangers from their formation in 1777 to the end of 
their war in 1784. The reasons for examining this particular unit are principally to provide 
a case study of a traditional Ranger unit, one which was officered and manned largely by 
American Loyalists.3 Butler‘s Rangers provide a sharp contrast to the second incarnation 
of the Queens Rangers and the British Legion, the other case studies in this thesis. The 
reason for providing this caveat for the Queens Rangers is that, Butler‘s Rangers were in 
many ways the regiment that the Queens Rangers was intended to become. They were a 
regiment who operated on the Canadian frontier and often worked alongside the Native 
Americans. They were equipped as traditional rangers, with camouflaged uniforms and 
their own choice of weapons and were not intended to take part in conventional warfare, 
but in raiding and scouting duties. Their overall objectives were to harass the Patriot 
frontier posts and to keep their army spread thinly. Both the Queens Rangers and the 
British Legion, although largely Loyalist in structure and personnel, were commanded by 
regular British officers, whereas Butler‘s Rangers were commanded by an American 
frontiersman and Indian Agent, a veteran of the frontier wars since the 1740s. John Butler 
provides a fascinating contrast to Simcoe and Tarleton, being a much older, vastly 
experienced American, fluent in the traditional methods of American warfare. Butler also 
provides an interesting comparison to his contemporary Robert Rogers. Butler was a less 
well known figure, and is therefore less extensively researched, but unlike Rogers he was 
not troubled by the same demons and was able to maintain an active presence for the 
entire war. 
Butler‘s Rangers are a neglected regiment historiographically, yet they are worthy 
of examination, because despite this comparative historical neglect, they were an 
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important regiment. They waged a relatively successful war for five years on the frontiers 
and participated in several successful raids, as well as keeping Patriot forces tied up on 
the frontier, when they could have been more useful further South. There is also 
considerable controversy surrounding the regiment, concerning their role in two alleged 
―massacres‖ of soldiers and civilians. The chapter will assess the regiment‘s role in these 
actions and will evaluate to what extent the bloodthirsty reputation- as shown in the first 
paragraph of this chapter- is justified. The intention is to not to take a revisionist stance of 
clearing the regiment for all the crimes held against their name, but to take an objective 
view and to try and understand, if they were guilty of acts of brutality, what motivated 
them to commit them.  
Butler‘s Rangers co-operated effectively with the Native Americans-particularly 
Chief Joseph Brant- on a number of raiding parties. It is indeed arguable that Brant 
pioneered the concept of the use of Rangers alongside the Native Americans.4 The 
chapter will assess the nature of this co-operation with the Native Americans. This will 
enable the thesis to cover an oft neglected area of the Loyalist war effort, that of their 
alliance with their fellow Loyalists, those Native American nations who fought for the 
British.  
Butler‘s Rangers, as a Northern frontier based regiment, were not affected by the 
disaster at Yorktown and went on campaigning until the summer of 1782, indeed they 
won two notable victories that year, one against Colonel William Crawford (the Sandusky 
Expedition) and the other at the Battle of Blue Licks, against the legendary frontiersman, 
Daniel Boone.5 As the war effectively ended at Yorktown for both the Queens Rangers 
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and the British Legion, this gives the thesis a chance to explore the continuing war after 
1781 and also to look at geographical areas not previously covered in the thesis, indeed 
often neglected in the study of the Loyalists, such as Ohio and Kentucky. 
The chapter will also analyse the administration of the regiment. While there are 
no extant Muster Rolls for the regiments there is considerable information available on 
the regiment‘s financial running costs.6  This enables analysis of data on the day to day 
running of the regiment and its cost to their British paymasters in order to provide a 
picture of the running of a regiment of frontiersmen.7 The aims of studying Butler‘s 
Rangers are to provide a detailed analysis of an American Ranger corps and to highlight a 
relatively neglected part of the Revolutionary War, namely the war on the frontier. 
Historiography 
As mentioned above, Butler‘s Rangers have attracted a great deal of popular 
criticism but there are very few works specifically on their role in the American 
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Revolution. The first work on them was by Ernest Cruikshank‘s in 1893.8 This work, 
although dated, is invaluable for tracing some of the legends that have grown up around 
the Butler‘s Rangers. It will be used, cautiously, throughout the chapter. The reason for 
approaching Cruikshank‘s work with caution is the lack of references.9 In his appendices 
he gives a roll of Butler‘s Rangers compiled from two sources.10 Lt. Col. William A. 
Smy‘s 2004 roll, is much more reliable as it is compiled from a wide variety of sources, 
including the above mentioned pay lists of 1778. It is an invaluable biographical source 
for Butler‘s Rangers and represents years of patient detective work.11 Howard Swiggett‘s 
work, published in 1933, deals with the reputation of Walter Butler.12  
The general works on the Revolutionary War do not usually mention Butler‘s 
Rangers, except their role in the ―Wyoming Massacre‖, one of the most controversial 
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actions of the Revolutionary War.13 Gary Nash includes an account of John Butler in his 
recent work, and attempts to set the record straight on Butler‘s reputation.14 There are a 
few recent works that devote some attention to Butler and his regiment, particularly that 
by Glenn Williams.15 Williams is not sympathetic to Butler‘s Rangers but he does credit 
them skill and ingenuity. Recently there have been a  number of works on the role of 
Native Americans in the Revolutionary War and it is necessary to examine these as to 
ascertain the nature of the co-operation between Butler‘s Rangers and the Native 
Americans and how influential Native Americans were on the tactics of the regiment.16 
Works by Barbara Alice Mann and Colin G. Calloway are particularly useful for this. 
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There is little secondary material on the administration of Butler‘s Rangers, despite the 
wealth of information in the sources.17  
Part 1: Formation and Administration. 1777-1782 
Butler‘s Rangers were formed on 15 September 1777 under the orders of Major 
General, Sir Guy Carleton, Governor of Quebec.18 They were to be commanded by Major 
John Butler. The war in the Northern theatre, in September 1777, was at a critical stage 
for the British. The Northern frontier, later to be regarded as of less than vital importance, 
was then one of the most strategically important areas of the war. Major General 
Burgoyne was using the frontier to attack the Patriots in upper New York and General 
Howe hoped to link up with him.19 Therefore, recruiting in this area was regarded as 
vitally important and a new highly mobile Ranger regiment was thought to be a key 
addition to the Provincial corps. However, the British did not intend another repeat of the 
Queens Rangers debacle.20 If they were going to have a Ranger unit then it was to be 
raised by a commander who would initially take full responsibility for them financially. 
They were not going to be raised by the British Army, but by Butler himself. 21 
Butler‘s Rangers owed their origins to the Ranger style of warfare pioneered in 
the Indian Wars earlier in the century and by Robert Rogers and others (including John 
Butler himself, at a lower level) during the French and Indian War. They also 
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An exception would be Calvin Arnt‘s online article on the uniform of Butler‘s Rangers, which is a 
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  Beating Order for Raising a Corps of Rangers to Major John Butler, 15 September 1777, Quebec, 
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incorporated Native American tactics. Butler owed his command to his close relations 
with the Native Americans, notably Chief Joseph Brant (Thayendanegea,) a Mohawk of 
the Six Nations Iroquois confederacy. As mentioned above, Brant had been using units of 
Native Americans and Rangers from 1775. The Native Americans were a resource that 
the British particularly wanted to utilize, and in Butler, like in Sir John Johnson, the 
British had a key contact who they could make use of in getting the Northern tribes to 
fight for their cause, particularly after the defeat at Saratoga had left the Northern 
frontiers exposed. 
 Part one of the chapter will discuss the formation and organisation of the 
regiment throughout its existence. The reason for doing this, is to produce an 
administrative record of the regiment and to assess how the regiment was raised, 
maintained and staffed. It will also serve as a comparison with the chapters on the Queens 
Rangers that provide an administrative record of that regiment. 
Raising the Regiment 
At Quebec on 15 September 1777, Major General Guy Carleton, gave a Beating 
Order to Major John Butler. 22 This order set out the rules under which Butler‘s new 
regiment was to be raised and administered, and so it is a very important document. The 
regiment was bound by the rules laid out in it and its officers frequently referred to it in 
correspondence; either to try and challenge it, or to cite it in their favour. Because of this 
it will be frequently consulted in this section. By the Beating Order, John Butler was 
ordered to raise the regiment, company by company rather than all at once. He was to 
form the other companies only once the first company was complete. The order states that 
―the first company be completed armed and fit for service and have passed muster before 
such person as shall be appointed for that purpose by some one of the Commanding 
Officers of His Majesty‘s Troops nearest to where the said companies so raised shall be at 
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 Beating Order for Raising a Corps of Rangers to Major John Butler, 15 September 1777, Quebec, 
Haldimand Papers, Add Mss 21700, f. 3, BL. 
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that the time, before another is begun to be raised.‖23 The company was to consist of ―a 
Captain, a First Lieutenant, a Second Lieutenant, three Sergeants, three Corporals, and 
fifty Private Men.‖24 This style of raising a regiment differed greatly from the way in 
which Provincial regiments were normally raised. It was the accustomed practice to 
appoint company commanders first and then to raise companies all at once. This was how 
it was done both before and after Innes‘ reforms of March 1777.25 The practice used by 
Butler‘s Rangers, had the advantage that each company was completed before another 
competed for recruits with it, but it certainly slowed down the rate of recruiting. This is 
reflected in the fact that it took Butler‘s Rangers until the summer of 1778 to have four 
companies.26  
 John Butler was authorized by the beating order to raise a maximum of eight 
companies. This is two less than the norm, (although they would eventually have 10 
companies by 1781.)27  The reason for this number is that the intention was to pay 
Butler‘s Rangers considerably more than other provincial soldiers.28 They were elites, and 
two of their companies were to be Indian speaking. These men were paid more.29 Thus 
their size would be limited as they would cost far more than most provincial units.  
It was made plain that Butler Rangers were not to be a standard infantry regiment; 
it was to be a specialist unit, practiced in the art of woodcraft and Indian fighting. The 
relations between the Native Americans and the British were complex; it was not always 
possible or indeed expedient to order them about as would be done with a regular or 
provincial regiment. Therefore in creating Butler‘s Rangers the British had a regiment 
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that was able to use Native American tactics and were still under their express command 
and bound by their rules and regulations. It is interesting to note that while these may 
have been Rogers‘ intentions for the Queens Rangers, he did not set out to recruit men 
with the express intention of using Native American tactics and there was no express 
provision for speakers of Indian languages in the Queens Rangers.30 
The document is worthy of study as it lays out the kind of tactics the regiment 
were to practise and highlights that they were to be paid well because of their expertise in 
these tactics. They were indeed highly paid. The daily rate of pay for most Provincial 
soldiers was around 8d and sometimes less.31 However, there is some variance between 
Sterling and New York currency, fortunately John and Walter Butler were punctilious 
record keepers and in the pay returns in WO 28/4 the total amounts paid to the men, are 
set out in New York Currency, Halifax Currency and Sterling.32 Thus it is possible to 
work out that the four shilling NY currency privates received 2s 2d per day and the two 
shilling privates received 1s 1d.33 Most other extant papers relating to Provincial units are 
not so well set out and thus there is often a good deal of confusion. However, as the 
beating order clearly states, this high rate of pay was to provide for the men‘s clothing 
and equipment (a non standard practice) and was to cause the regiment a good deal of 
trouble in equipping their men properly.34 
Thus, the rules for the regiment were clearly set out at the beginning. They were 
to be a regiment of skilled, knowledgeable, highly trained and highly motivated men. The 
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 312 
stressed that all men were to be ―well acquainted with the woods.‖ This would suggest 
that Carleton wanted men who had at least lived on the frontier, even if they were not 
born there. Butler‘s Rangers then, were a regiment who were set up from the beginning to 
be experts in the American Way of War. This was a hybrid of Native American tactics 
and Colonial American tactics and methods. They were commanded by an American and 
few of their officers were transferred directly from regular units, as was often the case 
with the Queens Rangers and the British Legion.35 This meant that the officer corps was 
fundamentally Loyalist in background. The next section will discuss their officers. 
Butler‘s Rangers Officers 
This section will give brief biographies of the two dominant figures in Butler‘s 
Rangers up to when they joined the regiment. It will then discuss the other officers.  
John Butler.  
John Butler was born in 1728 in New London, Connecticut, the son of Walter 
Butler, a British Army captain.36  When the Revolutionary War threatened, Butler joined 
the British at Niagara. Butler was at this point regarded as one of the most important 
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contacts with the Six Nations, described by Gary Nash as an ―invaluable British go-
between with the Iroquois.‖37 However, in 1775 and 1776, the British were not entirely 
sure how to use their Native American allies. The first two years of the war, were a period 
when the British were unsure how fully to prosecute the conflict.38 If the Patriots could be 
brought to the negotiating table, then there was a belief among some of the politicians and 
commanders, that matters could be put right with minimal bloodshed. There was a fear 
however, that if there was too great an American loss of life then the Patriots were more 
likely to resist. Thus it was felt that while there should be a threat of Native American 
involvement, actual involvement should be kept to a minimum, in case negative publicity 
should discourage people from joining the British cause. Butler offered to organise the 
Iroquois against the Patriots in the backcountry but was turned down by Carleton.39 Butler 
was not to be discouraged though, and he organised a network of intelligence agents 
amongst the tribes, as well as organising a force of Americans and Indians to help in the 
winter campaign of 1775-76. He also assisted Brant in the first use of Rangers and Native 
Americans together in late 1775. 40 This was Brant‘s command and it is therefore possible 
to argue that Brant is the founding father of Butler‘s Rangers in that he gave Butler the 
idea for combined operations. 
In 1777 the British strategy relating to the Native Americans changed. 
Burgoyne‘s advance was to come through territory in which Native American help would 
be vital. Butler was ordered to command a force of Native Americans in the Oswego 
expedition under Colonel Barry St Leger and was appointed Deputy Superintendent of the 
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Six Nations.41 He raised 350 Senecas, and fought at the battle of Oriskany on 6 August 
1777.42  
Oriskany was one of the few major Revolutionary War battles where the vast 
majority of participants were Americans; there were no regular British forces there. The 
non Patriot forces at Oriskany, consisted of 400 Six Nations Warriors and one company 
of Loyalists of the Kings Royal Regiment of New York under Captain John Johnson. 
Butler had with him twenty Loyalist rangers. 43  Therefore, it is arguable that this battle 
was the first engagement of Butler‘s Rangers, although they were not to be formally 
instituted for another month. St Leger was besieging Fort Stanix, and the Patriots sent the 
Tryon Country militia to raise the siege. St Leger, sent Johnson and Butler to ambush 
them, which they did successfully, although they were forced to withdraw after the 
garrison came out of Fort Stanix.  
Butler‘s Rangers were created out of one of the bloodiest battles of the war, yet 
one that is rarely mentioned in depth in the general histories, possibly because the victors 
were Native Americans and Loyalists. The Patriots took 450 casualties, as opposed to 150 
on the other side.44 Unfortunately for St Leger, Benedict Arnold arrived soon after with a 
large force and St Leger was forced to withdraw, taking Butler with him. St Leger‘s part 
of the Saratoga expedition had proven to ultimately be a failure but Oriskany had proven 
that Native Americans and Loyalist rangers could successfully work together and achieve 
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 Map 6: The Battle of Oriskany 6 August 1778. 
 
 
Source: Craig L. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution, (Baltimore, 1986) p.42. 
 
Map 7: The New York Frontier 1778-9. 
 
Source: Craig L. Symonds, A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution, p.73. 
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results. Less than a month after the battle, John Butler was promoted to Major of 
Provincials and given a warrant to raise a regiment of Rangers at Niagara.45 
Butler‘s reputation took a battering in early twentieth century popular culture. He 
was demonised in popular histories and even a film, DW Griffith‘s ―America.‖ Gary 
Nash analyses this anti Butler trend and argues that, because works about the Loyalists 
are no longer ―treason texts,‖ Butler can be reassessed.46 Nash argues that Butler was a 
―sympathetic Indianist, a frontiersman par excellence, and a man loyal to the crown, like 
most of his Mohawk River Valley neighbours.‖47 Nash‘s opinion of Butler is a fair one. 
Despite his poor reputation in Patriot circles- whether this is justified will be assessed 
later in the chapter- he does seem to have been all the things Nash suggests. It is hard to 
dispute the fact that the Iroquois liked him and that he liked them, he was undoubtedly a 
master of the woods, and his loyalty is hard to question- even if it did extend to lining his 
own pockets on occasion- and he certainly did suffer for this loyalty, not least in losing a 
son. 
It is tempting to see John Butler as a more successful, if less charismatic, version 
of Robert Rogers. They were roughly the same age and had a very similar upbringing. 
Both were familiar with the customs and languages of the Native Americans, as well as 
being well-schooled in frontier warfare. It was the aim of both of them to command 
Ranger regiments in the Revolutionary War, and to take the war to the Patriots on the 
frontiers. Yet there were crucial differences. Butler did not attain the fame that Rogers did 
in the French and Indian War, although arguably, he saw a similar amount of service. 
Rogers was able to create a lot of his own fame after the war, by his books and his play. 
Butler did not have Rogers‘ flaws; he seems to have been relatively trustworthy with 
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money, did not have a drink problem and, unlike Rogers, he had a happy domestic life, 
with a large family. On the eve of the Revolution, Rogers was on the run from creditors 
and under a cloud because of his 1768 court martial. Butler was a successful trader and 
Indian agent. Indeed, from 1776 to 1778, Butler was able monopolize all the trade 
involving refugee Loyalists in Niagara and a good deal of the trade with the Six 
Nations.48 One of the crucial differences between the two men is how they were regarded 
by their superiors. Haldimand and Carleton needed Rogers but did not fully trust him and 
indeed Gage loathed him.49 Butler on the other hand, was respected by Haldimand and 
Carleton, as a successful Indian agent and a useful contact.50 According to the DCB, the 
two commanding generals were slightly wary of the Johnsons (Guy Johnson, John 
Johnson and their relative, Daniel Claus) and appreciated Butler, who they felt was 
trustworthy. Ultimately, although Butler and Rogers both chose the losing side, their fates 
were affected by these relations with the senior men. The British gave up on Rogers and 
let him die in poverty in London; they continued supporting Butler after the war and he 
lived to become a prosperous man and one of the most important figures in the early 
Canadian state.51 
Major John Butler began forming his regiment in late 1777. His first orders were 
to rush to assist Burgoyne, but he received them after the surrender and before he had any 
recruits.52   The reason for the slowness may be that Butler had just lost his main 
recruiter. Even before Butler had been granted his commission he had sent his eldest son, 
Walter, to commence recruiting and all had not gone well... 
Walter Butler. 
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Walter Butler was born on his father‘s farm of Butlersbury, at Johnstown New 
York, in 1752.53 He fought his first actions against the Patriots in Tryon County in July 
1775 alongside Joseph Brant and the Iroquois. A letter to the Committee of Schenectady 
mentions that ―the Indians were to be under the command of Joseph Brant and Walter 
Butler.‖54  According to Swiggett, this is the first mention of Walter Butler in 
Revolutionary War records. 
Shortly after this, both the Butlers were present at the Indian Council held at 
Oswego, where they were chosen to go to Montreal with Guy Johnson.55 At Montreal in 
the autumn of 1775, Walter Butler fought in several actions with his father and the 
Iroquois, aimed at delaying the American advance under Arnold and Montgomery.56  At 
this time his mother and his sister, were interned as hostages in Tryon County New York. 
Walter Butler was commissioned as an ensign in the 8th foot in 1776. However, he spent 
most of his time on detachment on the frontier with his father, and in 1777 he 
accompanied his father on the St Leger expedition and fought with him at Oriskany.57 
While John Butler returned to Niagara with St Leger, Walter marched through the 
Mohawk Valley with a party of Rangers and Indians, under a flag of truce, carrying a 
proclamation from St Leger and a message to the locals from John Butler and John 
Johnson, that they should join the British cause. 58 These documents effectively negated 
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any flag of truce, as did the recruiting Walter Butler carried out in the Mohawk Valley. 
Although Butler‘s Rangers had not been officially formed at this point, this was 
effectively their first recruiting expedition. As such, the events and their repercussions 
deserve to be examined here. 
On the 13 August, at German Flats, New York, Walter Butler was captured. The 
local American commander, General Phillip Schuyler, explained in a letter to Washington 
that because of the papers he had on him, ―I could not consider him a Flag and have 
therefore ordered General Arnold to send him and the party with him prisoners of War to 
Albany.‖59 This letter would suggest that Butler and his companions and recruits would 
be treated as prisoners of war. Arnold had other ideas however, and a court-martial 
presided over by Colonel Marinus Willet, tried Butler as ―trayter and spy‖ and ―adjudged 
him to suffer the pain and penalty of death‖.60  He was sentenced to hang. According to 
the Court Martial he had stayed in the town, holding meetings and ―arguing with the 
inhabitants, endeavouring to persuade them to lay down their arms‖ despite the presence 
of several high ranking officers of the Continental Army at the meetings.61  This is an 
extraordinary example of the sense of unreality that can sometimes exist in a civil war. 
The sense that, despite all the differences, both sides were still countrymen and that 
matters could still be discussed in a civilised manner. After his sentence, Butler was not 
hung immediately because the army had to move following St Leger‘s withdrawal. He 
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was interned in Albany jail and wrote letters to Gates, stating his ―case was ―hard‖ and 
asking for a ―hearing‖.62 He remained in Albany jail for several months, until General 
Schuyler wrote to Gates in December asking for him to be reprieved and put on parole.63 
After several months of incarceration at the house of Richard Cartwright, he got his 
sentry drunk and escaped on 21 April 1778, and once more went to Fort Niagara to join 
his father and to take up the rank of Captain of Butler‘s Ranger‘s, into which he had been 
commissioned in his absence in November of 1777.64 
Walter Butler was to American historians of the nineteenth century, one of the 
greatest hate figures of the Revolution, because of his role in the Cherry Valley massacre 
of November 1778. In his 1933 work on Walter Butler, Howard Swiggett gives two 
particularly vitriolic examples: ―miscreants like …Walter Butler of the Mohawk Valley  
present no redeeming quality to plead for excuse‖; ―a man of enterprising boldness, 
whose heart was a compound of hate, insatiable cruelty and unappeasable revenge.‖65 
Swiggett describes him as ―a most dauntless and enterprising leader, eager, ambitious, 
tireless…grasping early in the war the grand strategy of the long North-western flank, 
impatient of older men, defending his every action at Cherry Valley, scorning to make 
war on women and children.‖66 This kind of difference of opinion is not unusual in 
historiography of civil wars. While the chapter is about Butler‘s Rangers rather than a 
biography of Walter Butler, it is hard to discuss the regiment without forming a view of 
Walter Butler, it‘s second in command. The chapter will try and assess the evidence make 
its own judgment on him, one that is not motivated by strong feelings on either side. 
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Butler‘s Rangers Officers: Company Commanders and Subalterns. 
John Butler‘s first task on assembling his corps of Rangers in the autumn and 
winter of 1777 was to recruit officers. The corps was intended to be an elite unit of 
rangers, able to act on their own initiative. As a result they were paid considerably more 
than most Loyalist corps and even Regular troops.67 There were not to be the same 
number of companies as a regular unit or Provincial unit, which was usually around ten. 
Butler‘s Rangers started with four companies before increasing to six and then eventually 
8. The officers varied and fluctuated over time. A total of 50 officers served in the 
regiment over the six years of its existence.68 Officers were transferred, killed, wounded 
or left for other reasons. The following table shows this fluctuation: 
Table 18: Number of officers serving in Butler‘s Rangers 1778-1781.69 
Date Lt Col/ Maj. Capt.s 1st Lt.s 2nd Lt.s Staff total 
1778 1 4 5 5 2 17 
1779 May 1 470 5 5 2 17 
1779 Nov 1 5 6 6 2 20 
1780 1 6 8 6 2 23 
1781 1 9 9 7 3 29 
Source: Returns of a Corps commanded by John Butler, WO 28/4, ff.2,3,4,9,12,14,16. 
So who were these officers? William Smy has done superb work on detailing as 
much information about them as possible.71 They were not all native born Americans, but 
most of them were American residents in 1775. One or two, such as Captains Caldwell 
and McDonnell, were recent immigrants but many of them were American born. They 
were mostly not town dwellers; they were farmers and frontiersmen. Many of them, like 
                                                 
67
 See Pay lists WO 28/4 ff.2-3, PRO. 
68
 See Table in Appendix 6. 
69
This table demonstrates is that there were three companies added between 1780 and 1781. Therefore 
there the regiment was expanding greatly at the time. To put it into context the regiment had gained 
notable victories in the period which would make them attractive to recruits. Also, the Patriots were 
expanding their presence in the area which meant more men had to be found. It was also during 1780 
and 1781 that the British sent large numbers of Regulars and Provincials to the Southern theatre so 
Butler‘s Rangers expanded their numbers.  
70
 Captain Ten Broek is listed as a Prisoner. 
71
 Smy, An Annotated Nominal Roll of Butler’s Rangers, pp. 33-207. 
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Butler, were traders and former residents of the Mohawk valley. 72  A good example 
would be Ralph Clench, from Schenectady in upper New York, a 2nd Lt., whose father 
was a Freemason acquaintance of Butler‘s. Clench had served as a private in the 53rd and 
42nd Foot, as a gentleman volunteer from 1777, before being commissioned in Butler‘s 
Rangers in 1780.73 Butler‘s younger sons Andrew and Thomas also served in the 
regiment, as did three more relatives, Butler‘s nephews Peter and John Bradt and his 
niece‘s husband, Richard Hansen.74 
How do these men compare to the officer corps of the other two case studies of 
this thesis? At first glance, the names appear more American.75 This is because there is 
such a cross section of names, similar in a way to the original officer corps of the Queens 
Rangers. Of the Captains, for example, there is only one ―Mac.‖ This is vastly different to 
the later Queens Rangers and the British Legion. Both these units had many American 
officers but their Captains and the senior officers, contained a high proportion of British 
born officers. Thus, superficially at least, Butler‘s Rangers appear to be more American. 
Six of the officers were related to the commander. Also, to what extent were the social 
backgrounds of the officers different to the other two regiments?  Initially the 
appointment of officers was left up to Butler. The British would have been anxious not to 
repeat the Queens Rangers fiasco, but they also wanted a very specific type of regiment. 
Possibly it was more important that the officers be experts in forest fighting than that they 
be gentlemen. It may also reflect the measure of trust Carleton had in Butler. He was a 
very different man to Howe and his notions of what constituted an officer may have been 
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different.76 Butler was a long term servant of the Crown and had already proved his skill 
and loyalty in the Revolutionary War. 
When Haldimand replaced Carleton as Commander in Chief of Northern 
Command in 1779, he wanted a greater say in the appointment of officers. Therefore, 
every commission had to be approved by Haldimand.77 Butler wrote to Haldimand‘s 
a.d.c. Capt. Robert Mathews, stating that, ―I was convinced from my Beating Orders that 
I had the right to appoint my own officers.‖ 78  The matter came to a head in January 1781 
when Haldimand appointed Captain John McKinnon to command a company in Butler‘s 
Rangers. Butler objected that he had no knowledge of the man or his fitness for duty and 
that it was ―a hardship on my officers to have others put in on them.‖79 Haldimand replied 
to Butler that he "ought not to think extraordinary what is every day unavoidably 
practised in established Regiments" and that ―he should not think it a hardship upon his 
corps the introducing into it an officer of long experience and service.‖80 In other words, 
Butler was to trust Haldimand‘s judgement on the issue. He also told Butler to avoid 
―putting appointments in orders until they are really made.‖ It is a rebuke but a gentle 
one. The fact that Haldimand was taking the time to explain these orders himself is 
indicative of the fact that he trusted Butler. This is not a cursory command of the like of 
those imposed on the Queens Rangers, there is no doubting Haldimand‘s meaning, but it 
is done in a polite way.81  This incident illustrates some of the tensions that arose when 
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 Paul David Nelson, General Sir Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, Soldier-Statesman of Early British 
Canada, (Madison, NJ, 2000), pp. 12-13. 
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 Letters to and from Officers in Niagara, Haldimand Papers Add Mss 21756, 21764 and 21765, BL. 
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 John Butler to Robert Matthews Niagara, 15 August 1780 Add Mss 21765 BL partially cited in Arnt, 
The Butler Ranger Uniform, p. 8. 
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 Butler to Haldimand, Niagara 1781 cited in Smy, An Annotated Roll of Butler’s Rangers, p. 6. 
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 Haldimand to Brig. Gen. Powell, Quebec, 11 April 1781 Add Mss 21764 ff. 195-197 cited in Smy, 
An Annotated Roll of Butler’s Rangers, p. 6. 
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The principal objection to MacKinnon was not the imposition but that he had seniority over the 
existing Captains, due to a ―commission he formerly had under Sir Henry Clinton,‖ as Captains 
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appointing practices were open to question. The Beating Order itself is open to 
interpretation as nothing is really said about the appointment of officers.82 The 
controversy demonstrates however, that the regiment was ultimately under British control 
in regards to appointments. Northern Command was not willing to spend such a lot of 
money on a corps that they did not have faith in. One area where Butler and his officers 
did have complete control was in recruitment of rank and file. The next section will look 
at recruitment and numbers. 
Recruitment and Numbers 1778-1782. 
The Beating Order clearly states that Butler‘s Rangers were to recruit on the 
frontiers of the Province of Quebec.83  Their recruits were to be ―able bodied men‖ who 
had come from the frontier colonies. This command was to be rigidly enforced. When 
Walter Butler attempted to recruit men from the safety of Montreal, Haldimand 
immediately informed the local commander there, Brig. Gen. Allan MacLean that he had 
ordered Walter Butler to: 
Discontinue enlisting men at Montreal for a Corps of Rangers 
commanded by Major Butler, whose beating order restricted him 
to the frontiers of this province for that service.‖ 84   
This echoes the controversy over the recruitment of Robert Rogers‘ King‘s 
Rangers, who were given a similar recruitment order. The principal reason was that 
                                                                                                                                            
McDonnell, Hare and Frey put it, when they wrote to Butler to protest see John McDonnel, Peter Hare 
and Bernard Frey to John Butler, Ranger Barracks, 2 October 1781, WO 28/4 f.30, PRO; MacKinnon 
himself wrote to Butler, stating that he felt ―ill used‖ that his fellow officers had ―written against him.‖ 
He stated that he had been commissioned in the Roman Catholic Volunteers on 25 February  1778 , see 
John MacKinnon to John Butler Rangers Barracks, 8 October 1781, WO 28/4/ f.32, PRO. 
82
The MacKinnon issue was ended when the unfortunate man had a stroke and was invalided out of the 
army, see Certificate by H.A Kennedy Physician General, Quebec, 29 August 1782, WO 28/4 f.39, 
PRO. 
83
 Beating Order for Raising a Corps of Rangers 15 September 1777. 
84
 Capt. Robert Mathews to Allan MacLean, Quebec 27 December 1779, Add Mss 21791, f. 29. 
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Canada was not to be drained of recruits who were needed for home defence. Also, the 
type of men a ranger regiment needed were far more likely to be found on the frontiers. 
However, it was not always an easy task. It was one thing to ask for recruits to come from 
behind enemy lines but it put the recruiters in constant danger. Walter Butler had already 
been captured in this way and several more recruiting parties would meet a similar fate. In 
December 1777, thirty potential recruits were captured in the Susquehanna valley.85 
Although recruiting was never easy, Butler‘s Rangers did manage to muster over 900 men 
in total.86  The method of recruiting laid out in the Beating Order, made for slow 
recruiting. John Butler‘s initial areas of recruiting were the Susquehanna Valley in upper 
New York and Pennsylvania.87 Butler had one complete company by December 1777 and 
two by February of 1778. 88  
The way in which men were recruited, was that a party was sent out to villages 
under a sergeant or a lieutenant. They would stay in the field until sufficient recruits had 
been collected. It was a dangerous task and they were also frequently competing against 
other Loyalist units, all with the same objective. As a result there were accusations made 
that not all recruits were entirely willing. Daniel Claus wrote that ―not one in twenty five 
Rangers in Butler‘s corps engaged voluntarily.‖89 As Claus was no friend of John Butler‘s 
his testimony is suspect and probably exaggerated. It is possible to say that had the men 
been unwilling they probably would not have stayed long, there is only so long that men 
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 Claus cited in Smy, An Annotated Roll of Butler’s Rangers 1777-1784, p. 12. 
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can be guarded for and the regiment does not seem to have suffered from desertion any 
more than other units.90 
 
Numbers.        
The number serving in Butler‘s Rangers, like any regiment, fluctuated over time. 
Because of the cost of paying them, they were not intended to be as big as the other 
Provincial regiments, however, by 1781 they were actually not a great deal smaller than 
most other units and by 1783 they were one of the biggest existing Provincial regiments.91 
The following table gives figures for the regiment from 1778 to 1784.   
Table 19: Total Numbers serving in Butler‘s Rangers 1778-1784. 
Date Officers NCO's Rank & File Total 
3/2/1778 7 6 112 125 
24/12/1778 15 30 246 291 
26/3/1779 16 27 294 337 
5/11/1779 20 31 304 355 
6/11/1780 23 40 381 444 
29/11/1780 23 23 376 422 
30/9/1781 28 39 484 551 
8/6/1783 32 80 461 573 
17/5/1784 32 80 422 534 
Average 22.625 40.75 354.25 417.625 
Source: Returns of a Corps of Rangers commanded by John Butler, WO 28/4 ff. 5,10,11,12,14;  
Returns of a Corps of Rangers commanded by John Butler, Add Mss 21765, ff.15, 415, BL;  Reported 
Strength of the Rangers given in Smy, An Annotated Nominal Roll of Butler’s Rangers, p. .31 
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 As there are no muster rolls for the unit, there is no accurate way of telling to what extent they were 
troubled by desertion but the relative stability in the numbers from year to year- see Table Six- would 
suggest that it was not a great problem. 
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of Northern Command. Yet even on a return from Northern command they are noted but no figures are 
given because they are ―in other parts.‖ Due to their service being on the frontier and sometimes as far 
south as Ohio, it was difficult to keep accurate paperwork on them. See, Pay lists for Six Companies of 
Butler‘s Rangers from 24 December 1777 to 24 October 1778 Add Mss 21765 ff.44-65; State of the 
British Troops in the Different Cantonments 12 December 1781, Northern Command, Orderly Book of 
Northern Command, Detroit Public Library MI. 
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The table shows a steady increase in numbers over time. In comparison with the other two 
case studies: the average rank and file in the British Legion was 343 and the Queens 
Rangers was 384. Both had significantly lower figures in 1783 and both had been 
disbanded by 1784. This demonstrates that Butler‘s Rangers had no problems with 
recruiting, even after Yorktown. This is possibly because Butler‘s Rangers were based in 
Canada and troops were needed to defend the Canadian frontier, which was still a part of 
the British Empire. Also, many men from other provincial regiments may have chosen to 
join Butler‘s Rangers, in the hope of continuing the war after their own regiments had 
been disbanded. At their disbandment in 1784, Butler‘s Rangers had had their second 
highest year in terms of soldiers serving. The fact that they continued to wage war 
successfully, long after the main British Army had stopped doing so, is also a factor. 
There was also a financial incentive for increasing the size of the battalion. An order of 
September 1780 had stated that all Provincial Regiments that had ten companies of 56 
men or more were eligible to go on the Provincial Establishment and thus their officers 
were eligible for half pay.92 Butler‘s Rangers were also a different unit in terms of their 
military service. They performed raiding duties on the far reaches of the frontier, rarely as 
a full regiment but rather in detachments, and when not raiding they were back at 
Niagara. They were not used in long campaigns which wore down numbers. Also, given 
their favourable situation, of being stationed in a place that would remain British at the 
end of the war, there would not have been the same inducement to desert as for regiments 
serving in territory surrounded by Patriots waiting to occupy it. 
Social Background of the Rank and File 
The general view of the social background of Butler‘s Rangers soldiers is that 
most of the recruits were farmers of some sort, from frontier towns in New York, 
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 General Order by General Sir Frederick Haldimand, 4 September 1780, Quebec, Add Mss, 21743, 
f.140. 
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Connecticut and Pennsylvania.93 Establishing the social background of Loyalist soldiers 
is no easy task as this information was not listed in the administrative documents 
compiled by the Muster Master General. However, in the case of Butler‘s Rangers, 
William Smy has done invaluable work in detailing the soldiers who served in his roll of 
the unit.94 Not all of his entries list background but some do. This section will briefly 
examine a sample of five private soldiers from Smy‘s Roll. 
The first is Private Phillip Bender, a native of Germany, born in 1743, who had 
come to America as a child. He bought a 320 acre farm on the Susquehanna River, New 
York in 1776 for £70. Thus Bender was a man of some means. He and his wife fled to 
Niagara in the winter of 1776-77.95 He served with the Rangers until 1783, when he was 
discharged and he started farming at Niagara.  
Private John Depew was born in Wyoming Pennsylvania, and was a farmer there. 
He served as a courier for Butler and subsequently became a Lieutenant in the Indian 
Department. He settled in Niagara in 1784 and once more became a farmer. His son 
Charles served as a private in Walter Butler‘s company.96 
Private Caspar Hoover was born in Holland and was a farmer on the Susquehanna 
River. He and his three sons, Henry, Jacob and John were all original recruits to the 
regiment in 1777. Henry and John were both captured by the Patriots. Henry was released 
but Smy has no information on the fate of John.97 
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 Gary Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, pp. 251-256. 
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Private Nicholas Miller was a Millwright from the Genesee River. He served in 
McDonnell‘s company from 1778. After the war he settled in York Township, in what is 
still Yonge Street in modern Toronto.98  
Private Thomas Tinbrook listed as ―a black man who served in Butler‘s Rangers.‖ 
No other information is given but it is evidence that Butler‘s Rangers enlisted African 
Americans.99 
The above soldiers are obviously only a tiny sample of the men who served but 
they provide an interesting cross section of the ordinary soldiers who served in Butler‘s 
Rangers.100  Examining Smy‘s Roll in greater detail, over two hundred of the soldiers 
settled on farms around the Niagara area after the war, which would also indicate that 
many of them had prior knowledge of farming. Thus although not all of Butler‘s Rangers 
fit the model of small farmers - see chapter two - many of them were, or had aspirations 
to be so, meaning that there was core of loyal farmers in their ranks.  
   Finances and Equipment.       
This section will assess the equipping and payment of the regiment. There is an 
unusually rich seam of evidence for this. Few other regiments have such detailed records 
on their pay and equipment. This is partly because the Butlers were rarely satisfied with 
the arrangements for equipping their regiment and therefore complained often to Northern 
Command, detailing their woes and giving figures and illustrations.101   
Butler‘s Rangers were treated differently to most other Regular and Provincial 
regiments in how they were paid and supplied. The Beating Order was applied with 
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payment as it was to recruitment and formation. Because of the special nature of their 
duties and their elite status, they were to be paid well. Ranger regiments had traditionally 
been an expensive commodity. Anderson calculates that in the French and Indian war, a 
ranger regiment cost twice what a regular regiment cost.102 Butler‘s Rangers received at 
least twice what the other provincial regiments did on a daily basis.103  
So why were they so expensive, and why did the British pay agree to pay them so 
much? The answer is that they were supposed to do the work of more than their numbers 
and cover wooded and broken terrain more rapidly than regular troops.104 Williams 
defines their role as ―to co-operate with the allied Indian warriors to help achieve the 
Crown‘s operational objectives in the absence of conventional British forces.‖105 Thus 
their job was to hold down and frustrate the Americans on the frontiers so that the Patriots 
would be forced to send men there and away from where the main British troops were 
operating. If the Rangers were used properly, they would save the British money as they 
would not need regular troops on the frontiers and could use them elsewhere. The 
Rangers could also provide liaison with the Native Americans and act as providers of 
intelligence. Therefore, they were seen by Carleton and Haldimand as a worthwhile 
investment. 
The original pay structure of the Rangers is set out in the following table: 
Table 20: Pay for Butler‘s Rangers for 212 days with Daily Rates. 106 
 Daily Rate Total Daily 212 Days Total NYC Total St at 
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 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War, (New York, 2000), p. 798. 
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 Haldimand to Butler 12 February 1780, Add Mss 21756, f. 172, cited in Calvin Arnt, Butler‘s 
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Thus private soldiers received either 2s. 2d. per day, or 1s. 1d. per day, in sterling. Another document 
gives a daily cost for the regiment of £65 New York Currency, see Walter Butler, Payment for 8 
companies at the Present Footing, Niagara, 3 March 1779, WO 28/4, f.3, PRO.  
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107 Pay NY C. NY C 4s 8d per 
Dollar.108 
1 Major 15s. £1 5s. 9d. £272 11s 5d   
4 Captains 10s. £3 8s. 7d. £726 17s 1d   
5 First Lt.s 4s8d. £2 £424   
5 Second Lt.s 3s8d. £1 11s. 5d. £333 2s 10d   
1 QM 4s.8d. 8s. £84 16s   
1 Surgeon 4s. 6s. 10d. £104 11s 
5d109 
  
15 Sergeants 5s. NYC110 £3 15s. £795   
15 Cpls 4s. 6d. 
NYC111 
£3 7s. 6d. £715 10s   
10 Dr. 4s. NYC £2 £424   
100 Pvts112 4s. NYC113 £20 £4,240   
173 Pvts. 2s. NYC114 £17 6s. £3582 16s.   
330 men all 
ranks. 
   £11, 837 2s. 
9d. 
£6904 19s. 
11d. 
Source: Subsistence wanting for the Corps of Rangers Commanded by John Butler Esq. Major Comm. 
From the 25 October 1778 to 24 May, following both days included being 212 days, from WO 28/4 
ff.6-7, PRO. 
 
The document from which the table is constructed is entitled, ―Subsistence 
Wanting‖ which means John Butler is claiming for pay that he has not yet been given. 
This would have made it difficult to buy equipment if there was no money to buy it. In a 
later letter Walter Butler says ―I was under the necessity of making payment myself.‖115 
Therefore, could anyone but the wealthy Butler‘s, have funded this type of regiment?  
They could not have funded their regiment had they not had their own capital to do so. In 
this they were lucky, in that unlike most Loyalists they were still making money after the 
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war started. This is possibly a reason why Rogers‘ two regiments failed. He did not have 
any source of private income, and any money he got was rapidly spent on carousing. 
Even British officers, like Simcoe and Tarleton, could not have afforded to finance their 
regiments themselves. They sometimes had to settle regimental bills but this was done on 
credit and unlike Butler‘s Rangers, their equipment was provided.  
Butler‘s Rangers were paid more, but because of this they were not provided with 
the normal extras that British or Provincial troops were normally given. This included 
supplies, equipment and clothing. As the Beating Order stated, ―the whole to cloth and 
arm themselves at their own expense.‖116 This caused some confusion when Butler 
attempted to appoint a quartermaster and an adjutant, the officers responsible for supplies 
and administration in a regiment. Haldimand therefore decided to clear the matter up in a 
letter written in 1780: 
 I never thought it reasonable that Rangers should be entitled to 
every allowance made to other troops who serve for half and 
sometimes one fourth of the pay. They receive their clothing and 
arms, being by no means adequate to the disproportion in pay.117 
This lays out the terms of service clearly. The Rangers were to be well paid but to 
receive no goods from the army, other than money. This was practical as well as 
economical as Butler‘s Rangers were often deployed far from any supply base. They had 
to buy what they could from local suppliers or order it themselves. However, this caused 
severe problems for the men on the lower salary. These men still had to buy the same 
equipment as those on the higher salary and they still had to replace lost equipment. 
Walter Butler wrote to headquarters in 1779, stating that ―the disproportion of the pay of 
the Privates of the four and two shilling companies of the Corps of Rangers creates much 
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 Haldimand to Butler 12 February 1780, Add Mss 21756. f. 172 cited in Arnt,  
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uneasiness between the men.‖ Acting with his father‘s authority, he suggested a solution, 
a revision of the pay scale. He outlined why this was a fair solution because ―after duly 
considering the hardships the men are subject to, the very great expence they must be out 
for extraordinary cloathing in a service of this kind, the high price of every article in the 
Quarter they serve and the losses they must make on service on service with the 
Indians.‖118 
Walter Butler makes a good point here. Other provincial units had their clothing 
and weapons provided for them out of army stores and were not subject to the vagaries of 
wartime prices and profiteering. Butler‘s men, however, had to contend with spiralling 
inflation and traders and merchants determined to make everything they could out of 
them.119 The letter makes it plain that all the men in the unit shared the same ―hardships‖ 
and therefore were entitled to be paid equally. Walter Butler suggested ―reducing the 
corps to seven companies and lowering the Corporal‘s pay to four shillings, the four 
shilling companies to three, and raising the two shilling companies to three.‖120 
Haldimand did eventually agree to change the wage structure in 1780 but reduced the pay 
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of the privates to two shillings and sixpence.121 As the officers were paid what was 
recommended, the Butlers made no objection. 
This evidence gives an insight into both the everyday running of the regiment and 
the extent to which the Butlers had greater administrative responsibilities than most of 
their contemporary regimental commanders. Whilst all eighteenth century regimental 
commanders had some administrative duties, the supplying of their corps was usually 
taken out of their hands, leaving them free to command. The Butlers had to occupy 
themselves with all aspects of the regiment‘s upkeep, as well as fighting a war. 
One of the biggest responsibilities John and Walter Butler had was to arm their 
men. Initially, the men themselves had been expected to do this, but it proved beyond the 
means of many of them, especially as a lot of them were refugees, as Walter Butler 
outlined in a letter to Carleton, ―the Rangers when they joined the Corps are nearly 
destitute of clothing and necessaries and having no bounty allowed them, confirmed by 
the general their being obliged to pay for their arms brings them greatly into debt.‖122 The 
Beating Order had stated that they were not entitled to draw on British Army stores and 
the men had to provide their own equipment. Haldimand reinforced this in 1778, when he 
made it plain that they could not even buy equipment from Government stores, stating 
―with respect to arms, the great deficiency of that article at present renders it impossible 
to supply you with any until we are furnished from England‖.123 Butler argued in a letter 
to Haldimand, that the nature of their duties; sleeping rough and patrolling in thick 
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forests, meant that ―they were more liable to losing or breaking their arms and 
accoutrements than any other corps or regiment.‖124 This is a fair point but it was unlikely 
that much could have been done by Haldimand, what with Butler‘s Rangers being the 
lowest priority for arms. In 1779 Colonel Bolton, the garrison commander at Niagara, 
gave Butler 100 muskets from his stores as a loan, but Haldimand made it plain in that he 
did not approve of this.125  
 The Butlers then, had to take matters completely into their own hands. In 1779, 
John Butler applied for permission for Walter to go to England and buy arms.126 He did 
not do so, because he was needed with the regiment, but in 1781, John Butler did succeed 
in hiring his own ship to carry ―a complete Stand of arms‖ and shipped them out from 
Britain on the ship the Uretta, drawing ―£5000 on account‖ from the Paymaster General 
to pay for it.127 The ship also contained clothing and other supplies, all adding to Butler‘s 
outlay. This is quite a step for any commander to take. In some ways Butler‘s Rangers 
almost seem like John Butler‘s private army, in that he had to equip them himself.  
For the reason that they were self equipped and largely kept away from the main 
British Army, Butler‘s Rangers did not look or behave like a regular army unit. When 
subject to inspections by regular officers they were often found wanting in dress and 
deportment. An example of this came in 1782, when Haldimand replaced Walter Butler 
(who had been killed in October 1781) with a regular British officer, Major William 
Potts. Potts‘ account of the unit is interesting: 
I must own that I am sorry to have it to say that I have 
found from the general condition and disposition of the Corps that 
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they have not only ever been (particularly since the death of 
Captain Butler) but still are not only void of, but in general have 
reluctant [sic] to the present and practice of regularly military 
discipline, the becoming due attentions to which the Officers in 
general have scarcely the most distant idea of. Their manner, their 
education, disposition, want of practical knowledge and the time 
of life most of them, are insurmountable obstacles in the way to 
effect the necessary requisites of an established Corps.128 
This is a scathing judgment of the unit. It is interesting what Potts says about the 
―time of life‖ of the unit. This would seem to suggest that they were older men. His use of 
the term ―established corps‖ means that he feels they are deficient in what is required to 
join the Provincial establishment that had been formed in 1779, with the Queens Rangers 
being first on the list. However, his report is not all critical. It seems that his critique is 
their deficiencies in not being a smartly dressed, well drilled unit, not as fighting men. 
Potts went on to say: 
During the course of the war, upon the service they have 
been employed, I believe they have ever (in general) behaved 
bravely and done their duty and are deserving of whatever His 
Majesty may be graciously pleased to favour or reward them 
with…I must not omit to observe to Your Excellency that two 
thirds of the private men are at present as fine fellows as ever I 
saw collected together, worthy of applause and by no means 
wanting in the customary requisites to effect in every respect good 
soldiers and might, should they be wanted, form a most complete 
small Corps of five or six Companies at fifty men per Company, 
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and might answer every purpose that could be wished for to effect 
the service of this Upper Country regarding the connection with 
the Indians.129 
Potts therefore reasons that the unit is fit for purpose they were formed for, but 
that they had deteriorated a little since Walter Butler‘s death. Pott‘s recommendation, that 
they be reduced in companies is similar to Walter Butler‘s recommendation of 3 years 
earlier. This would seem to suggest that Butler and Potts thought six companies was the 
ideal size for Butler‘s Rangers and that any more was not manageable. This might suggest 
that the expansion to ten companies was carried out for purely mercenary reasons rather 
than for the good of the unit. His praise of the unit sounds sincere and indeed he compares 
them favourably with the best men he has ever served with. Potts was an experienced 
man, used to a certain form of soldiering and was somewhat disconcerted when he found 
how lax the Rangers were in the soldierly skills he was most used to, namely parade 
ground discipline. However, what may have been good for a regular unit would have been 
a disadvantage in a ranger. Had they been dressed in smart red coats and stocks they 
might not been able to move freely and they certainly would not have been camouflaged. 
Their green coats might have been old and muddied, but they hid them in the forests.130 
Haldimand himself expressed this view when he said:  
In regard to high discipline nothing of the kind is 
expected, the business of a Ranger being to march well, to endure 
fatigue and to be a good marksman. Any time they have to spare 
ought to be employed in these exercises. The little minutiae and 
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forms of parade are totally out of their province, nor can their 
situation admit of a possibility of their acquiring them. 131 
This in essence gives licence to everything Butler was trying to do with his 
Rangers and puts Potts‘ complaints in perspective. The Rangers could never be as 
disciplined as a line regiment but then they were not intended to be. John Simcoe echoed 
these sentiments when devising his own drill for the Queens Rangers.132 These types of 
regiments were trained for a specific purpose, which was to serve in rough terrain and 
therefore their priorities were to be camouflaged, adept at tracking and stalking and to be 
good shots. They were required to use their initiative far more than conventional soldiers. 
Butler‘s Rangers were lucky in having commanders like Carleton and Haldimand who 
understood the purpose of Rangers and were willing to tolerate a little laxity in dress and 
behaviour in exchange for proficiency in combat. 
Despite the fact that Butler‘s Rangers were self equipped, ultimately they were a 
very costly regiment, the most expensive in the whole of Northern Command. At the end 
of the war Haldimand‘s staff drew up an account sheet of all the expenses of Northern 
command. The following shows total expenditure on Loyalist soldiers in the Northern 
department from 1778 to 1784. 
Table 21: Expenditure on Armed Loyalists Northern Dept 
1778-1784. 
Regiment Cost 
Butler‘s Rangers £102, 217/9/5 
Total for Regiments £283,627/6/4 
Total Expenditure £2,887,013/8/4 
Source: Amounts of Warrants Granted by His Excellency General Haldimand for the Extraordinary 
Services of the Army in Canada from July 1778 to November 1784 Add Mss 25754 f. 210.  
 
The table shows that Butler‘s Rangers accounted for more than a third of the 
Northern Department‘s expenditure on armed Loyalists. The rest of the chapter will 
examine whether they were worthy of this expenditure, by looking at their combat record. 
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This section has shown that Butler‘s Rangers were financially a very different regiment to 
the Queens Rangers and the British Legion, and indeed most other Provincial regiments. 
They were well paid, but they were also relatively self sufficient in terms of arms and 
equipment. Wright‘s work on the Continental Army and Mayer‘s work highlights the 
similarities that Butler‘s Rangers had administratively with many Patriot units. While the 
Continental Army was equipped by a central organisation, they often had to fend for 
themselves, and militia units were largely self sufficient.133  
This section has highlighted the differences that Butler‘s Rangers had with other 
Provincial regiments administratively. It is very important to point out that in many ways 
Butler‘s Rangers were a unique unit in the British Army. Rogers attempted twice to form 
a similar unit, but did not succeed on either occasion. The question is, why was this unit 
allowed to exist after the changes made to the Queens Rangers? Admittedly they were 
never raised by rank, but in most other respects Butler‘s Rangers were similar in form to 
the early Queens Rangers. The answers are: that Butler did actually succeed in raising and 
keeping his unit himself, until he could be paid later; they were far away from the regular 
British Army and therefore not expected to behave like regulars. They also had 
understanding commanding generals, who trusted Butler. Ultimately though, the reason 
why Butler‘s Rangers were able to keep their original form was because they were a good 
combat regiment and that they won more actions than they lost. The next section will 
examine Butler‘s Rangers record in combat. 
 
Part 2: The Rangers in Combat 
This part of the chapter will look at the battlefield effectiveness and battlefield 
discipline of Butler‘s Rangers from 1778 to 1784. The main issues it will examine are: 
were the Rangers effective in fulfilling their designated strategic role of keeping the 
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Patriots occupied on the frontiers? Did they co-operate effectively with the Iroquois? Did 
they breach the accepted rules of Warfare? Were they guilty of either atrocities towards 
civilians or of failing to exercise control on the Native Americans they were serving 
alongside? The answers to these questions will attempt to show whether Butler‘s Rangers 
deserve their bloodthirsty reputation or whether they were just so effective an enemy that 
it was in the Patriots interest to blacken their names. Rather than providing an exhaustive 
account of Butler‘s Rangers in action from 1778 to 1784 the section will focus on two key 
periods. It will first look at their early expeditions in 1778 in the Mohawk Valley. This is 
where their reputation was acquired at two large engagements often referred to as 
massacres: at Wyoming and Cherry Valley. It will then assess operations in New York, 
Ohio and Kentucky in 1781 and 1782, where the Rangers were once again active with the 
Native Americans and where they also took part in expeditions which gave fuel to 
accusations of brutality. The reason for looking at these events is that although the 
Rangers saw action from late 1779 to 1781 they were not quite so important in the overall 
picture of the war and they were often unoccupied at Niagara during these periods. In 
1778 and 1779 the Patriots mounted a major campaign against the Iroquois and Butler‘s 
Rangers were a vital part of the British reaction to it. After Yorktown the main British 
Army largely stopped major campaigns, so the frontier once more became the focus of 
Patriot attentions as it was the last major area of British/Loyalist resistance. Lastly there 
will be a brief section on the influence of the Native Americans of Butler‘s Rangers. 
1778: First actions and Wyoming. 
           When the turning points of the Revolutionary War are being discussed, 
Saratoga, in October 1777, seems to have one of the best claims for being the major 
turning point of the war. It eliminated a British force at one stroke and ushered in a major 
change in British strategy for prosecuting the war. At a local level the surrender of 
Burgoyne and the retreat of St Leger eliminated British regular forces in upper New 
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York. It also created a situation where Loyal Americans in upper New York had no-one 
to turn to for protection against irregular forces that were more than happy to use them as 
scapegoats and plunder their property.134 After Saratoga, securing settlements with large 
areas of potential Loyalists became vital to British strategy. The New York frontier was 
one area of proven Loyalty. As an added incentive there was also the presence of large 
numbers of Native Americans allied to the British. In early spring of 1778, General 
Carleton, the Governor of Quebec, began to consider the possibility of an offensive 
campaign in the Tryon-Susquehanna region, using Indians rather than regular troops. In 
March 1778, he sent John Butler to prepare the Iroquois for a major offensive.135 The 
commander at Fort Niagara, Colonel Mason Bolton, acting on information received from 
Butler, wrote to Carleton that ―the savages are determined to assist us‖ and stressed the 
necessity of ―acting sooner‖ than the Patriots.136 Butler himself echoed these sentiments 
in a letter written two days after Bolton‘s in which he claimed his Rangers were ready to 
act and that the Patriots were ―ripe‖ to be attacked.137 He also reported that he expected to 
receive recruits whilst on campaign as he had recruiting parties in the area.138  
John Butler and his Rangers spent the spring preparing for an attack in 
conjunction with the Senecas and the Mohawks. He left Fort Niagara, with two 
companies of Rangers, accompanied by Captain William Caldwell, his then second in 
command, as Walter Butler was then in the process of making his way to meet his father, 
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after his escape.139 Butler‘s Rangers did not stay as one body for long. Butler sent 80 
Rangers under Lt Frey and Joseph Brant to bring the Mohawks in from the Mohawk 
Valley.140 
On the 15 May Butler sent a report to General Carleton, stating that he was now 
almost ready to commence his campaign and was just waiting on Frey and Brant to join 
him.141 According to the report the plan was to strike through the Mohawk valley, to 
proceed down the Delaware to Pennsylvania and if possible to even link up with Howe 
somewhere in Pennsylvania.142 It was an ambitious plan and one that speaks of a man 
confident in his command. Although the Rangers had only been raised a few months 
previously Butler was confident enough in their abilities as guerrilla fighters to trust them 
for a major campaign beside the Native Americans. 
In purely strategic and tactical terms, the campaign of June and July 1778 was a 
success. Butler‘s Rangers and their Indian allies swept down from the frontier 
consistently surprising and defeating Patriot resistance.143 The Patriots had failed to 
respond to a warning from General Schulyer suggesting they were under prepared in the 
area and were thus overwhelmed by the Native Americans and Butler‘s Rangers. 144 After 
Saratoga, Gates had reassigned most of the Continental Army regiments to other areas. 
All the Patriots had to defend themselves were militia regiments of the type that Butler 
and Johnson had defeated the previous year at Oriskany. As a response to Butler‘s attacks 
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and frantic letters from Governor Clinton, Congress finally ordered General Gates to 
prepare a campaign against the Native Americans in the Mohawk Valley.145 Before that 
could happen, Butler Rangers had fought their first major action of the war and routed a 
force of Connecticut Militia at Wyoming on 3 July 1778.  
Butler commenced his operations in the Wyoming Valley in Connecticut on June 
10 1778.146 He was accompanied by a force of around 200 Rangers and 300 Native 
Americans, largely of the Seneca Tribe under their Chief, Sayenqueragtha.147 They raided 
several settlements and took prisoners. Yet it is here that the controversy started. In 
Butler‘s report of the campaign to his superior Colonel Bolton he states that on 30 June he 
―arrived with about 500 Rangers and Indians at Wioming, [sic] and encamped on an 
eminence which overlooks the greatest part of the settlement, from whence I sent out 
parties to discover the situation, and strength of the Enemy, who brought in eight 
Prisoners, and scalps.‖148 This almost casual reporting of scalp taking demonstrates that 
Butler did not regard it as something he should have been ashamed of. One of Butler‘s 
Rangers, Richard McGinnis described how the ―Savages captured two white men and a 
negro who they afterwards murdered in their camp.‖149 The fact that the source is a 
Ranger proves that this was no piece of engineered propaganda. Butler was not fully 
succeeding in controlling those under his command.  
Butler‘s report for the 30 June, mentions that he estimated the enemy to be about 
800 strong in three forts, Wintermorts, Jenkins and Forty.150 The following day he split 
his forces and forced Forts Wintermort and Jenkins to surrender, Fort Forty refused the 
                                                 
145
 Ibid. p.98. 
146
 Ibid., pp. 114-116                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
147
 Cruikshank, The Story of Butler‘s Rangers and the Settlement at Niagara, p.46.                            
148
 John Butler to Colonel Bolton, Lacuwanac, 8 July 1778, in Add Mss 21760, ff. 31-34. 
149
 Richard McGinnis, Journal, in Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, The Spirit of 
Seventy Six: The Story of the American Revolution as told by Participants, (1967) p. 1006, also 
partially cited in Williams, Year of the Hangman p. 118 
150
 Butler to Colonel Bolton, Lacuwanac, 8 July 1778, in Add Mss 21760, ff. 31-34. 
 344 
terms. Butler‘s terms of surrender were: that if all within the fort surrendered no-one 
would be harmed and the prisoners would be paroled, which they were on 5 July.151 These 
terms show that Butler did not intend to slaughter prisoners and when everything was 
running smoothly such as a formal surrender, rather than in the heat of battle, he acted 
fairly. The action also shows considerable military skill, as Butler was able to neutralise a 
large part of the opposing force. 
The assault on the forts caused great consternation in the Wyoming Valley and 
pushed the Patriots into summoning all their militia under Col. Zebulon Butler, who 
decided to attack on 3 July with somewhere between ―four and five hundred men.‖152 Col. 
Zebulon Butler, with the militia and sixty Continentals marched to meet the Rangers and 
Indians but was instead ambushed at four o‘clock in the afternoon of the 3rd.153 This 
chapter will not give a blow by blow account of the battle, but will highlight certain 
points about the efficiency of Butler‘s Rangers and the controversy of their actions at the 
battle, of which there is much. Fought in the thick woods, the battle was a confusing 
affair but Butler‘s report demonstrates that the Rangers showed considerable skill and 
tactical awareness: 
I ordered the Forts to be sett on fire, which deceived the 
Enemy into an opinion that we had retreated: We then posted 
ourselves in a fine open wood, and for our greater safety lay flat 
upon the ground, waiting their approach. When they were within 
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200 yards of us, they began firing; we still continued upon the 
ground without returning their Fire till they had fired three 
Vollies: by this time they had advanced within 100 yards of us, 
and being quite near enough Suingerachton ordered his Indians 
who were upon the right to begin the attack upon our part; which 
was immediately well seconded by the Rangers on the left. Our 
fire was so close, and well directed, that the affair was soon over, 
not lasting above half an hour, from the time they gave us the first 
fire till their flight. 154                                                                                                   
This account shows how efficiently Butler‘s Rangers had fulfilled the role 
assigned to them. They were experienced frontiersmen, used to this kind of warfare. 
Butler mentions that the Rangers‘ fire was ―close and well directed‖ which shows that 
they were more than a match for the Patriot force in this kind of combat. The afore- 
mentioned Richard McGinnis, left his own account of the battle, which also gives 
evidence of the political motivation of many of Butler‘s Rangers. He says: 
When the enemy came in sight of us they fell to 
blackguarding us, calling out aloud, ―Come out ye villainous 
Tories! Come out if ye dare, and show your heads, if ye durst, to 
the brave continental Sons of Liberty!‖ (Remark, I call them Sons 
of Sedition, Schism and Rebellion.) But we came out to their 
confusion indeed – for the Indians on the right under the command 
of Col. Butler and their King Quirxhta entirely surrounded the 
enemy and the white men under the command of Quiskkal on the 
left drove and defeated the enemy on every quarter. They fled to 
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the river and many of them even there were pursued by the 
savages and shared the same fate as those on the land.155 
This rare account from an enlisted man describes the hatred between the two sides 
effectively. McGinnis expresses strong political motivation for his actions. His account of 
the battle itself is brief but it still demonstrates the completeness of the victory. He also 
gives further demonstration of the motivation of Butler‘s Rangers when later in the 
account he describes how the seizure of livestock and property was a direct response to a 
similar seizure by the Patriots: 
The Rebles [sic] begged of us to restore something back, 
but we replyed. ―Remember how you served the peaceable 
subjects of his Majesty at Tankennick.156 Remember how you 
took their property and converted it to Reble purposes, and their 
persons fell in your hands, you immediately sent them off to 
prison clean into Connecticut and left their numerous families in 
the utmost distress. And be contented Rebles, that your lives are 
still spared and that you have not shared the same fate with your 
seditious brethren. 157 
 The linking of their actions to a previous event demonstrates that many in 
Butler‘s Rangers were motivated by revenge. In McGinnis‘s last sentence he describes 
how he felt that the survivors were lucky to be alive, linking this clearly with the fact that 
there were few survivors of the Patriot force. He also describes the destruction of civilian 
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property that followed the battle. These reasons ensure that the Battle of Wyoming was 
one of the most controversial of the war. 
In the aftermath of the battle no quarter was given and the scalps of all the dead 
were taken. Butler says in his report that ―in this action were taken 227 Scalps and only 
five prisoners. The Indians were so exasperated with their loss last year near Fort Stanwix 
that it was with the greatest difficulty I could save the lives of those few.‖158 Scalping was 
a vicious practice but it was the norm on the frontier. Many British and Loyalists suffered 
the same fate as the Patriots at Wyoming, including Walter Butler himself, in 1781.159 
So what was the role of Butler‘s Rangers in the events? Stories went round that 
many of Butler‘s Rangers had murdered their own relatives.160 According to Mann, there 
was only one incident of this nature, in which a Ranger, Giles Slocum, killed his father in 
the battle.161 The very fact that this happened at all, though, allowed the propagandists to 
exaggerate numerous incidents of a similar kind. In the years after the Revolution the 
atrocity stories of Wyoming turned it into a massacre. John Frost‘s 1851 account of the 
battle is not as exaggerated as some, but he claims 370 men were killed, which is contrary 
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to Butler‘s claim of 227.162 One of the most vivid accounts, written in 1820, claims that 
Butler ―with a band of 1600 Indians and Royalists invaded the settlement at Wyoming…. 
they put to death all the inhabitants of both sexes and every age, some thousands in 
number, enclosing some in buildings which they set on fire roasting others alive.‖163 This 
has echoes of the film ―the Patriot.‖ As far as can be ascertained no non combatants were 
killed. This was admitted by senior Patriot sources at the time.164 Barbara Alice Mann 
ascribes the massacre stories to sense of shame at the defeat.165 She argues that historians 
have depended upon one sided sources.166 She also argues that the stories of savagery also 
negated the fact that the local Patriots had recently destroyed three Iroqouis villages the 
year before Wyoming, where civilians had also been killed.167  Mann‘s points are relevant 
and demonstrate the strong pro-Patriot bias of much of the early historiography of the 
American Revolution, particularly of that concerning the deeds of Loyalists or Loyal 
Native Americans. Most of the primary sources detailing the ―massacre‖ seem to have 
been based on hearsay rather than being from witnesses.168  Although many of the stories 
cast the Iroquois, and particularly Joseph Brant, who was not even at Wyoming -it was 
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purely a Seneca affair- as the villains, Butler‘s Rangers were undoubtedly implicated and 
were permanently tainted with accusations of massacre. 169 
Another myth about Wyoming is that Butler was censured by the British high 
command.170 The opposite is in fact true. Haldimand was pleased with the victory and 
passed on the message to Henry Clinton, who forwarded Butler‘s report to Lord Germain. 
Germain‘s reply was a vindication of the military skill of Butler‘s Rangers and the trust 
that the High Command now had in them: 
 The success of Lt. Col Butler is distinguished for the few lives 
that have been lost among the Rangers and Indians he commanded 
and for his humanity in making those only his object who were in 
arms; and it is much to the credit of the officers and Rangers of his 
Detachment that they seem to partake of the spirit and 
perseverance which is common to all the British officers and 
soldiers.171 
The fact that Germain was so impressed with the conduct of the regiment spoke 
well of their skill and also ensured that they would be used frequently in future 
campaigns. Militarily, Butler‘s Rangers‘ first large scale engagement was a complete 
success. They had proved adept at forest fighting and had struck a major blow to the 
Patriots in Pennsylvania. However, they had laid themselves open to accusations of 
brutality-whatever their guilt- and these stories would continue after their next major 
engagement, at Cherry Valley. 
Cherry Valley 
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In the autumn of 1778 Butler‘s Rangers returned to Niagara and planned 
operations closer to their home base. A raid on the Mohawk Valley was decided upon. 
This was where many of the men were from, so it was to be a chance to gain back their 
property or at least enact some measure of revenge on those who had seized it. Swiggett 
describes the Mohawk Valley campaign as ―a little war planned and waged by desperate 
and lonely men for the recovery of their homes.‖172 This puts a far more favourable gloss 
than is normally put on events, but it does emphasise the localised nature of this particular 
part of the war. The combatants on both sides were men who had grown up in a small 
area in New York. Butler‘s Rangers often fought in an area close to where many of them 
were from, which possibly heightened their emotions towards those who now occupied 
these areas.173 
Operations started in September when companies under Captain Walter Butler 
and Captain Caldwell, raided German Flats in upper New York. The raids were designed 
to keep the enemy guessing, and for the fast moving to Rangers to be heading back to 
their base at Niagara before the Continental Army had time to organise resistance in an 
area. The raid on German Flats succeeded in this regard.174 Despite warnings from 
General John Stark at Albany that ―Butler and Brandt are determined to pay us a visit‖ 
Walter Butler succeeded in surprising German Flats, destroying the settlement.175 The 
                                                 
172
 Swiggett, War Out of Niagara, p.141. 
173
 In the autumn of 1778, Butler‘s Rangers split into detachments. This was to be the way Butler 
intended to run his regiment. After Wyoming there are few instances of Butler‘s Rangers going into 
combat as a regiment. Butler‘s strategy would be to fight in groups of one or two companies 
accompanied by Iroquois warriors. They would raid patriot settlements and harass the enemy, and 
disrupt their supply lines. The plan was for Walter Butler to concentrate his efforts in the Mohawk 
Valley, particularly around Cherry Valley see, John Butler to General Haldimand, Niagara, 17 
September 1778, Add Mss 21756, f.137: Swiggett, War Out of Niagara, pp.141-143. 
174
Swiggett, War Out of Niagara, p.143; Williams, The Year of the Hangman, p. 118. 
175
 John Stark to George Washington Albany, 14 September 1778, cited in Howard Swiggett, War Out 
of Niagara, p. 142. 
 351 
Patriot commander at German Flatts, Colonel Peter Bellinger, wrote to New York 
Governor George Clinton that: 
The enemy burned sixty three dwelling houses, fifty seven 
barns, with grain and fodder, three grist mills, one saw mill, took 
away two hundred and thirty five horses, two hundred and twenty 
nine horned cattle, 269 sheep, killed and destroyed hogs and 
burned a great many outhouses.176 
This was a great embarrassment to the Patriots. Butler‘s Rangers were proving to 
be a very effective opposition, even in the absence of the main British Army.177 This also 
is a further example of the military skill and usefulness of Butler‘s Rangers as well as 
their Iroquois allies. They were hurting the Patriots‘ supply lines as well as providing 
weapons, ammunition and food to their own side. While these tactics earned them 
condemnation from the Patriots, the raids were undoubtedly damaging the Patriot cause 
on the Frontier. An example of the reaction they caused at the highest levels in the Patriot 
command is provided by Washington‘s letter to Governor George Clinton: 
Mr. Herkimer… gives a melancholy account of the 
distresses of the Inhabitants at the German Flatts. To defend an 
extensive frontier against the incursions of Indians and the 
Banditti under Butler and Brant is next to impossible; but still if 
you think the addition of another Regiment, ill as I can spare it, or 
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a change of position in the troops that are already upon the 
Frontier, will answer any good purpose, I will cheerfully 
comply.178 
Washington here pays Butler‘s Rangers one of the greatest backhanded 
compliments they could possibly have received. He calls them ―banditti‖ but he 
acknowledges their ability to strike almost anywhere on the frontier. Yet, given the 
stretched resources of the Patriots, it is all the more extraordinary that Walter Butler 
caused Washington to send a full regiment to deal with two companies of Rangers. 
The Patriot response to the German Flats Raid was an uncompromising one. 
Colonel William Butler was appointed to counter Walter Butler in the Mohawk Valley 
and in October he raided and destroyed Iroquois settlements at Undilla.179 These events 
created bitterness amongst Butler‘s Rangers and their Iroquois allies. Swiggett claims that 
the events of Cherry Valley were attributable in part to a desire for revenge for Undilla.180 
This does not excuse Butler‘s Rangers however, although it does demonstrate that the war 
in the Mohawk Valley in autumn 1778 was not a ―Gentleman‘s War‖ but a desperate 
fight for supremacy by men who all felt they had a claim to dominate local affairs. 
Walter Butler then moved to counter a Patriot force at Tioga, before returning to 
Cherry Valley to attack the fort there, on 11 November 1778. This is the most notorious 
day in the history of Butler‘s Rangers. A letter from Colonel Bolton to Haldimand 
describes Walter Butler‘s movements before the battle: 
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Captain Butler‘s little army of Rangers and Indians 
amount to eight hundred, and from his last letter he intends to 
attack Cherry Valley where the enemy have a large number of 
cattle and a large quantity of corn.181 
The basic facts of the action at Cherry Valley are: Walter Butler, with two 
companies of Rangers under Caldwell and McDonnell; Mohawks under Brant and 
Senecas under Chief Garganwahgah,  attacked the Patriot fort and settlement at Cherry 
Valley, under Col. Ichabod Alden, and succeeded in defeating the enemy 
comprehensively and killing Alden. After the battle, Butler failed to control the men 
under his command and thirty two civilians, including women and children, were killed. 
At Wyoming, civilians were only killed in the histories written in the early nineteenth 
century, at Cherry Valley it actually happened. From the various accounts of the action it 
appears that it was a catalogue of mistakes and over confidence on the part of the Patriots 
that allowed Butler‘s victory. Colonel Alden ignored or downplayed numerous warnings 
in the days before the battle telling him that Butler and Brant were approaching.182 
It is difficult for the modern historian to make sense out of the events of Cherry 
Valley, there are so many conflicting reports. Mann argues that it is ―almost impossible‖ 
to tell exactly what happened.183 Walter Butler blamed the Native Americans –although 
not Brant, who he insisted was humane- and Brant blamed Butler for inciting those under 
his command. Mann further argues that the Rangers committed many of the murders 
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themselves and were culpable in others.184 Brant would later accuse Butler of being 
―more savage than the savages‖ and would claim that ―the atrocities were mostly 
chargeable to Walter Butler.185 Brant‘s biographer, Stone, argues that while there was no 
evidence that Walter Butler participated in any atrocities personally, he was culpable, as it 
was his expedition. This is a similar charge to the one laid on Tarleton for Waxhaws, and 
in Butler‘s case it has even more validity as unlike Tarleton, he was not hors de combat at 
any time. Mann‘s recent work attempts to put the record straight from the perspective of 
the Iroquois and she defends Brant, arguing that it was not Iroquois policy to make war 
on women and children. She concedes that many of the murders were done by Iroquois, 
as well as some by Rangers, but that Butler was guilty of inciting them.  
It was very easy for pro-Loyalist historians like Cruikshank and Swiggett, who 
were revising the established facts, to refute everything in traditional Whig 
historiography, and write it all off as propaganda. Much of it is, but at Cherry Valley 
there is at least a considerable basis in fact. Thirty two civilians were killed, and there is 
evidence that some of them were killed by the Rangers. Swiggett questioned Brant‘s 
honesty. He wrote ―What more easy than a savage, who was to murder his own son than 
to charge the dead Butler with his crimes?‖186 Swiggett‘s racism is difficult to deal with 
and on the charge of Butler being dead; he lived three more years and actually did defend 
himself against the charges of inhumanity. In his report to written on 17 November, he 
refutes all blame: 
I have much to lament that notwithstanding my utmost 
precautions and endeavours to save the Women and Children, I 
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could not prevent some of them falling unhappy victims to the 
Fury of the Savages... The death of the women and Children upon 
this occasion may be truly ascribed to the Rebels having falsely 
accused the Indians of Cruelty at Wyomen, this has much 
exasperated them, and they were still more incensed at finding the 
Colonel and those men who had laid down their Arms, soon after 
marching into their country intending to destroy their villages and 
they declared they would be no more falsely accused, or fight the 
enemy twice, meaning they would in future give no quarters.187 
Thus he lays the entire blame on the Native Americans. He also claims that the 
Patriots had surrendered, then they had taken up arms again and had attempted to destroy 
Iroquois villages. Walter Butler would repeat this claim in a letter to the Patriot General, 
James Clinton. Clinton wrote to Walter Butler on the subject of prisoner exchanges, and 
also charged him with inhumanity. Clinton, in his understated way, accused Butler and 
the Rangers of great crimes: 
I should hope for the sake of human nature and the sake 
and honour of civilized nations, that the British officers had 
restrained themselves in restraining the barbarity of the savages. 
But it is difficult for even the most disinterested mind to believe it 
as numerous instances of barbarity have been perpetrated where 
the Savages were not present-or if they were British force was not 
sufficient to restrain them, had there been a real desire to do so.188 
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This is a very eloquent accusation of Butler, Butler‘s Rangers and the British in 
general. Clinton goes on to mention that Mrs Butler (John Butler‘s wife and Walter‘s 
mother, then held at Albany) was lucky not to have fallen victim to retribution and the 
fact that she hadn‘t, was due to the  ―humane principles‖ of her Patriot captors. Walter 
Butler was understandably incensed by this, and replied to defend himself. This type of 
exchange between two Americans on opposing sides is very rare- normally prisoner 
exchange letters were brief and functional- and therefore repays close study. In Walter 
Butler‘s reply he once again refutes all charges against himself and the Rangers: 
Though you should call it inhumanity the killing men in 
the field we in that case plead guilty. The inhabitants killed at 
Cherry Valley does not lay at my door- my conscience acquits. If 
any are guilty (as accessories) it‘s yourselves at least the conduct 
of your officers... I must however, beg leave to observe that I 
experienced no humanity or even common justice, during my 
experience among you.189 
To ask what motivates men to commit these kinds of crimes is a very difficult 
question. Dave Grossman has analysed what motivates soldiers to commit atrocities and 
concludes that there is no one factor.190 Butler‘s Rangers were certainly motivated by 
revenge, but if that was the case, why did they not behave like that at Wyoming or indeed 
on every other occasion they went into battle?191  In the same way that Waxhaws is a 
turning point for the British Legion in demonising their reputation so is Cherry Valley for 
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Butler‘s Rangers. One of the principal causes of Waxhaws was the temporary loss of the 
Legion‘s commander, Butler's Rangers have no such excuse. Walter Butler was present 
throughout the battle. He would later refute all allegations of brutality and release all 
surviving civilians but the damage was done. Mann and others have made the case that 
Walter Butler whipped his men, both Ranger and Iroquois into such a state of rage and 
indignation that outrage was almost inevitable. Separating the fact from the myth is a very 
difficult task but there is a case for suggesting that Walter Butler was at least partially to 
blame. There is no evidence that he personally committed any crimes and while he 
claimed that he tried to stop events there is also evidence that he did not. 
The moral reputation of Butler‘s Rangers would never properly recover. There 
was little if any censure for Walter Butler. The British were pleased at the victory, and 
Walter Butler received no official condemnation. Haldimand wrote to John Butler, in 
December, expressing disapproval at the ―cruelties of the Indians‖ but there was no 
censure of the Rangers themselves.192 However, Walter Butler would never again receive 
an independent command and he remained a Captain for the rest of his life.193 
 
1779-1782: Tragedy and Triumph 
                                                 
192
 Haldimand to John Butler, Quebec, 25 December 1778, Add Mss 21756, f.84. 
193
 In 1781, his father petitioned on his behalf for him to be promoted to Major. The request was turned 
down by Haldimand. Haldimand‘s aide, Capt. Mathews, informed John Butler, in a letter ironically 
written two days after Walter Butler‘s death, that while Haldimand was ―desirous to reward Captain 
Butler‘s merits,‖ he could not ―promote him to the rank of Major over the heads of so many elder and 
more experienced officers.‖ This is interesting, as Butler had served continuously for six years and was 
twenty nine years old. Banastre Tarleton had been promoted to Major after two years service, at the age 
of 24, and there were similar early promotions in the Provincial Service, for Simcoe and Rawdon. As it 
is difficult to accuse Haldimand of anti American prejudice-he had no problem with promoting John 
Butler to Lt. Col., in 1780 – it is therefore possible that the events of Cherry Valley were still - 
unofficially- being held against Walter Butler three years later. See, John Butler to Capt. Mathews, 21 
September  1781, Niagara, Add Mss 21765, ff.284-285; Capt. Mathews to John Butler, 1 November 
1781, Quebec, Add Mss 21765 ff. 157-158. 
 358 
The next three years saw Butler‘s Rangers fight many actions on the frontiers. 
They won many of them but as the Patriots began to gain the upper hand in the war the 
Rangers were frequently outnumbered and under resourced and they also lost several 
engagements. At no point however, were they ever routed in combat and the regiment 
held together as a coherent unit until 1784.  
 After the defeats of 1778, the Patriots began to turn things around on the New 
York frontier, winning several victories in 1779. In the summer of 1779 General John 
Sullivan launched a major campaign against the Iroquois, British and Loyalist forces on 
the New York frontier. He had far superior numbers and was successful in defeating them 
and at the battle of Newtown on 16 August.194  Interestingly, Sullivan‘s expedition utterly 
destroyed several Six Nations villages and left the inhabitants without winter provisions, 
effectively dooming them to starvation.195 What it emphasises is that the frontier war was 
a brutal and vengeful affair where the civilian population did not escape unscathed on 
either side. After Sullivan‘s successful campaign, the frontier became less crucial to the 
Patriots as the focal point of the war switched to the South in late 1779. So Butler‘s 
Rangers had not succeeded entirely in their mission to divert troops from elsewhere but 
they still managed to keep a substantial number of Patriots occupied in the years to come. 
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Butler‘s Rangers, in conjunction with Brant‘s Iroquois warriors and Sir John 
Johnson‘s battalions, continued to wage war on the frontiers with sporadic success 
throughout 1780 and 1781. Then in late 1781 the Patriots claimed one of their biggest 
scalps, literally. On the 26 October 1781 the Patriots under Colonel Marinus Willett-for 
once outnumbered themselves-were victorious over a raiding expedition commanded by 
Major John Ross, of the Kings Royal Regiment of New York, at the Battle of 
Johnstown.196 Ross‘ command comprised of two companies of his own regiment, Walter 
Butler and one hundred and fifty Rangers, one hundred and thirty Six Nations warriors 
and small detachments of the 84th (formerly the Royal Highland Emigrants), 34th and 8th 
regiments.197 They were defeated by Willet and forced into retreat. Ross‘ casualties were: 
eleven killed, eleven wounded and thirty two captured.198 As if the loss to a numerically 
inferior enemy was not humiliating enough for the Rangers, there was an unfortunate 
aftermath to the battle. Four days later, the retreating Walter Butler, with forty Rangers, 
was surprised while camping for the night, near the West Canada Creek, by Willett and 
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his Oneida Indian allies. Butler and four Rangers were killed.199 Butler and the other dead 
were scalped by the Oneida Indians. 
The recollections of several soldiers who served at Johnstown and its aftermath 
convey the level of satisfaction amongst the Patriots at Walter Butler‘s death.200 Private 
Hugh Connolly of the Tryon County Militia recorded how after surprising Butler he and 
his comrades ―then pursued them as far as Canada Creek there Capt. Butler was killed 
that commanded the Tories. We then returned back the Indians that were with us had the 
scalps that they carried on a pole."201 Private Frederick Ullman took satisfaction in 
recording that ―Butler then the Commander of Indians and tories was shot Dead, and 
Recollects that he felt happy that it took place.202  This rejoicing was perhaps summed up 
best by Colonel Willett himself, who in his memoirs wrote,  
During the four years that had elapsed from his conviction as a 
spy, to the time of his death, he had exhibited more instances of 
enterprise, had done more injury, and committed more murders, 
than any other man on the frontiers. Such was the terror of the 
local inhabitants of the frontiers, so cruel a scourge had he been to 
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them, that though Cornwallis‘ surrender took place about this 
time, yet the inhabitants expressed more joy at the death of Butler, 
than the capture of Cornwallis.203 
This eloquent testament encapsulates the feelings of the Patriots at the death of 
one of their most hated enemies. For Butler‘s Rangers, the death of Walter Butler was 
also a severe blow to both their pride and morale. They had not taken substantial losses at 
Johnstown and Canada Creek, but the death of their second in command affected both 
their organisation and morale. With the exception of the Detroit detachment of Butler‘s 
Rangers under William Caldwell-see below- they saw little action after 1781. As recorded 
earlier in the chapter, Major Potts stated that they were still suffering from the effects of 
Walter Butler‘s loss in 1783. On hearing the news, Haldimand expressed his condolence 
to John Butler, stating in a letter to Brigadier Powell- Bolton‘s replacement as 
commander of Niagara- that Powell was to ―acquaint Colonel Butler that I most sincerely 
lament and condole with him the loss of Captain Butler- his good understanding, of the 
honourable cause in which he fell, will assist in consoling him in his heavy 
misfortune.‖204 Whether or not John Butler was genuinely condoled by belief in the 
British cause is unrecorded, but Butler‘s Rangers did fight on. 
In every other theatre of the war, the year 1782 was a quiet one. The Patriots had 
triumphed at Yorktown in October 1781 and it was generally held that the war was 
essentially over. The main British armies waited at Charleston and New York, doing little 
to provoke the Patriots. However, the war on the frontiers raged on. This is because the 
British may have been reconciled to the fact of eventually losing the territory that was 
shortly to become the United States but they were still determined to hold onto Canada 
and as much of the frontier as they could. So while most Loyalist Regiments did garrison  
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Map 8: The War on the Western Frontiers 
 
Source: Hugh Bicheno, Rebels and Redcoats, (London, 2003) p. 133 
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duty and other non combat tasks, Butler‘s Rangers were still in the thick of the fighting. 
In many respects, 1782 was one of the regiment‘s most successful years. They were very 
much needed to defend the frontiers and to make sure that the Patriots did not seize 
Canada. As a result their numbers actually increased between 1781 and 1783 which is in 
contrast to the Loyalist regiments based in New York or Charleston.205 
In 1780, William Caldwell‘s company had been detached to Detroit to serve 
under Major Arent De Peyster.206 It was Caldwell‘s detachment and not the rest of 
Butler‘s Rangers, who were still based at Niagara, which would play a major role in the 
events of the summer of 1782, in Ohio and Kentucky. Once more Butler‘s Rangers would 
be implicated in events that breached the accepted rules of war, although on this occasion 
their role in them was minimal. The events were precipitated by another dreadful act of 
violence, this time on the part of the Patriots. 
On 8 March 1782 over one hundred Moravian Christian Indians had been 
massacred by Pennsylvania Militia at Gnadenhutten mission.207 In response to this the 
Delaware Indians had enacted numerous reprisals on the Ohio frontier which had plunged 
the whole territory into chaos. A Patriot expedition under Colonel William Crawford set 
out in early summer to stabilise the territory, and reached the Sandusky Valley of Ohio by 
early June.208 Caldwell, and his company of Rangers from Detroit, were hastily 
despatched to Sandusky, where they linked up with Delaware Indians under the command 
of the local Indian Agent, Matthew Elliot.209 In a two day battle, on 5 and 6 June the 
                                                 
205
 See Table 19. 
206
 Maj. Arent de Peyster 1736-1822, commander at Detroit 1779-1783, see DCB, 
http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=2831 accessed 6/5/09. 
207
 Maj. De Peyster  to Gen. Haldimand, 13 May 1782, Detroit, Add Mss, 21783 f.283, BL: Earl P. 
Olmstead David Zeisberger: a Life among the Indians, (Kent, OH, 1997) pp.225-229;Nester, The 
Frontier War, p.323 
208
 William Crawford 1732-1782 see ANB Vol.5, pp.710-11; Nester, The Frontier War, pp.324-326. 
209
 Matthew Elliot, 1739-114, was an Irishman, who had lived in Ohio since 1763 See, DCB 
http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=2395 accessed 6/5/2009. 
 364 
Rangers and the Delawares utterly defeated Crawford. It is another example of the skill of 
Butler‘s Rangers in this type of warfare. They were heavily outnumbered but in this case, 
completely successful. The affair however, had an unfortunate aftermath, when Crawford 
and some of his men, whilst fleeing from the battle, were captured and tortured to death 
by the Delawares, in the presence of Elliot, who did nothing to stop it. Caldwell and the 
Rangers were not present but it once more exemplifies the harsh realities of the frontier 
war. Haldimand, while recognising the bravery and skill of the Rangers, condemned the 
reprisal and attributed it to an act of vengeance for Gnadenhutten.210 
Caldwell did not rest on his laurels after Sandusky. On 19 August 1782, with fifty 
Rangers and 300 Native Americans he won an even greater victory at the battle of Blue 
Licks in Kentucky. In July, Caldwell and Elliot with a force of Rangers had raised a force 
of Native Americans of various nations, to combat a projected expedition into Ohio by 
the Patriot General, George Rogers-Clark. Rogers-Clark did not go through with his 
expedition, so Caldwell took the offensive, marching into Kentucky and besieging the fort 
at Bryan‘s Station. The Patriots raised a force to combat them, led by the famous 
frontiersman, Lt. Colonel Daniel Boone, of the Kentucky militia. Using all the skill 
acquired from five years of frontier fighting, Caldwell and his force ambushed the 
Kentucky militia and routed them.211 The victory was short lived, Caldwell and his force-
ordered to act defensively- retreated to Detroit and Rogers-Clark regained control of the 
area in November 1782. 
Caldwell and his Rangers had proved that Butler‘s Rangers were a superb fighting 
unit even after the defeat of the main British Army. They had demonstrated their 
adeptness at co-operating with the Native Americans and that they could take on 
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experienced Patriot forces and emerge victorious. Although the general tide of the war 
had turned against them, Butler‘s Rangers arguably retired undefeated. 
The Rangers remained at Detroit and Niagara until late 1784 when they were 
disbanded.212 John Butler took a prominent role in the post war government of Canada, as 
Deputy Superintendent of the Six Nations and was a close friend and advisor to the 
Governor of Upper Canada, John Graves Simcoe, in the 1790‘s.213 He died aged 67 in 
1796. Caldwell, established the township of Malden, near Detroit, and attempted to settle 
it with retired Rangers.214 Many of the Rangers took active parts in the building of the 
Canadian state and some of their descendants would similarly follow careers in the upper 
reaches of Canadian society. 
Butler‘s Rangers and the Native Americans. 
As can be seen throughout this section on Butler‘s Rangers in combat, in almost 
every engagement that the regiment fought they were accompanied by Native Americans. 
This brief section will asses the nature of the co-operation. In the work of earlier 
historians such as Swiggett and Cruikshank the relationship between the Rangers and the 
Native Americans is very much with the Rangers in the lead, unless the Native Americans 
transgress the rules of war in which case, particularly with Swiggett, the Rangers were not 
to blame for these actions. However, recent historians, such as Mann, Taylor and Kelsay 
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have demonstrated that the relationship was much more complex.215 Were the Rangers 
actually merely an adjunct to their Native American allies and were their successes only 
achievable because of the large scale presence of Native Americans? Have pro Butler 
historians been guilty of minimising the role of Native Americans in their accounts of the 
regiment? The answers are, in many cases, yes, particularly in the case of the two 
historians mentioned above. John Butler began his career in the Revolutionary as a 
translator to Joseph Brant and it was Brant‘s idea to first use Rangers alongside Native 
Americans.216 Butler‘s Rangers operations were dependant on Native American support 
and it was undoubtedly the fear of the vengeance of Native Americans that kept the 
Patriots on edge on the frontier and ensured that they rarely achieved superiority. As 
Mann and Williams have pointed out many of the operations of Butler‘s Ranger arose out 
of vengeance for actions carried out on the Native Americans and were often dictated by 
their strategic requirements. This does not mean that the Rangers were in a subordinate 
position to the Native Americans. Many of them spoke Native American languages and 
used Native American tactics to their own advantage in combat. John Butler was well 
aware of the value of the close relationship. He had devoted his life to living in close 
proximity to Native Americans and would go on doing so after the Revolution. The 
British too were well aware of the extraordinary value of having Native American allies 
and although their co-operation was far from perfect they attempted to make use of them 
to further their own cause, as Allen argues throughout his work.217 As has been argued 
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earlier, John Butler was, as well as being an effective commander of rangers, a valuable 
agent in ensuring a smooth co-operation with the Native Americans. So to conclude, were 
the Native Americans the true victors of many of the regiment‘s actions? The answer is 
not a clear cut one; it is possible to suggest that both groups needed the other and that 
their success depended on both sides performing their combat duties effectively.  
Conclusion 
As a regiment, Butler‘s Rangers were both highly successful and highly 
controversial. They were feted in Canada and despised in the United States. While this 
could be true of most Loyalist regiments, with Butler‘s Rangers the contrast is even more 
apparent. By examining not just their combat record, but their administrative record this 
chapter has dealt with Butler‘s Rangers as a military community and not just a legendary 
or infamous group. Close examination of them provides a picture of the Revolutionary 
War that is very different from the experience of those who served in the main 
campaigns. They were an American-commanded regiment who had a considerable 
amount of autonomy. This autonomy extended to administration as well as combat duties. 
Whilst in combat duties, the autonomy they were given, largely worked in their favour, 
administratively, it was often a hindrance as the commanders were faced with 
responsibilities that most of their contemporaries escaped. This led to anxieties over lack 
of supplies and over the amount of money that had to be spent on the regiment. 
The British however, did not skimp on Butler‘s Rangers. They spent a 
disproportionate amount of money on them and were largely rewarded for this 
expenditure by having a dependable and reliable force on the frontier. In many respects 
however, the reputation of Butler‘s Rangers was not one that did the British any service. 
While they were not guilty of all the crimes held against them, they were guilty of some 
and those crimes helped to inspire Patriot resistance on the frontiers. The rejoicing at 
Walter Butler‘s death was not created out of nothing, there was some substance behind 
 368 
the hatred he engendered. Also, while the names of John and Walter Butler were reviled 
in the USA, it is important to state that at least some of the Rangers were equally guilty of 
the crimes. As has been illustrated in the latter half of this chapter, the frontier war was a 
nasty, brutal affair and both sides were guilty of atrocities toward the civilian populace. 
To use the old cliché, history is written by the winners, and many of the harsh deeds of 
the Patriots against the Native Americans, were downplayed, whereas the violence 
committed by Butler‘s Rangers and their Native American allies was brought to the fore. 
This chapter has not attempted to clear Butler‘s Ranger‘s of all crimes, that is impossible, 
but to place them within the context of a bloody period in American history.
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Dissertation Conclusion 
After the surrender at Yorktown, those Provincial units attached to 
Cornwallis‘s army were eventually returned to New York. The southern militias 
however, kept up a guerrilla war until into 1783. There were also some skirmishes in 
New York. The Negro Horse, for example won a skirmish on the New York frontier in 
1782 and Butler‘s Rangers continued to wage war successfully on the frontiers in 1782. 
Most of the Loyalist regiments were demobilised in Canada and many of the soldiers 
settled there. They are superbly chronicled by their Canadian descendants.1 Those 
Loyalists who stayed in what became the USA are less well chronicled. There were 
many who presumably, must have kept their war service very quiet and returned to their 
home state. The Royal Highland Emigrants became a British regiment as the 84th 
Highlanders and the Queens Rangers currently exist in the Canadian Army as the 
Queens York Rangers. The other regiments were disbanded. Most of the prominent 
officers settled in Canada or Great Britain. Robert Rogers died in poverty in London.2 
John Simcoe became Governor General of Canada and was appointed Commander in 
Chief in India but died on active service in the Napoleonic Wars before he could take up 
the appointment. Tarleton became a full general but never saw combat again. His rise to 
the top was assisted by a succession of well-placed mistresses. John Butler became a 
wealthy and respected citizen in Canada. Lord Rawdon became a successful general, 
cabinet minister and Viceroy of India. Although many Loyalists received pensions or 
compensation from the British government this was in the main restricted to property 
owners or officers. Most of the Rank-and-file received little financial compensation but 
many were given land in Canada. 
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This dissertation has demonstrated that the Loyalists deserve a greater 
place in the history of the Revolutionary war and in British and American military 
history. Their influence on future American soldiers was largely indirect, the 
experience that the British had with the Loyalists would greatly influence their use 
of colonial troops in the decades to come. By examining wider aspects than battles, 
the dissertation has shown that the Loyalist regiments were complex groups. The 
first two chapters, by examining, the changing conditions over time, combat, 
discipline, recruiting, supply issues, motivation, and composition have demonstrated 
that studying the Loyalists fully is more than just who fought where and when. The 
case studies confirm this complexity. The database on the Queens Rangers 
demonstrates fully the harsh conditions faced by the soldiers. For example, the table 
on absences details the amount of men falling prey to sickness, which highlights the 
hardships of being a soldier in the eighteenth century as much as any detailed 
account of a battle. The dissertation has argued that no one regiment was the same, 
their composition and motivations varied enormously but every regiment examined 
in the case studies contained a large number of committed men. The database shows 
that there were men who remained committed for the course of the war and the 
chapters on the British Legion and Butler‘s Rangers have shown that they had men 
of equal commitment who risked all for their regiments. This would suggest that 
those in charge of the regiments did something right. These men were prepared to 
risk everything for the British cause and the fact remained until the bitter end 
demonstrates that the British did not let the Loyalists down completely. 
The Loyalists regiments were ultimately dependent on the British. Because 
the British lost the war the Loyalists lost their homes and their property. However, did 
it have to be this way? By assimilating the Loyalists into their army, did the British 
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actually do both themselves and the Loyalists a disservice? Could the British have got 
more out of the Loyalists than they did?  In most of the traditional European style 
pitched battles fought in the Revolution, the British generally emerged as the victors.3  
The kind of tactics that hurt the British were the guerrilla and light infantry style 
tactics practised by Stark and Morgan and others- tactics that used the terrain against 
the British, because in an open field the British Army with its superior training held all 
the advantages. Light infantry sharpshooters would play major roles in the American 
victories at Saratoga and Kings Mountain and in both cases the Patriots used the 
terrain to their advantage. In the Loyalists the British had the facility to hit the 
Americans back with same weapons. The Loyalists could have provided a similar 
service to the British earlier on in the war, had circumstances been different. The man 
who practically invented these tactics, Robert Rogers, was a Loyalist officer but for 
various reasons -including his own failings- his potential was never realised. Simcoe, 
his eventual successor to the command of the Queens Rangers, similarly mastered 
guerrilla tactics and is considered to one of the best tacticians of the Revolutionary 
War, as his intelligent and well written journal shows, but Simcoe rarely commanded 
more than a regiment.  
 The Loyalists were more adept at handling the conditions of their native 
country than the British. If the likes of Rogers or Simcoe had been allowed full rein to 
operate guerrilla tactics on a larger scale in the Northern campaigns then it is possible 
that the effect of the Loyalists would have been considerable. As it was, the British 
only really began to use the Loyalists effectively after 1778, and although they did 
have successes by then it was really too late and the war was lost because of other 
larger circumstances like the French intervention. Although it is difficult to criticise 
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the British for funding the later Loyalists regiments, if they had moved more 
efficiently earlier on, as Smith argues, then the Loyalists could quite conceivably have 
had a greater impact.  
It is interesting to briefly compare the Loyalists with the Continental 
Army. The two forces are rarely discussed together yet, they were both American 
forces raised in America at the same time from men, who were maybe not similar in 
motivation but who had similarities in almost everything else. Family members 
represented different sides and some men even represented both sides. The previously 
quoted comment from the Loyalist, Major Dulany, that ―I never forgot I was an 
American‖ seems relevant here.4 For all the debate about the national origins of many 
Loyalists, ultimately the regiments consisted of men whose home was America and 
who had been moulded by that environment. The Continental Army too contained 
foreign born men who were expected to think of themselves as Americans. How easy 
was it for exiled Loyalists after the war to stop thinking of themselves as Americans 
but instead as Canadians or Britons? Equally, as mentioned above, the two forces used 
similar tactics. Both used Light Infantry and Ranger tactics and both attempted to 
adapt─ with varying degrees of success to European style tactics. Loyalists and 
Patriots then are not as far removed as was often posited by post Revolutionary 
writers. 
The presence of the Loyalists on the Revolutionary War battlefields 
created something resembling a civil war. Particularly in the South they participated 
in counter-insurgency against the Patriots. The dissertation has demonstrated that the 
American Revolutionary war was not just the Patriots against the British but in 
many cases, the Loyalists against the Patriots. Could the Revolution then, conceivably 
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have been a fully-fledged civil war?  Smith and Brown calculate there was enough 
Loyalist support for something along the lines of a civil war. However, the Loyalists did 
not join in large enough numbers for this to happen. Smith and Calhoon both blame the 
British for this. Yet it is possible to argue that this is not entirely the case. The British 
did make mistakes that discouraged Loyalists but they also did much to encourage them. 
The fact that recruits did not join in large numbers is surely as much to do with the way 
the war was going and the popularity of the Patriot cause as it had to do with poor 
recruiting tactics. The Loyalists, as Calhoon argues, produced no great military leaders 
like a Lee or a Jackson and the one potential great they had, Rogers, came to nothing 
because of his own self destructive nature.5 In terms of organisation they were inferior 
to the Confederacy as in terms of turning public support into recruits. The Confederacy 
managed to produce several hundred thousand recruits in an area confined to the South, 
compared to 19,000 Loyalists who could recruit in the North as well. Of course the 
population in the eighteenth century was considerably smaller. There are several reasons 
for this lack of real support, the attitudes of the British Army and government being an 
important factor. However, by blaming the British solely for the failure of the Loyalist 
cause it is possible to miss the point. The British had a lot to worry about during the 
Revolutionary War. They were also fighting an international war, with the French, 
Dutch and the Spanish. After Saratoga the war had become very difficult to win. They 
attempted to encourage Loyalism to bolster their cause. Was there enough natural 
support to do this? In New York, which was supposedly the one colony where the 
Loyalists were expected to rise en masse, the British struggled to fill the regiments with 
volunteers. The irony is that some of the strongest Loyalist support came not in areas 
where the British were present but in areas that were on the front line or were occupied 
by the Patriots. Many Massachusetts men risked their lives making their way to the 
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British lines to join a regiment. It was of course a similar story in the south where 
militias waged war on the Patriots well behind the lines. These men were often unpaid 
and their service often went unrecognised by the British as many of them stayed behind 
after 1783, and thus claimed no pension or compensation, yet they were arguably some 
of the most committed Loyalists. The reasons for indifference among people who might 
naturally be Loyalists are also complicated. Not everyone, of course, is willing to put 
their life on the line for a political cause. Also, once it looked as though the British 
might lose it was eminently sensible for prospective Loyalists to reserve judgement. 
After all, by the late 1770s, the risks of becoming Loyalists were plain for all to see. 
Property and land were confiscated by order of the Continental Congress and the new 
state governments. Also many Loyalists were put to death, although this was never 
officially sanctioned. There is also the argument that people who sympathised with the 
British cause did not want to fight against their fellow citizens. Civil wars are confused 
affairs and it is normal that friends and families end up on opposing sides. The Delancey 
family, for example, supplied prominent Loyalists and Patriots. Robert Rogers was 
extremely reluctant to take arms against Americans and John Cuneo argues that while 
he gave the Queens Rangers full commitment he never really recovered from having to 
fight his friends.6 
Yet despite these factors people volunteered for the Loyalist cause up until 1783, 
two years after Cornwallis‘s surrender at Yorktown, which had effectively ended the war. 
This proves that there was always support for the Loyalist cause. It was not always 
concentrated support, which was a problem, but there is still reason for believing that the 
Loyalists could have been used more effectively. The story of the armed Loyalists then is 
one of failed potential, and because of their fate in losing their homes, it is ultimately a 
tragic one.
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Brig. Gen. Timothy Ruggles Proposal for the Formation of 
the Boston Association November 1774. 
1. That we will upon all occasions, with our lives, and 
fortunes, stand by and assist each other, in the defence of 
his Life, Liberty and Property, whenever the same shall be 
attacked, or endangered by any Bodies of Men, riotously 
assembled, upon any pretences of authority, nor warranted 
by the Laws of the Land 
2. That we will upon all occasions, mutually support each 
other in the free exercise of eating drinking, buying, selling, 
communing, and acting, what with whom, and as we please 
consistent with the Laws of God and the King. 
3. That we will not acknowledge, or submit to the pretended 
authority of any Congresses, Committees of 
Correspondence, or any other unconstitutional Assemblies 
of Men; but will at the risqué of our Lives, if need be 
oppose the forceable exercise of all such authority. 
4. That we will to the utmost of our Power, promote, 
encourage, and when called to it enforce obedience of our 
most gracious Sovereign King George the third and of his 
Laws. 
5. That when the Person of Property of any one of us shall be 
invaded or threatned by any Committees, mobs or unlawful 
Assemblies, the others of us will upon notice received 
 ii 
forthwith repair, properly armed, to the Person on whom, or 
place where such invasion or threatning shall be, and will to 
the utmost of our Power, defend such Person and his 
Property, and if need be, will oppose and repel force with 
force. 
6. That if any one person of us shall unjustly and unlawfully 
be injured in his Person or Property, by any such 
Assemblies as before mentioned, the others of us will 
united demand, and in our Power compel the Offenders, if 
known, to make all remuneration and satisfaction for such 
Injury; and if all other means of security fail, we will have 
recourse to the natural Law of Retaliation. 
Source: 
 
Boston Evening Post 26 December 1774, Harbottle Dorr 
Collection.
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Appendix 2: Table of Provincial Regiments Raised 1776- 1783. 
 
Provincial Regiments 1776-1783.
 1
 
Regiment Where Formed Date of 
Formatio
n 
Date 
Disbanded 
Commander
2
 
1. Black 
Pioneers
3
 
North 
Carolina  
May 
1776 
1783 George Martin 
2. Delancey‘s 
Regiment
4
 
Long Island, 
New York  
Septemb
er 1776 
1783 Oliver Delancey 
3. Guides and 
Pioneers
5
 
New York 
City, New 
York  
Decemb
er 1776 
1783 Samuel 
Holland/Andreas 
Emmerich/Simon 
Fraser/Beverly 
Robinson/John 
Aldington 
4. King‘s 
American 
Regiment
6
 
New York 
City, New 
York  
Decemb
er 1776 
1783 Edmund Fanning 
5. King‘s Orange 
Rangers7 
Orange 
County, New 
York  
Autumn 
1776 
1783 John Bayard 
6. King‘s Royal 
Regiment of 
New York8 
Frontiers of 
New York 
June 
1776 
1784 John Johnson 
                                                 
1 This table lists substantive units formed and administered by the Provincial Service of the British Army. There were numerous 
other Loyalist units which were listed either as militia associators, or local units. Most of the units mentioned were intended to be 
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http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/delancey/dellet2.htm  accessed 8/11/2008. 
5 A brief history of the regiment is online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/g&p/gphist.htm accessed 8/11/2008. 
6 Warrant for Raising the King‘s American Rangers, 18 December 1776, Orderly Book of the King‘s American Rangers, 
Clements Library, Online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/kar/kar1hist.htm accessed 8/11/2008. 
7 Lt Col. John Bayard to Brig. Gen. Francis MacLean, Memorial (1780)  Clinton Papers Vol 221 f.14, Clements Library, online 
at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/kor/kormem1.htm accessed 8/11/2008. 
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7. New Jersey 
Volunteers 
(Skinner‘s Greens) 
6 Battalions9 
New Jersey  June-
Decemb
er 1776 
1783 Cordlandt Skinner 
8. New York 
Volunteers
10
 
Halifax, Nova 
Scotia  
January 
1776 
1783 George Turnbull 
9. Nova Scotia 
Volunteers 
Halifax, Nova 
Scotia 
October 
1775 
1783 Francis Legge 
10. Prince of 
Wales 
Volunteers11 
Long Island, 
New York  
Novemb
er 1776 
1783 Montfort Browne 
11. Queens 
Rangers12 
Long Island, 
New York  
August 
1776 
1783 Robert Rogers/ 
Christopher French/ 
James Wemyss/ 
John Graves 
Simcoe/John 
Saunders 
12. Royal Fencible 
Volunteers 
Halifax, Nova 
Scotia 
June 
1775 
1783 Joseph Gorham 
13. Royal 
Highland 
Emigrants (2 
Battallions) 
Halifax N.S. June 
1775 
1783 Allan MacLean 
14. American 
Legion
13
 
New York 
City 
October 
1780 
1783 Benedict Arnold 
15. American 
Volunteers
14
 
New York 
City  
Decemb
er 1779 
1780 Patrick Fergusson 
16. British Long Island, August 1783 Lord 
Cathcart/Banastre 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Guy Carleton to Lord Barrington, 8 June 1776, WO1/2 ff. 315, online at  
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9William S. Stryker, The New Jersey Volunteers in the Revolutionary War (Trenton, NJ, 1867 ) pp.4-5; Paul H. Smith, ―New 
Jersey Loyalists and the British Provincial Corps in the War for Independence‖ in New Jersey History, 87 (1969) pp.69-78. 
10 See section in this chapter. 
11 Lt. Col Montfort Browne to Lord Dartmouth, 2 November 1776, Dartmouth Papers, D (w) 1778/II/1714, Staffordshire Record 
Office, Online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/pwar/pwarlet1.htm accessed 8/11/2008. 
12 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
13 Benedict Arnold‘s regiment, see Recruiting Notice Royal Gazette, 25 October 1780 online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/amlegn/amlgproc.htm accessed 9/11/2008. 
14 This was not a full regiment but was instead a company sized detachment drawn from other Provincial regiments and intended 
to be an elite unit of Provincial marksmen commanded by Major Patrick Ferguson.  They were the only Provincial unit at Kings 
Mountain-the rest of the combatants were Loyalist Militia- where they were wiped out, see Ferguson to Rawdon, December 11, 
New York, Clinton Papers, Vol. 80 f.8 Clements Library online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/amvol/amvlet1.htm accessed 9/11/08; Extract of a Letter from an Officer at 
Charlestown 30 January 1781, in  
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Legion
15
 New York  1778 Tarleton 
17. Bucks County 
Light 
Dragoons
16
* 
Bucks County 
Pennsylvania 
April 
1778 
1780 Abraham Sandford 
18. Butler‘s 
Rangers
17
 
Niagara, New 
York  
August 
1777 
1784 John Butler 
19. Caledonian 
Volunteers
18
* 
New York 
City, New 
York  
June 
1778 
1778 Lord Cathcart 
20. Emmerich‘s 
Chasseurs
19
 
Kingsbridge, 
New York  
August 
1777 
1779 Andreas Emmerick 
21. Georgia Light 
Dragoons
20
 
Savannah, 
Georgia  
August 
1779 
1781 Archibald Campbell 
22. Georgia 
Loyalists21 
Savannah, 
Georgia  
August 
1779 
1782 James Wright 
23. King‘s 
American 
Dragoons22 
New York 
City  
June 
1780 
1783 Timothy Ruggles 
24. King‘s 
Rangers23* 
Quebec  June 
1779 
1783 Robert Rogers/ 
James Rogers 
25. King‘s 
Carolina 
Rangers 24 
Savannah 
Georgia  
January 
1779 
1783 Thomas Brown 
                                                 
15 See Chapter 5. 
16 This unit was attached to the Queens Rangers in 1779 and eventually merged into the British Legion Sees Rangers Part 2 and 
British Legion Chapter; Recruiting Notice, Royal Pennsylvania Gazette, 21 April 1778. 
17 See Butler‘s Rangers Chapter. 
18 This regiment only existed under this name for a  few weeks before being combined with several cavalry companies  to 
become the British Legion, see British Legion Chapter. 
19 Orders from Lt. Gen. Henry Clinton to Maj. Gen. Tryon,  21 August 1777, Orderly Book of the Kings American Regiment, 
Clements Library, online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/emmerick/emmords.htm accessed 9/11/2008 
20 Recruiting Notice, Royal Georgia Gazette, 4 August 1779, online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/gald2/gld2rcrt.htm accessed 9/11/2008. 
21 Recruiting Notice, Royal Georgia Gazette, 12 August 1779, online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/galoy/galrcrt.htm accessed 9/11/2008. 
22 This was a unit formed by the veteran  Massachusetts soldier and politician Timothy Ruggles. Germain to Clinton, 7 June 
1780, Whitehall, PRO 30/55/2812 PRO also online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/kad/kadplan2.htm accessed 
9/11/2008. 
23 This was Robert Rogers‘ second Regiment, see Add Mss 21820 BL. 
24 This regiment was formed out of the East Florida Rangers and renamed by Brig. Gen Prevost in 1779, see Memorial of Lt 
Col. Thomas Brown 11 January 1783, St Augustine, PRO 30/55/6757, online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/kcarrng/kcrngmem1.htm accessed 9/11/2008. 
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26. Loyal 
American 
Regiment
25
 
New York 
City  
 Spring 
1777 
1783  
 
Beverly Robinson 
27. Loyal New 
Englanders 26 
Newport 
Rhode Island  
April 
1777 
1781 George Wightman 
28. Jessup‘s Loyal 
Rangers 27 
Quebec 1781 1781 Edward Jessup 
29. Maryland 
Loyalists 28 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
August 
1777 
1783 James Chalmers 
30. Newfoundland  
Loyalists 29 
St Johns 
Newfoundland 
Septemb
er 1780 
1782 Robert Pringle 
31. North Carolina 
Highlanders 30* 
Charlestown 
South 
Carolina. 
July 
1780 
1781 Allan Stewart 
32. Pennsylvania 
Loyalists 31 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania  
October 
1777 
1783 William Allen 
33. Philadelphia 
Light 
Dragoons 32 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania  
Decemb
er 1777 
1778 Jacob James 
34. Roman 
Catholic 
Volunteers 33 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania  
October 
1777 
1778 Alfred Clifton 
                                                 
25 W.O. Raymond, Loyalists in Arms p.202 
26 Recruiting Notice, Newport Gazette 1 April 1777 online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/loyneng/lnercrt2.htm    accessed 9/11/2008. 
27 See Collection relating to Jessop‘s Loyal Rangers WO 28/4 PRO. 
28 Lt. Gen. William Howe to James Chalmers 14 October 1777, Philadelphia,   Reel 4, A1, No. 23, Military Affairs 1777-1875. 
ff.971, online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/mdloy/mdllet2.htm accessed 9/11/2008; Paul Smith Loyalists and 
Redcoats, p.49 
29 Warrant for raising a regiment, Gov. Richard Edwards to Lt. Col. Robert Pringle 14 September 1780, St Johns,  CO 194/35 
ff69-70 PRO, online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/nfregt/nfrwarrant.htm accessed 12/11/2008. 
30 This unit, consisted of two companies, very little information is available on them other than that were commanded by Capt. 
Allan Stewart, formerly of the 71st Regiment see Nan Cole and Todd Braistead, Introduction to North Carolina Loyalist Units 
online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/ncindcoy/ncintro.htm accessed 12/11/2008; David K. Wilson, The 
Southern Strategy, Britain’s Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia 1775-1780, (Charlestown, SC,  2005) p. 124. 
31 Warrant for raising a Corps of Loyalists, Gen. William Howe to William Allen (n.d.) Philadelphia, PRO 30/55/827, PRO 
online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/paloyal/palform.htm accessed 12/11/2008;  Paul Smith, Loyalists and 
Redcoats, p.49. 
32 This unit later became part of the British Legion, see Chapter 4; Gen. William Howe to Jacob James, (n.d.) Philadelphia, PRO 
30/55/827 online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/philld/pldform.htm accessed 12/11/2008; this unit later 
became part of the British Legion, see Chapter 5. 
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35. Royal North 
Carolina 
Regiment 34 
Savannah, 
Georgia  
Februar
y 1779 
1783 John Hamilton 
36. South Carolina 
Light 
Dragoons 35* 
South 
Carolina  
January/
Februar
y 1781 
1781 Edward Fenwick 
37. South Carolina 
Royalists
36
 
New York, 
Charleston 
Decemb
er 1779 
1783 Alexander Innes 
38. Volunteers of 
Ireland 37 
New York 
City  
May 
1778 
1783 Lord Rawdon 
Source: Compiled from  Paul H. Smith, American Loyalists Notes on their Numerical Strength, pp. 
259-277; Philip Katcher, Encyclopaedia of British, and Provincial and  German Army Units, 1775-
1783 (Harrisburg, PA, 1973) ; List of Loyalist Armed Units online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rlist/rlist.htm, ,accessed 8/11/08/ , see notes . 
                                                                                                                                            
33 This unit was merged with the Volunteers of Ireland in 1778; Robert McKenzie to Alfred Clifton, 14 October 1778, 
Germantown, PRO 30/55/698, PRO, online at http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/rcvol/rcvlet1.htm accessed 
12/11/2008. 
34 David K. Wilson, The Southern Strategy, Britain’s Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia 1775-1780, (Columbia, SC,  
2005) pp. 90, 186. 
35 These were two troops of cavalry commanded by Capt. Edward Fenwick, who according to Lambert was a Patriot spy,  see 
Robert Stansbury Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution, (Columbia, SC) 1987, p. 217. 
36 Colonel Alexander Innes‘ regiment formed with Southern refugees New York in anticipation of the Southern campaign  and 
augmented in South Carolina in the spring of 1780, see State of the South Carolina Loyalists commanded by Col. A. Innes, 24 
April 1780 Clinton Papers Vol. 94 f43 Clements Library online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/scroyal/scrstate.htm accessed 10/12/2008. 
37 Lord Rawdon‘s regiment, alongside the Queens Rangers and the British Legion the most renowned Provincial regiments of 
the war, see chapter 2; Recruiting Notice in the Royal Gazette, 9 May 1778, online at 
http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/voi/voircrt.htm  accessed 11/11/2008; Oliver Snoddy, The Volunteers of Ireland, 
in Irish Sword Vol. 7 1965 pp 147-159, pp.147-148. 
 viii 
 
 
Appendix 3 
Instructions for Queens Rangers Database 
The Database compiled from the Muster Rolls of the Queens Rangers is contained on 
a DVD supplied with this thesis. 
Contents 
MS Access Database: Go to forms and then switchboard. The forms there contain a 
complete record of every soldier that served in the Queens Rangers. 
The Queens Rangers 
MS Excel Files: 
 Analysis of the Queens Rangers Part 1 
Analysis of the Queens Rangers Part 2. 
 ix 
 
Appendix 4 
Company Commanders of the Queens Rangers 1776-1777 
 
Company 
Commanders 
Rogers‘ 
Command 
August 1776-
March 1777 
Company Commanders 
March 1777 (French‘s 
Reorganization).
1
 
Company Commanders 
August to November 
1777.
2
 
Robert Rogers Arthur French James Kerr 
Isaac Gerow John MacKay John MacKay 
John Eagles Francis Stephenson John McGill 
Ephraim 
Sandford 
Robert Muirdern John Murray 
Robert 
McGinnock 
John Saunders John Saunders 
John Griffiths James Buchanan  John McGill 
John Brandon James Dunlop James Dunlop 
Peter Fairchild, Robert McCrea Robert McCrea 
Richard 
Armstrong 
Richard Armstrong Richard Armstrong 
Job Williams Job Williams Job Williams/Francis 
Stephenson 
  John Smythe 
                                                 
1Queen‘s Rangers, New Appointments March 1777 PRO: TS 11/221. 
2 Muster Rolls from 22 August 1777 to 24 November 1777, C Series Vol. 1861, National Archives of Canada. 
 x 
Source: List of Officers of the Queen‘s Rangers under the Command of Lt. Col. Robert Rogers, n.d. 
[early 1777?] ;  Queen‘s Rangers, New Appointments March 1777, both TS 11/221 PRO.
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Appendix 5 
 
British Legion Minutes of Muster 1780-1782. 
 
British Legion Companies 1780-1782: NCOs‘ and Privates.1 
Company 
Name 
Arm Date Sgts Cpls Drum 
/Trum 
Pvts Cavalry 
Privates 
per 
Muster 
Infantry 
Privates 
per 
Muster 
Recruits 
Total 
per 
muster 
Total 
Per 
muster 
Captain 
Hovendon 
C 25 
October 
1780 
3 3 2 55     
Captain 
James 
C 25 
October 
1780 
3 3 2 51     
Captain 
Sandford 
C 25 
October 
1780 
3 2 2 45     
Captain 
Ogilvy 
C 25 
October 
1780 
3 3 2 56     
Captain 
Vernon 
C 25 
October 
1780 
4 2 2 54     
Captain 
Stewart 
I 25 
October 
1780 
3 3 2 55     
Captain 
Rousselet 
I 25 
October 
1780 
3 3 2 59     
Captain 
Miller 
I 25 
October 
1780 
3 3 2 45     
Captain 
McDonald 
I 25 
October 
1780 
3 3 0 32     
Total Per 
Muster 
 25 
October 
1780 
28 25 16 450 261 191 81 519 
Captain 
Hovenden 
C 25 
December 
1780 
3 3 2 54     
                                                 
1 This table is compiled from a combination of minutes of Muster 1780-82 included in the Muster rolls and the rolls themselves.  
There are no minutes of muster for the period 1778-1779. The minutes of muster were forms submitted by the adjutant after 
musters giving a short summary of the muster rolls. There are no minutes of muster for the Infantry companies after August 1781 
so the rolls themselves have been used. Muster Rolls of the British Legion C series Vols. 1883-1885; Murtie June Clark, 
Loyalists in the Southern Campaign , Vol. 2 (Ontario 1985). Pp 246-251. 
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Captain 
James 
C 25 
December 
1780 
3 3 2 48     
Captain 
Sandford 
C 25 
December 
1780 
3 3 1 45     
Captain 
Ogilvy 
C 25 
December 
1780 
3 3 2 48     
Captain 
Gildart 
C 25 
December 
1780 
3 4 2 26     
Captain 
Vernon 
C 25 
December 
1780 
3 2 1 52     
Captain 
Stewart 
I 25 
December 
1780 
2 1 2 42     
Captain 
Rousselet 
I 25 
December 
1780 
1 2 2 36     
Captain 
Miller 
I 25 
December 
1780 
3 3 0 45     
Captain 
McDonald 
I 25 
December 
1780 
2 3 0 31     
Total For 
Muster 
 25 
December 
1780 
26 27 14 427 273 154 18 494 
Captain 
Hovenden 
C 24 
February 
1781 
3 1 2 43     
Captain 
James 
C 24 
February 
1781 
3 2 2 40     
Captain 
Sandford 
C 24 
February 
1781 
1 3 0 31     
Captain 
Ogilvy 
C 24 
February 
1781 
3 2 2 38     
Captain 
Gildart 
C 24 
February 
1781 
3 4 2 26     
Captain 
Vernon 
C 24 
February 
1781 
3 2 1 40     
Captain I 24 0 0 2 24     
 xiii 
Stewart February 
1781 
Captain 
Rousselet 
I 24 
February 
1781 
1 1 1 12     
Captain 
Miller 
I 24 
February 
1781 
4 1 0 23     
Captain 
McDonald 
I 24 
February 
1781 
2 3 0 19     
Total for 
Muster 
 24 
February 
1781 
23 19 12 296 218 78 1 350 
Captain 
Hovenden 
C 25 April 
1781 
3 2 2 39     
Captain 
James 
C 25 April 
1781 
3 2 2 36     
Captain 
Sandford 
C 25 April 
1781 
2 1 0 32     
Captain 
Ogilvy 
C 25 April 
1781 
3 2 2 37     
Captain 
Gildart 
C 25 April 
1781 
3 4 2 26     
Captain 
Vernon 
C 25 April 
1781 
3 2 0 39     
Captain 
Stewart 
I 25 April 
1781 
0 0 2 24     
Captain 
Rousselet 
I 25 April 
1781 
1 1 1 12     
Captain 
Miller 
I 25 April 
1781 
4 1 0 23     
Captain 
McDonald 
I 25 April 
1781 
2 1 0 19     
Total for 
Muster 
 25 April 
1781 
24 16 11 287 209 78 3 337 
Captain 
Hovenden 
C 24 
August 
1781 
3 3 2 37     
Captain 
James 
C 24 
August 
1781 
2 2 2 39     
Captain 
Sandford 
C 24 
August 
1781 
2 1 0 32     
Captain 
Ogilvy 
C 24 
August 
1781 
3 2 2 43     
Captain C 24 3 4 2 25     
 xiv 
Gildart August 
1781 
Captain 
Vernon 
C 24 
August 
1781 
3 2 0 26     
Captain 
Stewart 
I 24 
August 
1781 
0 0 2 24     
Captain 
Rousselet 
I 24 
August 
1781 
1 1 1 8     
Captain 
Miller 
I 24 
August 
1781 
4 1 0 22     
Captain 
McDonald 
I 24 
August 
1781 
2 1 0 17     
Total for 
Muster 
 24 
August 
1781 
23 17 11 273 202 71 6 324 
Captain 
Hovenden 
C 23 
February 
1782 
2 1 2 31     
Captain 
James 
C 23 
February 
1782 
0 0 2 22     
Captain 
Sandford 
C 23 
February 
1782 
1 3 0 20     
Captain 
Ogilvy 
C 23 
February 
1782 
0 1 0 24     
Captain 
Gildart 
C 23 
February 
1782 
2 2 0 20     
Captain 
Vernon 
C 23 
February 
1782 
2 0 0 29     
Captain 
Edwards 
I 23 
February 
1782 
1 1 1 38     
Captain 
McDonald 
I 23 
February 
1782 
        
Total for 
Muster 
 23 
February 
1782 
8 8 5 184 146 38 7 205 
Captain 
Hovenden 
C 24 April 
1782 
2 0 2 24     
 xv 
Captain 
James 
C 24 April 
1782 
1 0 1 14     
Captain 
Sandford 
C 24 April 
1782 
0 3 0 17     
Captain 
Ogilvy 
C 24 April 
1782 
1 1 0 13     
Captain 
Gildart 
C 24 April 
1782 
2 3 0 18     
Captain 
Vernon 
C 24 April 
1782 
2 1 0 26     
Captain 
Edwards 
I 24 April 
1782 
1 1 1 36     
Total for 
Muster 
 24 April 
1782 
9 9 4 148 112 36 1 170 
Totals 
1780-
1782 
  141 121 73 2067 1421 646 116 2399 
Source: Muster Rolls of the British Legion C series Vols. 1883-1885 Micro film Reel 4321; Murtie 
June Clark, Loyalists in the Southern Campaign, Vol. 2 (Ontario 1985) pp, 246-251
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Appendix 6: 
Butler‘s Rangers Officers. 
 
Table 1: Officers Serving in Butler‘s Rangers in 1781 with date of current 
Commission 
Name Rank Date of 
Commission 
(current ranks) 
Totals by Rank 
John Butler Lt. Col. February 14 1780 1 
Walter Butler Capt. December 20 1777  
William Caldwell
1
 Capt. December 24 1777  
John McDonnell
2
 Capt. August 1 1778  
Peter Hare Capt. February 8 1779  
George Dame Capt. November 11 1779  
Andrew Thompson Capt. December 25 1779  
Bernard Frey Capt. October 2 1780  
John McKinnon Capt. January 1 1781  
Captains   8 
Andrew Bradt 1st Lt. August 1 1778  
Benjamin Pawling
3
 1st Lt. October  25 1778  
John Ferris 1st Lt. February 8 1779  
                                                 
1 William Caldwell, 1750-1822, an Irishman who arrived in America in 1773. Caldwell would lead a detachment of Butler‘s 
Rangers on the Western Frontier in 1782 and notably won the Battle of Blue Licks, one of the last battles of the War, see DCB at 
http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=2783 accessed 12/8/2008. 
2 John McDonnell of Aberchalder, 1758-1809, a Highland Scot who arrived in the Mohawk Valley in 1773 and served in the 
Royal Highland Emigrants before transferring to Butler‘s Rangers in 1778, see. DCB http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-
e.php?&id_nbr=2517&&PHPSESSID=6h3878q57cr7vbg05lrg9lgue3 accessed 12/8/2008. 
3 DCB http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-
e.php?&id_nbr=2600&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=6h3878q57cr7vbg05lrg9lgue3 accessed 12/9/2009. 
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Jacob Ball 1st Lt. August 4 1779  
John Hare 1st Lt. December 25 1779  
George Harkiman 1st Lt. December 26 1779  
Peter Ball 1st Lt. August 15 1780  
1
st
 Lt.s   7 
Joseph Ferris 2
nd
 Lt. February 8 1779  
Alex. McDonald 2
nd
 Lt. December 25 1779  
Donald McDonald 2
nd
 Lt. December 25 1779  
Andrew Wempe 2
nd
 Lt. June 24 1780  
Ralph Clinche
4
 2
nd
 Lt. June 25 1780  
Richard Hanson 2
nd
 Lt. June 26 1780  
Fred. Dockstedter 2
nd
 Lt. February 19 1781  
David Brass 2
nd
 Lt. February 20 1780  
2
nd
 Lt.s   8 
William Smith Adj. 18 March 1781  
Jesse Pawling
5
 Qtr. Mstr. 25 December 1779  
Robert Guthrie Surgeon 24 July 1779  
Staff   3 
Total Officers   29 
Source: Dates of Officers Commissions in the Corps of Rangers under the Command 
of Lt. Col. Butler, (n.d., 1781) WO 28/4/f.15. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 DCB http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-
e.php?&id_nbr=2808&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=6h3878q57cr7vbg05lrg9lgue3 accessed 12/9/2009. 
5 DCB http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-
e.php?&id_nbr=2600&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=6h3878q57cr7vbg05lrg9lgue3 accessed 12/9/2009. 
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Table 2: Officers not included in Table 1 and Promotions 
Name Rank Date of 
commission
6
 
Totals by Rank 
    
William Potts Major 14 February 1782
7
 1 
James Campbell Capt.   
Lewis Geneway Capt. 21 September 1781  
Benjamin Pawling
8
 Capt. Lt 25 October 1778  
Andrew Bradt
9
 Capt.   
- Wilson
10
 Capt.   
Capt.   4 
Capt. combined 
with table 1. 
  12 
John Bradt Lt   
Andrew Butler Lt   
Thomas Butler Lt   
Caleb Reynolds Lt   
James Secord Lt   
Solomon Secord Lt   
John Turney Lt   
Laurence Van Aller Lt   
John Young Lt   
Lt   9 
Lt combined with 
table 1 
  16 
Charles Tonnacour 2
nd
 Lt 19 October 1781  
Samuel Tuffie 2
nd
 Lt 28 July 1782  
David Sutherland 2
nd
 Lt 25 August 1783  
Chichester 
McDonell 
2
nd
 Lt 19 October 1781  
Baron De 
Shaffalesky 
2
nd
 Lt 27 July 1782  
Philip Luke 2
nd
 Lt 28 July 1782 6 
2
nd
 Lt    
2
nd
 Lt combined 
with table 1 
  14 
Samuel Coffe Ensign  1 
Total    21 
Total with Table 1   49 
Source: Cruikshank, The Story of Butler’s Rangers, pp217-223; Smy, An Annotated Nominal Roll of 
Butler’s Rangers, pp.33-207; Online list at the Butler‘s Rangers website 
http://www.iaw.on.ca/~awoolley/brang/broffr.html accessed 20/8/2008.
                                                 
6 If date is not shown then none is known. 
7 Potts was seconded from the British army to replace Walter Butler. 
8 Pawling is in the first table but is shown as a Captain Lieutenant in a later list. 
9 Promoted 
10 Cruikshank states he was killed at Orsica Field Cruikshank, The Story of Butler‘s Rangers, p. 123. 
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Appendix 7: 
Minutes of Muster for the Cavalry of the British Legion 25 August 1781- 23 February 
1782. 
 
Source: C Series Muster Rolls, Vol. 1882, f.31. Reel 4221, Library and Archives Canada. 
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Appendix 8 
Expenditure for Northern Command showing total expenditure on Butler‘s Rangers 
1778-1784.  
 
Source: Source: Amounts of Warrants Granted by His Excellency General Haldimand for the 
Extraordinary Services of the Army in Canada from July 1778 to November 1784 Add Mss 25754 f. 
210,  M. F. Reel 40 Library and Archives Canada.  
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Appendix 9: 
Subsistence Wanting for Butler‘s Rangers 25 October 1778 -24 May 1779 
 
Source: WO 28/4 f.7 PRO. 
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Appendix 10:Muster Roll of Captain John MacKay‘s Company of the Queens 
Rangers, 24 October 1778 to 23 February 1779. 
 
Source: C Series Muster Rolls, Vol 1862, f.5. Reel 4217 Library and Archives of Canada. 
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Appendix 11: 
Newspaper Report of Queens Rangers at Brandywine Creek, 11 September 1777. 
 
Source: The Pennsylvania Ledger 3 December 1777, from America‘s Historical Newspapers at 
http://www.newsbank.com/readex/?content=96 accessed 6/6/2008. 
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Appendix 12: Newspaper Report of British Legion‘s Victory at Waxhaws 29 May 
780.  
 
 xxv 
 
 
Source: Massachusetts Spy 7 June 1780, from America‘s Historical Newspapers at 
http://www.newsbank.com/readex/?content=96 accessed 6/6/2008. 
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Appendix 13: Notice of the several Loyalist Regiments Embarkation to Nova Scotia 17 
August 1783. 
 
 xxvii 
Source: The Freeman‘s Journal 10 September 1783 from America‘s Historical 
Newspapers at http://www.newsbank.com/readex/?content=96 accessed 6/6/2008. 
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